T.C. Memo. 2006-37
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ARTHUR A. LEMANN III AND ROBERTA A. LEMANN, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 12857-02L. Filed March 7, 2006.
Arthur A. Lemann III and Roberta A. Lemann, pro sese.
Susan S. Canavello, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GALE, Judge: The petition in this case was filed in
response to a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection
Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330.1 Respondent has moved
1
Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code applicable to the periods at issue, and all
Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
- 2 -
for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121. Respondent's motion
is supported by the Declaration of Daniel J. Mazaroli, the
Appeals officer who conducted petitioners' section 6330 hearing,
and relevant documents from the administrative file.
Petitioners' opposition is supported by the Declaration of Arthur
A. Lemann III and an attached exhibit setting forth Mr. Lemann's
interests in certain family corporations.
The only issue before the Court is whether respondent abused
his discretion in determining to proceed to levy with respect to
petitioners' income tax liabilities for the taxable years 1992,
1993, 1994, and 1996. We conclude that no genuine issue as to
any material fact exists and that respondent is entitled to
summary judgment in his favor.
Background
Petitioners are Arthur A. Lemann III, a practicing attorney,
and his wife, Roberta A. Lemann, a clerk. At the time the
petition was filed, petitioners resided in New Orleans,
Louisiana.
Petitioners do not dispute their underlying tax liability.
As of the date the notice of levy was issued, petitioners' unpaid
Federal income tax liabilities were as follows:
- 3 -
Year Amount
1992 $31,435
1993 50,236
1994 83,218
1996 36,302
Total 201,191
On January 30, 2001, respondent sent petitioners a Letter
1058, Final Notice, Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your
Right to a Hearing. On February 26, 2001, petitioners timely
filed Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing.
By letter dated March 29, 2001, the Appeals officer first
assigned to conduct the section 6330 hearing noted that
petitioners had previously requested an installment payment plan
and asked that petitioners submit a copy of their prior proposal
and updated financial documents. Petitioners promptly provided
copies of their previously submitted installment agreement
proposal to pay $1,500 per month and their Form 433-A, Collection
Information Statement for Individuals. Petitioners indicated
that their financial situation had not changed since the earlier
submission. Their Form 433-A indicated that petitioners had net
equity in their assets of approximately $31,000, monthly income
of $7,423, and monthly expenses of $7,450.2
2
While petitioners' Form 433-A lists total monthly expenses
of $7,450, the sum of the individual expense items identified
therein is $7,455.
- 4 -
The record shows no further activity with respect to the
hearing until April 8, 2002, when a second Appeals officer
assigned to conduct the hearing sent a letter requesting that
petitioners review and update their previously submitted Form
433-A and provide additional documents related to their financial
condition. Petitioners submitted the requested information on
April 16, 2002. On their revised Form 433-A, petitioners
indicated they had net equity in their assets of approximately
$67,000 (up from $31,000), and monthly gross income of $7,715 per
month (up from $7,423). Petitioners' monthly expenses remained
unchanged.
By letter dated April 19, 2002, the Appeals officer advised
petitioners that their proposed installment agreement of $1,500
per month was not acceptable because it would not result in
payment of all amounts due within the applicable periods of
limitation on collection. The letter informed petitioners that
an offer-in-compromise might serve as an alternative to the
proposed levy and explained that such an approach would require
petitioners to make a payment equal to the net realizable equity
in their assets, which might require borrowing against those
assets.
On April 22, 2002, petitioners submitted a Form 656, Offer
in Compromise, in which they offered to make a one-time payment
of $67,000 to compromise their aggregate unpaid tax liabilities
- 5 -
of $201,191. Petitioners checked the "Doubt as to
Collectibility" box as the basis on which they believed they were
entitled to be considered for an offer-in-compromise.
The Appeals officer forwarded the offer-in-compromise to an
offer specialist for review. By letter dated May 7, 2002, the
offer specialist informed petitioners that an acceptable offer
amount would consist of both equity in assets and some portion of
"future income" available to pay taxes; i.e., gross income less
necessary living expenses. The offer specialist further advised
that her preliminary calculations showed a reasonable collection
potential significantly higher than the offer petitioners had
made. The offer specialist's administrative file notes of the
same day indicate that she had preliminarily computed
petitioners' future income as $2,713 per month for 48 months, or
$130,224.
The offer specialist's notes record that on May 3, 2002, she
discussed with Mr. Lemann the monthly credit card expense of
$1,600 reported by him on the revised Form 433-A, and advised him
that this expense was not allowable in computing future income.
On May 7, 2002, the offer specialist sent Mr. Lemann her
preliminary income and expense computations in which she noted
that, for purposes of evaluating petitioners' offer-in-
- 6 -
compromise, petitioners' future income was $2,713 for 48 months,3
or $130,224. In a letter to her dated May 14, 2002, Mr. Lemann
responded:
It seems to me that the future income calculation
overlooks two important facts:
1. I am now 60 years of age and may very well not
have 4 more years of productivity;
2. Converting that future income potential into a
$130,224.00 lump sum is impossible given my
financial circumstances.
The offer specialist's notes record that she received this
letter on May 21, 2002, and that on May 23, 2002, she discussed
with Mr. Lemann the special circumstances that would give rise to
a departure from the standard computation of future income and
gave examples. The offer specialist's notes further record that
Mr. Lemann did not provide her with any information that
constituted special circumstances.
On May 24, 2002, the offer specialist forwarded her final
computations of petitioners' reasonable collection potential to
the Appeals officer. In computing petitioners' net realizable
equity in assets, the specialist accepted petitioners' $125,000
estimate of the value of their residence as reported on their
3
Under Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) guidelines, for
purposes of evaluating "cash" offers-in-compromise such as
petitioners', future income for 48 months is considered, whereas
future income for 60 months is generally used when deferred
payment offers-in-compromise (which may include both a lump-sum
payment and an installment agreement) are evaluated. IRM, sec.
5.8.5.4 (Nov. 2000).
- 7 -
revised Form 433-A. The offer specialist reduced that amount to
a "quick sale" value4 of $100,000, which she offset with
petitioners' reported $60,000 of indebtedness encumbering the
residence, yielding net realizable equity of $40,000. Similarly,
the offer specialist accepted petitioners' $2,000 estimate of the
value of their two automobiles and discounted it to a $1,600
quick sale value. Overall, the offer specialist's final
computation of petitioners' net realizable equity was $41,600.
With respect to future income, the offer specialist adjusted
petitioners' reported monthly gross income and necessary living
expenses as follows. She increased reported monthly wages by
$412 to reflect the amounts included on petitioners' Forms W-2,
Wage and Tax Statement, for 2001, and added monthly dividend
income of $200 to reflect dividend income reported on
petitioners' 2001 joint Federal income tax return. Thus,
petitioners' gross monthly income was increased from $7,715 to
$8,327.
Regarding monthly necessary living expenses, the offer
specialist followed Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) guidelines and
reduced petitioners' reported monthly transportation expenses
from $680 to $289 and disallowed petitioners' claimed $1,600
monthly expense for credit cards. She also increased
4
Quick sale value is defined as the estimate of the price a
seller could get for an asset in a situation where financial
pressures motivate a sale in a short time, usually 90 days or
less. IRM, sec. 5.8.5.3.1 (Nov. 2000).
- 8 -
petitioners' reported monthly expense for housing and utilities
by $50. The net effect of the offer specialist's adjustments to
petitioners' monthly necessary living expenses was to reduce them
from $7,455 to $5,514.
Overall, the offer specialist determined that petitioners
had $2,813 in monthly future income available to pay off their
tax liabilities, as compared to petitioners' reported figure of
$265. The offer specialist further determined that petitioners
could pay this amount for 59 months, resulting in aggregate
payments out of future income of $165,967.
The foregoing calculations produced a reasonable collection
potential of $207,567; i.e., $41,600 in net realizable equity
plus $165,967 in future income. In her final report, the offer
specialist noted that petitioners also had some interests in
family corporations, interest in real property referred to as the
B. Lemann Building, and possibly life insurance. She did not
assign any value to these assets or rely upon them in determining
petitioners' reasonable collection potential.5 The offer
specialist concluded that petitioners had failed to demonstrate
any special circumstances that would justify calculating their
reasonable collection potential outside the prescribed
guidelines. Because the reasonable collection potential of
5
The offer specialist also noted that petitioners had
previously entered into an installment agreement on which they
had defaulted.
- 9 -
$207,567 exceeded petitioners' outstanding tax liabilities, the
offer specialist recommended that petitioners' offer-in-
compromise of $67,000 be rejected.
The Appeals officer accepted the offer specialist's
recommendations. On June 10, 2002, the Appeals officer sent
petitioners a letter explaining that their $67,000 offer-in-
compromise would not be accepted because review indicated the
entire outstanding balance of their tax liabilities could be
collected over time. The letter explained that, in such
circumstances, an installment agreement was the available
collection alternative.
Based on the offer specialist's calculations, the Appeals
officer proposed that petitioners make an initial lump-sum
payment of $40,000,6 and monthly payments of $2,8207 commencing
July 26, 2002. The letter further advised petitioners that,
because their case had been under consideration since 2000, and
an installment agreement had been determined to be the available
alternative to a levy, their failure to accept the terms of the
6
The Appeals officer's case memorandum indicates that he
disregarded the $1,600 equity in petitioners' automobiles
postulated by the offer specialist, concluding that their net
realizable equity consisted only of the $40,000 equity in their
residence as found by the offer specialist.
7
The offer specialist had computed petitioners' monthly
future income as $2,813. While the record does not disclose the
basis on which the Appeals officer increased this figure to
$2,820 for purposes of the installment agreement he proposed, we
conclude that the difference is immaterial.
- 10 -
proposed installment agreement by June 20, 2002, would result in
the issuance of a determination letter sustaining the proposed
levy.
On June 18, 2002, Mr. Lemann sent a letter to the Appeals
officer acknowledging and rejecting the proposed installment
agreement. The letter read: "I simply cannot afford the payments
you propose." The letter offered no further collection
alternatives to the levy.
On July 16, 2002, a Notice of Determination was issued to
petitioners which determined that the proposed levy was
appropriate. The determination concluded: (1) That all
requirements of applicable law and administrative procedures had
been met; (2) that petitioners' proposed collection alternative
of monthly installment payments of $1,500 was not acceptable
because it would not result in full payment of the outstanding
tax liabilities within the applicable periods of limitation on
collection; (3) that petitioners' $67,000 offer-in-compromise
based on doubt as to collectibility was unacceptable given that
their net equity in assets and future income were sufficient to
pay their outstanding tax liabilities in full;8 and (4) that, in
light of petitioners' refusal to accept the installment agreement
8
The Appeals officer's case memorandum indicates that he,
like the offer specialist, reached his conclusions regarding
petitioners' ability to pay without relying on petitioners'
interests in any family corporations or in the B. Lemann
Building.
- 11 -
proposed by the Appeals officer that would have resulted in full
payment of their outstanding liabilities, the levy was an
appropriate balance between the need for efficient collection of
taxes and petitioners' legitimate concern that the collection
action be no more intrusive than necessary.
Petitioners timely sought review in this Court pursuant to
section 6330(d).
Discussion
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be
granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues in
controversy "if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,
depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be
rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(a) and (b); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965
(7th Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the burden of proving
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and factual
inferences are drawn in a manner most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.
812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344
(1982).
- 12 -
Section 6331(a) authorizes the Secretary to levy against
property and property rights where a taxpayer liable for taxes
fails to pay those taxes within 10 days after notice and demand
for payment is made. Section 6331(d) requires the Secretary to
send written notice of an intent to levy to the taxpayer, and
section 6330(a) requires the Secretary to send a written notice
to the taxpayer of his right to a section 6330 hearing at least
30 days before any levy is begun.
If a section 6330 hearing is requested, the hearing is to be
conducted by the Commissioner's Office of Appeals and, at the
hearing, the Appeals officer conducting it must verify that the
requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure
have been met. Sec. 6330(b)(1), (c)(1). The taxpayer may raise
at the hearing any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or
the proposed levy, including challenges to the appropriateness of
collection actions or offers of collection alternatives, such as
an installment agreement or an offer-in-compromise. Sec.
6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer may contest the existence or amount
of the underlying tax liability at the hearing if the taxpayer
did not receive a statutory notice of deficiency with respect to
the underlying tax liability or did not otherwise have an
opportunity to dispute that liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). At
the conclusion of the hearing, the Appeals officer must determine
whether and how to proceed with collection, taking into account,
- 13 -
among other things, collection alternatives proposed by the
taxpayer and whether any proposed collection action balances the
need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate
concern of the taxpayer that the collection action be no more
intrusive than necessary. See sec. 6330(c)(3).
We have jurisdiction to review the Appeals officer's
determination where we have jurisdiction over the type of tax
involved in the case. Sec. 6330(d)(1)(A); see Iannone v.
Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287, 290 (2004). Generally, in reviewing
the Appeals officer's determination for abuse of discretion we
may consider only those issues that the taxpayer raised during
the section 6330 hearing. See sec. 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F5,
Proced. & Admin. Regs.; see also Magana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C.
488, 493 (2002). Where the underlying tax liability is properly
at issue, we review the determination de novo. E.g., Goza v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). Where the underlying
tax liability is not at issue, we review the determination for
abuse of discretion. Id. Whether an abuse of discretion has
occurred depends upon whether the exercise of discretion is
without sound basis in fact or law. See Freije v. Commissioner,
125 T.C. 14, 23 (2005); Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co. v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 367, 371 (1995).
The issues raised by petitioners with the Appeals officer
and herein concern only collection alternatives. Petitioners
- 14 -
contend that respondent arbitrarily refused to accept their
proposed installment agreement and subsequent offer-in-
compromise, opting instead to proceed with a levy. They contend
that they could not agree to the Appeals officer's proposed
installment agreement because they lacked the financial resources
and borrowing capacity to fulfill the terms of that agreement.
Moreover, they contend that the formula used by respondent to
determine the acceptable amount of an installment agreement or an
acceptable offer-in-compromise failed to account adequately for
petitioners' age, earning capacity, and poor financial
circumstances. Finally, they assert that respondent's
determination to proceed with a levy does not balance the need
for efficient collection with their legitimate concern that the
collection action be no more intrusive than necessary, see sec.
6330(c)(3)(C), and accordingly is arbitrary and capricious.9
As petitioners have not challenged the validity of the
underlying tax liability, we review respondent's determination to
proceed with collection for abuse of discretion. Jones v.
9
In the petition, petitioners also assert that respondent's
actions were "unduly punitive" in violation of petitioners'
Eighth Amendment rights. They do not mention this claim in their
opposition to respondent's motion for summary judgment, and we
deem it abandoned. See Bradley v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 367,
370 (1993); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 344
(1991); Rybak v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 566 n.19 (1988). In
any event, petitioners have not cited, and we are unaware of, any
authority suggesting that, where a taxpayer concedes that unpaid
taxes are due, the Commissioner's decision to collect those taxes
by means of his power to levy may violate the Eighth Amendment.
- 15 -
Commissioner, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2003); Sego v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner,
supra.
Petitioners' Proposed Installment Agreement
The Appeals officer rejected petitioners' initial proposal
to pay $1,500 per month to satisfy the liabilities at issue on
the grounds that such an installment agreement would not result
in satisfaction of the liabilities within the applicable periods
of limitation on collection. Section 6159(a) gives the Secretary
discretionary authority to enter into installment agreements to
satisfy tax liabilities where he determines that it will
facilitate collection. Under the statute and regulations
applicable in 2002, generally only installment agreements that
allowed a taxpayer to fully satisfy a tax liability before
expiration of the applicable period of limitation on collection
were authorized.10 See sec. 6159(a); sec. 301.6159-1(a), Proced.
& Admin. Regs. Petitioners' proposal to pay $1,500 per month was
insufficient to satisfy their outstanding tax liabilities in full
before the collection period expiration dates, the latest of
which was July 21, 2007.11 Accordingly, it cannot be said that
10
Sec. 6159(a) was amended by the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357, sec. 843(a)(1)(B), 118 Stat. 1600,
to authorize the Secretary to enter into installment agreements
that do not fully satisfy a tax liability, effective for
agreements entered into on or after Oct. 22, 2004.
11
This proposition is self-evident. Petitioners'
(continued...)
- 16 -
the Appeals officer's rejection of petitioners' proposed
installment agreement was an abuse of discretion.
Petitioners' Offer-in-Compromise
The Appeals officer also rejected petitioners' second
proposed collection alternative, their $67,000 offer-in-
compromise. In doing so, the Appeals officer essentially adopted
the recommendation of the offer specialist that petitioners did
not qualify for an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to
collectibility because they were capable of paying the entire
amount of the outstanding liabilities (by making an initial
payment of $40,000 and monthly installments of $2,820 thereafter
for 59 months).
11
(...continued)
outstanding liabilities when the notice of intent to levy was
issued on Jan. 30, 2001, totaled $201,191. The aggregate
payments under a $1,500 per month installment plan running
through July 21, 2007 (the expiration date of the latest period
of limitations) would have fallen substantially short of that
figure, whether measured from the time when the Appeals officer
preliminarily rejected it in Apr. 2002 ($96,000) or finally
rejected it in the notice of determination in July 2002
($91,500).
Sec. 6502(a)(2)(A) allows the taxpayer and the Commissioner
to extend the period for collection in connection with entering
into an installment agreement. The Commissioner's policy
generally limits such extensions to no more than 5 years beyond
the original expiration of the limitations period. IRM, sec.
5.14.2.1 (Mar. 2002). While there is no evidence that the
Appeals officer considered such an extension, this issue is
immaterial, as an addition of 5 years to the applicable periods
of limitation would still not have resulted in full satisfaction
of petitioners' liabilities; i.e., $1,500 per month for an
additional 60 months would amount to another $90,000, which, when
added to the $91,000 petitioners would pay before the expiration
date, would still be less than petitioners' total unpaid tax
liabilities.
- 17 -
Section 7122 authorizes the Secretary to compromise any
civil case arising under the internal revenue laws and requires
him to prescribe guidelines for officers and employees of the
Internal Revenue Service to determine whether an offer-in-
compromise is adequate and should be accepted to resolve a
dispute. Sec. 7122(a), (c)(1). These guidelines must include
published schedules of national and local allowances designed to
ensure that taxpayers entering into a compromise will have
adequate means to provide for basic living expenses and must also
provide for a determination, based on the facts and circumstances
of each taxpayer, that use of the published schedules will not
result in the taxpayer's lacking adequate means to provide for
basic living expenses. Sec. 7122(c)(2).
The contemplated guidelines and schedules have been
published. See sec. 301.7122-1T(b)(3)(ii), Temporary Proced. &
Admin. Regs., 64 Fed. Reg. 39020 (July 21, 1999); IRM, exh.
5.15.1-4 and -5 (Oct. 1999); IRM, exh. 5.15.1-10 and -11 (Oct.
2000). Under this administrative guidance, the Commissioner will
generally compromise a liability on the basis of doubt as to
collectibility only if the liability exceeds the taxpayer's
reasonable collection potential. Cf. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125
T.C. 301, 308-310 (2005). A taxpayer's reasonable collection
potential is determined, in part, using published guidelines for
certain national and local allowances for basic living expenses,
- 18 -
and essentially treating income and assets in excess of those
needed for basic living expenses as available to satisfy Federal
income tax liabilities. The foregoing formulaic approach is
disregarded, however, upon a showing by the taxpayer of special
circumstances including, but not limited to, advanced age, poor
health, history of unemployment, disability, dependents with
special needs, or medical catastrophe, that may cause an offer to
be accepted notwithstanding that it is for less than the
taxpayer's reasonable collection potential. Sec. 301.7122-
1(c)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; IRM, secs. 5.8.5.4 (Nov. 2000),
5.8.11.2.1 (Nov. 2001).
A taxpayer's reasonable collection potential is calculated
by determining, then adding together: (1) The taxpayer's "net
realizable equity"; i.e., quick sale value less amounts owed to
secured lien holders with priority over Federal tax liens; and
(2) his "future income"; i.e., the amount collectible from the
taxpayer's expected future gross income after allowing for
necessary living expenses. IRM, sec. 5.8.5.4 (Nov. 2000).
Here, the offer specialist followed published guidelines in
computing petitioners' net realizable equity. The net realizable
equity from their residence was computed by accepting
petitioners' estimate of value ($125,000), reducing it to a quick
sale value of $100,000 as prescribed by IRM, sec. 5.8.5.3.1 (Nov.
2000), and offsetting that figure by their claimed mortgage
- 19 -
indebtedness of $60,000. The resulting $40,000 figure was less
than the $67,000 of equity in the residence reported by
petitioners. Similarly, the offer specialist accepted
petitioners' estimate of their equity in their automobiles
($2,000) and reduced it to quick sale value ($1,600), resulting
in total net realizable equity of $41,600. In accepting the
offer specialist's recommendations, the Appeals officer made a
further concession to petitioners by disregarding the equity in
their automobiles to conclude that their net realizable equity
equaled $40,000.
The offer specialist likewise followed published guidelines
in computing petitioners' future income. Following standard
procedure, she increased the monthly income petitioners reported
on their Form 433-A by $612 to conform with their 2001 Forms W-2
and dividend income reported on their 2001 Federal income tax
return. See IRM, sec. 5.8.5.2.1 (Nov. 2001). She made
adjustments to the expenses claimed by petitioners on the Form
433-A in accordance with the applicable procedures contained in
the IRM.12 Those procedures allow taxpayers the lesser of the
12
The IRM sets forth procedures for evaluating both
proposed installment agreements and offers-in-compromise. See
IRM, secs. 5.15.1-5.15.1.4 (Mar. 2000). Those procedures contain
guidelines for allowable necessary and conditional expenses.
Necessary expenses are those that provide for the health and
welfare of the taxpayer and his or her family, and for the
production of income. These expenses must be reasonable in
amount, and are generally based on national or local standards.
Necessary expenses include such things as: (1) Food, housekeeping
supplies, clothing, personal care expenses and services (based on
(continued...)
- 20 -
local standard or the amount actually paid for transportation
expense. IRM, exh. 5.15.1-11 (Oct. 2000). On that basis, the
specialist reduced petitioners' claimed monthly expense of $680
for transportation to the local standard of $289. Likewise,
conditional expenses like credit card debt, i.e., expenses
charged to a credit card that were not for basic living expenses,
are not allowable where the tax liability would not be paid
within 5 years. IRM, sec. 5.15.1.3 (Mar. 2000). On that basis,
the offer specialist disregarded petitioners' claimed monthly
credit card expense of $1,600.13
The foregoing calculations of the offer specialist produced
monthly future income of $2,813, which the offer specialist
estimated petitioners could pay for 59 months; i.e., until
12
(...continued)
national standards); (2) housing, utilities, and transportation
(based on local standards); and (3) other expenses like health
care. Other expenses, so-called conditional expenses, are
allowable only if the tax liability, including projected
accruals, can be fully paid within five years. Credit card
payments and repayments on other unsecured debts are examples of
conditional expenses. See, e.g., Schulman v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-129 n.6.
As noted in our findings, the offer specialist increased
petitioners' claimed monthly expense for housing and utilities by
$50. The basis on which the offer specialist made this
adjustment is not clear from the record. In any event, it
constitutes a concession by respondent.
13
Minimum payments on unsecured debts like credit cards are
allowed if a taxpayer substantiates and justifies the expense as
necessary for either the health and welfare of the taxpayer
and/or his or her family, or for the production of income. IRM,
sec. 5.15.1.3.2.4 (Mar. 2000). Petitioners do not allege that
their credit card expense was incurred for either of these
reasons.
- 21 -
expiration of the latest period of limitation on collection
applicable to petitioners' unpaid tax liabilities. The offer
specialist therefore concluded that petitioners had a reasonable
collection potential of $207,567, consisting of net realizable
equity of $41,600 and future income of $165,967 ($2,813 per month
for 59 months). The offer specialist's notes indicate that she
considered Mr. Lemann's claim that he was 60 and might not work 4
more years and, noting that he had identified no health or other
reasons why he would become unemployed, concluded that there were
no special circumstances that would warrant a departure from the
IRM guidelines in determining petitioners' reasonable collection
potential, as required under section 7122(c)(2)(B). See sec.
301.7122-1(c)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; IRM, secs. 5.8.5.4
(Nov. 2000), 5.8.11.2.1 (Nov. 2001).
Petitioners' Arguments
With respect to the net realizable equity found by the offer
specialist, petitioners make averments in the petition to the
effect that they were unable to borrow and were
"undercreditworthy". We assume for purposes of the pending
motion that they made a similar claim in connection with the
section 6330 hearing, including a claim that they were unable to
borrow against the equity in their residence (which equity
constitutes the net realizable equity found by the Appeals
officer). Given that petitioners had previously offered to make
- 22 -
a lump-sum payment of $67,000 to satisfy their tax liabilities,
we do not believe it was an abuse of discretion for the Appeals
officer to disregard this claim in concluding that they had net
realizable equity of $40,000.
We also find no abuse of discretion in the Appeals officer's
acceptance of the offer specialist's computation of future
income. The offer specialist's increase in monthly income as
reported by petitioners followed guidelines, given petitioners'
Forms W-2 and Federal income tax return for 2001. Her decreases
in reported monthly expenses likewise conformed to respondent's
published guidelines. Petitioners offer no specific dispute with
these adjustments. Instead, Mr. Lemann wrote in connection with
the hearing that "I am now 60 years of age and may very well not
have 4 more years of productivity" and that the future income
calculated by the offer specialist was "impossible given my
financial circumstances". Similarly, the petition avers that
"application of the formula used by the Commissioner to determine
the acceptable amount of an installment agreement or Offer in
Compromise failed to adequately take into account Petitioners'
age, earning capacity, and poor financial circumstances".
We interpret petitioners' statements as claims that the
Appeals officer's determination failed to take into account their
special circumstances, as required by section 7122(c)(2)(B) and
IRM sections 5.8.5.4 (Nov. 2000) and 5.8.11.2.1 (Nov. 2001). We
- 23 -
disagree, because we are satisfied that petitioners have not
identified any condition sufficient to constitute special
circumstances as contemplated by the regulations and IRM
guidelines. The offer specialist's case notes record that
petitioners did not identify special circumstances, even after
she explained the concept and solicited them. Being age 60 is
not a special circumstance under the guidelines, which refer to
being "elderly" as a potential special circumstance. See IRM,
sec. 5.8.5.4 (Nov. 2001). Beyond the statements noted above,
petitioners have not identified any facts in their petition or in
their opposition to the motion for summary judgment that might
constitute special circumstances, such as poor health,
disability, advanced age, or dependents with special needs. We
accordingly do not believe it was an abuse of discretion for the
Appeals officer to conclude that no special circumstances
existed. Stated differently, the Appeals officer's use of the
premise that Mr. Lemann would be able to work until the
traditional retirement age of 65 and generate approximately the
same income over that period was not arbitrary or unreasonable in
these circumstances. The Appeals officer's decision to adhere to
the guidelines was therefore not an abuse of discretion.
Generally, where an Appeals officer has followed
respondent's guidelines to ascertain a taxpayer's reasonable
collection potential and rejected the taxpayer's collection
- 24 -
alternative on that basis, we have found no abuse of discretion.
See Schulman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-129; see also Etkin
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-245; Schenkel v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-37.
Balancing Efficient Collection and Intrusiveness
Petitioners also argue that the Appeals officer failed to
balance the need for efficient collection of taxes with
petitioners' legitimate concern that any collection action be no
more intrusive than necessary, as required under section
6330(c)(3)(C). We disagree. In the case of installment
agreements and offers-in-compromise, respondent has established
relatively detailed guidelines for his employees to follow in
considering these collection alternatives. The Appeals officer
and offer specialist did so in this case; indeed, the undisputed
record indicates that both conducted extensive discussions with
Mr. Lemann, offered suggestions regarding how petitioners might
avoid levy, and solicited evidence of any special circumstances.
The two collection alternatives petitioners offered fell
substantially short of their ability to pay as determined under
respondent's prescribed guidelines. Upon learning this,
petitioners offered no others. Their delinquent tax liabilities
are likewise substantial, and they have previously defaulted on
an installment agreement. We are satisfied that the Appeals
officer struck the appropriate balance, especially given the
- 25 -
abuse of discretion standard under which his actions are to be
reviewed.
Genuine Issues of Material Fact
Finally, petitioners oppose respondent's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that genuine issues of material fact
remain in this case. The alleged issues are: (1) Petitioners did
not fail to provide evidence in support of their financial
statement; (2) petitioners do not own a partial interest in the
"Lehman" building; (3) petitioners' interest in certain family
corporations has no market or collateral value; and (4)
petitioners do not have excess income of $2,813 per month.
Regarding any failure of petitioners to provide evidence in
support of their financial statement, we see no genuine issue
here. The offer specialist did not modify any of the income or
expense items reported by petitioners on their Form 433-A for
lack of substantiation. Her adjustments to income were based on
petitioners' 2001 Federal income tax return. Her adjustments to
reported expenses were dictated by respondent's published
guidelines.
Regarding any interest petitioners held in the "Lehman"
building (B. Lemann Building) or family corporations, both the
offer specialist's analysis and the Appeals officer's
determination make clear that neither the value of the B. Lemann
Building nor any family corporation was relied upon in
- 26 -
calculating petitioners' reasonable collection potential. These
issues are therefore not material, even if disputed.
Regarding the issue of whether petitioners have monthly
excess income of $2,813, petitioners' claim that this is a
disputed issue of fact merely restates their challenge to the
analysis and conclusions reached by the offer specialist and
Appeals officer concerning their future income, which we have
fully considered and addressed above.
Conclusion
We note that we are not called upon to decide in this case
what would have been an acceptable offer-in-compromise or
installment agreement. Rather, we must decide whether the
Appeals officer's rejection of the collection alternatives
offered by petitioners was an abuse of discretion. See Speltz v.
Commissioner, 124 T.C. 165, 179-180 (2005); Fowler v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-163. As noted, the only collection
alternatives offered by petitioners were substantially below
their reasonable collection potential as estimated under
respondent's published guidelines. Accordingly, we hold that it
was not an abuse of discretion to reject them, that there are no
genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary
judgment, and that respondent is entitled to a decision in his
favor that he may proceed with the proposed collection by levy.
- 27 -
We shall therefore grant respondent's motion for summary
judgment.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered for
respondent.