T.C. Summary Opinion 2005-96
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MARIO O. AND ELSIE R. GARZA, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 779-04S. Filed July 21, 2005.
Mario O. and Elsie R. Garza, pro se.
Thomas D. Greenaway, for respondent.
COUVILLION, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard
pursuant to section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect
at the time the petition was filed.1 The decision to be entered
1
Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references
are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at
issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
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is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion should not
be cited as authority.
Respondent determined deficiencies of $5,939, $5,472, and
$4,318 in petitioners’ Federal income taxes for 1999, 2000, and
2001, respectively. Respondent also determined an accuracy-
related penalty under section 6662(a) in the amount of $863 for
2001. The issues for decision are: (1) Whether Mario O. Garza
(petitioner) received income from American Income Life Insurance
Co. (American Life) during 1999, 2000, and 2001 under section
61(a); (2) whether petitioner is liable for self-employment
taxes for 1999, 2000, and 2001 under section 1401(a); and (3)
whether petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty
for 2001 under section 6662(a) for negligence, disregard of rules
or regulations, or a substantial understatement of income tax.2
Some of the facts were stipulated. Those facts, with the
annexed exhibits, are so found and are made a part hereof.
Petitioners’ legal residence at the time the petition was filed
was Fresno, California.
At the time of trial, petitioner and his wife, Elsie R.
Garza (Ms. Garza), were seeking a divorce. However, they were
2
Respondent did not determine any penalty for the years 1999
or 2000. Additionally, in the notice of deficiency, some of
petitioners’ itemized deductions for the 3 years at issue were
disallowed. The notice of deficiency states that petitioners
agreed to those adjustments. Petitioners did not challenge these
adjustments at trial.
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married and resided together at all times during the years at
issue.
Petitioner was employed as an independent insurance agent
(agent) with American Life from 1987 to 1988 and again from 1989
to 1998.3 As an agent for American Life, petitioner sold
insurance policies. For each policy he sold, petitioner earned a
commission. American Life would advance to petitioner the
anticipated first-year commission on that policy. This
advancement was referred to as a loan against anticipated
first-year commissions and not taxable at the time of receipt.
In the event the policy was terminated before the year ended,
petitioner was obligated to pay the commission back to American
Life. Additionally, American Life paid certain expenses for
petitioner that were added to petitioner’s outstanding account
balances due to American Life.4 According to account ledgers
produced by respondent from American Life, during the term of
petitioner’s employment, petitioner received advances against
3
There is a dispute as to whether petitioner terminated his
employment in 1997 or 1998. Petitioner contends that he was no
longer employed by American Life in 1997; however, he stipulated
to working for American Life until 1998. This discrepancy has no
bearing on the issue.
4
At the time of the audit, Ms. Garza went through the
documents provided by American Life, which set out the advances
and expenses paid by American Life on petitioner’s behalf.
Ms. Garza contacted American Life requesting an explanation of
the expenses on the account. Petitioners presented no evidence
at trial with respect to these expenses.
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future commissions and had certain expenses paid for by American
Life that amounted to almost $90,000. When asked at trial
whether he kept books or records to keep track of the advances
made, expenses paid, and the commissions earned, petitioner
stated that he may have kept records but did not know where they
were at the time.
When petitioner left American Life in 1998, his accounts
were terminated fully vested. The term “fully vested” meant that
petitioner would continue earning commissions on all policy
renewals in his accounts even if he was no longer working for
American Life. During 1999, 2000, and 2001, several of
petitioner’s former accounts with American Life were renewed.
Petitioner was entitled to commissions on these renewals.
Additionally, during 1999, 2000, and 2001, petitioner was
entitled to commissions from renewals on policies written by
agents who were subordinate to petitioner while he was employed
by American Life.
During the years at issue, all commissions coming to and
creditable to petitioner were applied to the liquidation of
petitioner’s outstanding account balances owed to American Life.
American Life credited to petitioner’s accounts $20,9575 of such
5
These amounts are rounded to the whole dollar.
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commissions in 1999, $17,705 in 2000, and $14,673 in 2001.6
American Life issued Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, for
these amounts in the respective years.
Petitioners filed timely joint Federal income tax returns
for 1999, 2000, and 2001. However, because petitioners were
confused by the Forms 1099 sent to them by American Life, they
did not report the income reflected on those forms for any of the
years at issue.7
On October 10, 2003, respondent issued the notice of
deficiency (notice) for the years in question. As stated above,
respondent determined deficiencies of $5,939, $5,472, and $4,318
in petitioners’ Federal income taxes for 1999, 2000, and 2001,
respectively. In the notice, respondent explained:
According to American Income Life Insurance Company,
the income on 1099 you received is income to you.
These are your earning[s] from commission on prior
sales. According to American, you took advance monies
on your future earnings and the 1099 amounts are what
was applied to the amount due. * * * These earnings
are to be reported as income either in the year you
received the monies or the year earned.
6
The amounts in the ledgers for 2001, attached as part of
the Stipulation of Facts, do not equal the amount on the Form
1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, from American Life for that
year. There is a $32 difference in petitioner’s favor on the
Form 1099. For purposes of this opinion, the Court considers the
amounts determined in the notice of deficiency to be correct, as
no evidence was presented to establish the $32 difference.
7
Although petitioners claim they contacted American Life
questioning the Forms 1099, no evidence was presented to show
that the amounts on the Forms 1099 were incorrect.
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The deficiencies also included self-employment taxes for 1999,
2000, and 2001, as respondent determined these commissions
constituted self-employment income. Additionally, respondent
determined an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) in
the amount of $863 only for 2001.
The first issue is whether petitioner earned income from
American Life during 1999, 2000, and 2001 under section 61(a)
based on commissions that he was entitled to after he no longer
worked for American Life that were not paid directly to him but
were diverted or applied to his debit accounts to offset the
balances he owed.
The determinations of the Commissioner in a notice of
deficiency are presumed correct, and the burden is on the
taxpayer to prove that the determinations are in error.
Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).8
8
Sec. 7491 shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner if
the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any
factual issue relevant to ascertaining a tax liability provided
the taxpayer has maintained books and records and has cooperated
with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses,
information, documents, meetings, and interviews. The burden of
proof does not shift in this case principally because petitioners
did not maintain accurate books and records of the commissions
earned by petitioner with American Life. Had petitioners
maintained accurate books and records, there likely would have
been no need for these proceedings. The questions raised by
petitioner are attributable solely to his failure to maintain
books and records. Sec. 7491(c), however, places upon the
Commissioner the burden of production with respect to any penalty
or addition to tax.
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Section 61(a)(1) provides that gross income includes “all
income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited
to) * * * compensation for services, including fees, commissions,
fringe benefits, and similar items”, unless otherwise provided.
The Supreme Court has consistently given this definition of gross
income a liberal construction “in recognition of the intention of
Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted”.
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955); see
also Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983),
revg. 79 T.C. 398 (1982) (“[all] realized accessions to wealth
are presumed to be taxable income, unless the taxpayer can
demonstrate that an acquisition is specifically exempted from
taxation”). Moreover, section 1.61-2(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.,
provides that “wages, salaries, commissions paid salesmen, * * *,
commissions on insurance premiums, * * * are income to the
recipients unless excluded by law”.
“In the situation where the advances are actually loans,
when the repayments are offset directly by the future earned
commissions, then the agent will have either commission income or
cancellation of indebtedness income at the time of the offsets.”
Diers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-229; Cox v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1996-241; cf. Warden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-
165. Although petitioner’s employment with American Life
terminated in 1998, he continued to thereafter earn renewal
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commissions on policies he had sold before his departure.
Instead of paying these commissions to petitioner, American Life
diverted the commissions to his accounts showing balances owed by
petitioner for the advances and expense payments previously
described. When American Life previously made advances to
petitioner, he was not taxable on such advances because the
advances were loans secured and payable through future earned
commissions. Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 91 (1970);
Diers v. Commissioner, supra. When American Life applied the
renewal commissions to petitioner’s outstanding account balances,
petitioner’s obligation to repay the loans was reduced by those
amounts, and the reduction of his obligations constituted his
receipt of taxable income. Diers v. Commissioner, supra; Newmark
v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 913, 915 (2d Cir. 1962), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1961-285. Therefore, the Court holds that petitioner
received commission income during 1999, 2000, and 2001, in the
amounts of $20,957, $17,705, and $14,673, respectively, as
determined in the notice of deficiency. Respondent, therefore,
is sustained on this issue.
The second issue is whether petitioners are liable for
self-employment taxes for 1999, 2000, and 2001 under section 1401
based on the aforesaid income.
Section 1401(a) imposes a tax upon the self-employment
income of every individual. In general, self-employment income
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consists of the net earnings derived by an individual (other than
a nonresident alien) from a trade or business carried on by such
individual. Sec. 1402(a) and (b); sec. 1.1401-1(c), Income Tax
Regs. To constitute self-employment income, “there must be a
nexus between the income received and a trade or business that
is, or was, actually carried on.” Newberry v. Commissioner, 76
T.C. 441, 444 (1981). The “income must arise from some actual
(whether present, past, or future) income-producing activity”.
Id. at 446. Additionally, section 1.1402(a)-1(c), Income Tax
Regs., provides that gross income derived from an individual’s
trade or business may be subject to self-employment tax even when
it is attributable to services rendered in a prior taxable year.
Jackson v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 130, 134 (1997); Schelble v.
Commissioner, 130 F.3d 1388, 1392 (10th Cir. 1997), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1996-296.
In order to be derived from a trade or business the payment
received by an insurance agent after termination must be “tied to
the quantity or quality of the taxpayer’s prior labor, rather
than the mere fact that the taxpayer worked or works for the
payor.” Milligan v. Commissioner, 38 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.
1994), revg. T.C. Memo. 1992-655; see Jackson v. Commissioner,
supra at 135. The taxpayer in Milligan was not liable for
self-employment tax because “none of his business activity was
the ‘source’ of the Termination Payments. * * * Nor were they
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renewal commissions on previously-generated policies”. Milligan
v. Commissioner, supra at 1099 (citing Erickson v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1992-585, affd. without published opinion 1 F.3d 1231
(1st Cir. 1993)). In Erickson v. Commissioner, supra, the Court
found that the payments under the settlement agreement entered
into between the taxpayer and the insurance company represented
renewal commissions and were taxable as self-employment income
under section 1401(a).
Petitioner was an independent agent for American Life until
1998. Upon the termination of his employment, he was fully
vested in his accounts, which entitled him to receive commissions
on the renewal of any policies that he wrote while he was an
active agent. Petitioner did not dispute or challenge whether
the commissions earned, and applied to his outstanding balances,
were commissions on the renewal of policies that he wrote. He
did not contend or establish that he was a statutory employee
pursuant to section 3121(d)(3)(B). See Diers v. Commissioner,
supra at n.6. Accordingly, the Court holds that petitioner
earned renewal commission income and is, therefore, liable for
self-employment tax on that income.
The final issue is whether petitioners are liable for the
accuracy-related penalty for the year 2001 under section 6662(a)
for negligence, disregard of rules or regulations, or a
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substantial understatement of income tax. As noted above, the
burden of production is on respondent. Sec. 7491(c).
Section 6662(a) provides that, if it is applicable to any
portion of an underpayment in tax, there shall be added to the
tax an amount equal to 20 percent of the portion of the
underpayment to which section 6662 applies. Section 6662(b)(1)
provides that section 6662 shall apply to any underpayment
attributable to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.
Section 6662(b)(2) provides that section 6662 shall apply to any
substantial understatement of income tax.
Section 6662(c) provides that the term "negligence" includes
any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the
provisions of the internal revenue laws, and the term "disregard"
includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard of
rules or regulations. Negligence is the lack of due care or
failure to do what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person
would do under the circumstances. Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.
934, 947 (1985).
Under section 6662(d)(1), there is a substantial
understatement of income tax if the amount of the understatement
exceeds the greater of (1) 10 percent of the tax required to be
shown on the return or (2) $5,000. For purposes of section
6662(d)(1), "understatement" is defined as the excess of tax
required to be shown on the return over the amount of tax that is
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shown on the return, reduced by any rebate. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(A).
Section 6662(d)(2)(B) provides that the amount of the
understatement shall be reduced by that portion of the
understatement that is attributable to the tax treatment of any
item by the taxpayer if there is or was substantial authority for
the treatment or to any item with respect to which (1) the
relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment are adequately
disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the return,
and (2) there is a reasonable basis for such treatment.
Under section 6664(c), however, no penalty shall be imposed
under section 6662(a) with respect to any portion of an
underpayment if it is shown that there was a reasonable cause for
the portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with
respect to the portion of the underpayment.
The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs. The taxpayer has the burden of proving that he
acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-449 (2001).
Due to the failure to report petitioner’s commission income
in 2001, petitioners had an understatement of tax in the amount
of $4,318. The amount of tax required to be shown on the 2001
return was $6,932; thus, the amount of the understatement exceeds
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10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return.
Therefore, there was a substantial understatement of tax under
section 6662(d)(1). Petitioners received a Form 1099 for 2001
and failed to include that income on their 2001 income tax
return. Because the requirements for relief from the section
6662 substantial understatement penalty have not been met and
petitioners have not given any reasonable cause for failing to
report the income, petitioners are liable for the
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662.9
Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
Division.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.
9
Because it is clear that there was a substantial
understatement of tax on the 2001 return, it is not necessary for
the Court to determine whether petitioners were negligent in not
reporting the commission income for that year.