T.C. Summary Opinion 2004-7
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JOHN R. AND EDITH M. GARBINI, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 3593-00S. Filed January 23, 2004.
James G. Sanford, for petitioners.
Paul K. Voelker, for respondent.
PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to
the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at the time the petition was filed. Unless otherwise
indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. The decision to be
entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
should not be cited as authority.
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Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners’ Federal
income taxes and accuracy-related penalties in the following
amounts:
Year Deficiency Sec. 6662(a)
1996 $39,965 $7,993.00
1997 36,817 7,363.40
After concessions by respondent of the medical expense
issues, this Court must decide: (1) Whether petitioners were not
engaged in an activity for profit under section 183, (2) whether
petitioners were entitled to claimed Schedule F, Profit or Loss
From Farming, deductions for the taxable years in issue, and (3)
whether petitioners were liable for accuracy-related penalties
under section 6662(a) for the taxable years in issue.
Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated and are
so found. Petitioners’ residence was in Myrtle Creek, Oregon, at
the time they filed their petition.
Petitioners timely filed Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income
Tax Return, for 1996 and 1997. On the Forms 1040 for both years,
petitioner John R. Garbini (petitioner) listed his occupation as
rancher. Petitioner Edith M. Garbini’s occupation was listed as
housewife. Both petitioners were senior citizens during the
taxable years in issue. For each taxable year in issue,
petitioners attached to their Form 1040, Schedule F, Profit or
Loss From Farming. On Schedule F for 1996, petitioners reported
no gross income and deducted expenses in the amount of $127,341,
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for a net loss of $127,341. On Schedule F for 1997, petitioners
reported no gross income and deducted expenses in the amount of
$124,584, for a net loss of $124,584. Respondent disallowed
petitioners’ 1996 and 1997 Schedule F loss deductions in full
because petitioners did not substantiate their deductions and
because petitioners were not engaged in an activity for profit.
Due to the fact that petitioners did not substantiate their
deductions, section 7491(a) is not applicable. Therefore,
petitioners have the burden of proof with respect to these
determinations. Rule 142(a).
We first address whether petitioners were not engaged in an
activity for profit. Section 183(a) disallows deductions
attributable to an activity not engaged in for profit, except as
provided under section 183(b). For an activity not engaged in
for profit, section 183(b)(1) allows deductions that would be
allowable without regard to whether or not an activity is engaged
in for profit. Section 183(b)(2) allows deductions that would be
allowable if the activity were engaged in for profit, but only to
the extent that gross income attributable to the activity exceeds
the deductions allowable under section 183(b)(1). Section 183(c)
defines an “activity not engaged in for profit” as “any activity
other than one with respect to which deductions are allowable for
the taxable year under section 162 or under paragraph (1) or (2)
of section 212.”
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The standard for determining whether an expense is
deductible under section 162 or 212, and not subject to the
limitations of section 183, requires a taxpayer to demonstrate
that the activity was carried on with the actual and honest
objective of making a profit. Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
642, 645 (1982), affd. without opinion 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir.
1983); sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Although a reasonable
expectation of profit is not required, the facts and
circumstances must indicate that the taxpayer entered into the
activity, or continued the activity, with the actual and honest
objective of making a profit. Dreicer v. Commissioner, supra at
645. The taxpayer’s objective to make a profit must be analyzed
by looking at all the surrounding facts. Id. These facts are
given greater weight than the taxpayer’s mere statement of
intent. Id.
The regulations under section 183 provide a nonexclusive
list of relevant factors that should be considered in determining
whether the taxpayer has the requisite profit objective. Sec.
1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs. The factors are: (1) The manner in
which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of
the taxpayer; (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in
carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that the assets
used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the success of
the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar
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activities; (6) the taxpayer’s history of income or losses with
respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if
any, which are earned; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer;
and (9) any elements indicating personal pleasure or recreation.
Id. These factors are not applicable or appropriate in every
case. Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360, 371 (1986). The
facts and circumstances of the case in issue remain the primary
test. Id.
In determining whether petitioners were engaged in an
activity with the requisite profit objective, all the facts and
circumstances of their situation must be taken into account.
Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411, 426 (1979), affd. without
published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981). No single factor
is controlling, nor is the existence of a majority of factors
favoring or disfavoring a profit objective necessarily
controlling. Hendricks v. Commissioner, 32 F.3d 94, 98 (4th Cir.
1994), affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-396; sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax
Regs.
In 1984, petitioners purchased 666 acres of land (the ranch)
in Myrtle Creek, Oregon. Except for two log cabins, the ranch
was unimproved, and contained trees, pasture land, and three
ponds. Since about 1986, petitioners have cleared areas and
planted more trees, had cattle graze the pasture land, and built
roads, ponds, and barns. Petitioners’ residence was built in
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about 1985. Petitioners moved into the house in approximately
1987, and have resided there through the time of trial. In 1986,
petitioners sold a mobile home park for $7 million.
In applying the factors to determine profit objective, we
first consider the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the
activity. “The fact that the taxpayer carries on the activity in
a businesslike manner and maintains complete and accurate books
and records may indicate that the activity is engaged in for
profit.” Sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners did
not maintain books and records. Rather, petitioner made a
monthly list of expense categories and, based on his canceled
checks, recorded the amounts expended for each category. At
trial, petitioner submitted various invoices, canceled checks,
and the monthly lists for the taxable years in issue. Petitioner
did not have a business plan to make money from the ranch.
Petitioner did not keep the type of records which could be used
to increase the profitability of a business. Petitioner never
prepared budgets or market projections which would outline
strategies for ensuring a profitable business venture and making
informed business decisions on a periodic basis. Such lack of
information upon which to make educated business decisions tends
to belie a taxpayer’s contentions that an activity was pursued
with the primary objective of making a profit. Dodge v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-89, affd. without published opinion
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188 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1999).
“A change of operating methods, adoption of new techniques
or abandonment of unprofitable methods in a manner consistent
with an intent to improve profitability may also indicate a
profit motive.” Sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner
contends that he has made efforts to reduce expenses in order to
operate the ranch in a profitable manner. Nothing in the record
indicates what efforts to reduce expenses, if any, were made
during the taxable years in issue. Petitioner never ascertained
how or when he would make a profit or how he could change his
operating methods to improve his profitability. Although
petitioners owned cattle during the years in issue, there were no
sales of cattle during those years. Nor was there any evidence
of an effort to raise cattle for profit on their ranch.
We next consider the expertise of the taxpayer. Since
purchasing the ranch, petitioner has learned about the types of
trees that should be planted in specific areas on the ranch.
Petitioner also claimed that in 1986 he began studying,
researching, and compiling data on the marketing and sale of
verified emission reduction offsets (carbon credits) to polluting
entities, and that he has consulted about that subject with the
Oregon Department of Forestry and a chemistry/biology professor
who holds a Ph.D. Yet, during the years in issue petitioner did
not put any acquired knowledge to use in an endeavor to make a
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profit.
We next consider the time and effort expended by the
taxpayer in carrying on the activity. Petitioner worked on the
ranch almost everyday and employed one full-time ranch hand
during the taxable years in issue. The ranch hand performed
general maintenance of the property and barns. Petitioner
occasionally hired outside temporary labor.
We next consider the taxpayer’s expectation that the assets
used in the activity may appreciate in value. Petitioner
contends that he has enhanced and created value in the trees and
the carbon credits related to the trees. Petitioner paid
$566,000 for the ranch in its undeveloped condition. With the
improvements made by petitioner and the value of the timber and
carbon credits, petitioner estimates that the value of the trees
alone is $2.5 million and that the ranch is worth $15 million.
Petitioner did not provide any basis for such estimates.
Petitioner stated that since 1984, with the exception of 1994 and
1995, he has planted 3,000 to 5,000 trees per year. Petitioner
further stated that these trees are not considered suitable for
harvesting until 7 years after planting. We note that no trees
were harvested during the taxable years in issue. Petitioner
contends that the growing trees have value and profit potential
in the form of cut timber and carbon credits. Again, petitioner
never sold any carbon credits during these 2 taxable years.
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We next consider the success of the taxpayer in carrying on
other similar or dissimilar activities. Prior to purchasing the
ranch, petitioner said he purchased undeveloped land in San Jose,
California, and developed “the first luxury mobile home park for
senior citizens in the state”. Petitioners owned and operated
the mobile home park for approximately 20 years. Petitioner
stated that petitioners worked 7 days per week and employed one
groundsman. Petitioner further stated that the mobile home park
operated profitably after the first 10 years and that 10 years
thereafter, petitioners sold the mobile home park for $7 million.
The taxpayer’s history of income or losses with respect to
the activity is another factor. At trial, petitioner did not
provide a history of income or losses for his ranch. During the
taxable years in issue, losses exceeded $250,000, an average of
$125,000 for each year. Although petitioner claimed that the
losses since 1997 have lessened, petitioner admitted that the
losses for the years before those in issue would have been
roughly the same as the taxable years in issue. Over this
approximate time frame of 12 years, petitioner incurred losses of
$1,500,000.
The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned
is another factor. No profits were earned with respect to the
ranch during the years in issue.
We next consider the financial status of the taxpayer.
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During the taxable years in issue, neither petitioner nor his
wife earned income from wages. For taxable year 1996,
petitioners reported taxable interest in the amount of $139,778,
dividend income in the amount of $1,832, capital gains in the
amount of $55,488, and taxable Social Security benefits in the
amount of $10,076. For taxable year 1997, petitioners reported
taxable interest in the amount of $93,360, dividend income in the
amount of $865, taxable refunds, credits, or offsets in the
amount of $645, capital gains in the amount of $88,813, rental
real estate income in the amount of $6,251, and taxable Social
Security benefits in the amount of $10,365. For both taxable
years, almost all the taxable interest income and capital gains
income were derived from interest and installment payments of
principal made by the buyers of petitioners’ mobile home park.
As a result of their other income, petitioners realized
substantial tax benefits from the approximate $125,000 loss
deduction for each taxable year in issue.
Finally, in determining profit objective, we consider
whether there are elements of personal pleasure or recreation.
Petitioners owned horses during the taxable years in issue, but
petitioner stated that neither of them rode the horses for
pleasure. Petitioners probably had personal pleasure from
residing on a large ranch.
Although petitioners had the money to purchase the ranch and
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operate it, they never had a business plan or took steps to
operate the ranch to make a profit. Taking the record as a
whole, we find that the facts and circumstances indicate that
petitioners did not possess the actual and honest objective of
making a profit from their ranch. Therefore, we find that
petitioners were not engaged in an activity for profit. Sec.
183(a).
Pursuant to section 183(b)(2), deductions are allowed for an
activity not engaged in for profit, but only to the extent that
gross income exceeds the deductions allowable under section
183(b)(1) without regard to whether or not the activity is
engaged in for profit. Petitioners did not prove that they had
any such expenses. Because petitioners had no gross income for
the taxable years in issue, none of their claimed expenses are
deductible. Therefore, we sustain respondent’s determinations.
As to the accuracy-related penalties imposed for the taxable
years in issue, respondent has satisfied his burden of production
under section 7491(c). Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438,
446-447 (2001). Section 6662(a) imposes a 20 percent penalty on
the portion of any underpayment of tax attributable to negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations. Sec. 6662(b)(1).
Negligence is any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply
with the provisions of the internal revenue laws and includes any
failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to
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substantiate items properly. Sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs. Moreover, negligence is the failure to exercise
due care or failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person
would do under the circumstances. Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.
934, 947 (1985). Disregard includes any careless, reckless, or
intentional disregard of rules or regulations. Sec. 6662(c);
sec. 1.6662-3(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. No penalty will be imposed
with respect to any portion of any underpayment if it is shown
that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the
taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such portion. Sec.
6664(c).
Under the facts of this case, section 6664(c) is not
applicable. Petitioner’s recordkeeping practice of creating
monthly lists from canceled checks simply is inadequate. Such
actions are not those of a prudent and reasonable person in
business. On this record, we conclude that petitioners were
negligent and are liable for the accuracy-related penalties under
section 6662 as determined by respondent for the taxable years in
issue. We need not address other grounds for respondent’s
determinations as to section 6662.
Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
Division.
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.