T.C. Summary Opinion 2005-95
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MYRTLE JEAN CLARK, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 19081-03S. Filed July 20, 2005.
Myrtle Jean Clark, pro se.
John W. Strate, for respondent.
COUVILLION, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard
pursuant to section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect
at the time the petition was filed.1 The decision to be entered
is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion should not
be cited as authority. Petitioner seeks a review under section
1
Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references
are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at
issue.
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6330(d) of respondent’s decision to proceed with collection of
petitioner’s Federal income tax liabilities for the 1991, 1992,
and 1993 tax years.
Some of the facts were stipulated. Those facts, with the
annexed exhibits, are so found and are made a part hereof.
Petitioner’s legal residence at the time the petition was filed
was Bakersfield, California.
Petitioner was married to Zack Clark (Mr. Clark). Mr. Clark
died on October 25, 2001.2 During the years in issue, petitioner
was a housewife. Mr. Clark was self-employed as a mechanic in
1991 and operated a personnel and property management business
during 1991, 1992, and 1993.
Petitioner and Mr. Clark filed a joint Federal income tax
return for 1991 on July 3, 1996. The return showed a tax of
$2,938. This amount was not paid at the time of filing.
Petitioner and Mr. Clark filed a joint Federal income tax return
for 1992 on April 15, 1996. That return showed a tax of $9,141,
which was also not paid at the time of filing. Petitioner and
Mr. Clark filed a joint Federal income tax return for 1993 on
April 16, 1996. That return showed a tax of $6,798, which also
was not paid at the time of filing.
2
Petitioner and Mr. Clark were divorced in 1984 but
remarried about 1 year later. For purposes of this proceeding,
however, petitioner was married to Mr. Clark during the years in
issue. Therefore, the divorce is not a factor to be considered
in deciding this case.
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As to the 1991 taxes, overpayment credits from subsequent
years were applied to the balance due in 1997, 1998, and 1999.
On December 13, 2000, “intent to levy collection”, “due process
notice”, and “levy notice” (collection notices) were issued to
petitioner and Mr. Clark for each of the years at issue. These
notices were labeled as “refused/unclaimed” on December 30, 2000.
Copies of the notices were not presented at trial. Petitioner
claims that she never knew of or saw these notices.
After Mr. Clark died on October 25, 2001, petitioner became
aware that she could request relief from joint liability in
connection with the tax liabilities described. On May 21, 2003,
petitioner filed Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief,
and an attached Form 12510, Questionnaire for Requesting Spouse,
which were received by respondent on May 30, 2003.
In a notice of determination for 1991 and a preliminary
notice of determination for 1992 and 1993, respondent denied and
proposed to deny, respectively, petitioner’s request for relief
from joint liability for her Federal income taxes under section
6015(b), (c), and (f).
On October 24, 2003, respondent mailed to petitioner a final
notice denying petitioner’s request for innocent spouse relief
under section 6015(b), (c), and (f) for 1991. The notice stated
that the request was denied because it was received “more than
two years after the date * * * [the Internal Revenue Service]
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began collection activity. * * * The date of the collection
activity on your account, after the enactment of IRC Section 6015
was May 3, 1999.” On January 29, 2004, respondent mailed to
petitioner a preliminary determination proposing to deny
petitioner’s request for innocent spouse relief under section
6015(b), (c), and (f) for 1992 for the reason the request was
received “more than two years after the date * * * [the Internal
Revenue Service] began collection activity. * * * The date of
the first collection activity on your account, after the
enactment of IRC section 6015 was January 22, 2001.”3
Petitioner filed an amended petition with this Court for
1991, 1992, and 1993 on January 5, 2004, appealing respondent’s
determinations. The sole issue for decision is whether denial of
relief for 1991, 1992, and 1993 was an abuse of respondent’s
discretion.
Where the underlying tax liability is not at issue, as in
this case, the Court reviews the determination regarding
collection actions on the basis of whether there was an abuse of
discretion by respondent. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604,
610 (2000). An abuse of discretion is defined as any action that
3
Though the preliminary notice for 1992 and 1993 stated that
the first collection activity on that account was Jan. 22, 2001,
as opposed to Dec. 13, 2000, this discrepancy is insignificant to
the issue because May 21, 2003, is still more than 2 years after
Jan. 21, 2001. Respondent contends that Dec. 13, 2001, the date
the collection notices were sent, is the date of the first
collection activity on each of the accounts.
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is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, or lacking sound basis
in law, taking into account all the facts and circumstances.
Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32, 39 (2004); Jonson v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002). The issue to be decided
here is whether the denial of relief from joint liability to
petitioner for her 1991, 1992, and 1993 Federal income taxes
under section 6015 was an abuse of discretion.
Generally, spouses filing joint Federal income tax returns
are jointly and severally liable for all taxes due. Sec.
6013(d)(3). Under certain circumstances, however, section 6015
provides relief from this general rule.4 Section 6015 applies to
any liability for tax arising after July 22, 1998, and to any
liability for tax arising on or before July 22, 1998, but
remaining unpaid as of such date. Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206,
sec. 3201(g), 112 Stat. 740.
Section 6015 provides three avenues for relief to a taxpayer
who has filed a joint return: (1) Section 6015(b) provides
relief with respect to understatements of tax attributable to
certain erroneous items on the return; (2) section 6015(c)
4
Sec. 6015 was enacted as part of the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L.
105-206, sec. 3201, 112 Stat. 734. Prior to the enactment of
sec. 6015, relief from the imposition of joint and several
liability for spouses filing joint returns was available under
sec. 6013(e).
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provides relief for a portion of an understatement of tax for
taxpayers who are separated or divorced; and (3) section 6015(f)
more broadly confers on the Secretary discretion to grant
equitable relief for taxpayers who otherwise do not qualify for
relief under section 6015(b) or (c).
A requisite to granting relief under section 6015(b) or (c)
is the existence of a tax deficiency. Sec. 6015(b)(1)(B) and
(c)(1); Block v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 62, 66 (2003).
Therefore, if there is no deficiency for the year for which
relief is sought, relief from joint and several liability is not
available under section 6015(b) or (c). See Washington v.
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 147-148 (2003); see also Block v.
Commissioner, supra. In this case, for the 3 years in question,
there are underpayments of taxes arising from filed income tax
returns on which the taxes shown on those returns were not paid.
There are no deficiencies arising from the issuance by respondent
of notices of deficiencies. Therefore, because there are no tax
deficiencies, petitioner is not entitled to relief under section
6015(b) or (c). To that extent, therefore, respondent is
sustained. However, petitioner falls under the equitable relief
provision of section 6015(f). Section 6015(f) provides:
SEC. 6015(f). Equitable Relief.--Under procedures
prescribed by the Secretary, if--
(1) taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual
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liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any
portion of either); and
(2) relief is not available to such individual
under subsection (b) or (c),
the Secretary may relieve such individual of such
liability.
To request equitable relief under section 6015(f), a
requesting spouse must file Form 8857 or other similar statement
with the IRS no later than 2 years from the date of the first
collection activity against the requesting spouse after July 22,
1998, with respect to the joint tax liability. Sec. 1.6015-
5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.5 One example of “collection activity”,
as defined in section 1.6015-5(b)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs., is a
section 6330 notice, which is a notice sent providing taxpayers
notice of the IRS’s intent to levy and of a right to a section
6330 hearing. Sec. 1.6015-5(b)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs.
In addition to the requirement that a section 6330 notice be
sent to the taxpayer, section 3501 of the RRA 1998 requires that
collection-related notices sent by the IRS inform individuals
subject to joint liability of their rights to relief under
section 6015. RRA 1998 sec. 3501(b), 112 Stat. 770; see McGee v.
Commissioner, 123 T.C. 314, 317 (2004); see also Nelson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-9. In holding that it was an abuse
5
Sec. 1.6015-5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., is applicable for
all elections under sec. 6015 filed on or after July 18, 2002.
Sec. 1.6015-9, Income Tax Regs.
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of discretion for the Commissioner to deny a request for relief
under section 6015(f) by applying the 2-year statute of
limitations,6 the Court in McGee stated:
It would be inequitable if respondent could prevent
review of a request for relief under section 6015(f) by
failing to inform petitioner of her right to relief in
defiance of a congressional mandate. Such a result
would be contrary to the very purpose of section
6015(f), which is to relieve inequitable situations
involving joint liabilities. * * *
McGee v. Commissioner, supra at 319; see also Nelson v.
Commissioner, supra.
Respondent contends that the date of the first collection
activity in each of the tax years at issue was the date
collection notices were mailed to petitioner and Mr. Clark on
December 13, 2000. The collection notices are not in the
administrative record of the IRS and were not presented as
evidence at trial. There is no evidence that the collection
notices informed petitioner of her right to apply for relief
6
In McGee, the Court decided that applying the statute of
limitations imposed by Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, was
an abuse of discretion. McGee v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 314, 319
(2004). Though the statute of limitations applied in this case
was imposed by sec. 1.6015-5, Income Tax Regs., and not by Rev.
Proc. 2000-15, supra, the interpretation remains the same. Any
other interpretation would be in conflict with the public law.
Additionally, it should be noted that Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2
C.B. 296, not Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, applies to tax
years 1992 and 1993 in this case because Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
supra, supersedes Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra, for requests still
pending on Nov. 1, 2003, for which no preliminary determination
letter had been issued as of Nov. 1, 2003. The notice of
preliminary determination for 1992 and 1993 was mailed to
petitioner on Jan. 29, 2004.
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under section 6015(f). According to the testimony of petitioner,
she was not aware of her right to request relief until after the
death of Mr. Clark on October 25, 2001.
Not sending the notice of rights resulted in petitioner’s
failure to request relief under section 6015(f) within 2 years
after the first collection activity because she did not know of
these rights. Therefore, on this record, there was an abuse of
discretion by respondent in denying petitioner’s request for
relief under section 6015(f) on the ground that the 2-year
limitation period applies.
Respondent acknowledged at trial that there was no analysis
or evaluation of the facts and circumstances of petitioner’s case
in denying her request for relief under section 6015(f). The
courts have held that, in reviewing administrative actions, a
case should be remanded for further factual determinations deemed
necessary to complete an inadequate administrative record or to
make one adequate. See Natl. Nutritional Foods Association v.
Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973); Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d
1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980); Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. ____
(2005). Therefore, because the Court holds that petitioner filed
her application for relief timely, and, because the
administrative record is not adequate, the case will be remanded
to respondent for further consideration.
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Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
Division.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order
will be issued.