T.C. Summary Opinion 2005-102
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JANI LYN THOMAS, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 14668-04S. Filed July 21, 2005.
Jani Lyn Thomas, pro se.
A. Gary Begun, for respondent.
DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to
section 7463 in effect at the time the petition was filed. This
case is before the Court on respondent’s motion for summary
judgment filed pursuant to Rule 121. All subsequent Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as amended.
- 2 -
The motion arises in the context of a petition filed after
respondent failed to issue a notice of final determination
concerning relief from joint liability under section 6015 within
6 months after receiving petitioner’s Form 8857, Request for
Innocent Spouse Relief. See sec. 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(II).
Background
A statutory notice of deficiency for 1999 was sent to
petitioner and her then-husband, Raymond G. Thomas (Thomas), at
two separate addresses. A Tax Court petition was subsequently
filed in the case of Raymond G. & Jani L. Thomas v. Commissioner,
docket No. 12813-02S, disputing the adjustments to tax proposed
in the notice of deficiency. It does not appear that the
purported signature of petitioner on the petition was made by her
hand. An amended petition for Thomas and petitioner was
subsequently filed with a signature that does not appear to have
been made by petitioner. Thomas provided to respondent a
stipulation of settled issues that contains petitioner’s
purported signature.
Petitioner did sign, along with Thomas, a stipulated
decision settling the case on May 29, 2003. The stipulated
decision did not provide for relief to petitioner from joint and
several liability for 1999.
- 3 -
Four months after the Court entered the decision in the
deficiency action filed in the name of Thomas and petitioner,
petitioner filed a Form 8857 requesting relief for 1999.
On March 28, 2003, Circuit Judge Stanley J. Latreille of the
State of Michigan issued in favor of petitioner, and against
Thomas, an ex parte personal protection order that remains in
effect.
Discussion
Res Judicata
Respondent has moved for summary judgment because of the
prior decision entered in the deficiency action brought by
petitioner and Thomas. Respondent asks the Court to find that,
as a matter of law, petitioner is precluded from seeking relief
in this Court under section 6015 due to the judicial doctrine of
res judicata.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, when a court of
competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits
in a cause of action, the parties to the action and those in
privity with them are bound as to every matter that was offered
and as to every matter that might have been offered in defense or
pursuit of the claim. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597
(1948).
As a general rule, where the Tax Court has entered a
decision for a taxable year, both the taxpayer and the
- 4 -
Commissioner (with certain exceptions) are barred from reopening
that year. Hemmings v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 221, 233 (1995).
It has also been held that “the Tax Court’s jurisdiction, once it
attaches, extends to the entire subject of the correct tax for
the particular year.” Erickson v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl.
202, 309 F.2d 760, 767 (1962).
An agreed or stipulated judgment is a judgment on the merits
for purposes of res judicata. In re Baker, 74 F.3d 906, 910 (9th
Cir. 1996); accord Erickson v. United States, supra at 768;
Krueger v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 824, 828-829 (1967); see also
United States v. Intl. Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 503-506 (1953)
(upholding res judicata effect of stipulated Tax Court
decisions).
Respondent argues that since petitioner could have claimed
the benefits of section 6015 in the deficiency action for 1999
but did not, she is precluded from litigating the issue for 1999
in another action. Respondent recognizes the exception to the
judicial doctrine of res judicata provided for in section
6015(g)(2) where the individual did not participate meaningfully
in the prior proceeding. See Thurner v. Commissioner, 121 T.C.
43, 50 (2003); Vetrano v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 272, 280 (2001).
But respondent argues that the facts show that petitioner did
meaningfully participate in the prior action and therefore does
not qualify for the exception.
- 5 -
Petitioner appeared at the hearing on respondent’s motion.
She testified that she was unaware of the tax case for 1999 until
she was called by Thomas who informed her that she had to go to
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) office “that day” to sign the
decision document. She testified that she was unrepresented and
did not have time to prepare. She spoke with the IRS attorney,
she stated, who informed her that he was not her attorney and
could not give her legal advice. She testified that she was and
presently is afraid of reprisal from her former husband should
she challenge the settlement. Further, she said that she thought
she could sign the decision document and nevertheless institute a
later action under section 6015.
Standard for Granting Summary Judgment
The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 121 is stated in the Rule itself.
A decision shall * * * be rendered if the pleadings,
answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions,
and any other acceptable materials, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that a decision may be
rendered as a matter of law. * * * [Rule 121(b).1]
The moving party has the burden of “showing” the absence of
a genuine issue as to any material fact. See Espinoza v.
1
Rule 121 is derived from Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56. Therefore,
authorities interpreting the latter will be considered by the
Court in applying the Rule. Espinoza v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
412, 415-416 (1982).
- 6 -
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 412, 416 (1982) (and cases cited therein.)
The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159 (1970). There is,
however, no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for the finder of fact to find in
favor of the nonmoving party. First Natl. Bank v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-289 (1968). The nonmovant’s evidence must
be more than merely colorable. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S.
82, 84 (1967) (per curiam).
In this case, respondent seems to believe that factual
ambiguities in the record require a decision in his favor on this
motion. When considering a motion for summary judgment, however,
“the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); accord Shiosaki v. Commissioner, 61
T.C. 861, 862 (1974).
In Thurner v. Commissioner, supra at 53, a case cited by
respondent in his memorandum of authorities, a petitioning spouse
claimed that her participation in the prior litigation was not
material in that it was limited to signing pleadings and
documents in compliance with her husband’s instructions. The
Court held that the allegation “raises an issue of material fact
- 7 -
as to her level of participation in that proceeding.” The Court
denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. In this
case, there is more than just petitioner’s testimony. She has
also offered evidence that at the time she signed the decision
document there was a protective order in effect against her
former husband, and there is evidence that she did not sign
either the petition or the amended petition in the prior case.
Respondent has neither produced evidence negating an
essential element of petitioner’s case, nor has he shown a
“complete failure of proof” in the record on an essential element
of petitioner’s case. Respondent has failed to make the initial
showing required by Rule 121(b) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986). The Court, as a result, finds that respondent
has failed to show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of
law that petitioner is barred by the doctrine of res judicata
from pursuing relief under section 6015. The Court therefore
denies respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
An appropriate order
will be issued.