Yazzie v. Comm'r

T.C. Memo. 2004-233

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

LUCINDA A. YAZZIE, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 15422-03L. Filed October 13, 2004.

P filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to
sec. 6330, I.R.C., in response to a determination by R
that levy action was appropriate.

Held: Because P has advanced solely groundless
complaints in dispute of the notice of intent to levy,
R’s determination to proceed with collection action is
sustained.

Held, further, damages under sec. 6673, I.R.C.,
are due from P and are awarded to the United States in
the amount of $2,000.

Lucinda A. Yazzie, pro se.

Stephen S. Ash, for respondent.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

WHERRY, Judge: This case is before the Court on

respondent’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121 and

to impose a penalty under section 6673.1 The instant proceeding

arises from a petition for judicial review filed in response to a

Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under

Section 6320 and/or 6330. The issues for decision are:

(1) Whether respondent may proceed with collection action as so

determined, and (2) whether the Court should impose a penalty

under section 6673.

Background

Petitioner filed a Federal income tax return for the 1999

taxable year reporting zero liability. Respondent issued to

petitioner a statutory notice of deficiency for 1999 on January

18, 2002. Respondent determined a deficiency of $10,380 and an

accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) in the amount of

$594. Petitioner responded to the notice on February 20, 2002,

with a letter acknowledging her receipt of the notice and her

right to file a petition with the Tax Court but stating, inter

alia: “Before I file, pay, or do anything with respect to your

‘Notice,’ I must first establish whether or not it was sent

1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and all Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
 - 3 -

pursuant to law, whether or not it has the ‘force and effect of

law,’ and whether you had any authority to send me the notice in

this first place.” Also on February 20, 2002, and again in

connection with her receipt of the notice, petitioner sent

letters espousing her position that no law established liability

for income taxes or required her to file a return to various

Government officials, including Charles O. Rossotti, Commissioner

of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Paul O’Neil, Secretary of

the Treasury, and Congressman Jon Kyl of Arizona.

Petitioner at no time petitioned this Court for

redetermination of the deficiency and penalty reflected in the

notice. Respondent assessed tax, penalty, and interest amounts

due for 1999 on July 22, 2002, and sent a notice of balance due

on that date.

On December 21, 2002, respondent issued to petitioner a

Final Notice of Intent To Levy and Notice of Your Right To a

Hearing with respect to her unpaid liabilities for 1999.

Petitioner timely submitted to respondent a Form 12153, Request

for a Collection Due Process Hearing, with multiple attachments,

setting forth her disagreement with the proposed levy. On the

Form 12153 itself petitioner wrote: “I do not owe taxes. I am

not liable to pay taxes.” Through the attachments to the Form

12153, petitioner disputed the validity of, and requested that

the Appeals officer have at the hearing copies of documents
 - 4 -

pertaining to, among other things, the underlying tax liability,

the assessment, the notice and demand for payment, and the

verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any

applicable law or procedure had been met. The attachments also

include the following statement: “This is also to remind you

that I will be tape recording the CDP hearing. I will also have

a court reporter.”

Settlement Officer Angela M. Carmouche (Ms. Carmouche), of

the IRS Office of Appeals in Phoenix, Arizona, sent petitioner a

letter dated June 1, 2003, scheduling a hearing for June 26,

2003. The letter briefly outlined the hearing process, advised

that audio or stenographic recording of hearings was not allowed,

and explained the circumstances in which challenges to the

underlying liability would be barred by section 6330(c)(2)(B).

The letter also warned petitioner with respect to frivolous

arguments and sanctions therefor, citing pertinent cases and

administrative materials. Ms. Carmouche enclosed with the letter

copies of Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments and

Other Specified Matters, for 1999; of Pierson v. Commissioner,

115 T.C. 576 (2000); and of Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35

(2000).

At the request of petitioner, the hearing was subsequently

rescheduled for July 25, 2003, and a face-to-face conference

between petitioner and Ms. Carmouche was held on that date.
 - 5 -

Following the hearing, respondent on August 14, 2003, issued to

petitioner the aforementioned Notice of Determination Concerning

Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330, sustaining

the proposed levy action. An attachment to the notice addressed

the verification of legal and procedural requirements, the issues

raised by the taxpayer, and the balancing of efficient collection

and intrusiveness. The attachment also described what took place

at the hearing, as follows:

On July 25, 2003, Appeals held a conference with the
taxpayer. Appeals explained the Collections Due
Process proceeding, including further litigation
rights, and clarified that this hearing related to the
1999 Form 1040. The taxpayer stated that she filed a
zero tax return. She wanted verification from the
Secretary that she is liable for taxes and that the
persons [sic] who signed the Statutory Notice of
Deficiency was delegated to do so. She questioned the
“Notice and Demand” and wanted to know if it was
computer-generated or a form that you could get from a
shelf. She questioned the delegation order for the
individual who signed Form 4340. She indicated that
she would be willing to sit down and discuss collection
alternatives, but only when it is established that she
owes a liability. Appeals’ policy of not allowing
recording of conferences was also discussed. She was
told that the policy is being reviewed in light of
recent court decisions, but the policy as of July 25th
was the [sic] ban recording. The taxpayer was given an
information sheet on how to make a Freedom of
Information request. Appeals confirmed that she
received Form 4340 and the court cases that were sent.
The taxpayer was warned of the courts issuing sanctions
again. Appeals also confirmed that she didn’t want to
discuss collection alternatives at this point.

The issues raised by the taxpayer had no merit. She
acknowledged that she received the Statutory Notice of
Deficiency and stated why she didn’t pursue her Tax
Court rights then. She didn’t raise any specific
defect with the assessment process. She didn’t want to
 - 6 -

discuss collection alternatives unless her liability
was proven to her.

Petitioner’s petition disputing the notice of determination

was filed with the Court on September 9, 2003, and reflected an

address in Window Rock, Arizona. Petitioner’s complaints with

respect to the administrative proceedings include the following:

No legitimate hearing under section 6330 ever took place;

petitioner was not permitted to record a hearing; petitioner was

denied the opportunity to raise issues she deemed “relevant”

(e.g., the “existence” of the underlying tax liability); and

requested documentation was not produced (e.g., record of the

assessments, statutory notice and demand for payment, any “valid

notice of deficiency”, various delegations of authority, and

verification from the Secretary that all applicable requirements

were met). Petitioner prays that this Court declare invalid the

August 14, 2003, determination; order the IRS to hold the

statutorily mandated “Collection Due Process Hearing”; order the

IRS to have at the hearing all documents requested by petitioner;

and order the Government to reimburse petitioner for all costs

incurred in submitting the instant petition.2

After the pleadings were closed in this case, respondent

filed the subject motion for summary judgment and to impose a

2
The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks
reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to
sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be further
addressed. See Rule 231.
 - 7 -

penalty under section 6673. Petitioner was directed to file any

response to respondent’s motion on or before September 30, 2004.

Discussion

Rule 121(a) allows a party to move “for a summary

adjudication in the moving party’s favor upon all or any part of

the legal issues in controversy.” Rule 121(b) directs that a

decision on such a motion shall be rendered “if the pleadings,

answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any

other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law.”

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and that he or she is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sundstrand Corp. v.

Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th

Cir. 1994). Facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id. However, where a motion for summary

judgment has been properly made and supported by the moving

party, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or

denials contained in that party’s pleadings but must by

affidavits or otherwise set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Rule 121(d).
 - 8 -

I. Collection Actions

A. General Rules

Section 6331(a) authorizes the Commissioner to levy upon all

property and rights to property of a taxpayer where there exists

a failure to pay any tax liability within 10 days after notice

and demand for payment. Sections 6331(d) and 6330 then set forth

procedures generally applicable to afford protections for

taxpayers in such levy situations. Section 6331(d) establishes

the requirement that a person be provided with at least 30 days’

prior written notice of the Commissioner’s intent to levy before

collection may proceed. Section 6331(d) also indicates that this

notification should include a statement of available

administrative appeals. Section 6330(a) expands in several

respects upon the premise of section 6331(d), forbidding

collection by levy until the taxpayer has received notice of the

opportunity for administrative review of the matter in the form

of a hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals. Section 6330(b)

grants a taxpayer who so requests the right to a fair hearing

before an impartial Appeals officer.

Section 6330(c) addresses the matters to be considered at

the hearing:

SEC. 6330(c). Matters Considered at Hearing.--In
the case of any hearing conducted under this section--

(1) Requirement of investigation.--The
appeals officer shall at the hearing obtain
verification from the Secretary that the
 - 9 -

requirements of any applicable law or
administrative procedure have been met.

(2) Issues at hearing.--

(A) In general.--The person may raise at
the hearing any relevant issue relating to
the unpaid tax or the proposed levy,
including--

(i) appropriate spousal defenses;

(ii) challenges to the
appropriateness of collection actions;
and

(iii) offers of collection
alternatives, which may include the
posting of a bond, the substitution of
other assets, an installment agreement,
or an offer-in-compromise.

(B) Underlying liability.--The person
may also raise at the hearing challenges to
the existence or amount of the underlying tax
liability for any tax period if the person
did not receive any statutory notice of
deficiency for such tax liability or did not
otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such
tax liability.

Once the Appeals officer has issued a determination

regarding the disputed collection action, section 6330(d) allows

the taxpayer to seek judicial review in the Tax Court or a

District Court, depending upon the type of tax. In considering

whether taxpayers are entitled to any relief from the

Commissioner’s determination, this Court has established the

following standard of review:

where the validity of the underlying tax liability is
properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on
a de novo basis. However, where the validity of the
 - 10 -

underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, the
Court will review the Commissioner’s administrative
determination for abuse of discretion. [Sego v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).]

B. Analysis

1. Appeals Hearing

The petition emphasizes petitioner’s claim that she was

denied the collection hearing to which she was entitled and seeks

a remand to Appeals in order to allow a conference to be held.

Relevant caselaw precedent and regulatory authority, however,

indicate that the circumstances here do not render remand

appropriate.

Hearings conducted under section 6330 are informal

proceedings, not formal adjudications. Katz v. Commmissioner,

115 T.C. 329, 337 (2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 41

There exists no right to subpoena witnesses or documents in

connection with section 6330 hearings. Roberts v. Commissioner,

118 T.C. 365, 372 (2002), affd. 329 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2003);

Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166-167 (2002); Davis v.

Commissioner, supra at 41-42. Taxpayers are entitled to be

offered a face-to-face hearing at the Appeals Office nearest

their residence. Where the taxpayer declines to participate in a

proffered face-to-face hearing, hearings may also be conducted

telephonically or by correspondence. Katz v. Commissioner, supra

at 337-338; Dorra v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-16; sec.

301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.
 - 11 -

Furthermore, once a taxpayer has been given a reasonable

opportunity for a hearing but has failed to avail himself or

herself of that opportunity, we have approved the making of a

determination to proceed with collection based on the Appeals

officer’s review of the case file. See, e.g., Taylor v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-25; Leineweber v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2004-17; Armstrong v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-

224; Gougler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-185; Mann v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-48. Thus, a face-to-face meeting

is not invariably required.

Regulations promulgated under section 6330 likewise

incorporate many of the foregoing concepts, as follows:

Q-D6. How are CDP hearings conducted?

A-D6. * * * CDP hearings * * * are informal in
nature and do not require the Appeals officer or
employee and the taxpayer, or the taxpayer’s
representative, to hold a face-to-face meeting. A CDP
hearing may, but is not required to, consist of a face-
to-face meeting, one or more written or oral
communications between an Appeals officer or employee
and the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative, or
some combination thereof. * * *

Q-D7. If a taxpayer wants a face-to-face CDP
hearing, where will it be held?

A-D7. The taxpayer must be offered an opportunity
for a hearing at the Appeals office closest to
taxpayer’s residence or, in the case of a business
taxpayer, the taxpayer’s principal place of business.
If that is not satisfactory to the taxpayer, the
taxpayer will be given an opportunity for a hearing by
correspondence or by telephone. If that is not
satisfactory to the taxpayer, the Appeals officer or
employee will review the taxpayer’s request for a CDP
 - 12 -

hearing, the case file, any other written
communications from the taxpayer (including written
communications, if any, submitted in connection with
the CDP hearing), and any notes of any oral
communications with the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s
representative. Under such circumstances, review of
those documents will constitute the CDP hearing for the
purposes of section 6330(b). [Sec. 301.6330-1(d)(2),
Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.]

This Court has cited the above regulatory provisions with

approval. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, supra; Leineweber

v. Commissioner, supra; Dorra v. Commissioner, supra; Gougler v.

Commissioner, supra.

With respect to the instant matter, the record reflects that

petitioner and Ms. Carmouche participated in a face-to-face

hearing on July 25, 2003. As regards petitioner’s complaints

concerning recording, on July 8, 2003, this Court issued Keene v.

Commissioner, 121 T.C. 8, 19 (2003), in which it was held that

taxpayers are entitled, pursuant to section 7521(a)(1), to audio

record section 6330 hearings. The taxpayer in that case had

refused to proceed when denied the opportunity to record, and we

remanded the case to allow a recorded Appeals hearing. Id.

In contrast, we have distinguished, and declined to remand,

cases where the taxpayer had participated in an Appeals Office

hearing, albeit unrecorded, and where all issues raised by the

taxpayer could be properly decided from the existing record.

E.g., id. at 19-20; Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87;

Durrenberger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v.
 - 13 -

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2003-195. Stated otherwise, cases will not be remanded to

Appeals, nor determinations otherwise invalidated, merely on

account of the lack of a recording when to do so is not necessary

and would not be productive. See, e.g., Frey v. Commissioner,

supra; Durrenberger v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v.

Commissioner, supra; Kemper v. Commissioner, supra; see also

Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001).

A principal scenario falling short of the necessary or

productive standard exists where the taxpayers rely on frivolous

or groundless arguments consistently rejected by this and other

courts. See, e.g., Frey v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v.

Commissioner, supra; Kemper v. Commissioner, supra. Here,

because the contentions advanced by petitioner throughout the

administrative process and before the Court are of this nature,

and because petitioner in fact received an in-person conference,

this case is closely analogous to those just cited. The record

does not indicate that any purpose would be served by remand.

The Court concludes that all pertinent issues relating to the

propriety of the collection determination can be decided through

review of the materials before it.

2. Review of Underlying Liabilities

A statutory notice of deficiency for 1999 was issued to

petitioner, and communications from petitioner reference the
 - 14 -

notice, making clear that this document was received. To the

extent that petitioner has argued that she should nonetheless be

entitled to challenge her underlying liabilities on grounds that

the notice was invalid, due to a lack of a delegation of

authority from the Secretary to the individual at the Ogden

Service Center signing the notices, this contention is without

merit.

The Secretary or his delegate may issue notices of

deficiency. Secs. 6212(a), 7701(a)(11)(B) and (12)(A)(i). The

Secretary’s authority in this matter has been delegated to

District Directors and Directors of Service Centers, and may in

turn be redelegated to officers or employees under the

supervision of such persons. Secs. 301.6212-1(a), 301.7701-9(b)

and (c), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see also Nestor v. Commissioner,

118 T.C. at 165.

Hence, because petitioner received a valid notice of

deficiency and did not timely petition for redetermination, she

is precluded under section 6330(c)(2)(B) from disputing her

underlying tax liabilities in this proceeding. Her remaining

contentions generally challenging the “existence” of any statute

imposing or requiring her to pay income tax warrant no further

comment. See Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th

Cir. 1984) (“We perceive no need to refute these arguments with
 - 15 -

somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so

might suggest that these arguments have some colorable merit.”).

3. Review for Abuse of Discretion

Petitioner has also made various arguments relating to

aspects of the assessment and collection procedures that we

review for abuse of discretion. Action constitutes an abuse of

discretion under this standard where arbitrary, capricious, or

without sound basis in fact or law. Woodral v. Commissioner, 112

T.C. 19, 23 (1999).

As a threshold matter, we point out that petitioner’s

demands and allegations regarding the authority of the individual

issuing the notice of intent to levy are meritless for reasons

substantially identical to those just discussed in connection

with the notice of deficiency. The Secretary or his delegate

(including the Commissioner) may issue collection notices, and

authority to so issue notices regarding liens and to levy upon

property has in turn been delegated to a host of pertinent

collection and compliance personnel. Secs. 6320(a), 6330(a),

7701(a)(11)(B) and 12(A)(i), 7803(a)(2); secs. 301.6320-1(a)(1),

301.6330-1(a)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; Delegation Order No.

191 (Rev. 3; June 11, 2001); Delegation Order No. 196 (Rev. 4;

Oct. 4, 2000); see also Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 263

(2002); Everman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-137.

Additionally, we note that there exists no statutory requirement
 - 16 -

that such collection notices be signed. Everman v. Commissioner,

supra.

Federal tax assessments are formally recorded on a record of

assessment in accordance with section 6203. The Commissioner is

not required to use Form 23C in making an assessment. Roberts v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 369-371. Furthermore, section

6330(c)(1) mandates neither that the Appeals officer rely on a

particular document in satisfying the verification requirement

nor that the Appeals officer actually give the taxpayer a copy of

the verification upon which he or she relied. Craig v.

Commissioner, supra at 262; Nestor v. Commissioner, supra at 166.

A Form 4340, for instance, constitutes presumptive evidence

that a tax has been validly assessed pursuant to section 6203.

Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 40 (and cases cited thereat).

Consequently, absent a showing by the taxpayer of some

irregularity in the assessment procedure that would raise a

question about the validity of the assessments, a Form 4340

reflecting that tax liabilities were assessed and remain unpaid

is sufficient to support collection action under section 6330.

Id. at 40-41. We have specifically held that it is not an abuse

of discretion for an Appeals officer to rely on Form 4340, Nestor

v. Commissioner, supra at 166; Davis v. Commissioner, supra at

41, or a computer transcript of account, Schroeder v.
 - 17 -

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-190; Mann v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-48, to comply with section 6330(c)(1).

Here, the record contains a Form 4340 for 1999, dated April

21, 2003, indicating that assessments were made for the year and

that taxes remain unpaid. Petitioner has cited no irregularities

that would cast doubt on the information recorded thereon.

In addition to the specific dictates of section 6330, the

Secretary, upon request, is directed to furnish to the taxpayer a

copy of pertinent parts of the record of assessment setting forth

the taxpayer’s name, the date of assessment, the character of the

liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the

amounts assessed. Sec. 6203; sec. 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin.

Regs. A taxpayer receiving a copy of Form 4340 has been provided

with all the documentation to which he or she is entitled under

section 6203 and section 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs.

Roberts v. Commissioner, supra at 370 n.7. This Court likewise

has upheld collection action where taxpayers were provided with

literal transcripts of account (so-called MFTRAX). See, e.g.,

Frank v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-88; Swann v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2003-70. The June 1, 2003, letter to petitioner from

Ms. Carmouche enclosed a copy of Form 4340.

Furthermore, arguments similar to petitioner’s statements

concerning copies of the tax returns from which assessments were

made have been summarily rejected. See, e.g., Bethea v.
 - 18 -

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-278; Fink v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2003-61. The Court concludes that petitioner’s complaints

regarding the assessments and verification are meritless.

Petitioner has denied receiving the notice and demand for

payment that section 6303(a) establishes should be given within

60 days of the making of an assessment. However, a notice of

balance due constitutes a notice and demand for payment within

the meaning of section 6303(a). Craig v. Commissioner, supra at

262-263. The Form 4340 indicates that petitioner was sent such a

notice of balance due for the tax year involved.

Petitioner has also attempted to raise section 7401 as a

defense. Section 7401 directs that no civil action for, inter

alia, collection or recovery of taxes shall be commenced unless

authorized or sanctioned by the Secretary, and the Attorney

General or his delegate directs that the action be commenced.

This section has no bearing on the instant proceeding in that the

filing of a notice of Federal tax lien under section 6323 and the

levying upon property under section 6331 are administrative

actions that do not necessitate the institution of a civil suit.

Thus, with respect to those issues enumerated in section

6330(c)(2)(A) and subject to review in collection proceedings for

abuse of discretion, petitioner has not raised any spousal

defenses, valid challenges to the appropriateness of the

collection action, or collection alternatives. As this Court has
 - 19 -

noted in earlier cases, Rule 331(b)(4) states that a petition for

review of a collection action shall contain clear and concise

assignments of each and every error alleged to have been

committed in the notice of determination and that any issue not

raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed conceded. See

Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. at 185-186; Goza v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 183 (2000). For completeness, we

have addressed various points advanced by petitioner during the

administrative process, but the items listed in section

6330(c)(2)(A) were not pursued even during those proceedings.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that respondent’s determination

to proceed with collection of petitioner’s tax liabilities was

not an abuse of discretion.

II. Section 6673 Penalty

Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to require the

taxpayer to pay a penalty not in excess of $25,000 when it

appears to the Court that, inter alia, proceedings have been

instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or

that the taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is frivolous or

groundless. In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 581, the

Court warned that taxpayers abusing the protections afforded by

sections 6320 and 6330 through the bringing of dilatory or

frivolous lien or levy actions will face sanctions under section

6673. The Court has since repeatedly disposed of cases premised
 - 20 -

on arguments akin to those raised herein summarily and with

imposition of the section 6673 penalty. See, e.g., Craig v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 264-265 (and cases cited thereat).

With respect to the instant matter, we are convinced that

petitioner instituted this proceeding primarily for delay.

Throughout the administrative and pretrial process, petitioner

advanced contentions and demands previously and consistently

rejected by this and other courts. She submitted lengthy

communications quoting, citing, using out of context, and

otherwise misapplying portions of the Internal Revenue Code,

regulations, court decisions, and other authorities. Moreover,

petitioner was, before this case was filed, explicitly alerted to

Pierson v. Commisssioner, supra, and use of sanctions in

analogous situations.

Hence, petitioner received fair warning but has persisted in

frivolously disputing respondent’s determination. The Court

concludes that a penalty of $2,000 should be awarded to the

United States in this case. To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order

granting respondent’s motion

and decision for respondent

will be entered.