Ogonoski v. Comm'r

T.C. Memo. 2004-52

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

ARLENE C. OGONOSKI, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 4759-02. Filed March 8, 2004.

Arlene C. Ogonoski, pro se.

John Aletta, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BEGHE, Judge: Respondent denied petitioner’s claim for

relief under section 6015(f)1 from her unpaid Federal income tax

liabilities for taxable years 1989 through 1999. In a timely

petition and amended petition, petitioner requested this Court to

1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
 - 2 -

review respondent’s determination for the 1989 through 1997 tax

years. Petitioner also requested this Court to review whether

the period of limitation for collection of her unpaid tax

liability for 1989 has expired.

We sustain respondent’s determination that petitioner is not

entitled to relief under section 6015(f). We lack jurisdiction

to review the limitation issue.

Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

Petitioner lived in Burlington, Connecticut, when she filed her

petition in this case. From 1989 to the present, petitioner has

been married to Arthur Ogonoski (Mr. Ogonoski) and lived with him

in the same household. Since 1994, petitioner and Mr. Ogonoski

have lived in a house they own, at 348 George Washington Turnpike

in Burlington, that they purchased for $71,000. The house is

subject to a mortgage loan (from an individual rather than a

lending institution) that appears to bear an above-market rate of

interest.

From 1989 to April 1994 petitioner was employed part time as

an office temp; since April 1994 petitioner has been employed as

a secretary/clerk. At all times relevant, Mr. Ogonoski has

worked as a self-employed excavator.

Petitioner and Mr. Ogonoski have five children; they

reported all five children as dependents on their 1989 through

1994 tax returns, four children as dependents on their 1995
 - 3 -

return, three children as dependents on their 1996 through 1998

returns, and two children as dependents on their 1999 return.

For taxable years 1989 through 1999, petitioner and Mr.

Ogonoski filed and executed joint income tax returns. With the

exception of the 1998 return, these returns were timely filed.

The 1998 return was filed on August 4, 2000.

The handwriting on the returns confirms that petitioner

prepared the returns, including the Schedule C, Profit or Loss

From Business, for Mr. Ogonoski’s excavation business. For each

of the years in question, Mr. Ogonoski’s business had net income,

which generated self-employment tax liability and contributed to

the taxable income shown on the returns.

Throughout the marriage, Mr. Ogonoski has kept his business

and financial transactions private from petitioner; he provided

petitioner little or no information about or control over his

finances. Petitioner’s only involvement with Mr. Ogonoski’s

business was to maintain a ledger and prepare their income tax

returns. Even though petitioner stated she had no control over

Mr. Ogonoski’s business and “couldn’t get him to wear a seat

belt, let alone pay his taxes”, she described Mr. Ogonoski as a

“wonderful man”. There is no record evidence Mr. Ogonoski

physically or mentally abused petitioner other than having

created a continuing climate of uncertainty about whether and

when he would make contributions or payments in respect of the

Federal income tax liabilities shown on the joint returns.
 - 4 -

All the above-mentioned income tax returns reflected

balances due. Neither petitioner nor Mr. Ogonoski paid the

balances due when they filed their returns for the taxable years

1989 through 1999. A substantial portion of the unpaid balances

is attributable to Social Security self-employment tax on Mr.

Ogonoski’s excavation business. There is no record evidence Mr.

Ogonoski promised petitioner he would pay the tax liabilities

reported on their returns. Some payments were subsequently made

in respect of the amounts shown due on these returns. Respondent

accepted as filed all the returns for the years in issue.

The balances due, petitioner’s wages, and income tax and

Medicare and Social Security payments withheld from petitioner’s

wages, reflected on petitioner’s and Mr. Ogonoski’s joint income

tax returns, were as follows:

Medicare/Social
Balance Petitioner’s Income Tax Security Tax
Year Due Wages Withheld Withheld

1989 $8,943.18 $5,115.25 $67.87 $384.17
1990 7,696.89 4,966.80 -0- 379,96
1991 2,995.76 5,319.00 -0- 406.90
1992 5,474.30 3,355.96 32.75 256.76
1993 4,333.32 8,233.46 954.26 629.84
1994 2,242.57 14,104.65 1,151.04 1,079.05
1995 2,211.52 22,031.54 2,696.67 1,685.33
1996 3,023.28 25,302.31 3,476.39 1,935.49
1997 2,621.75 29,547.44 4,330.30 2,264.44
1998 3,647.39 33,519.15 5,336.74 2,598.56
1999 1,831.50 36,015.24 6,137.84 2,801.81

On the following dates, respondent assessed income tax,

estimated tax and failure-to-pay penalties, and interest against

petitioner and Mr. Ogonoski for the taxable years 1989 through
 - 5 -

1999 in the amounts set forth below as to which respondent denied

petitioner’s prayer for relief under section 6015:

Year Assessment Date Assessments

1989 5/28/90 $20,197.34
1990 6/3/91 23,431.75
1991 6/1/92 7,697.66
1992 5/31/93 12,829.84
1993 5/30/94 9,502.73
1994 5/29/95 4,630.19
1995 6/10/96 3,662.62
1996 6/2/97 3,865.19
1997 5/25/98 8,327.69
1998 10/30/00 2,047.29
1999 6/5/00 -0-

Since at least 1997 through the present, petitioner and Mr.

Ogonoski have had a joint checking account and used the funds in

this account to pay some of their personal expenses. Mr.

Ogonoski had other checking accounts related to his business that

petitioner did not control or have access to.

On August 7, 1992, petitioner and Mr. Ogonoski filed for

chapter 13 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Hartford,

Connecticut. On January 15, 1993, the Bankruptcy Court

dismissed the case. On April 16, 1993, petitioner and Mr.

Ogonoski filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy

Court in Hartford, Connecticut. On July 14, 1993, the Bankruptcy

Court dismissed the case.

In 1994, petitioner’s house was foreclosed on and sold to

pay her and Mr. Ogonoski’s debts. For 4 months the Ogonoskis

lived in the family car before they rented and then purchased the

other house in which they now live.
 - 6 -

On November 1, 2000, petitioner filed Form 8857, Request for

Innocent Spouse Relief, with respondent regarding taxable years

1972 through 2000. On this form, petitioner requested relief

under section 6015(b) and (f), claiming that she had an

“understatement of tax” and “underpayment of tax”, respectively.

On November 1, 2000, when petitioner filed her request for

relief under section 6015, there were no outstanding tax

liabilities due from petitioner for taxable years 1972 through

1988. Petitioner stated that Mr. Ogonoski had paid, apparently

out of his own separate funds, all of the outstanding taxes,

interest, and penalties for taxable years 1972 through 1988.

When petitioner filed her request for relief under section

6015 with respondent, there were outstanding tax liabilities

resulting from balances due on her and Mr. Ogonoski’s joint

returns for taxable years 1989 through 1999. In her request for

relief, petitioner acknowledged: “I have been told if I file

separately I would not be in this predicament. However I believe

if you are married you file jointly”.

In workpapers dated May 22, 2001, respondent’s examiner

proposed to deny petitioner relief under section 6015(b) and (f)

for all of petitioner’s outstanding tax years.

On June 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Form 12509, Statement

of Disagreement, in which she appealed the examiner’s proposed

determination with respondent’s Appeals Office and requested

relief under section 6015 for her 1989 through 1997 tax years.
 - 7 -

By notice of determination dated January 9, 2002, respondent

denied petitioner relief from joint and several liability under

section 6015(f) for taxable years 1989 through 1999. Although

section 6015(b) is not discussed in the notice of determination,

respondent’s Appeals Office also denied petitioner relief under

section 6015(b) because petitioner’s liabilities did not result

from an understatement of tax.

On February 21, 2002, petitioner filed her original petition

for relief from joint and several liability. On March 28, 2002,

petitioner filed her amended petition. Petitioner’s prayer for

relief does not specify the taxable years for which relief is

requested or the Internal Revenue Code provisions under which

relief is requested. It concludes: “I pray that I am found to

be not responsible for prior taxes my husband owes.”

Petitioner’s brief says she seeks relief under section 6015(f)

for her 1989 through 1997 tax years. In her petition, petitioner

says: “I always believed that my husband would pay his taxes.

In 1989, he paid over $30,000 in taxes, his entire tax plus all

penalties & late charges.” In her brief, petitioner says: “it

is reasonable for her to believe that at sometime her spouse

would pay the taxes. The same pattern had existed in the past

and the spouse had paid the taxes.” Petitioner says she believes

the tax liabilities for 1998 through 2001 have been paid.

On May 14, 2002, respondent filed an answer; on June 10,

2002, the Court filed respondent’s certification under interim
 - 8 -

Rule 325, as amplified by King v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 118

(2000), that respondent had notified Mr. Ogonoski that petitioner

had filed a claim for relief from joint and several liability in

this case. Mr. Ogonoski has not intervened in this case.

Discussion

Issue 1. Relief Under Section 6015

Generally, married taxpayers may elect to file a joint

Federal income tax return. Sec. 6013(a). After making the

election, each spouse generally is fully responsible for the

accuracy of the return and jointly and severally liable for the

entire tax due for that year. Sec. 6013(d)(3); Butler v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 282 (2000).

Petitioner requested relief under section 6015 from

liability for the taxes reported on her 1989 through 1997 joint

returns that were not paid when the returns were filed.

Respondent determined petitioner was not entitled to the

requested relief. In requesting relief, petitioner argues that

when she signed the returns, it was reasonable for her to believe

Mr. Ogonoski would pay the reported tax liabilities at some

future time because there was a similar pattern of nonpayment for

prior years, followed by his payment of the balances due for

those years. Petitioner also argues she will suffer economic

hardship if relief is not granted.

If a taxpayer’s request for relief under section 6015 is

denied, the taxpayer may petition this Court under section
 - 9 -

6015(e)(1) for a review of the Commissioner’s determination. Our

jurisdiction in cases brought under section 6015(e)(1)

encompasses a review of the Commissioner’s determination with

respect to all relief afforded by section 6015. Ewing v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. 494, 497-507 (2002); Fernandez v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 330-331 (2000); Butler v.

Commissioner, supra at 289-290. This type of case is referred to

as a “stand-alone” case, in that petitioner’s request for relief

is independent of any deficiency proceeding. Ewing v.

Commissioner, supra at 497 (quoting Fernandez v. Commissioner,

supra at 329).

In this case, petitioner seeks equitable relief under

section 6015(f). To prevail, petitioner must prove that

respondent’s denial of equitable relief from joint liability

under section 6015(f) was an abuse of discretion. See Rule

142(a); Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 146 (2003);

Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d

1181 (10th Cir. 2003); Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183,

198 (2000), affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002); Demirjian v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-22.2 The Commissioner’s exercise

of discretion is entitled to due deference; in order to prevail,

the taxpayer must demonstrate that, in not granting relief, the

Commissioner exercised his discretion arbitrarily, capriciously,

2
Petitioner has not alleged sec. 7491 applies.
 - 10 -

or without sound basis in fact or law. Jonson v. Commissioner,

supra at 125; Butler v. Commissioner, supra at 292. We are not

limited to the matters contained in the Commissioner’s

administrative record when deciding this question. Ewing v.

Commissioner, 122 T.C. ___, ___ (2004) (slip op. at 6-21).

Section 6015 provides three ways taxpayers may obtain relief

from joint and several tax liability. First, section 6015(b)

provides full or apportioned relief for “an understatement of

tax”.3 Sec. 6015(b)(1)(B) and (2). Because petitioner’s

liabilities resulted from underpayments of tax shown due on

petitioner’s returns, not understatements of tax, petitioner does

not qualify for relief under section 6015(b). See Washington v.

Commissioner, supra at 146.

Second, petitioner does not qualify for relief under section

6015(c) because there are no deficiencies for petitioner’s tax

years at issue and petitioner and Mr. Ogonoski continue to be

married and live together. See sec. 6015(c); Washington v.

Commissioner, supra at 147.

Section 6015(f), under which petitioner claims relief,

authorizes the Commissioner to grant equitable relief where: (1)

The taxpayer is not entitled to relief under section 6015(b) or

(c), and (2) “taking into account all the facts and

3
An understatement is the “excess of (i) the amount of the
tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable year, over
(ii) the amount of the tax imposed which is shown on the return”.
Secs. 6015(b)(3), 6662(d)(2)(A).
 - 11 -

circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable

for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion thereof)”.

See Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 500; see also Fernandez v.

Commissioner, supra at 330; Foor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2004-54.

As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has

prescribed procedures to use in determining whether a requesting

spouse qualifies for relief under subsection (f). When

respondent issued his notice of determination to petitioner,

those procedures were found in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B.

447. This Court has upheld the use of these procedures in

reviewing a negative determination. See, e.g., Washington v.

Commissioner, supra at 147-152; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at

125-126.

Seven threshold conditions must be satisfied before the

Commissioner will consider a request for relief under section

6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448.

Respondent agrees petitioner satisfies those threshold

conditions.

Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists

three conditions, which, if met, ordinarily will persuade the

Commissioner to grant relief from unpaid liabilities reported on

a joint return. As applicable here, these conditions are:

(a) At the time relief is requested, the
requesting spouse is no longer married to * * * the
nonrequesting spouse * * *;
 - 12 -

(b) At the time the return was signed, the
requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know
that the tax would not be paid. The requesting spouse
must establish that it was reasonable for the
requesting spouse to believe that the nonrequesting
spouse would pay the reported liability * * *; and

(c) The requesting spouse will suffer economic
hardship if relief is not granted * * *.

If relief is not available under Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec.

4.02, the Commissioner may nevertheless grant relief under the

general provisions of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1), 2000-1

C.B. at 448, which provides a list of factors the Commissioner

considers when deciding whether to grant relief. No single

factor will be determinative of whether equitable relief will be

granted in any particular case. Rather, all factors will be

considered and weighed appropriately. The list of factors is not

intended to be exhaustive. See Washington v. Commissioner, supra

at 147-148; Jonson v. Commissioner, supra at 125.

Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, lists the following four

factors whose presence the Commissioner weighs in favor of

granting relief and whose absence the Commissioner weighs against

granting relief: (1) The requesting spouse would suffer economic

hardship if relief is denied; (2) the unpaid liability is

attributable to the nonrequesting spouse; (3) in the case of a

liability that was properly reported but not paid, the requesting

spouse did not know and had no reason to know the reported

liability would be unpaid at the time the return was signed (the

absence of this factor is an “extremely strong factor weighing
 - 13 -

against relief”); and (4) the nonrequesting spouse has a legal

obligation pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement to pay the

unpaid liability (this factor weighs against relief only if the

requesting spouse has the obligation). See Demirjian v.

Commissioner, supra.

Petitioner’s failure to introduce current evidence of

economic hardship weighs against granting relief. Economic

hardship is defined as an inability to meet reasonable basic

living expenses. Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs.

Petitioner did not introduce into evidence her financial records,

such as her current salary, basic living expenses, and amounts of

other debts, that are necessary to support her claim that she

will not be able to pay reasonable basic living expenses if

relief is not granted. Although petitioner and Mr. Ogonoski have

had a history of financial problems throughout their marriage

that suggests petitioner may not be able to pay the tax

liabilities if respondent attempts to collect the unpaid taxes

from her, she has not introduced any evidence of her current

financial standing to enable us to conclude she will suffer

economic hardship if relief is denied.

The attribution factor weighs in favor of granting relief.

The unpaid liabilities are solely attributable to Mr. Ogonoski.

A substantial portion of the unpaid balances is attributable to

Social Security self-employment tax on Mr. Ogonoski’s excavating

business income. Petitioner timely paid more than her share of
 - 14 -

the joint tax liabilities in full through withholdings from her

salary. Petitioner did not own any part of or have any control

over Mr. Ogonoski’s finances or business.

The legal obligation factor is neutral or inapplicable in

this case because petitioner is not divorced or separated and

there is no agreement between petitioner and Mr. Ogonoski

regarding responsibility for payment of the unpaid liabilities.

The primary reason we deny petitioner relief is that

petitioner knew or had reason to know Mr. Ogonoski would not pay

the reported liabilities when the returns were signed and filed.

Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra, characterizes this factor as “an

extremely strong factor” weighing against relief.

In order for the no-knowledge-or-reason-to-know factor to be

present, petitioner must establish (1) that at the time she

signed the joint returns for each of the years at issue, she had

no knowledge or reason to know that the tax reported in each of

those returns would not be paid, and (2) that it was reasonable

for her to believe Mr. Ogonoski would pay the tax reported on

each return. See Collier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-144.

Petitioner admitted several times in her petition and brief

that she knew at the times the returns were signed and filed that

the tax liabilities were not being paid on or before the due date

because the “same pattern” of not paying the tax liabilities

reported on the returns “existed in the past”. See, e.g.,

Feldman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-201 (when the 1997
 - 15 -

return was filed, the requesting spouse was aware that no

estimated tax payments had been made on the 1997 liabilities and

that only a $500 payment was made at the time of filing; the

requesting spouse thus had actual knowledge of the unpaid

liabilities for 1997 at the time the return was filed).

There is no record evidence Mr. Ogonoski promised petitioner

he would pay the tax liabilities reported on their returns or

that he deceived her into believing he would do so. Each return

as filed showed a balance due. Yet petitioner continued to sign

and file joint returns with Mr. Ogonoski for the 11 consecutive

years for which she originally requested relief. It was

unreasonable for her to believe Mr. Ogonoski would suddenly

change his “pattern” and pay the reported tax liabilities just

because he had paid the back taxes once before. Without any

knowledge of whether Mr. Ogonoski’s financial circumstances would

enable him to pay the liabilities, petitioner’s professed belief

that he would do so amounts to a triumph of hope over experience

in which neither we nor respondent are required to join. In

continuing to sign and file joint returns with Mr. Ogonoski

showing taxes due, petitioner assumed the risk that she would be

called upon to satisfy the joint liabilities shown on those

returns.

When petitioner realized Mr. Ogonoski was not paying his

share of their tax liabilities, she could have protected herself

from liability by filing separate returns. Petitioner claims to
 - 16 -

believe a married couple should file joint income tax returns.4

We note, however, that in exchange for assuming joint and several

liability for Mr. Ogonoski’s taxes by filing jointly, petitioner

became entitled to and received certain tax advantages. We

explained the reason for the provisions establishing joint and

several liability in Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373,

380-381 (1971), as follows:

It is important that these provisions be kept in
proper perspective. The filing of a joint return is
a highly valuable privilege to husband and wife since
the resulting tax liability is generally
substantially less than the combined taxes that would
be due from both spouses if they had filed separate
returns. This circumstance gives particular emphasis
to the statutory rule that liability with respect to
tax is joint and several, regardless of the source of
the income or of the fact that one spouse may be far
less informed about the contents of the return than
the other, for both spouses ordinarily benefit from
the reduction in tax that ensues by reason of the
joint return. * * *

See also Murphy v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 111, 117 (1994).

When petitioner voluntarily signed the returns with the

knowledge of Mr. Ogonoski’s “pattern” of nonpayment, petitioner

assumed the risk Mr. Ogonoski would not pay the reported

liabilities.

4
Petitioner cannot persuasively claim she was unaware she
could file separately from Mr. Ogonoski because the instructions
to Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, inform married
taxpayers they have the right to file separately, and the Form
1040 that she signed allows the taxpayer to check a box for
“married filing separate return” status. Petitioner’s failure to
know or understand the tax laws is not a defense. See Cheshire v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183, 198 (2000), affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th
Cir. 2002).
 - 17 -

Petitioner knew the amount of the reported tax liability and

balance due on each return because she signed and helped prepare

the returns. Petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the tax

consequences of signing the returns with reported tax liabilities

that were unpaid. See Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 197

(quoting Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 n.8 (11th

Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1988-63).

Petitioner claims that excess tax was withheld from her

wages. In return for the privilege of filing jointly, any excess

withholdings from petitioner’s wages were credited to

petitioner’s and Mr. Ogonoski’s unpaid tax liabilities, which is

reflected on the “Amount You Owe” line in each of petitioner’s

Forms 1040.

Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, lists the following two

factors whose presence the Commissioner weighs in favor of

granting relief and whose absence the Commissioner treats as

neutral: (1) The requesting spouse is separated or divorced from

the nonrequesting spouse; and (2) the requesting spouse was

abused by the nonrequesting spouse.

The marriage factor is neutral or inapplicable under Rev.

Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, because at all relevant times,

petitioner and Mr. Ogonoski were married and lived together as

husband and wife.

The abuse factor is neutral because there was no evidence

Mr. Ogonoski physically or mentally abused petitioner in any
 - 18 -

sense to which the tax law or common experience will accord any

recognition.

Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, lists the following two

factors whose presence the Commissioner weighs against granting

relief and whose absence the Commissioner treats as neutral: (1)

The requesting spouse significantly benefited (beyond normal

support) from the unpaid liability, and (2) the requesting spouse

has not made a good faith effort to comply with Federal income

tax laws in the tax years following the tax year to which the

request for relief relates.

Although there is no record evidence to establish that Mr.

Ogonoski failed to contribute any of his financial resources,

including any of his separate funds attributable to the unpaid

taxes, to their household for basic living expenses or to pay the

mortgage on their $71,000 house, such payments are not lavish

expenditures beyond what is required for petitioner’s normal

support. See, e.g., Foley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-16.

There is no evidence Mr. Ogonoski gave petitioner any money in

excess of the amounts petitioner required for normal support.

Because Mr. Ogonoski controlled the finances of his excavation

business and had his own checking accounts related to his

business that petitioner did not control or have access to,

petitioner was unable to stop Mr. Ogonoski from using for his own

personal purposes the funds made available by his failures to pay

the taxes due. As stated above, Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra,
 - 19 -

states that the significant benefit factor can only favor the

Commissioner. In contrast, in cases decided under old section

6013(e) in which the spouse seeking relief did not significantly

benefit from the omitted income or erroneous deductions

attributable to the other spouse, the fact that the taxpayer did

not significantly benefit weighed in favor of granting relief.

See, e.g., Belk v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 434, 440-441 (1989);

Foley v. Commissioner, supra. We conclude that this factor

favors petitioner. See Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. ___, ___

(2004) (slip op. at 22-23); Ferrarese v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2002-249.

The noncompliance factor weighs against granting relief.

Petitioner failed to make a good faith effort to comply with

Federal income tax laws in the tax years following 1989 though

1997, the tax years for which she requests relief. Petitioner

continued to help prepare, sign, and file tax returns for 1998

and 1999 without paying the reported liabilities on those returns

even though she was painfully aware of the “pattern” of

nonpayment for returns before 1998.

With respect to the factors under Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec.

4.03, two factors weigh in favor of relief, three factors weigh

against relief, and the other factors are neutral. Petitioner

fails to satisfy any of the three conditions required for relief

under Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02.
 - 20 -

Petitioner knew or had reason to know at the time she signed

the returns that Mr. Ogonoski would not pay the reported

liabilities on time, which is “an extremely strong factor”

against relief. We find no abuse of discretion in respondent’s

determination that petitioner and Mr. Ogonoski are jointly liable

to pay their substantial joint tax liabilities, estimated tax and

nonpayment penalties, and accumulated interest. Because

petitioner knew the taxes were not being paid currently and might

not be paid in the future, she assumed the risk that she would be

called upon to pay the remaining joint liabilities should

respondent attempt to collect them from her. Considering all the

facts and circumstances and applying the relevant conditions and

factors under Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra, as a whole, we hold

respondent did not abuse his discretion, i.e., he did not act

arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound basis in fact, in

denying petitioner’s request for equitable relief under section

6015(f).5 We sustain respondent’s determination denying relief

under section 6015(f).

Issue 2. Period of Limitation

Petitioner asks us to decide whether the period of

limitation for collection of her 1989 unpaid tax liability has

5
This is not a case like Foor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2004-54, in which the presence of a whole panoply of factors
favoring relief overcame the significance of the taxpayer’s
reason to know the reported tax liabilities would not be paid.
See Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 150-151 (2003).
 - 21 -

expired. Respondent contends we do not have jurisdiction under

section 6015(e) to review this issue.

We are a court of limited jurisdiction and may exercise our

power only to the extent authorized by Congress. Gati v.

Commissioner, 113 T.C. 132, 133 (1999); Naftel v. Commissioner,

85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985).

In her stand-alone petition, petitioner invoked our

jurisdiction under section 6015(e) to review respondent’s denial

of her request for relief from joint and several liability.

Section 6015(e)(1) limits our jurisdiction to reviewing

respondent’s denial of the specific relief contemplated under

section 6015. See Block v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 62, 64-65

(2003); Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 499; Butler v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 290. We do not have jurisdiction to

decide whether the period of limitation has expired because

petitioner’s request that we review the limitation issue goes

beyond the specific relief contemplated by section 6015. See

Block v. Commissioner, supra.6

To reflect the foregoing,

6
Although our lack of jurisdiction precludes us from
deciding the limitation issue, we are satisfied the 10-year
period of limitation on petitioner’s 1989 tax liability, see sec.
6502(a)(1), has been substantially extended as a result of
petitioner’s and Mr. Ogonoski’s filing petitions for bankruptcy
in 1992 and 1993, see sec. 6503(h), and remains extended by the
pendency of this proceeding, see sec. 6015(e)(2).
- 22 -

Decision will be entered

for respondent.