T.C. Summary Opinion 2005-86
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JOHN E. AND VICKI D. MORRISSEY, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 5073-04S. Filed July 13, 2005.
John E. and Vicki D. Morrissey, pro sese.
Douglas S. Polsky, for respondent.
KROUPA, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the
provisions of section 74631 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at the time the petition was filed. The decision to be
entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
should not be cited as authority.
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years at issue, unless otherwise indicated.
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Respondent determined deficiencies of $6,225 for 1999,
$6,687 for 2000, and $5,866 for 2001 in petitioners’ Federal
income taxes. The issue to be decided is whether petitioner John
E. Morrissey (petitioner) operated his automobile drag racing
activity for profit during 1999, 2000, and 2001 (the years at
issue). We hold that he did.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are
incorporated by this reference. Petitioners resided in Wetmore,
Kansas, at the time they filed the petition in this case.
Petitioner has been interested in cars throughout his life
and has been involved from time to time in some type of
automobile racing since 1969.
Petitioner graduated from Emporia State University in 1970
with a degree in business administration. His studies included
courses in marketing and mathematics. During the years at issue,
petitioner was the senior vice president and chief financial
officer of Kansas State Bank of Holton, Kansas (the bank), a
full-time position.2 He earned a salary of approximately $58,000
during each of the years at issue. Petitioner also served on the
board of directors of the bank. Petitioner oversaw the bank’s
financial planning, budgeting, and statistical analysis
2
Petitioner Vicki D. Morrissey was also employed full time
at the Wetmore, Kansas, branch of the bank during the years at
issue.
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functions. Petitioner also served on the loan committee and
designed the review mechanism by which the members of the bank’s
loan committee assessed loan applicants.
Petitioner believed that his business degree and technical
skills could be an advantage to him in drag racing. Petitioner
began competing about 1974, beginning with a relatively simple
car and then moving up. Petitioner applied his extensive
knowledge of mechanics, mathematics, and physics to make
important technical modifications to his car. For example,
petitioner installed electronic equipment intended to fine-tune
the car’s reaction time. Petitioner is a skilled mechanic and
was able to perform almost all of the work on his car himself.
Petitioner also kept detailed computer records of his car’s
performance during each race, including weather conditions, heat
times, and records of opponents’ performances. Petitioner
thought these records would help him identify the ideal
attributes of his car to enable him to win races. Petitioner
also often spoke to other competitors and assessed their
strategies. Petitioner also examined less successful competitors
in an attempt to determine why those competitors were not
successful. Petitioner began winning rounds of competition in
1991 and races in 1993.
Petitioner carefully organized his racing schedule to
compete in races where he had the greatest chance of success.
During the years at issue, petitioner raced mainly at
unsanctioned or “outlaw” racetracks, which had lower entry fees
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and typically more prize money. Although the National Hot Rod
Association (NHRA) licensed petitioner in the Super Comp
category, petitioner viewed NHRA-sanctioned events merely as
opportunities to gain exposure for his sponsor. The entry fees
at NHRA-sanctioned events were higher, the prizes were not as
large, and there were many more competitors.
Petitioner prepared detailed budget forecasts and expense
estimates for his racing activity for the years at issue, which
he modified throughout each year as circumstances changed.
Petitioner also kept a separate checking account for his racing
activity.
Petitioner entered eight drag races in 1999, eight drag
races in 2000, and six drag races in 2001. Petitioner’s son also
raced petitioner’s car at some races during the years at issue.
Although the bank employed petitioner full time during the years
at issue, petitioner was able to take the time to attend to the
necessary aspects of his racing, such as repairing his car,
contacting sponsors, and participating in races. The amount of
time these activities took varied according to, for example, the
amount of repairs needed after a race. Petitioner’s wife and son
also assisted petitioner with these activities on occasion.
Petitioner believed that he owned a quality car and used
quality parts in its maintenance. Petitioner hoped that his car
would hold its value as much as possible but did not expect that
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his car would appreciate in value. Petitioner instead focused on
keeping his car in as good a condition as possible so that it
would retain most of its value.
Petitioner knew that a substantial sponsor was essential to
be profitable in drag racing. While some sponsors pay small sums
of money to racers to display the sponsors’ logos on their cars,
petitioner was instead interested in cultivating a mutually
beneficial relationship with a sponsor on a larger scale.
Petitioner successfully secured sponsorship in 1998 by the Sac
and Fox Casino (Sac and Fox) of $15,000 for the year. In
connection with the sponsorship, petitioner purchased a new body
for his car and painted Sac and Fox’s logo on the car.
Petitioner performed various duties for Sac and Fox,
including acting as a representative of Sac and Fox at races, car
shows, and various other public appearances. Petitioner met
patrons and handed out coupons, flyers, and key chains for Sac
and Fox at several public appearances. Petitioner also
coordinated with the Cameron, Missouri, reserve track to sponsor
a race, adding $500 to the purse. Petitioner promoted this race
as the Sac and Fox Casino Quick Eight Race. At the end of the
year, petitioner provided Sac and Fox a detailed race report
listing each of the events petitioner attended as a
representative of Sac and Fox, with notations about each event.
This report indicates petitioner undertook some activity on
behalf of Sac and Fox on 31 days during 1998. Despite
petitioner’s efforts on behalf of Sac and Fox in 1998, Sac and
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Fox did not renew petitioner’s sponsorship for 1999 nor any later
year. Petitioner expected this sponsorship relationship to
continue and did not foresee the termination of Sac and Fox’s
marketing director, who was his primary contact at Sac and Fox.
Petitioner tried to get another sponsorship. Petitioner
contacted Sac and Fox and two other local casinos seeking
sponsorship but was ultimately unsuccessful. Petitioner
continued to race in 1999 despite lacking a sponsor.
Petitioner determined in 2000 that he could not profitably
continue the drag racing operations without sponsorship and
therefore limited his racing activity and offered his car for
sale, intending to liquidate. Much of petitioner’s racing
activity during 2000 and 2001 was intended to market his car to
sell it. Petitioner also offered his car for sale in the
National Dragster Magazine in 2001.
While there were some elements of personal enjoyment in the
drag racing activity, petitioner also indicated there were
aspects to it that he did not enjoy, including the significant
heat on the track and the multiple layers of protective clothing
required.
Petitioner’s drag racing activity produced a loss for each
year from 1991 through 1997. In 1998, petitioner earned a profit
of $587 on gross receipts of $1,400 plus the $15,000 sponsorship.
Petitioner forecasted a profit of $13,040 for 1999 assuming the
Sac and Fox sponsorship would continue and assuming $5,000 of
race winnings. Petitioner had gross receipts of $550 and a net
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loss of $20,348 in 1999, gross receipts of $225 and a net loss of
$22,197 in 2000, and gross receipts of $25 and a net loss of
$18,826 in 2001.
Petitioners deducted expenses relating to the drag racing
activity on their tax returns for the years at issue. Respondent
disallowed the deduction of petitioner’s losses in a notice of
deficiency dated February 5, 2004, determining that petitioner
did not engage in the drag racing activity for profit under
section 183. Petitioners timely filed a petition with this Court
seeking redetermination of the disallowed deductions and
asserting that petitioner entered the drag racing activity with
the intent of making a profit, and that, when he was not able to
make a profit as anticipated, he liquidated the activity.
Discussion
A. Whether Petitioner Operated the Drag Racing Activity for
Profit During the Years at Issue
The sole issue for decision is whether petitioner operated
the drag racing activity for profit during the years at issue
within the meaning of section 183. Section 183(a) provides
generally that if an individual engages in an activity and “if
such activity is not engaged in for profit, no deduction
attributable to such activity shall be allowed under this chapter
except as provided in this section.” Deductions that would be
allowable without regard to whether the activity is engaged in
for profit shall be allowed under section 183(b)(1), and
deductions that would be allowable only if the activity is
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engaged in for profit shall be allowed under section 183(b)(2),
but only to the extent that the gross income from the activity
exceeds the deductions allowable under section 183(b)(1).
Petitioner has the burden of proving that his actual and
honest objective in engaging in the activity was to make a
profit. See Evans v. Commissioner, 908 F.2d 369, 373 (8th Cir.
1990), revg. T.C. Memo. 1988-468; Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 642, 645 (1982), affd. without published opinion 702 F.2d
1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
We begin with the burden of proof. We ruled at trial that
the burden of proof did not shift to respondent under section
74913 because petitioner failed to provide respondent the general
ledgers he maintained during the years at issue as well as his
tax returns for the years prior and subsequent to the years at
issue. Therefore, the burden remains with petitioner.
We now focus on whether petitioner had an actual and honest
profit objective in drag racing. Whether a taxpayer has an
actual and honest profit objective is determined on the basis of
all surrounding facts and circumstances. Dreicer v.
Commissioner, supra at 645; sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs.
While a taxpayer’s expectation of profit need not be reasonable,
there must be a good faith objective of making a profit. Allen
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 28, 33 (1979); sec. 1.183-2(a), Income
3
Sec. 7491 applies to examinations commencing after July 22,
1998, and therefore applies here. See Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001,
112 Stat. 726.
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Tax Regs. We give greater weight to objective facts than to a
taxpayer’s statements of intent. Dreicer v. Commissioner, supra
at 645; sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs.
We structure our analysis around nine nonexclusive factors.
Sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs. The nine factors are: (1) The
manner in which the taxpayer carried on the activity; (2) the
expertise of the taxpayer or his or her advisers; (3) the time
and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity;
(4) the expectation that the assets used in the activity may
appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying
on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer’s
history of income or loss with respect to the activity; (7) the
amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the
financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) whether elements of
personal pleasure or recreation are involved. Id.
No factor or set of factors is controlling, nor is the
existence of a majority of factors favoring or disfavoring a
profit objective necessarily controlling. Hendricks v.
Commissioner, 32 F.3d 94, 98 (4th Cir. 1994), affg. T.C. Memo.
1993-396; Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir.
1984), affg. 78 T.C. 471 (1982); sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax
Regs. The individual facts and circumstances of each case are
the primary test. Keanini v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 41, 46
(1990); Allen v. Commissioner, supra at 34; sec. 1.183-2(b),
Income Tax Regs.
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B. Application of the Factors
1. The Manner in Which the Taxpayer Carried On the
Activity
We begin by examining the manner in which petitioner carried
on the drag racing activity. The fact that a taxpayer carries on
the activity in a businesslike manner may indicate a profit
objective. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. In determining
whether a taxpayer conducted an activity in a businesslike
manner, we consider whether the taxpayer maintained complete and
accurate books and records, whether the activity was conducted in
a manner substantially similar to those of comparable businesses
that are profitable, and whether changes were attempted in an
effort to earn a profit. Engdahl v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 659,
666-667 (1979); sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner conducted the drag racing activity in a
businesslike manner during the years at issue. Petitioner kept a
separate checking account for the drag racing activity, out of
which he paid his expenses and into which he deposited his
earnings. Petitioner also prepared budget forecasts and expense
estimates for each of the years at issue and modified these
projections throughout the year as circumstances changed.
Petitioner had a specific, concrete business plan to profit
from drag racing, the details of which he explained to the Court
in his testimony. Cf. Spear v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-354
(taxpayer alluded in testimony to a plan to realize profit but
did not provide details). Petitioner’s business plan called for
him to obtain substantial sponsorships, to enter NHRA-sanctioned
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races as a means of gaining exposure for his sponsor, and
otherwise to enter unsanctioned races where he had the best
chance of success and the opportunity to win larger prizes.
Petitioner was successful in making a profit as predicted in the
business plan during 1998. Petitioner was not able to earn a
profit as predicted in the business plan, however, during the
years at issue, largely because he had lost his sponsorship and
was unsuccessful in persuading other local businesses to sponsor
him.
When petitioner realized that he was not able to earn a
profit on the drag racing activity as predicted in his business
plan, he decided to liquidate his business and sell his race car.
See Engdahl v. Commissioner, supra at 667; Canale v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-619 (taxpayer’s decision to leave
racing because of its unprofitability supported claim of entering
racing with a profit objective). During the years at issue,
petitioner decreased the number of races he entered and testified
he entered them mainly to market his car. The separate checking
account, specific business plan, budget and expense forecasts,
and decision to modify the activity when it became unprofitable
support petitioner’s contention that he carried on the drag
racing activity in a businesslike manner during the years at
issue.
2. The Expertise of the Taxpayers or Their Advisers
We next consider petitioner’s expertise (or the expertise of
his advisers) in the drag racing activity. Preparing for the
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activity by extensive study of its accepted business, economic
and scientific practices and consulting with experts in these
matters may indicate that a taxpayer has a profit objective when
the taxpayer follows that advice. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(2), Income Tax
Regs.
There is no question that petitioner has significant
expertise in drag racing. Petitioner has been involved in drag
racing since 1969 and began winning rounds of competition in
1991. Petitioner is a skilled mechanic and was able to perform
most of the required work on his car himself. Petitioner studied
the performances of his car and his opponents’ cars (and kept
records of these performances) to determine the ideal
characteristics for his car. Petitioner also often consulted
with competitors to learn about their tactics and strategies.
Petitioner also has considerable business knowledge. He was
the senior vice president and chief financial officer of the bank
during the years at issue. While pursuing his degree in business
administration, petitioner took courses in marketing and
mathematics. These skills proved valuable to petitioner in
creating business plans and budget forecasts and doing the
necessary marketing to obtain a sponsor.
Petitioner has demonstrated that he has significant
knowledge and expertise both in drag racing itself and in the
business world. Petitioner has also shown that he consulted
others to further his knowledge and improve his prospects of
success.
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3. The Time and Effort Expended by the Taxpayer in
Carrying On the Activity
We next consider the time and effort petitioner expended in
carrying on the drag racing activity. A taxpayer’s devotion of
much time and effort to conducting an activity, particularly if
the activity does not have substantial personal or recreational
aspects, may indicate an intention to derive a profit. Sec.
1.183-2(b)(3), Income Tax Regs. The fact that a taxpayer devotes
a limited amount of time to an activity does not necessarily
indicate a lack of profit motive where the taxpayer employs
competent and qualified persons to carry on the activity. Id.
Petitioner expended an adequate amount of time on the drag
racing activity during the years at issue. Petitioner competed
in eight races in 1999 and 2000 and six races in 2001. When
petitioner was unable to race, petitioner’s son raced
petitioner’s car. Petitioner testified that he limited the
number of races in which he competed because he did not have
sponsorship and was trying to minimize costs. Petitioner’s
report to Sac and Fox for 1998, however, indicates he undertook
some activity on behalf of Sac and Fox on 31 days during that
year. See Canale v. Commissioner, supra (taxpayer decreased the
number of races entered after the taxpayer decided to leave
racing but had devoted substantial time to racing in previous
years). Petitioner introduced no evidence regarding the number
of hours per week he spent on drag racing but indicated it
varied, depending on, for example, the level of repairs needed
after a race. Petitioner’s schedule, although full-time, was
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flexible enough to permit him to devote time to his racing as
needed. Petitioner’s wife and son also assisted petitioner in
doing the required work.
4. The Expectation That the Assets Used in the Activity
May Appreciate in Value
We next examine the expectation that the assets used in
petitioner’s drag racing activity may appreciate in value. A
taxpayer may intend, despite the lack of profit from current
operations, that an overall profit will result when appreciation
in the value of assets used in the activity is realized.
Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 261, 274 (1965), affd. 379
F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967); sec. 1.183-2(b)(4), Income Tax Regs.
Although petitioner believed he had a quality car and used
quality parts in his car, he did not expect the assets he used in
the drag racing activity to appreciate in value. Petitioner
concentrated on maintaining his car in as good a condition as
possible to minimize repair and upgrade costs, not because he
thought that doing so would cause the value of the car to
increase.
5. The Success of the Taxpayer in Carrying On Other
Similar or Dissimilar Activities
We next examine petitioner’s success in carrying on other
similar or dissimilar activities. If a taxpayer has previously
engaged in similar activities and made them profitable, this
success may show that the taxpayer has a profit objective, even
though the current activity is presently unprofitable. Sec.
1.183-2(b)(5), Income Tax Regs. A taxpayer’s success in other,
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unrelated activities also may indicate a profit objective.
Daugherty v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-188. A taxpayer who
was able to start a business and turn it into a relatively large
and profitable enterprise through the taxpayer’s diligence,
initiative, foresight, and other qualities that generally lead to
success in other business activities has shown evidence of a
profit objective. Id.
Petitioner is an experienced businessman. During the years
at issue, petitioner was the senior vice president and chief
financial officer of the bank. Petitioner’s activities in his
position included serving on the loan committee, which required
petitioner to assess the needs and attributes of businesses
applying for loans and to oversee the bank’s financial planning,
budgeting, and statistical analysis functions. Petitioner also
served on the board of directors of the bank, helping to make
important business decisions and oversee the bank’s direction.
Petitioner’s success in the banking field indicates that he has
considerable business skills. See id.
6. The Taxpayer’s History of Income or Loss With Respect
to the Activity
We next examine petitioner’s history of income or loss with
respect to the activity. A history of substantial losses may
indicate that the taxpayer did not conduct the activity for
profit. Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411, 427 (1979), affd.
without published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981); sec.
1.183-2(b)(6), Income Tax Regs. Losses during the initial or
startup stage of an activity do not necessarily indicate,
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however, that the taxpayer did not conduct the activity for
profit, but losses that continue to be sustained beyond the
period that customarily is necessary to bring the operation to
profitable status may indicate the taxpayer did not engage in the
activity for profit. Engdahl v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 668;
sec. 1.183-2(b)(6), Income Tax Regs. Losses due to unforeseen
circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control do not indicate that
the taxpayer did not engage in the activity for profit. Sec.
1.183-2(b)(6), Income Tax Regs. Abandoning an activity after
indications that the activity will be unprofitable signifies that
the taxpayer engaged in the activity for profit. Canale v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-619.
Petitioner sustained losses from the drag racing activity
each year from 1991 to 1997 while he was beginning and developing
the drag racing activity. During 1998, petitioner successfully
attracted a sponsor and earned a profit, albeit small.
Petitioner testified that during 1998 he also incurred some one-
time expenses related to the sponsorship, such as painting the
sponsor’s logo on his car. Petitioner sustained further losses
during the years at issue, but these losses were due first to the
unforeseen event of his contact at Sac and Fox being terminated
that led to his losing his sponsorship and next to the winding up
and liquidation of his business. Petitioner attempted to
minimize his losses during the years at issue by cutting costs
and entering fewer races.
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7. The Amount of Occasional Profits, If Any, Which Are
Earned
We next consider the amounts of occasional profits, if any,
petitioner earned. Occasional profits the taxpayer earned from
the activity, in relation to the amount of losses incurred, the
amount of the taxpayer’s investment, and the value of the assets
used in the activity provide useful criteria in determining the
taxpayer’s intent. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(7), Income Tax Regs. A
practical possibility that a taxpayer could earn enough money in
a year to exceed expenses also can indicate a profit objective.
Bolt v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 1007, 1014 (1968).
Petitioner obtained a substantial sponsorship in 1998 and
expected the sponsorship to continue during the years at issue.
Petitioner incurred one-time costs related to the sponsorship in
1998, such as painting the sponsor’s logo on his car, but did
make a small profit during that year.
Respondent contends that petitioner would have had a net
loss even with a $15,000 sponsorship during the years at issue.
We do not give respondent’s hypothetical situation great weight.
Petitioner organized his affairs during the years at issue around
the reality that he did not have a sponsor. If petitioner had
had a sponsor during the years at issue, his income and expenses
might have been considerably different. Petitioner might have
competed in more races (incurring more entry fees but also
creating more opportunities to win prize money) to gain more
exposure for his sponsor. In fact, petitioner’s 1999 budget
projection with a $15,000 sponsorship and $5,000 race winnings
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anticipated a profit of $13,040 for 1999. Petitioner also
decided to liquidate in 2000 and therefore minimized costs and
entered fewer races. Petitioner has shown that he could earn
enough money in a year to cover his expenses; he accomplished
that in 1998.
8. The Financial Status of the Taxpayer
We next examine petitioner’s financial status. If a
taxpayer does not have substantial income or capital from sources
other than the activity in question, it may indicate that the
taxpayer engages in the activity for profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(8),
Income Tax Regs. Conversely, substantial income from sources
other than the activity, especially if the losses generate large
tax benefits, may indicate that the taxpayer is not conducting
the activity for profit. Id. Those with substantial income from
other sources have a much greater tax incentive to incur large
expenditures in a hobby type of business. Jackson v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 312, 317 (1972).
During the years at issue, petitioners’ financial status was
stable. Petitioner earned a good salary from the bank but not in
six figures. Both petitioners used some of their income from
their full-time jobs at the bank to help support the drag racing
activity during the startup phase. While petitioners’ financial
status was stable, their income was not so substantial that it
would indicate a great tax incentive to incur large losses from
the drag racing activity.
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9. Whether Elements of Personal Pleasure or Recreation Are
Involved
We next examine whether elements of personal pleasure or
recreation were involved in the activity. The presence of
recreational or pleasurable motives in conducting an activity may
indicate that the taxpayer is not conducting the activity for
profit. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs. The fact that the
taxpayer derives personal pleasure from engaging in the activity
is not sufficient to cause the activity to be classified as not
engaged in for profit, however, if the activity is, in fact,
conducted for profit as shown by other factors. Jackson v.
Commissioner, supra; sec. 1.183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner has been interested in cars throughout his life
and obviously enjoys drag racing. Petitioner also testified,
however, that there were aspects of the activity that he did not
enjoy, including the heat on the track and the multiple layers of
protective clothing he was required to wear. Petitioner further
emphasized that, when he was unable to produce a profit from the
activity, he stopped the activity. He testified that he did not
enjoy it enough to continue without the possibility of financial
gain. Although petitioner may have derived some pleasure from
the drag racing activity, this factor does not outweigh the other
factors indicating that petitioner engaged in the drag racing
activity for profit.
10. Conclusion
Considering all of the facts and circumstances of this case,
we find that petitioner has proved that he engaged in the drag
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racing activity with the actual and honest intent to earn a
profit. Accordingly, we do not sustain respondent’s
determination in the statutory notice of deficiency.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for petitioners.