T.C. Memo. 2004-261
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MARY A. GEORGE, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 2380-03. Filed November 16, 2004.
Mary A. George, pro se.
Brianna J. Basaraba, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WELLS, Judge: Respondent determined that petitioner was not
entitled to equitable relief pursuant to section 6015(f) for
petitioner’s 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 tax years.1
The issue to be decided is whether respondent’s denial of
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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petitioner’s request for equitable relief pursuant to section
6015(f) was an abuse of discretion.
The parties have submitted the instant case fully
stipulated, without trial, pursuant to Rule 122. The parties’
stipulations of fact are incorporated herein by reference and are
found as facts in the instant case.
At the time of filing her petition, petitioner resided in
Atlanta, Georgia.
During the years in issue, petitioner was married to James
George. Both petitioner and Mr. George held master’s degrees.
Petitioner was employed as a school teacher, and Mr. George was
employed by Georgia Power Company. In addition to his regular
employment, Mr. George entered a business venture in 1998 to
build and sell single-family homes.
Petitioner and Mr. George failed to timely file income tax
returns for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. Mr. George,
however, periodically told petitioner that he had timely filed
the tax returns for those years and had paid the related tax
liabilities, and respondent concedes that petitioner believed Mr.
George had done so.
Mr. George died in October of 1999, and petitioner was
appointed to represent Mr. George’s estate. While assembling
financial records of the estate, petitioner discovered that tax
returns for 1994 through 1998 had not been filed. Therefore,
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petitioner hired an accountant to prepare such returns. Joint
returns for 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 were signed by petitioner
on March 14, 2000, and received by respondent on March 21, 2000,
and a joint return for 1998 was signed by petitioner on March 14,
2000, and received by respondent on March 20, 2000. The
accountant also prepared a joint return for 1999, which
petitioner timely filed. The foregoing joint tax returns,
collectively referred to as the returns, showed the following
amounts due for the respective years:
Tax Year Tax Liability
1994 $8,119
1995 7,862
1996 10,037
1
1997 4,447
1998 19,488
1999 3,740
1
Respondent subsequently corrected a math error and
increased the balance due for 1997 to $4,873.
No portion of the amounts shown as due on the returns was paid at
the time of filing.
Respondent assessed petitioner’s Federal income taxes based
on the returns. The sum of tax, penalties, and interest assessed
against petitioner for the years in issue exceeds $115,000.
Respondent received from petitioner a Form 8857, Request for
Innocent Spouse Relief, and respondent denied that claim for
relief. Subsequently, respondent denied a request for
reconsideration of respondent’s prior decision and forwarded the
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request to respondent’s Appeals Office. Respondent’s Appeals
Office issued petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning
Request for Relief Under the Equitable Relief Provisions of
Section 6015(f), again denying the requested relief.
We must decide whether respondent’s denial of petitioner’s
request for equitable relief pursuant to section 6015(f) was an
abuse of discretion. Under limited circumstances, a spouse may
qualify for relief from joint and several liability pursuant to
section 6015.
In the instant case, petitioner reported the tax due but
failed to make timely payment. Petitioner’s tax liability,
therefore, arises from neither an understatement nor a
deficiency. Based on the foregoing, petitioner concedes that
relief is unavailable under either section 6015(b) or (c).
Section 6015(f) authorizes the Secretary to relieve
taxpayers of joint and several liability where holding the
taxpayer liable would be inequitable and relief is unavailable
under subsections (b) and (c):
Sec. 6015(f). Equitable relief.--
Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if–-
(1) taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
individual liable for any unpaid tax or any
deficiency * * * and
(2) relief is not available to such
individual under subsection (b) or (c),
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the Secretary may relieve such individual of such
liability.
Pursuant to the discretionary authority granted in section
6015(f), respondent has prescribed procedures, set forth in Rev.
Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, for determining whether a spouse
qualifies for equitable relief from joint and several liability.
We have previously applied Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra, in
considering equitable relief requests pursuant to section
6015(f). See, e.g., Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125-
126 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003). The record
demonstrates that respondent applied Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra,
to evaluate petitioner’s application for equitable relief in the
instant case.
We review respondent’s denial of petitioner’s claim for
equitable relief pursuant to section 6015(f) for abuse of
discretion. Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 291-292
(2000). Consequently, we decide in the instant case whether
respondent acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound
basis in fact in denying the requested relief. Jonson v.
Commissioner, supra at 125. Petitioner bears the burden of proof
as to whether respondent’s denial of such relief was an abuse of
discretion. See Rule 142(a). We are not limited to matters
contained in respondent’s administrative record when deciding the
issue. Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32, 35-44 (2004).
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Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, sets
forth seven threshold conditions2 that must be satisfied before
2
Section 4. General Conditions for Relief
.01 Eligibility to be considered for equitable relief. All
the following threshold conditions must be satisfied before the
Service will consider a request for equitable relief under
§ 6015(f). * * * The threshold conditions are as follows:
(1) The requesting spouse filed a joint return for the
taxable year for which relief is sought;
(2) Relief is not available to the requesting spouse
under § 6015(b) or 6015(c);
(3) The requesting spouse applies for relief no later
than two years after the date of the Service’s first
collection activity after July 22, 1998, with respect to the
requesting spouse;
(4) Except as provided in the next sentence, the
liability remains unpaid. A requesting spouse is eligible
to be considered for relief in the form of a refund of
liabilities for: (a) amounts paid on or after July 22,
1998, and on or before April 15, 1999; and (b) installment
payments, made after July 22, 1998, pursuant to an
installment agreement entered into with the Service and with
respect to which an individual is not in default, that are
made after the claim for relief is requested;
(5) No assets were transferred between the spouses
filing the joint return as part of a fraudulent scheme by
such spouses;
(6) There were no disqualified assets transferred to
the requesting spouse by the nonrequesting spouse. If there
were disqualified assets transferred to the requesting
spouse by the nonrequesting spouse, relief will be available
only to the extent that the liability exceeds the value of
such disqualified assets. For this purpose, the term
“disqualified asset” has the meaning given such term by §
6015(c)(4)(B); and
(continued...)
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the Secretary will consider any request for equitable relief
pursuant to section 6015(f). In the instant case, respondent
concedes that petitioner satisfied the seven threshold
conditions.
Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, provides
that equitable relief will ordinarily be granted if the seven
threshold conditions and each of the following three elements
(collectively referred to hereinafter as the three elements) are
satisfied:
(a) At the time relief is requested, the
requesting spouse is no longer married to, or is
legally separated from, the nonrequesting spouse, or
has not been a member of the same household as the
nonrequesting spouse at any time during the 12-month
period ending on the date relief was requested [the
first element];
(b) At the time the return was signed, the
requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know
that the tax would not be paid. The requesting spouse
must establish that it was reasonable for the
requesting spouse to believe that the nonrequesting
spouse would pay the reported liability. If a
requesting spouse would otherwise qualify for relief
under this section, except for the fact that the
requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know of
only a portion of the unpaid liability, then the
requesting spouse may be granted relief only to the
extent that the liability is attributable to such
portion [the second element]; and
(c) The requesting spouse will suffer economic
hardship if relief is not granted. For purposes of
this section, the determination of whether a requesting
2
(...continued)
(7) The requesting spouse did not file the return with
fraudulent intent.
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spouse will suffer economic hardship will be made by
the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s delegate, and
will be based on rules similar to those provided in
§ 301.6343-1(b)(4) of the Regulations on Procedure and
Administration [the third element].
Respondent concedes that petitioner satisfied the first element
because Mr. George was deceased at the time petitioner requested
relief. The parties, however, dispute whether petitioner
satisfied the second and third elements.
The second element is satisfied if the requesting spouse did
not know or have reason to know when the requesting spouse signed
the returns that the taxes would not be paid. Accordingly,
petitioner must establish that it was reasonable for her to
believe that Mr. George would pay the reported liability.
Petitioner contends that she did not know or have reason to
know when she signed the returns in 2000 that the taxes would not
be paid because she believed that Mr. George had settled the tax
liability prior to his death. Petitioner further contends that
she believed that, even if Mr. George did not make the tax
payments as he had claimed, losses related to Mr. George’s
business venture of building and selling single-family homes
might have offset any taxable income. Because Mr. George’s
records were incomplete, petitioner contends that she had no way
of knowing the extent of any such losses.
Although petitioner signed the tax returns in 2000 with each
return showing an amount due, petitioner cites Wiest v.
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Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-91, in support of the proposition
that a taxpayer’s signature on a tax return submitted without
payment does not constitute constructive knowledge by such
taxpayer of an underpayment. Petitioner contends that she did
not review the returns before signing them and that her signature
merely illustrates her knowledge that the returns needed to be
filed as soon as possible, as instructed by her accountant.
Petitioner’s contention is without merit. Petitioner had
reason to know at the time she signed the returns in 2000 that
taxes were due. By signing the joint returns, petitioner is
charged with constructive knowledge of the amounts shown on the
returns as tax due. Castle v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-142.
Failure to review the returns prior to signing does not relieve
petitioner of responsibility for the stated liability. See id.
Additionally, petitioner knew or had reason to know that the
tax liabilities reported in 2000 on her tax returns would not be
paid. In that regard, petitioner’s reliance on Wiest v.
Commissioner, supra, is misplaced. In Wiest, we held that the
spouse requesting relief could reasonably have expected the
nonrequesting spouse to pay the tax liability where the
nonrequesting spouse had already assumed responsibility for
preparing and filing the return. In the instant case, however,
after discovering that the returns for 1994 through 1998 had not
been filed, petitioner did not rely on her spouse to either
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prepare or file the joint returns. On the contrary, petitioner
had access to the couple’s records and directed the preparation
of the joint returns prior to her signing them. Because Mr.
George was deceased at the time petitioner signed the returns in
2000, petitioner at that time could not have relied on her spouse
to pay the liability. Furthermore, as the personal
representative of Mr. George’s estate, petitioner had reason to
know that the liability had not been paid by the estate of Mr.
George.
After petitioner already had learned that Mr. George’s
statements to her with regard to his filing the returns were
false, petitioner could not have reasonably relied on statements
made by Mr. George that he had paid the tax liabilities.
Petitioner had significant education and access to the couple’s
financial records. Additionally, petitioner could have but
apparently did not inquire with respondent as to whether Mr.
George had in fact made estimated tax payments.
Based on the foregoing, we believe that petitioner knew or
had reason to know that the liability would not be paid.
The third element is satisfied if the requesting spouse will
suffer economic hardship if relief is not granted. The Secretary
is directed to base the determination of whether a requesting
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spouse will suffer economic hardship on rules similar to those
provided in section 301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs.3
3
(4) Economic hardship.
(i) General rule. * * * This condition applies if
satisfaction * * * will cause an individual taxpayer to be unable
to pay his or her reasonable basic living expenses. The
determination of a reasonable amount for basic living expenses
will be made by the director and will vary according to the
unique circumstances of the individual taxpayer. Unique
circumstances, however, do not include the maintenance of an
affluent or luxurious standard of living.
(ii) Information from taxpayer. In determining a reasonable
amount for basic living expenses the director will consider any
information provided by the taxpayer including –-
(A) The taxpayer’s age, employment status and history,
ability to earn, number of dependents, and status as a
dependent of someone else;
(B) The amount reasonably necessary for food, clothing,
housing (including utilities, home-owner insurance, home-
owner dues, and the like), medical expenses (including
health insurance), transportation, current tax payments
(including federal, state, and local), alimony, child
support, or other court-ordered payments, and expenses
necessary to the taxpayer’s production of income (such as
dues for a trade union or professional organization, or
child care payments which allow the taxpayer to be gainfully
employed);
(C) The cost of living in the geographic area in which
the taxpayer resides;
(D) The amount of property exempt from levy which is
available to pay the taxpayer’s expenses;
(E) Any extraordinary circumstances such as special
education expenses, a medical catastrophe, or natural
disaster; and
(F) Any other factor that the taxpayer claims bears on
economic hardship and brings to the attention of the
director.
(continued...)
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Petitioner contends that she will suffer economic hardship
if she is not granted relief pursuant to section 6015(f).
Respondent received from petitioner a questionnaire, Form 886-A,
in which petitioner reported that she was employed as a teacher,
with an annual salary of approximately $48,000.4 Petitioner also
reported on Form 886-A approximately $1,000 of annual income from
dividends and interest.5 Petitioner reported her current monthly
income on her Form 886-A as $3,500 and her current monthly
3
(...continued)
(iii) Good faith requirement. In addition, in order to
obtain a release of a levy under this subparagraph, the taxpayer
must act in good faith. Examples of failure to act in good
faith include, but are not limited to, falsifying financial
information, inflating actual expenses or costs, or failing to
make full disclosure of assets.
4
The Dekalb County Board of Education reported the following
compensation to petitioner on Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement
(W-2), for each of the years in question:
1994 $39,128.29
1995 41,969.06
1996 43,429.00
1997 44,947.00
1998 47,823.60
1999 48,572.22
5
On her joint returns for the years in question, petitioner
reported the following dividend and interest income:
Dividend Income Interest Income
1994 $811 $144
1995 589 92
1996 1,272 1,500
1997 1,406 2,372
1998 1,011 32,591
1999 1,476 2,991
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expenses as $3,775. Petitioner’s stated monthly expenses
included the following:
Monthly Expenses
Mortgage payments $1,250
Utilities 375
Food 400
Clothing 150
Vehicle 250
Entertainment 200
Insurance 150
Charity 500
Gifts, travel, miscellaneous 500
Total 3,775
Petitioner notes that her situation has changed in several
respects since she submitted the Form 886-A. Petitioner is no
longer employed.6 In lieu of the annual salary reported on the
Form 886-A, petitioner has received a monthly pension of $2,000
since her retirement. Petitioner also states that she paid off a
second mortgage on her home.
On June 3, 2003, petitioner provided respondent with
documentation regarding her assets. Petitioner disclosed to
respondent a net worth of $315,000, including a $25,000 checking
account, a $250,000 IRA, and $45,000 of equity in her home.
Petitioner contends that full payment of the tax liabilities
would require a distribution of approximately $210,000 from her
IRA account, leaving a balance of approximately $100,000.
6
Petitioner states in petitioner’s brief that she is
considering a resumption of her teaching career.
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We conclude that satisfaction of the tax liabilities in
issue will not cause petitioner to be unable to pay reasonable
basic living expenses. Although petitioner may not be currently
employed, she states in her brief that she is considering a
return to the workforce to resume her teaching career.7
Petitioner is well educated, and she has posited no reason why
she could not be expected to earn income comparable to her 1999
salary of $48,572. Also, petitioner’s reasonable basic living
expenses are significantly less than the $3,775 listed on
petitioner’s Form 886-A. In the absence of more detailed
itemization, we do not consider her monthly expenses of $200 for
entertainment, $500 for charity, and $500 for gifts and travel to
be basic living expenses. Furthermore, petitioner’s mortgage
payments have presumably been reduced since petitioner paid off
the second mortgage on her home.
Even if petitioner were to be unable to resume her
employment, we believe that petitioner could liquidate a portion
of the IRA inherited from Mr. George in order to pay her tax
liabilities without causing her to be unable to pay reasonable
basic living expenses. The IRA provides petitioner with a
payment source independent of her compensation and retirement
pension.
7
Petitioner’s brief states that she is 55 years old.
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Therefore, we conclude that petitioner would not suffer
economic hardship if relief were not granted.
Because petitioner does not satisfy each of the three
elements, petitioner does not qualify for relief pursuant to Rev.
Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02.
Where the seven threshold conditions are satisfied but
relief is unavailable because the three elements are not
satisfied, the Secretary is authorized to grant relief if it
would be inequitable under the facts and circumstances to hold
the requesting spouse liable for the unpaid liability
(hereinafter, the facts and circumstances test). Rev. Proc.
2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. at 448. The facts and
circumstances test provides a partial list of positive and
negative factors to be taken into account in determining whether
to grant relief under section 6015(f).
The facts and circumstances test provides the following
positive factors weighing in favor of relief:
(1) Factors weighing in favor of relief. The
factors weighing in favor of relief include, but are
not limited to, the following:
(a) Marital status. The requesting spouse is
separated (whether legally separated or living
apart) or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse
[the marital status positive factor].
(b) Economic hardship. The requesting spouse
would suffer economic hardship (within the meaning
of section 4.02(1)(c) of this revenue procedure)
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if relief from the liability is not granted [the
economic hardship positive factor].
(c) Abuse. The requesting spouse was abused
by the nonrequesting spouse, but such abuse did
not amount to duress [the abuse positive factor].
(d) No knowledge or reason to know. In the
case of a liability that was properly reported but
not paid, the requesting spouse did not know and
had no reason to know that the liability would not
be paid [the knowledge positive factor].
(e) Nonrequesting spouse’s legal obligation.
The nonrequesting spouse has a legal obligation
pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement to pay
the outstanding liability [the nonrequesting
spouse’s legal obligation positive factor].
(f) Attributable to nonrequesting spouse.
The liability for which relief is sought is solely
attributable to the nonrequesting spouse [the
liability attribution positive factor].
As to the marital status positive factor, petitioner’s
marital status weighs in favor of relief because Mr. George was
deceased at the time petitioner sought equitable relief. The
economic hardship positive factor does not weigh in favor of
relief. As stated above, we do not believe that petitioner would
suffer economic hardship if relief from the tax liabilities were
not granted. The abuse positive factor does not weigh in favor
of relief. On her Form 886-A, petitioner conceded that marital
abuse does not apply.
The knowledge positive factor does not weigh in favor of
relief. As stated above, we believe that petitioner knew or had
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reason to know at the time of filing the tax returns in 2000 that
the tax liabilities would not be paid.
The nonrequesting spouse’s legal obligation positive factor
does not weigh in favor of relief. On her Form 886-A, petitioner
stated that neither petitioner nor Mr. George entered into any
enforceable agreements related to the payment of the tax
liabilities.
The liability attribution positive factor does not weigh in
favor of relief. Petitioner concedes that the liability for
which relief is sought is not solely attributable to Mr. George.
The facts and circumstances test provides the following
negative factors weighing against relief:
(2) Factors weighing against relief. The factors
weighing against relief include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(a) Attributable to the requesting spouse.
The unpaid liability or item giving rise to the
deficiency is attributable to the requesting
spouse [the liability attribution negative
factor].
(b) Knowledge, or reason to know. A
requesting spouse knew or had reason to know of
the item giving rise to a deficiency or that the
reported liability would be unpaid at the time the
return was signed [the knowledge negative factor].
This is an extremely strong factor weighing
against relief. Nonetheless, when the factors in
favor of equitable relief are unusually strong, it
may be appropriate to grant relief under § 6015(f)
in limited situations where a requesting spouse
knew or had reason to know that the liability
would not be paid, and in very limited situations
where the requesting spouse knew or had reason to
know of an item giving rise to a deficiency.
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(c) Significant benefit. The requesting
spouse has significantly benefitted (beyond normal
support) from the unpaid liability * * * [the
significant benefit negative factor].
(d) Lack of economic hardship. The
requesting spouse will not experience economic
hardship (within the meaning of section 4.02(1)(c)
of this revenue procedure) if relief from the
liability is not granted [the lack of economic
hardship negative factor].
(e) Noncompliance with federal income laws.
The requesting spouse has not made a good faith
effort to comply with federal income tax laws in
the tax years following the tax year or years to
which the request for relief relates [the tax law
noncompliance negative factor].
(f) Requesting spouse’s legal obligation.
The requesting spouse has a legal obligation
pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement to pay
the liability [the requesting spouse’s legal
obligation negative factor]. [Rev. Proc. 2000-15,
sec. 4.03.]
Regarding the liability attribution negative factor,
petitioner contends that the majority of the unpaid liability is
attributable to Mr. George. In a letter to respondent dated July
27, 2001, petitioner’s representative stated that the aggregate
tax liability for the 6 years at issue should be allocated as
follows:
Mr. George Petitioner Combined
Tax $38,819 $13,382 $52,201
Pen./Int. 30,761 12,127 42,888
Total 69,580 25,509 95,089
Petitioner further contends that, if she had filed separate
rather than joint returns, her unpaid liability would total only
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$7,500 for the 6 years in question.8 We conclude that
petitioner’s contention has no merit because petitioner filed
joint returns with Mr. George, and we must base our decision on
the actual facts of the instant case. Consequently, because a
significant portion of the unpaid liability is attributable to
petitioner, the liability attribution negative factor weighs
against relief.
The knowledge negative factor weighs against relief. As
noted above, we believe that petitioner knew or had reason to
know that the reported liabilities would be unpaid at the time
petitioner signed the returns.
The significant benefit negative factor weighs against
relief. “Significant benefit” for purposes of section
6015(b)(1)(D) is defined in section 1.6015-2(d), Income Tax
Regs.:
(d) Inequity. All of the facts and circumstances
are considered in determining whether it is inequitable
to hold a requesting spouse jointly and severally
liable for an understatement. One relevant factor for
this purpose is whether the requesting spouse
significantly benefitted, directly or indirectly, from
the understatement. A significant benefit is any
benefit in excess of normal support. Evidence of
direct or indirect benefit may consist of transfers of
property or rights to property, including transfers
that may be received several years after the year of
the understatement. Thus, for example, if a requesting
spouse receives property (including life insurance
8
Petitioner reaches this amount by subtracting withholding
of $3,750 from $4,250 of estimated annual tax liability and
adding penalties and interest.
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proceeds) from the nonrequesting spouse that is beyond
normal support and traceable to items omitted from
gross income that are attributable to the nonrequesting
spouse, the requesting spouse will be considered to
have received significant benefit from those items.[9]
* * *
Petitioner contends that the only benefit she received from the
understatement was the estimated $750 tax for which she would
have been liable if she had filed separate rather than joint tax
returns. We, however, do not believe that petitioner’s estimated
$750 annual benefit approximates the actual benefit she received
because petitioner filed joint returns. Furthermore, petitioner
concedes that she received from Mr. George a pension of $250,000
(converted by petitioner into an IRA) and life insurance proceeds
9
Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, references sec.
1.6013-5(b), Income Tax Regs., for an explanation of “significant
benefit”. Sec. 1.6013-5(b), Income Tax Regs., effective at the
time Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. at 447, was published but
subsequently replaced, is substantially similar to sec. 1.6015-
2(d), Income Tax Regs., which is currently in effect. Sec.
1.6013-5(b), Income Tax Regs., provided:
normal support is not a significant “benefit” * * *.
Evidence of direct or indirect benefit may consist of
transfers of property, including transfers which may be
received several years after the year in which the
omitted item of income should have been included in
gross income. Thus, for example, if a person seeking
relief receives from his spouse an inheritance of
property or life insurance proceeds which are traceable
to items omitted from gross income by his spouse, that
person will be considered to have benefitted from those
items. Other factors which may also be taken into
account, if the situation warrants, include the fact
that the person seeking relief has been deserted by his
spouse or the fact that he has been divorced or
separated from such spouse.
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of $150,000. Petitioner could have used, but did not, these
resources to pay the liabilities. Moreover, we note that, had
Mr. George paid the joint liabilities during his lifetime, the
funds petitioner received from Mr. George at his death would have
been reduced by those payments. Consequently, petitioner
received a significant benefit beyond normal support.
The lack of economic hardship negative factor weighs against
relief. As noted above, we do not believe that petitioner will
experience economic hardship if relief is not granted.
The tax law noncompliance negative factor weighs against
relief. The record indicates that petitioner had not filed tax
returns for 2000 or 2001 as of April 20, 2002.
The requesting spouse’s legal obligation negative factor
does not weigh against relief. As noted above, petitioner did
not enter an agreement with Mr. George with regard to payment of
the liability.
Taking into account all the facts and circumstances, we
conclude that it would not be inequitable to hold petitioner
liable for the unpaid liability. Petitioner has not carried her
burden to establish that respondent’s denial of equitable relief
pursuant to section 6015(f) was an abuse of discretion.10 We
have considered all of petitioner’s arguments and contentions
10
That the facts of the instant case were fully stipulated
does not relieve petitioner of the burden of proof. Rule 149(b).
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which are not discussed herein, and we find them to be without
merit or irrelevant.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered for
respondent.