T.C. Summary Opinion 2005-69
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DENISE RENEE LINGWALL, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 5031-04S. Filed June 2, 2005.
Denise Renee Lingwall, pro se.
John C. Schmittdiel, for respondent.
KROUPA, Judge: This collection review proceeding was heard
pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal
Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed.1 The
decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and
this opinion should not be cited as authority.
1
Subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code, as amended. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
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This matter is before the Court on respondent’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed pursuant to Rule 121. Respondent
contends that he is entitled to summary judgment that the Office
of Appeals (Appeals Office) did not abuse its discretion in
determining that it was appropriate to file a tax lien against
petitioner with regard to her unpaid Federal income taxes for
1997 and 1998.
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. See Fla. Peach Corp. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be
granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues in
controversy “if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,
depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be
rendered as a matter of law.” Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th
Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988);
Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). The moving
party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue
of material fact, and factual inferences will be read in a manner
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See
Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982).
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As discussed in detail below, we conclude that there is no
dispute as to a material fact in this case and respondent is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Consequently, we shall
grant respondent’s motion.
Background
The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the
following. Petitioner resided in Ham Lake, Minnesota, at the
time the petition was filed. Petitioner filed joint Federal
income tax returns with her now former spouse, Curtis J.
Lingwall, for the taxable years 1997 and 1998, on August 16,
1998, and April 20, 1999, respectively. Although both tax
returns reported taxes due, petitioner and her former spouse
failed to remit payment with the returns.
Petitioner subsequently submitted to respondent a request
for relief from joint and several liability on a joint return for
1997 and 1998. Respondent issued to petitioner on August 15,
2001, a Final Notice denying her request for relief for 1997 and
1998. Petitioner did not file with the Court a petition
challenging respondent’s determination.
Almost 2 years later, on April 17, 2003, respondent issued
to petitioner a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right
to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 regarding her unpaid tax liabilities
for 1997 and 1998. On May 16, 2003, petitioner submitted to
respondent a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process
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Hearing under section 6330, in which she asserted that her former
spouse was responsible for the unpaid taxes.
On February 18, 2004, respondent issued to petitioner a
Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s)
(Determination Notice) that acknowledged petitioner asserted in
her collection hearing request that her former spouse was
responsible for the tax liabilities. Respondent explained,
however, that because petitioner had “been through the Innocent
Spouse claim process, you know that both you and your ex-spouse
are separately responsible for the entire amount of the joint
liability.” The Determination Notice also stated that petitioner
failed to raise an appropriate spousal defense. Respondent
determined in the Determination Notice that the filing of the
notice of Federal tax lien was appropriate.
On March 19, 2004, petitioner filed with the Court a
petition for lien or levy action challenging respondent’s
Determination Notice.2 Petitioner’s sole contention is that she
paid her fair share of the unpaid tax liabilities.
As previously mentioned, respondent filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. Petitioner filed an objection to respondent’s
motion on May 5, 2005, repeating her assertion that her former
spouse is responsible for the tax liabilities.
2
The parties do not dispute that the petition in this case
was timely filed under secs. 6330 and 7502(a).
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Discussion
Lien and Levy Actions
Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States on
all property and rights to property of a person when a demand for
the payment of taxes has been made and the person fails to pay
those taxes. Such a lien arises when the Commissioner makes an
assessment. Sec. 6322. The lien imposed under section 6321 is
not valid, however, against any purchaser, holder of a security
interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien creditor until the
Secretary has filed a notice of Federal tax lien with the
appropriate authorities. Sec. 6323(a); Behling v. Commissioner,
118 T.C. 572, 575 (2002).
Section 6320 provides that the Secretary shall furnish the
person described in section 6321 with written notice of the
filing of a Federal tax lien under section 6323. Such notice
must be provided not more than 5 business days after the day of
the filing of the notice of lien (5-day period). Sec.
6320(a)(2). Section 6320 further provides that the person may
request administrative review of the matter (in the form of an
Appeals Office hearing) within 30 days beginning on the day after
the 5-day period. Section 6320(c) provides that the Appeals
Office hearing generally shall be conducted consistent with the
procedures set forth in section 6330(c), (d), and (e).
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Section 6330(c)(2) outlines the issues that a person may
raise at an administrative hearing. Those issues include
appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness
of the Commissioner's intended collection action, and possible
alternative means of collection. Section 6330(c)(4) bars a
person from raising at an administrative hearing an issue that
was raised and considered at a previous administrative or
judicial proceeding if the person seeking to raise the issue
“participated meaningfully” in such hearing or proceeding.
Section 6330(d) provides for judicial review of the
administrative determination in the Tax Court or Federal district
court, as appropriate.
Claims for Relief From Joint and Several Liability
Section 6013(d)(3) provides that if a husband and wife make
a joint Federal income tax return, “the tax shall be computed on
the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax
shall be joint and several.” Section 6015(a) provides, however,
that, notwithstanding section 6013(d)(3), an individual who has
made a joint return may elect to seek relief from joint and
several liability on such return.
Congress vested this Court with jurisdiction to review a
taxpayer’s election to claim relief from joint and several
liability on a joint return under varying circumstances. See
King v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 118, 121-122 (2000); Corson v.
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Commissioner, 114 T.C. 354, 363-364 (2000). As relevant in this
case, a person may file a so-called stand alone petition seeking
relief from joint and several liability on a joint return in
response to the Commissioner’s final notice disallowing a claim
for relief. See sec. 6015(e)(1); Mora v. Commissioner, 117 T.C.
279 (2001). Such a petition must be filed within 90 days of the
date that the Commissioner mailed the final notice disallowing
relief. Sec. 6015(e)(1)(A).
Analysis
The record in this case reflects that respondent issued a
final notice to petitioner disallowing her claim for relief from
joint and several liability for 1997 and 1998 in August 2001.
Petitioner did not file, however, a petition with the Court
challenging respondent’s determination. Petitioner does not
allege that the final notice was not mailed to her correct
address. In any event, the 90-day period in which petitioner
could have invoked this Court’s jurisdiction under section
6015(e) has long since expired.
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the Appeals Office
correctly determined that section 6330(c)(4) barred petitioner
from attempting to resurrect her claim for relief under section
6015 during her collection review hearing initiated under section
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6320.3 Simply put, petitioner participated in an earlier
administrative proceeding in which respondent determined that she
was not entitled to relief under section 6015. Respondent issued
a final written notice of determination to petitioner explaining
her right to obtain judicial review of respondent’s determination
in the Tax Court. Petitioner failed to avail herself of that
opportunity, however. Moreover, petitioner has not offered any
argument that she did not “meaningfully” participate in the
earlier section 6015 administrative proceeding within the meaning
of section 6330(c)(4). Consistent with the foregoing, we hold
that petitioner is barred by section 6330(c)(4) from attempting
to raise her claim for relief under section 6015 in this
proceeding.
Petitioner has failed to raise any other valid challenge to
respondent’s collection action. There being no other valid issue
for consideration, we shall grant respondent’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered granting
respondent’s motion for summary
judgment.
3
See sec. 301.6320-1(e)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. (“A
taxpayer may raise any appropriate spousal defenses at a CDP
hearing unless the Commissioner has already made a final
determination as to spousal defenses in a statutory notice of
deficiency or final determination letter.”)