T.C. Memo. 2004-35
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
VERNA DOYEL, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 9138-02. Filed February 10, 2004.
Terri A. Merriam, Wendy S. Pearson, and Jennifer A. Gellner,
for petitioner.
Margaret A. Martin, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
VASQUEZ, Judge: Respondent determined that petitioner did
not qualify for relief from joint and several liability pursuant
to section 6015(b), (c), or (f).1 The issue for decision is
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax
(continued...)
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whether petitioner is entitled to relief from joint and several
liability pursuant to section 6015(b) or (f) for 1982, 1983,
1984, 1985, and 1986.2
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The first stipulation of facts, second stipulation of facts,
third stipulation of facts, and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. At the time she filed the
petition, petitioner resided in Buchanan, Michigan.
Petitioner
Petitioner is a high school graduate and a mother of four.
After high school, she worked full time doing “office work”.
Around 1960, petitioner married her first husband. She
worked full time during this marriage.
Petitioner’s marriage to her first husband lasted 7 years.
After their divorce, petitioner worked in order to support her
children.
1
(...continued)
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2
In her petition, petitioner sought relief pursuant to
sec. 6015(b) and (f). Accordingly, sec. 6015(c) is not in issue.
On brief, petitioner argues that she is entitled to sec.
6015 relief for 1981. In her petition, petitioner did not raise
her 1981 tax year; in her request for sec. 6015 relief,
petitioner did not raise her 1981 tax year; and, in the notice of
determination, respondent did not make a determination regarding
petitioner’s 1981 tax year. Accordingly, petitioner’s 1981 tax
year is not before the Court.
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Petitioner and Her Second Husband Christopher
Petitioner met Christopher Doyel (Christopher) in 1971 and
married him in 1973. As of the date of trial, petitioner and
Christopher were married and living together.3
After she married Christopher, petitioner sold Avon
products, Tupperware, and liquid embroidery; she also babysat.
Petitioner’s Relationship With Christopher
Christopher never misled petitioner regarding their finances
or “anything else”. Christopher never hid any information from
petitioner. Anything petitioner wanted to see or know, including
anything about their finances, he shared with her. Petitioner
was welcome to read all financial materials, and other mail, he
received.
Christopher never abused petitioner. He never threatened
petitioner or forced her to sign anything against her will.
Each December or early January, Christopher drafted a budget
for the household bills. After finishing his draft, Christopher
discussed the proposed budget with petitioner to make sure there
was enough money for projected expenses. If the budget did not
balance, petitioner and Christopher decided what expenses to
eliminate so they achieved a balanced budget.
3
Since October 2002, Christopher has been working in
Charlotte, North Carolina.
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Investments
Christopher researched the investments petitioner and
Christopher made. Christopher then talked with petitioner about
what he learned, and petitioner and Christopher reached an
agreement on whether or not to invest in that particular
investment. Petitioner and Christopher had an agreement to reach
a consensus about investment decisions. Neither did anything
without talking it over with the other.
Hoyt Partnerships
Walter J. Hoyt III and some members of his family were in
the business of creating tax shelter limited partnerships for
their cattle breeding operations (Hoyt partnerships or Hoyt
investments). As part of their services, the Hoyt organization
also prepared the investor’s tax returns. For a description of
the Hoyt organization and its operation, see Bales v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-568; see also River City Ranches #1
Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-150; Mekulsia v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-138; River City Ranches #4, J.V. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-209, affd. 23 Fed. Appx. 744 (9th
Cir. 2001).
Investment in SGE 1984-2
Christopher first heard about the Hoyt partnerships in 1983
from a coworker. In 1984, Christopher and petitioner’s
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financial situation changed, and Christopher thought of the Hoyt
investment.
Christopher received promotional materials from the Hoyt
organization about the Hoyt partnerships. He read these
materials, often several times, and kept them in his files. One
of the promotional materials included the following language
under the heading Specific Risks Involved: “A change in the tax
law or an audit and disallowance by the I [illegible] could take
away all or part of the tax benefits, plus the possi [illegible]
of having to pay back the tax savings, with penalties and in
[illegible]”. It further stated:
Even though the term “head torn off” is crude, it is a
concept that is very applicable to the comparison of a
disallowance of a tax deduction by the Internal Revenue
Service, the prospect of having to pay the taxes back
when you have put the tax money into a tax shelter, and
its [sic] gone.
The brochure went on to state that there was no assurance that
things would be “O.K.” In discussing the preparation of investor
tax returns, the promotional materials warned “there is a risk”
and stated that after many years of experience with tax shelters
the Hoyt partnerships have learned how “to deal with I.R.S.
audits of the Partnership returns and the Partners personal
returns, (being ‘attacked’ by the I.R.S.)”.
The promotional materials also advised prospective investors
to “seek independent advice and counsel concerning this
investment.”
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The promotional materials further stated: “If a Partner
needs more or less Partnership loss any year, it is arranged
quickly within the office without the Partner having to pay a
higher fee while an outside preparer spends more time to make the
arrangements.”
The promotional materials clearly contemplated the tax
shelter being audited by respondent--stating at one point: “we
know we will be subject to constant audits by the I.R.S.”
After Christopher reviewed the promotional materials,
Christopher and petitioner talked about the Hoyt investment.
Petitioner did not fully understand how the Hoyt partnerships
worked because she did not carefully read the promotional
materials. Christopher, however, was always willing to discuss
the Hoyt investment with petitioner, and petitioner knew that
there were risks associated with the Hoyt investment.
In 1984, petitioner and Christopher invested in Shorthorn
Genetic Engineering 1984-2 (SGE 1984-2), a Hoyt partnership.
Christopher signed the subscription agreements when they first
invested in the Hoyt partnership. Under the heading of
ownership, the line next to joint tenants with the right of
survivorship was checked.
In 1992, petitioner also signed subscription agreements
affirming and accepting the agreements Christopher had signed
earlier. Included with the subscription agreements were powers
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of attorney, partnership agreements, and a debt assumption
agreement.
Petitioner was not forced by Christopher to invest in the
Hoyt partnerships. Petitioner agreed to participate in the Hoyt
investments upon Christopher’s encouragement.
After becoming investors in a Hoyt partnership, petitioner
and Christopher attended several meetings with other Hoyt
partners. Petitioner made calls to the Hoyt organization.
In 1984, petitioner and Christopher paid no “cash” to SGE
1984-2. In 1985, petitioner and Christopher paid $19,999 in
“cash” to SGE 1984-2. By 1986, petitioner and Christopher had
paid at least $29,298 in “cash” to SGE 1984-2.
From 1985 through 1996, numerous checks, drawn on petitioner
and her husband’s joint checking account, were made payable to a
Hoyt partnership. These checks totaled almost $25,000.
Additional checks, totaling over $14,000, made payable to a Hoyt
partnership, were drawn on an account owned by Christopher and
the Verna Irene Doyel Trust.
Tax Returns
Petitioner and Christopher filed joint Federal income tax
returns for 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. Petitioner signed
each of these returns.
On their joint income tax return for 1982, petitioner and
Christopher reported $40,609.38 in wages. Attached to this
return was a Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, for Christopher
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from Florida Power Corp. reporting $38,889.90 in wages. In
arriving at total income and adjusted gross income, the only
subtractions were a $426.06 Schedule C, Profit or (Loss) From
Business or Profession, business loss and a $577.65 Schedule E,
Supplemental Income Schedule, loss. The total tax listed was
$4,160. The Federal income tax withheld listed was $5,225.34.
Christopher prepared the 1982 return.
On their joint income tax return for 1983, petitioner and
Christopher reported $42,570 in wages. Attached to this return
was a Form W-2 for Christopher from Florida Power Corp. reporting
$42,363.66 in wages. In arriving at total income and adjusted
gross income, the only additions and subtractions were $214.21 in
interest income, an $800.50 Schedule C business loss, and a
$753.62 Schedule E loss. The total tax listed was $5,102. The
Federal income tax withheld listed was $5,741.01. Christopher
prepared the 1983 return.
On their joint income tax return for 1984, petitioner and
Christopher reported $47,234 in wages. Attached to this return
was a Form W-2 for Christopher from Florida Power Corp. reporting
$47,096.20 in wages and a Form W-2 for petitioner from “Mad.
Health Spa of St Pete, Inc” reporting $138.32 in wages. In
arriving at total income, the only additions and subtractions
were $92 in interest income and a $30,270 Schedule E loss. This
Schedule E loss was entirely attributable to petitioner and
Christopher’s investment in SGE 1984-2. Petitioner and
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Christopher also subtracted $645 in adjustments to income to
arrive at adjusted gross income. The total tax listed was zero.
The Federal income tax withheld listed was $6,609. The Tax
Office of W.J. Hoyt Sons Management Co. was listed as the return
preparer on the 1984 return.
On their joint income tax return for 1985, petitioner and
Christopher reported $49,748 in wages. In arriving at total
income, the only additions and subtractions were $1,022 in
interest income, $300 in dividends, an $8 capital gain, and a
$23,719 Schedule E loss. This Schedule E loss ($20,180) was
mostly attributable to petitioner and Christopher’s investment in
SGE 1984-2. Petitioner and Christopher also subtracted $2,609 in
employee business expenses to arrive at adjusted gross income.
The total tax listed was zero. The Federal income tax withheld
listed was $1,703. The Tax Office of W.J. Hoyt Sons Management
Co. was listed as the return preparer on the 1985 return.
On their joint income tax return for 1986, petitioner and
Christopher reported $50,407 in wages. In arriving at total
income, the only additions and subtractions were $237 in interest
income, $691 in dividends, a $1 capital gain, and a $22,620
Schedule E loss. This Schedule E loss ($20,180) was mostly
attributable to petitioner and Christopher’s investment in SGE
1984-2. Petitioner and Christopher also subtracted $1,523 in
employee business expenses and a $2,000 IRA deduction to arrive
at adjusted gross income. The total tax listed was $240. The
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Federal income tax withheld listed was $394. The Tax Office of
W.J. Hoyt Sons Management Co. was listed as the return preparer
on the 1986 return.
The Schedules K-1, Partner’s Share of Income, Credits,
Deductions, etc., issued by SGE 1984-2 to petitioner and
Christopher for 1984, 1985, and 1986 list the following under the
area for partner’s name: “Christopher & Verna Doyel”.
In reviewing the 1984 return, the $30,270 loss surprised
petitioner because it was so large, but she did not ask any
questions about this deduction. Petitioner and Christopher
merely assumed that the losses would be large enough so that all
withheld income taxes would be refunded to them.
In 1985, petitioner and Christopher applied for a refund of
their 1981, 1982, and 1983 taxes in the amounts of $3,531,
$4,160, and $5,102, respectively.
On March 11, 1998, respondent mailed petitioner and her
husband two letters and reports explaining computational
adjustments made to their 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986
returns as a result of adjustments made to the partnership
returns of SGE 1984-2 for 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986.
These computational adjustments resulted from the Court’s opinion
in Shorthorn Genetic Engg. 1982-2, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-515.
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Section 6015 Claims--General
Currently, all section 6015 cases are centralized in
respondent’s Cincinnati Service Center. The centralized unit,
called the “Innocent Spouse Unit”, was set up in 1999. When the
Innocent Spouse Unit was set up, the unit anticipated about 600
cases per year; however, in its first year the Innocent Spouse
Unit received approximately 70,000 cases.
When an Innocent Spouse Unit employee is assigned a case,
the employee requests documents, reviews the file, and then makes
a determination. In all requests for relief pursuant to section
6015 made by Hoyt investors, respondent’s employees request
available internal documents regarding the Hoyt cases.
Respondent works on section 6015 cases, including those involving
Hoyt investors, on a case-by-case basis.
Request for Relief From Joint and Several Liability
On July 19, 2000, petitioner mailed respondent a Form 8857,
Request for Innocent Spouse Relief (and Separation of Liability
and Equitable Relief). Betty Sneed, a financial assistant in the
Innocent Spouse Unit, was assigned to review petitioner’s request
for section 6015 relief.
Ms. Sneed reviewed petitioner’s entire file. In processing
petitioner’s claim, Ms. Sneed requested Hoyt partnership related
information regarding petitioner and Christopher from Revenue
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Agent Deborah Ritchie.4 Ms. Richie provided Ms. Sneed with a
computer printout for Hoyt partnership taxable years related to
petitioner and Christopher, copies of agreements and powers of
attorney signed by petitioner and/or Christopher, copies of
Schedules K-1 issued to petitioner and Christopher from the Hoyt
partnerships, and copies of checks made payable to Hoyt
partnerships drawn on petitioner’s and her husband’s joint
checking account and on an account owned by Christopher and the
Verna Irene Doyel Trust.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner sent a declaration of
Christopher B. Doyel to the Cincinnati Service Center
(Christopher’s declaration). In Christopher’s declaration, he
stated: “I decided to investigate the investment opportunity
with the Hoyt partnerships. Initially, my spouse did not attend
any meetings, but, did read some promotional literature on the
Hoyt partnership investments. After we were involved my spouse
did attend approximately three meetings.” Christopher also
stated that petitioner signed the subscription agreements and
that petitioner never asked any questions about the Hoyt
4
Ms. Ritchie worked on the “Hoyt audit team” and the “Hoyt
tax shelter project”. The Hoyt tax shelter project examined Hoyt
partnerships. Ms. Ritchie assisted District Counsel in preparing
Hoyt partnership cases for trial.
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partnership investment until they declared bankruptcy (sometime
after the years in issue).
On June 5, 2001, respondent mailed Christopher a letter
notifying him of petitioner’s request for relief from joint and
several liability.
On October 26, 2001, respondent mailed petitioner a
preliminary determination with respect to petitioner’s request
for relief from joint and several liability for 1982 through
1986. Respondent determined that petitioner was not entitled to
relief pursuant to section 6015(b), (c), or (f).
On February 11, 2002, respondent mailed petitioner a notice
of determination that determined petitioner was not entitled to
relief from liability pursuant to section 6015(b), (c), or (f)
for 1982 through 1986 (notice of determination). On Form 886-A,
Explanation of Items, attached to the notice of determination,
regarding section 6015(b) respondent explained:
We have concluded that you had actual knowledge or
reason to know of the item giving rise to the
understatement. The following factors were considered
in reaching this conclusion:
• You signed one or more
partnership/subscription agreements/powers
of attorney with respect to the Hoyt
partnerships.
• You signed personal checks made payable to
W.J. Hoyt Sons or other Hoyt entity.
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• You signed other correspondence/documents
relating to the Hoyt partnerships.
• The size of the loss/deduction in relation
to the income reported on the return would
reasonably put you on notice that further
inquiry would need to be made.
• You have not shown that you satisfied your
duty of inquiry at the time the return was
prepared and signed to make sure the
return was correct.
• Your investment in the Hoyt partnerships
was a joint investment with your spouse
giving you actual knowledge of the item
giving rise to the deficiency.
You cannot claim relief under section 6015(b) with
respect to your own erroneous items and you have not
shown that the erroneous items are attributable to your
spouse.
You have not shown that it would be inequitable, taking
into account all of the facts and circumstances, to
hold you liable for the deficiency attributable to the
understatement.
Respondent also explained why petitioner did not qualify for
relief under section 6015(c). Regarding section 6015(f),
respondent wrote: “You have not shown that it would be
inequitable, taking into account all of the facts and
circumstances, to hold you liable for the deficiency attributable
to the understatement.”
On or about April 9, 2002, Ms. Sneed forwarded petitioner’s
case to respondent’s Appeals Office. Appeals Officer Gloria
Flandez was assigned to review petitioner’s case. In November
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2002, Ms. Flandez completed her review. Ms. Flandez concluded
that petitioner was not entitled to relief from liability
pursuant to section 6015(b), (c), or (f) for 1982 through 1986.
OPINION
I. Evidentiary Issue
As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether a document
petitioner submitted during the trial of this case should be
admitted into evidence. At trial, petitioner sought to introduce
a “fraud referral” memorandum for Walter J. Hoyt III (Exhibit
120-P). Respondent objected to the admission of Exhibit 120-P on
the grounds of authentication, relevance, and hearsay. We
reserved ruling on Exhibit 120-P’s admissibility.
Petitioner failed to make any arguments regarding the
admissibility of Exhibit 120-P in her opening brief. In her
reply brief, petitioner stated: “Petitioner has addressed the
relevance and purpose of Exhibit 120-P in her opening brief, in
the context of proposed findings of fact.”
Petitioner’s requests for findings of fact in her opening
brief are not argument for the admissibility of Exhibit 120-P.
Merely requesting a finding of fact does not automatically make
the requested finding relevant. On this basis, we can conclude
that petitioner abandoned this issue. Petzoldt v. Commissioner,
92 T.C. 661, 683 (1989).
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Even were we to conclude that petitioner did not abandon
this issue, petitioner makes no argument regarding the
authenticity of Exhibit 120-P or why Exhibit 120-P is not
excludable as hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 802-804, 807, 901.
Furthermore, petitioner’s belated, conclusory assertion in her
reply brief that Exhibit 120-P is relevant is insufficient. We
find Exhibit 120-P to be hearsay, lacking authenticity, not
relevant to the issue of petitioner’s being entitled to section
6015 relief. Furthermore, even if we did not so find, it would
be within our discretion to exclude Exhibit 120-P as wasteful.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Accordingly, we do not admit Exhibit 120-P into evidence.
II. Section 6015 Relief
In general, spouses filing joint Federal income tax returns
are jointly and severally liable for all taxes due. Sec.
6013(d)(3). Under certain circumstances, however, section 6015
provides relief from this general rule. Except as otherwise
provided in section 6015, petitioner bears the burden of proof.
Rule 142(a); Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 113 (2002),
affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003).
In arguing that petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to
section 6015, petitioner also relies on the regulations related
to section 6015. Sections 1.6015-0 through 1.6015-9, Income Tax
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Regs., are applicable for elections or requests for relief filed
on or after July 18, 2002. Sec. 1.6015-9, Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner filed her election prior to this date; accordingly,
the regulations are inapplicable.
A. Relief Under Section 6015(b)
To qualify for relief from joint and several liability under
section 6015(b)(1), a taxpayer must establish:
(A) a joint return has been made for a taxable
year;
(B) on such return there is an understatement of
tax attributable to erroneous items of 1 individual
filing the joint return;
(C) the other individual filing the joint return
establishes that in signing the return he or she did
not know, and had no reason to know, that there was
such understatement;
(D) taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other
individual liable for the deficiency in tax for such
taxable year attributable to such understatement; and
(E) the other individual elects (in such form as
the Secretary may prescribe) the benefits of this
subsection not later than the date which is 2 years
after the date the Secretary has begun collection
activities with respect to the individual making the
election * * *.
The requirements of section 6015(b)(1) are stated in the
conjunctive. Accordingly, a failure to meet any one of them is
sufficient for us to find that petitioner does not qualify for
relief pursuant to section 6015(b). Alt v. Commissioner, 119
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T.C. 306, 313 (2002).
Respondent contends that petitioner failed to meet the
requirements of subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D). For the sake of
completeness, we shall discuss the application of 6015(b)(1)(B),
(C), and (D). See Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 119.
1. Section 6015(b)(1)(B): Attributable to One Spouse
Petitioner admits that the Hoyt investment caused the
erroneous items on the returns. Petitioner, however, contends
that the Hoyt investments are not attributable to her.
Petitioner was a joint investor with Christopher in the Hoyt
investments. She signed documents relating to her and
Christopher’s investment in the Hoyt investments. See Hayman v.
Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1260-1261 (2d Cir. 1993), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1992-228. From the inception, the documents listed the
Hoyt investment as a joint investment of petitioner and
Christopher.
Additionally, checks were drawn on their joint account and
on a trust account apparently belonging to petitioner. These
checks were made payable to Hoyt partnerships.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Hoyt organization treated
her as a joint investor with Christopher in the Hoyt
partnerships. The Schedules K-1 the Hoyt organization issued
regarding their investment in SGE 1984-2 listed petitioner as a
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joint investor with her husband.
Finally, Christopher may have taken the initiative and
researched the Hoyt investment, but petitioner agreed to invest
in the Hoyt partnerships and she did it jointly with Christopher.
All investment decisions in the Doyel household were made jointly
by petitioner and Christopher.
Accordingly, we conclude that the understatements are not
attributable to the erroneous items of one individual filing the
joint returns.
2. Section 6015(b)(1)(C): Know or Reason To Know
The requirement in section 6015(b)(1)(C), the no-knowledge-
of-the-understatement requirement, is virtually identical to the
same requirement of former section 6013(e)(1)(C); therefore,
cases interpreting former section 6013(e) remain instructive to
our analysis. Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 115; Butler v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 283 (2000).
The relief-seeking spouse knows of an understatement of tax
if she knows of the transaction that gave rise to the
understatement. E.g., Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470,
473-474 (6th Cir. 1987), affg. 86 T.C. 228 (1986). The relief-
seeking spouse has reason to know of an understatement if she has
reason to know of the transaction that gave rise to the
understatement. E.g., Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126, 146
(1990), affd. 992 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1993). Courts
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consistently apply these standards to omission of income cases;
however, some Courts of Appeals, starting with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have adopted a more lenient
approach to deduction cases. Kistner v. Commissioner, 18 F.3d
1521 (11th Cir. 1994), revg. and remanding T.C. Memo. 1991-463;
Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1989), revg.
an Oral Opinion of this Court. In Bokum v. Commissioner,
supra at 153, we declined to apply the Price approach to
deduction cases; however, under the rule established in Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.
1971), we are bound to defer to the decision of a Court of
Appeals that is squarely on point and which is the likely venue
for appeal. Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 116.
Petitioner contends that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, which has adopted the Price approach, is the
likely venue for appeal because petitioner currently resides in
Florida.5 Respondent contends that the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit is the likely venue for appeal.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, it is section 7482, and
not 28 U.S.C. section 1391 (2000), that provides the Courts of
Appeal with jurisdiction to review our decisions. Section
5
Although petitioner claims to currently reside in
Florida, we note that since October 2002, Christopher has worked
full time in North Carolina (where he and petitioner own a home),
and petitioner lives with her husband.
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7482(b)(1) provides that the venue for appeal of a case involving
a petitioner who is an individual is the legal residence of the
petitioner. Sec. 7482(b)(1)(A). Legal residence is determined
as of the time the petition was filed. Sec. 7482(b)(1) (third
sentence).
At the time she filed the petition, petitioner resided in
Michigan. Accordingly, in the absence of a stipulation to the
contrary, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the
likely venue for any appeal of this case. See sec. 7482(b)(2).
We have found no published authority of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopting the Price approach. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has adopted the
following standard for reason to know in deduction cases:
The test adopted by the Sanders court is the same
test advanced by the Restatement (Second) of Agency §
9, comment d (1958), which reads as follows:
A person has reason to know of a fact if he
had information from which a person of
ordinary intelligence which such person may
have, or of the superior intelligence which
such person may have, would infer that the
fact in question exists or that there is such
a substantial chance of its existence that,
in exercising reasonable care with reference
to the matter in question, his action would
be predicated upon the assumption of its
possible existence.
The primary ingredients of the “reason to know” tests
are (1) the circumstances which face the petitioner;
and (2) whether a reasonable person in the same
position would infer that omissions or erroneous
deductions had been made. [Shea v. Commissioner, 780
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F.2d 561, 565-566 (6th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted),
affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1984-310.]
We believe that petitioner had reason to know of the
understatements under the approaches followed by the Tax Court
and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Eleventh (which
has adopted the Price approach) Circuits, and any disparity among
them is immaterial to our disposition of this case. See Jonson
v. Commissioner, supra at 116.
3. Result of the Price Approach in This Case
In Price v. Commissioner, supra at 965, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit stated:
A spouse has “reason to know” of the substantial
understatement if a reasonably prudent taxpayer in her
position at the time she signed the return could be
expected to know that the return contained the
substantial understatement. Factors to consider in
analyzing whether the alleged innocent spouse had
“reason to know” of the substantial understatement
include: (1) the spouse’s level of education; (2) the
spouse’s involvement in the family’s business and
financial affairs; (3) the presence of expenditures
that appear lavish or unusual when compared to the
family’s past levels of income, standard of living, and
spending patterns; and (4) the culpable spouse’s
evasiveness and deceit concerning the couple’s
finances. [Citations omitted.]
“The interplay of these factors is dynamic, so that different
factors will predominate in different cases.” Bliss v.
Commissioner, 59 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 1995), affg. T.C. Memo.
1993-390. One factor may dominate the analysis and alone be
reason for denying relief. Id. at 379.
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Under the Price approach, a spouse’s knowledge of the
transaction underlying the deduction is not irrelevant; the more
a spouse knows about a transaction, the more likely it is that
she will know or have reason to know that the deduction arising
from that transaction may not be valid. Price v. Commissioner,
887 F.2d at 963 n.9; see Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d at 1261
(citing Price).
a. Education
Petitioner had a high school education.
b. Involvement in Financial Affairs
Petitioner argues that she was not involved in the family’s
financial affairs. Being a homemaker, being focused on family
affairs, and lacking sophistication in financial affairs does not
relieve a taxpayer of joint and several tax liability. Shea v.
Commissioner, supra at 566. Additionally, complete deference to
the other spouse’s judgment concerning the couple’s financial
affairs, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that a
spouse had no “reason to know”. Kistner v. Commissioner, supra
at 1525.
Contrary to her assertion, petitioner was involved in her
family’s financial affairs. Although she may have not played a
“dominant” role or been the initiator, all family investment
decisions were made in consultation with petitioner. Petitioner
and her husband had an agreement to reach a consensus about
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whether or not to make an investment before any investment was
made.
Petitioner was shown the documents relating to the Hoyt
investments, signed Hoyt investment documents, was aware that the
Hoyt investment was supposed to result in substantial tax
savings, and attended Hoyt investor meetings.6 Petitioner was
aware of the large deductions taken on her joint tax returns
associated with the Hoyt investments. The Hoyt investment
materials she was shown and had the opportunity to review
apprised her of tax risks associated with the investment. These
facts establish that petitioner had “reason to know”. See Jonson
v. Commissioner, supra at 117.
Petitioner argues that her health issues limited her
involvement in financial affairs. In the mid-1970s, petitioner
was diagnosed with sarcoidosis--a disease that affects the
lymphatic system. Petitioner developed tumors in her body and
has a reduced lung capacity. Despite her illness, the
testimonial and documentary evidence establishes that petitioner
participated in the family’s financial affairs.
c. Expenditures, etc.
The evidence does not establish that the tax savings
generated by the Hoyt investments resulted in lavish or unusual
expenditures benefiting petitioner compared to prior years’
6
Although petitioner claimed not to attend Hoyt meetings,
her testimony was contradicted by Christopher’s testimony and the
documentary evidence.
- 25 -
spending. This factor, however, is not determinative. Id. at
118.
The losses helped to reduce petitioner and her husband’s
reported tax liabilities for 1984 through 1986 to a total of
$394. Such deductions, which shelter such a large percentage of
the income reported on the returns, support a finding that
petitioner had reason to know of the understatement. Id.
Section 6015 relief “was not designed to protect willful
blindness or to encourage the deliberate cultivation of
ignorance.” Friedman v. Commissioner, 53 F.3d 523, 525 (2d Cir.
1995), affg. in part and revg. and remanding in part T.C. Memo.
1993-549. “Extravagant tax savings may alert even a financially
unsophisticated spouse to the possible improprieties of a tax
scheme.” Id.
d. Other Spouse’s Evasiveness and Deceit
Where one spouse is “cunning and systematic” in concealing
the understatement of taxes, the other spouse may plausibly claim
ignorance notwithstanding some educational attainments or some
involvement in family financial affairs that are distinct from
the understatement of taxes. Bliss v. Commissioner, supra at
379. Disclosure by the other spouse, however, is probative in
determining that relief is inappropriate. Id.; see also Hayman
v. Commissioner, supra at 1262, 1263 (lack of deceit by other
spouse important factor in denying relief).
- 26 -
Petitioner and her husband testified that petitioner was
aware of the investment in the Hoyt partnerships, she had access
to all of the files/information regarding the Hoyt investment,
and that Christopher made no effort to deceive petitioner
regarding the family’s financial affairs. This further supports
a finding that petitioner had reason to know of the
understatement. Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 118.
Petitioner claims that Mr. Hoyt’s deceit is relevant to the
determination of “reason to know”. Although Mr. Hoyt’s deceit
may be relevant, it does not lead to the result petitioner seeks.
The purpose of section 6015 relief is to protect one spouse
from the overreaching or dishonesty of the other. Purcell v.
Commissioner, 826 F.2d at 475. Relief is inappropriate where it
would allow the requesting spouse to escape liability for
apparently legitimate claims that are later disallowed. See
Bartlett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-413.
As was the case in Mora v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 279, 288
(2001), where we denied relief under section 6015(b) in a case
involving Hoyt investments, neither petitioner nor Christopher
knew the facts that made the flowthrough losses from the Hoyt
partnerships unallowable as deductions on their joint returns and
both petitioner and Christopher put their trust in the Hoyt
organization to determine the basis for, propriety of, and amount
of their deductions.
- 27 -
e. Conclusion
It is significant that petitioner knew (1) of the Hoyt
investment, (2) the Hoyt investment was designed to generate
large deductions resulting in substantial tax savings, (3) those
deductions were taken on joint returns for the years in issue,
and (4) there was a risk that the deductions might be disallowed
by the IRS. Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 118.
“Tax returns setting forth large deductions, such as tax
shelter losses offsetting income from other sources and
substantially reducing * * * the couple’s tax liability,
generally put a taxpayer on notice that there may be an
understatement of tax liability.” Hayman v. Commissioner, 992
F.2d at 1262. Furthermore, the court in Price noted that the
size of the deduction in issue vis-a-vis the total income
reported on the return, when considered in light of the fact that
the taxpayer knew of the investment and its nature, is enough to
put the taxpayer on notice that an understatement exists (and,
therefore, if the duty of inquiry is not discharged, leads to an
imputation of “reason to know” of the understatement). Price v.
Commissioner, 887 F.2d at 966 ($90,000 deduction and just more
than $100,000 in income).
Petitioner did not ask any questions about the Hoyt
investment deductions even though the loss surprised petitioner
because it was so large. Petitioner never asked any questions
about the Hoyt partnerships until they declared bankruptcy (after
- 28 -
the years in issue). Petitioner did not satisfy her duty to
inquire. Id. at 965-966; see also Mora v. Commissioner, supra at
289 (involving a Hoyt investment).
A reasonable person, faced with petitioner’s circumstances
and in petitioner’s position, would have had reason to know of
the understatement. We conclude that, under both the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s standard and the
Price approach, petitioner had reason to know of the
understatements.
4. Section 6015(b)(1)(D): Inequitable To Hold Liable
The requirement in section 6015(b)(1)(D), that it be
inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for an
understatement on a joint return, is virtually identical to the
same requirement of former section 6013(e)(1)(D); therefore,
cases interpreting former section 6013(e) remain instructive to
our analysis. Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 283.
Whether it is inequitable to hold a spouse liable for a
deficiency is determined “taking into account all the facts and
circumstances”. Sec. 6015(b)(1)(D). The most often cited
material factors to be considered are (1) whether there has been
a significant benefit to the spouse claiming relief, and (2)
whether the failure to report the correct tax liability on the
joint return results from concealment, overreaching, or any other
wrongdoing on the part of the other spouse. Alt v. Commissioner,
119 T.C. at 314; Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 119.
- 29 -
No such untoward circumstances are present in this case. It
is clear that there was no concealment on Christopher’s part.
Christopher never hid information from petitioner, petitioner was
welcome to read all the Hoyt investment materials, Christopher
was always willing to discuss the Hoyt investment with
petitioner, petitioner never asked any questions about the Hoyt
partnership investment until she and Christopher declared
bankruptcy (after the years in issue), and petitioner did not
question the large deductions associated with the Hoyt
investment. Additionally, the evidence established that
Christopher never attempted to deceive her with respect to their
financial affairs.
As we noted supra, the purpose of section 6015 relief “is to
protect one spouse from the overreaching or dishonesty of the
other.” Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d at 475. The
understatement in tax in this case is attributable to a mistaken
belief on the part of both petitioner and Christopher as to the
legitimacy of the tax shelter deductions. Under these
circumstances, we perceive no inequity in holding both spouses to
joint and several liability. Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d at
1135; McCoy v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732, 735 (1972).
We have also considered other factors that are relevant to
whether it would be inequitable to hold petitioner liable. We
find that petitioner will not experience economic hardship if
- 30 -
relief from the liabilities is not granted given her current
level of income. See Alt v. Commissioner, supra at 314-315; Von
Kalinowski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-21; Walters v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-111; Dillon v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1998-5.
Christopher testified that he and petitioner owe $96,000 to
the IRS for their 1981 through 1986 tax years.7 In her “Appeals
Transmittal and Case Memo”, Ms. Flandez listed the tax owed for
1982 through 1986 as $20,300. According to an IRS transcript, as
of August 26, 1998, petitioner and Christopher owed $20,300 in
tax and approximately $61,000 in interest for their 1982 through
1986 tax years.
The Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage
Earners and Self-Employed Individuals, that petitioner and
Christopher signed on February 28, 2003, contained the following
statements: Petitioner and Christopher owned their home; they
had no dependents they could claim on their tax return; they had
a Bank of America checking account with a balance of $4,000;
7
We note that the 1981 tax year is not in issue. See
supra note 2.
Additionally, on brief petitioner makes claims regarding the
total liability relating to the Hoyt investment for 1981 through
1996. Petitioner’s tax years 1987 through 1996 also are not
before the Court. Even if they were, according to petitioner’s
own estimate of the total tax liability, petitioner and her
husband have substantial assets (real property and investments)
and credit that could be used to pay the total tax liability for
1981 through 1996 without creating economic hardship.
- 31 -
their investments included (1) Vanguard--401(k) with a current
value of $267,578, (2) Fidelity--401(k) with a current value of
$14,007, and (3) a U.S. Savings Bond with a current value of $28;
they had $100 of cash on hand; they had available credit of
$19,750 from Discover Card and $4,200 from Capital One; they had
life insurance with a current cash value of $20,455; they owned
two cars (a 1991 Toyota Previa and a 1995 Toyota Avalon); they
owned the following real estate (1) a home in Beverly Hills,
Florida, purchased in June 1995 for $183,000, with a current
value of $168,000, a loan balance of $150,245, and a monthly
payment totaling $1,465, and (2) a home in Charlotte, North
Carolina, purchased in October 2002 for $95,000, with a current
value of $76,000, a loan balance of $75,000, and a monthly
payment of $872; and no personal assets (i.e., zero).
In determining the current value of their investments,
petitioner and Christopher valued them at 60 percent of the face
value of the investments even though the Form 433-A states:
“Current Value: Indicate the amount you could sell the asset for
today.” In determining the current value of their real estate,
petitioner and Christopher valued their homes at “80 percent
quick sale value” even though the Form 433-A states: “Current
Value: Indicate the amount you could sell the asset for today.”
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Under the monthly income and expense analysis on Form 433-A,
petitioner and Christopher listed monthly wages of $9,167 and
monthly interest/dividends of $1,667 for total monthly income of
$10,834. Under total living expenses, petitioner and Christopher
listed $1,290 for food, clothing, and miscellaneous; $2,212 for
housing and utilities; $573 for transportation; $1,173 for health
care; $2,679 for taxes; $108 for child/dependent care; $56 for
life insurance; $672 for other secured debt (second house); and
$1,683 for other expenses comprising $600 in attorney’s fees and
$1,083 for church contributions. This brought their total
expenses to $10,446 per month.
Attached to the Form 433-A were the following: A uniform
residential appraisal report for the Beverly Hills, Florida, home
with an estimate of fair market value, as of March 16, 1998, of
$210,000; a Bank of America statement for petitioner and
Christopher for the period December 13, 2002, through January 14,
2003, which listed (1) their average balance of $8,165, a
beginning balance on December 13, 2002, of $12,423.62, and an
ending balance of $5,150 in their checking account and (2) having
an equity line of credit for $25,244.76; a Vanguard account
statement listing a closing and vested balance as of December 31,
2002, totaling $478,278.71; a Fidelity account statement listing
a closing and vested balance as of December 31, 2002, totaling
$29,865.49; their 2001 tax return which listed a total of
- 33 -
$5,193.31 in medical expenses; and a self-prepared chart listing
$6,018.70 in medical expenses that are not covered by their
insurance and $1,014.35 under “Flex Plan” for 2002.
Petitioner testified that her oldest daughter, Tina, suffers
from health problems, is totally disabled, and that the financial
burden for her daughter rests on her and Christopher. Tina has
her own home, does not live with petitioner and her husband, and
petitioner and Christopher admitted that they cannot claim her as
a dependent. We also note that on the Form 433-A, petitioner and
Christopher stated that they had no dependents they could claim
on their tax return.
Petitioner did not present evidence that demonstrated that
petitioner will be unable to pay her reasonable basic living
expenses if relief is not granted. Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4),
Proced. & Admin. Regs. Some of the expense figures provided on
the Form 433-A are unsupported and seem excessive.
Additionally, petitioner and her husband have substantial
assets (real property and investments) and credit that could be
used to pay a tax liability as high as $96,000 without creating
economic hardship. We conclude that petitioner will not
experience economic hardship if relief from the liabilities is
not granted given her current level of income and assets. See
Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 314-315; Von Kalinowski v.
Commissioner, supra; Walters v. Commissioner, supra; Dillon v.
- 34 -
Commissioner, supra.
We also may consider whether the requesting spouse was
deserted, divorced, or separated. See Walters v. Commissioner,
supra. Petitioner’s husband has not disappeared or left
petitioner to “face the music” alone. Hayman v. Commissioner,
992 F.2d at 1263; Von Kalinowski v. Commissioner, supra.
Petitioner and Christopher remain married. The two have not
separated, and petitioner has not been left by her husband to
deal with the tax liabilities alone. Instead, petitioner
continues to enjoy the lifestyle and financial security that are
largely attributable to her husband’s assets and income.
5. Conclusion
Petitioner was not denied access to financial records by her
husband or threatened with physical violence if she objected to
the Hoyt investment or questioned the tax returns. There was no
physical or mental abuse by petitioner’s husband, and he did not
coerce her into investing in the Hoyt partnerships or signing the
tax returns.
The understatements are not attributable to the erroneous
items of one individual filing the joint returns for 1982 through
1986, petitioner had reason to know of the understatements on
these returns, and it is not inequitable to hold the petitioner
liable for the deficiencies in tax for 1982 to 1986. On the
basis of all the facts and circumstances, we conclude that
petitioner is not entitled to relief pursuant to section 6015(b).
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B. Relief Under Section 6015(f)
Respondent argues that he did not abuse his discretion in
denying petitioner equitable relief under section 6015(f).
Respondent’s denial of relief is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183, 198
(2000), affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002); Butler v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 292. Our review is not limited to
respondent’s administrative record. Ewing v. Commissioner, 122
T.C. ___ (2004).
Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we
held under section 6015(b)(1)(D) that it is not inequitable to
hold petitioner liable for the deficiencies. The language of
section 6015(f)(1), “taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable
for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either)”
does not differ significantly from the language of section
6015(b)(1)(D), “taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other individual
liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year
attributable to such understatement”.8 Butler v. Commissioner,
8
Additionally, the language in both sections is similar to
the language in former sec. 6013(e)(1)(D), “taking into account
all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable
year attributable to such substantial understatement”. Butler v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 291 (2000); see Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 292 F.3d 800, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Subsection (f)
(continued...)
- 36 -
supra at 291. Further, the equitable factors we considered under
section 6015(b)(1)(D) are the same equitable factors we consider
under section 6015(f).9 Alt v. Commissioner, supra at 316. As a
result, we hold that respondent did not abuse his discretion in
denying petitioner relief under section 6015(f) for taxable years
1982 to 1986.
In this case, none of the six factors in Rev. Proc. 2000-15,
2000-1 C.B. 447, weighing in favor of granting relief are
present: (1) Petitioner was not divorced from her husband, (2)
petitioner will not suffer economic hardship if relief is denied,
(3) petitioner was not abused by her husband, (4) petitioner had
“reason to know”, (5) petitioner’s husband did not have an
obligation to pay the liability pursuant to a divorce decree, and
(6) the items giving rise to the deficiencies are not
8
(...continued)
has no statutory antecedent as a stand alone provision, but has
roots in the equity test of former subparagraph 6013(e)(1)(D)
carried forward into subparagraph 6015(b)(1)(D).”), affg. T.C.
Memo. 2000-332.
9
As directed by sec. 6015(f), the Commissioner prescribed
procedures in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, to be used in
determining whether an individual qualifies for relief under sec.
6015(f). The revenue procedure takes into account factors such
as marital status, economic hardship, and significant benefit in
determining whether relief will be granted under sec. 6015(f).
Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. at 448.
We note that Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296 (Aug.
11, 2003), superseded Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra. Rev. Proc,
2003-61, sec. 6, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296. The new revenue procedure,
however, is effective for requests for relief filed on or after
Nov. 1, 2003. Id. Accordingly, it is inapplicable to the case
at bar.
- 37 -
attributable solely to Christopher. See Washington v.
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 147 (2003). Additionally, the
following factors weighing against relief are present:10 (1) The
items giving rise to the deficiencies also are attributable to
petitioner, (2) petitioner had “reason to know”, and (3)
petitioner will not suffer economic hardship. Id.
Petitioner also argues that respondent made blanket “pro
forma” denials of Hoyt investor section 6015 claims. We
disagree.
Respondent’s internal memoranda contemplate that some Hoyt
investors would qualify for section 6015 relief. The memoranda
do not reflect a decision to issue blanket denials to all Hoyt
investor section 6015 claims.
Ms. Sneed testified that she processed claims granting
section 6015 relief in other Hoyt investor cases she has
reviewed. Furthermore, Ms. Sneed credibly testified that she
conducted a full, impartial, and fair evaluation of petitioner’s
section 6015 claim.
The format of the determination letter denying section 6015
relief for Hoyt investors was unique to the Hoyt cases. This
format was provided to Ms. Sneed. Respondent did use uniform
10
The absence of factors weighing against equitable relief
does not weigh in favor of granting relief--this is merely
neutral. See Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 149
(2003) (absence of factor weighing in favor of equitable relief
does not weigh against granting equitable relief--it is neutral).
- 38 -
procedures, and a uniform denial letter, in the Hoyt investor
section 6015 cases; however, respondent did not make blanket
denials of Hoyt investor section 6015 relief claims. We find
nothing abusive in using this form letter.
On the basis of all the facts and circumstances, we conclude
that respondent did not abuse his discretion in denying
petitioner relief pursuant to section 6015(f).
In reaching our holdings, we have considered all arguments
made by the parties, and, to the extent not mentioned above, we
conclude they are irrelevant or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.