Taylor v. Comm'r

T.C. Memo. 2006-67

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

SUE TAYLOR, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 21744-03. Filed April 6, 2006.

P filed Federal income tax returns for P and two
LLCs for 1999 and 2000. R subsequently determined
deficiencies and penalties with respect to P’s income
taxes, which P contested primarily on the basis of tax
protester arguments. P also argued that R did not
provide to either of the LLCs a final partnership
administrative adjustment and therefore the deficiency
notice mailed to her was premature.

Held: Following a concession by R, P is liable
for the remaining deficiencies, except for an
adjustment for a reduced share of income from one LLC
in 1999, determined by R for 1999 and 2000 including
self-employment taxes pursuant to sec. 1401, I.R.C.

Held, further, P is liable for a penalty under
sec. 6662, I.R.C., for 1999 and 2000.
 - 2 -

Sue Taylor, pro se.

Cameron M. McKesson, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

WHERRY, Judge: Respondent determined Federal income tax

deficiencies in the amounts of $49,525 and $39,717 together with

penalties pursuant to section 6662(a) in the amounts of $9,905

and $7,943.40 for taxable years 1999 and 2000, respectively.1

After concessions,2 the issues for decision are:

1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for
the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2
Respondent conceded petitioner’s allegedly unreported
income derived from National Land Bank LLC (National Land Bank)
in the amount of $43,862 for 1999 because respondent determined
that a tax return was filed for National Land Bank. However,
there was a mathematical subtraction error on National Land
Bank’s Form 1065, U.S. Partnership Return of Income, for 1999.
Instead of reporting $10,308 in income, National Land Bank
reported a $10,308 loss. Petitioner’s Form 1040, U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return, Schedule E, Supplemental Income and Loss,
consistent with the erroneous Form 1065, Schedule K-1 (Form
1065), Partner’s Share of Income, Credits, Deductions, Etc.,
reported her 50-percent alleged distributive share loss of
$5,154. The notice of deficiency for 1999 eliminated the $5,154
loss but, because of the claimed $43,862 income adjustment, did
not contain an adjustment to properly reflect her mathematically
corrected share of reported National Land Bank income.
Furthermore, as discussed infra in text, the Court finds that
petitioner is taxable in 1999 and 2000 on the income of Speck
Trust, the other 50-percent member of National Land Bank.
Therefore, petitioner has a total of $10,308 (her 50-percent
$5,154 share plus Speck Trust’s 50-percent $5,154 share) of
additional income for 1999 from National Land Bank in lieu of the
conceded $43,862.

(continued...)
 - 3 -

(1) Whether petitioner is liable for deficiencies for her

taxable years 1999 and 2000;

(2) whether petitioner is liable for penalties under section

6662(a) for her taxable years 1999 and 2000; and

(3) whether the Court should impose a penalty, sua sponte,

under section 6673.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. Background

Some of the facts have been deemed stipulated pursuant to

Rule 91(f) and are so found.3 The stipulated facts, with

accompanying exhibits, are incorporated in our findings by this

reference. At the time this petition was filed, petitioner

resided in Gilbert, Arizona.

2
(...continued)
As to respondent’s concession, this Court has the discretion
to accept or reject an offered concession. McGowan v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 599, 604-607 (1976)(“All concessions,
including stipulated settlement agreements, are subject to the
Court’s discretionary review. Only through this process can the
interests of justice be protected.” Id. at 607.). In this case,
we reject $10,308 of respondent’s concession due to the
mathematical calculation error.
3
Petitioner objected to many of the paragraphs in the
Stipulation of Facts as well as questions from respondent during
direct examination on Fifth Amendment grounds. The Court
informed petitioner on more than one occasion that even if it was
found to be applicable, she was not permitted to use the Fifth
Amendment privilege as both a sword and a shield. See United
States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983); Ruocco v.
Commissioner, 346 F.3d 223, 224 (1st Cir. 2003), affg. T.C. Memo.
2002-91; Lehmann v. Commissioner, 63 Fed. Appx. 412, 413 (9th
Cir. 2003); see also infra Part II, Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment
Claims.
 - 4 -

Petitioner initially filed a timely Form 1040, U.S.

Individual Income Tax Return, for 1999 on which she reported a

$133 loss on her Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, from

her Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden business and a $3,964 Schedule E

loss. The Schedule E loss arose from her membership in Miroyal,

LLC (Miroyal) from which she reported income of $1,190 and her

membership in National Land Bank, LLC (National Land Bank) from

which she reported a loss of $5,154 for a net loss from the two

entities combined of $3,964. Adding this alleged loss to the

$133 loss from Schedule C resulted in a negative adjusted gross

income of $4,098 and no taxable income.

Petitioner adopted an aggressive approach to Federal income

taxation when she filed her Form 1040 for 2000. That approach

utilizing discredited protester arguments resulted in

petitioner’s timely filing of a Form 1040 for 2000 which reported

“0” amounts on all relevant lines of the tax return.4 In June

2001, petitioner filed a Form 1040X, Amended U.S. Individual

4
Petitioner included with her Form 1040 for 2000 a letter
entitled: “Asseveration of Claimed Gross Income”, claiming, among
other things, that she did not have gross income or “any items of
gross income from any taxable sources listed by the Secretary”.
With her Form 1040X, Amended U.S. Individual Tax Return, for
1999, petitioner submitted similar letters and made similar
statements that she did not earn any income taxable under sec.
861. Petitioner, as managing member of Miroyal and National Land
Bank, submitted similar documents with Miroyal’s and National
Land Bank’s Forms 1065 for the 2000 taxable year and National
Land Bank’s amended Form 1065 for its 1999 taxable year. The
Court deems petitioner’s claims to be frivolous and will not
discuss the issue any further in this report. See Woods v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-38.
 - 5 -

Income Tax Return, for 1999, reflecting “0” in the “corrected

amount” column of the return. Respondent audited her individual

1999 and 2000 income tax returns.

On September 10, 2003, respondent issued to petitioner a

notice of deficiency determining that petitioner received

$164,356 and $126,686.85 of taxable income for 1999 and 2000,

respectively, had tax deficiencies, and owed tax penalties.

Petitioner timely filed her petition with this Court on December

22, 2003.

II. Income

During 1999 and 2000, petitioner earned income as a real

estate sales and property manager and as the proprietor of a

business, Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden. Petitioner was also a

member of two limited liability companies (LLCs), Miroyal and

National Land Bank, for 1999 and 2000. At trial, petitioner

objected to confirming her occupations and associations stating

that the answers might incriminate her, and she chose to invoke

the Fifth Amendment as a defense.

Petitioner was warned that she should assume she had the

burden of proof and was given the opportunity to present her case

to the Court; however, she chose not to do so. She presented no

evidence, nor did she offer any witnesses on her behalf. In

resting her case, petitioner stated: “I don’t have any witnesses
 - 6 -

to call. And I will just let the Government go ahead with the

case and proceed. I don’t believe that I owe the deficiencies

that they are claiming. And I’ll just let them go ahead and

bring forth their case. I rest my case.”

Because petitioner would not cooperate with or provide

documents for the audit, respondent computed petitioner’s income

using an indirect bank deposit analysis. This was accomplished

by examining copies of checks and bank statements and determining

whether the bank deposits reflected in the statements constituted

gross income to petitioner. Petitioner had signatory authority

over four accounts, which respondent contends are relevant to

this case: (1) Arizona Federal Credit Union (Account No. 136856

- Sue Taylor), (2) Norwest Bank Arizona, N.A. (Account No.

6056602931 - Sue Taylor d|b|a Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden), (3)

San Tan Credit Union (Account No. 8198 - National Land Bank LLC),

and (4) Arizona Federal Credit Union (Account No. 138022 - Sue

Taylor d|b|a Miroyal L.L.C.). In addition, respondent disallowed

expenses claimed on the filed tax returns for which no

substantiation was provided.

A. Miroyal LLC

1. Taxable Year 1999

On October 1, 2000, petitioner signed and then on October

18, 2000, filed Form 1065, U.S. Partnership Return of Income, on
 - 7 -

behalf of Miroyal for 1999. Miroyal claimed the following

deductions for 1999: (1) Repairs and maintenance, $20,165;

(2) interest, $15,696; and (3) other deductions, $14,107.

Attached to Form 1065 was a listing of these “other deductions”:

Insurance, $5,913; miscellaneous, $6,351; and utilities, $1,843.

During 1999 and 2000, Miroyal had two members. According to the

filed 1999 Form 1065 partnership tax return, each member, Sue

Taylor and Gerald Ricks, had a 50-percent interest. Sue Taylor

was designated as the tax matters partner on the calendar year

2000 Form 1065 Federal tax return.5 On its Form 1065, Miroyal

reported $2,380 of income for 1999. Petitioner’s Form 1065,

Schedule K-1 reflected her one-half distributive share of

Miroyal’s income in the amount of $1,190.

2. Taxable Year 2000

On April 19, 2001, petitioner filed Miroyal’s Form 1065 for

2000. Miroyal reported no income and no deductions for 2000.

In addition, petitioner attached Form 8275, Disclosure Statement,

referencing tax protester rhetoric claiming that Miroyal did not

have any income from any taxable sources. During 2000, the filed

Form 1065 partnership tax return indicated petitioner and Gerald

5
Miroyal’s Form 1065 for 1999 did not designate a tax
matters partner.
 - 8 -

Ricke6 had a 95-percent and 5-percent membership interest in

Miroyal, respectively. The Form 1065, Schedules K-1 for both

petitioner and Gerald Ricke reflected a distributive share of

zero dollars for 2000.

B. National Land Bank LLC

1. Taxable Year 1999

National Land Bank filed its Form 1065 for 1999 on October

19, 2000, with attached Schedules K-1 showing petitioner and

Speck Trust (Speck) each with a 50-percent membership interest.

In 1999, National Land Bank reported $110,544 in gross receipts

and sales and claimed “other deductions” totaling $100,236 for a

claimed $10,308 loss. Revenue Agent Wayne Johnson (Mr. Johnson)

testified that petitioner made a mathematical error on National

Land Bank’s Form 1065 for 1999. The $10,308 loss should have

been reflected as $10,308 of income.7

On June 25, 2001, petitioner filed an amended Form 1065 for

National Land Bank’s 1999 taxable year showing zero dollars in

taxable income and changing the membership interest: Petitioner

25 percent and Speck International Trust 75 percent.8 Attached

6
The Court (noting that the letters “e” and “s” are
diagonally adjacent on a standard typewriter keyboard) assumes
that Gerald Ricks and Gerald Ricke are the same person. In any
event, it is not material to this opinion.
7
See supra note 2.
8
The Court assumes Speck Trust and Speck International
(continued...)
 - 9 -

to the amended Form 1065 was Form 8275 including tax protester

rhetoric similar to that on Form 8275 attached to the return

filed by Miroyal in 2000.

During 1999 and 2000, National Land Bank had a bank account

at the San Tan Credit Union (Account No. 8198). Mr. Johnson

testified that petitioner controlled Account No. 8198 at the San

Tan Credit Union in the name of National Land Bank and authorized

all payments from this account in the name of National Land Bank.

2. Taxable Year 2000

On June 7, 2001, petitioner filed Form 1065 for 2000 on

behalf of National Land Bank showing no income. As in the

instance of the amended 1999 tax return, the attached Form 8275

contained tax protester rhetoric. In addition, a Form 4852,

Substitute for Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, or Form 1099-R,

Distributions From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-

Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc. (stating that

National Land Bank had, in petitioner’s opinion, been unable to

obtain a correct Form 1099, Miscellaneous Income, from its

employer, Circle G Property Development), accompanied National

Land Bank’s Form 1065 tax return for 2000.

8
(...continued)
Trust are one and the same entity and shall hereafter refer to
both as “Speck”. Despite the amended 1999 Federal income tax
returns for petitioner and National Land Bank, respondent audited
the original returns, and the audit adjustments are keyed to
those returns as is our report in this case.
 - 10 -

3. Speck

Petitioner did not explain, nor did she provide any

documents illuminating her relationship with Speck. Although

petitioner testified that she did not control all the assets held

in the name of Speck during 1999 and 2000, she offered no

evidence or documentation that anyone other than herself was the

grantor of, was a beneficiary of, or controlled Speck.

On August 10, 1998, Speck issued to Krismon Buttes, LLC

(Krismon Buttes), an entity in the business of real estate

investment, invoice No. 303 for “International Marketing services

rendered for the years 1998 thru 2000” in the amount of $70,000.

Krismon Buttes issued check No. 1023 to Speck on August 19, 1998,

in the amount of $70,000. William A. McGlothlin

(Mr. McGlothlin), bookkeeper for Krismon Buttes from 1996-2002,

testified that he issued to Speck a Form 1099 after check No.

1023 was issued. Check No. 1023 did not clear Krismon Buttes’s

checking account. Mr. McGlothlin was instructed to void check

No. 1023.

More than a year later, on September 28, 1999, Krismon

Buttes issued check No. 1027 in the amount of $70,000 to Property

Resources as a replacement for the original check No. 1023.

Check No. 1027 cleared Krismon Buttes’s checking account and was

deposited into a payee account at Swiss American Bank Limited,

High Street, St. John’s, Antigua. Respondent attributed the
 - 11 -

$70,000 payment made to Property Resources, by check No. 1027,

for taxable year 1999 to petitioner.

Mr. McGlothlin stated that petitioner, whom he personally

knew for 18 years, was a friend of the owners of Krismon Buttes,

and petitioner provided marketing services to Krismon Buttes.

At trial, respondent’s counsel asked petitioner whether she

provided marketing services to Krismon Buttes during 1999.

Petitioner responded: “I do not provide services personally

myself. That was through Speck Trust.”

The original 1999 Schedules K-1 from National Land Bank for

both Speck and petitioner listed their address and National Land

Bank’s as 20 North Gilbert Road, Gilbert, Arizona, 85234.

However, when National Land Bank filed its amended Form 1065 for

1999, Speck’s address was changed to 5804 W. Vista Drive #347,

Glendale, Arizona 85301. For 2000, Schedules K-1 for Speck and

petitioner did not list their respective addresses although the

Form 1065, Schedule K-1 instructions, and the form respectively

required and provided space for those addresses. See sec.

1.6031(b)-1T(a)(3)(ii), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg.

34491 (Sept. 7, 1988).

C. Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden

For 1999 and 2000, respondent contended that petitioner

operated a business named Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden. Respondent

provided copies of numerous checks written during the relevant
 - 12 -

time period payable to Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden which had been

deposited into the Norwest Bank Arizona, N.A. account titled,

“Sue Taylor d|b|a Natures’s Herb & Tea Garden”. Respondent also

provided copies of checks drawn on Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden’s

Norwest Bank Arizona, N.A. account and signed by petitioner, as

well as copies of the account’s bank statements reflecting Sue

Taylor DBA Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden.

OPINION

I. Contentions of the Parties

On the premise of tax protester arguments, petitioner

contends that she did not receive any taxable income for 1999 and

2000. She also maintains, among other things, that any income

received by any LLCs in which she was a member cannot be

attributed to her because respondent did not issue the LLCs a

final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) before issuing

the notice of deficiency. Further, petitioner states that even

if income in 1999 and 2000 can be attributed to her, she is

entitled to deductions, allowances, and credits that should have

reduced her tax liability to zero. Petitioner also asserts that

she should be entitled to recover her litigation and/or

administrative costs.9 Lastly, petitioner raises tax protester

9
Although petitioner claimed in her petition that she
should be entitled to recovery of her administrative or
litigation costs, she did not argue for costs at trial or on
brief. In any event, consideration of her eligibility for costs
(continued...)
 - 13 -

arguments under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in

opposition to the filing requirement.

Respondent claims that petitioner received income in 1999

and 2000 from various sources. Respondent maintains that the

entities, National Land Bank and Speck, should be disregarded for

tax purposes due to each entity’s lack of economic substance.

Thus, the income from these entities should be attributed to

petitioner. Because petitioner did not pay taxes on self-

employment income, respondent maintains that petitioner is liable

for self-employment tax, and since petitioner did not

substantiate Miroyal’s or her deductions, respondent seeks to

disallow the claimed deductions.

II. Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment Claims

A person does not have a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege

to avoid filing a Federal income tax return or to refuse signing

a Federal income tax return under penalties of perjury. See

United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927); see also

Major v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-141 n.2; Brunner v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-187, affd. per curiam 142 Fed.

Appx. 53 (3d Cir. 2005). In order for an individual validly to

9
(...continued)
under sec. 7430 would be premature, and the Court will not
further discuss the issue in this report. See Rule 231.
 - 14 -

claim the privilege against self-incrimination, there must be a

“real and appreciable danger” from “substantial hazards of self

incrimination”, and the individual must have “‘reasonable cause

to apprehend (such) danger from a direct answer’ to questions

posed to him”. United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th

Cir. 1980)(quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486

(1951)). “A taxpayer cannot base his failure either to cooperate

with the IRS or to produce records on a generalized fear of self-

incrimination. The fifth amendment privilege cannot be used as a

method of evading payment of lawful taxes.” Edelson v.

Commissioner, 829 F.2d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo.

1986-223.

Respondent confirmed at trial and represented to both the

Court and petitioner that there were no open, contemplated,

anticipated, or planned criminal investigations of petitioner.

Petitioner, when asked, indicated she had no specific basis for

fearing criminal action, but nevertheless insisted on asserting

her Fifth Amendment claim as she felt it was inappropriate to

testify against herself.

THE COURT: Are you talking about your right against
self-incrimination?

MS. TAYLOR: Yes, in the Fifth Amendment.

THE COURT: And do you have some other right that
you’re standing on beside that one?

MS. TAYLOR: No, just the Fifth.
 - 15 -

THE COURT: All right. Do you have some reason to
believe that you’re under criminal investigation or?

MS. TAYLOR: No, I don’t. But any time that you
testify it becomes a record. And, you know, it’s not a
good idea to testify against yourself so other people
can use that. So, you know, I don’t know what would
ever happen in the future. Or it could become -- it’s
public record so I’m not going to testify against
myself. Would you?

Petitioner did not demonstrate that there was any real or

appreciable danger of self-incrimination, nor did she offer to

provide to the Court in camera any particularized basis or facts

supporting the claimed Fifth Amendment privilege. Therefore,

petitioner was not entitled to use the Fifth Amendment as a

defense to participating in the required Rule 91 stipulation

process and answering questions posed to her at trial.

III. Petitioner’s Income Tax Liability

A. Burden of Proof

In general, the Commissioner’s determination of a taxpayer’s

tax liability is presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the

burden of proving that respondent’s determination is improper.

Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The

“presumption of correctness” is appropriate where respondent has

furnished evidence linking the taxpayer to the “tax generating

activity”. Gold Emporium, Inc. v. Commissioner, 910 F.2d 1374,

1378 (7th Cir. 1990), affg. Malicki v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1988-559.
 - 16 -

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court to

which an appeal of this case would normally lie, has made clear

that if respondent introduces evidence that the taxpayer received

unreported income, as respondent did here, the burden generally

is on the taxpayer to show by a preponderance of the evidence

that the deficiency was arbitrary and erroneous. Hardy v.

Commissioner, 181 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999), affg. T.C.

Memo. 1997-97; see also Palmer v. United States, 116 F.3d. 1309,

1312 (9th Cir. 1997)(“The Commissioner’s deficiency

determinations and assessments for unpaid taxes are normally

entitled to a presumption of correctness so long as they are

supported by a minimal factual foundation.” (Emphasis added.));

Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1982)

(“[T]he Commissioner’s assertion of deficiencies are

presumptively correct once some substantive evidence is

introduced demonstrating that the taxpayer received unreported

income.”).

However, section 7491 may shift the burden to respondent in

specified circumstances, for example, where the taxpayer produces

“credible evidence” and meets other requirements. Sec.

7491(a)(1). The legislative history of section 7491 clarifies

the meaning of “credible evidence”:

Credible evidence is the quality of evidence which,
after critical analysis, the court would find
sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue
 - 17 -

if no contrary evidence were submitted (without regard
to the judicial presumption of IRS correctness). A
taxpayer has not produced credible evidence for these
purposes if the taxpayer merely makes implausible
factual assertions, frivolous claims, or tax protestor-
type arguments. The introduction of evidence will not
meet this standard if the court is not convinced that
it is worthy of belief. If after evidence from both
sides, the court believes that the evidence is equally
balanced, the court shall find that the Secretary has
not sustained his burden of proof. * * * [H. Conf.
Rept. 105-599, at 240-241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 994-
995.]

In addition, to effectuate a shift in the burden of proof,

petitioner must maintain all records required by the Code and

regulations and cooperate with reasonable requests by the

Secretary for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and

interviews. Sec. 7491(a)(2).

Petitioner did not satisfy the prerequisites under section

7491(a)(1) and (2) to shift the burden of proof to respondent.

Consequently, except for any penalties subject to section

7491(c), as to which respondent bears the initial burden of

production, the general premise of Rule 142(a) remains

applicable.

B. Bank Deposits Method for Computing Taxable Income

The IRS has broad powers under section 446 to compute the

taxable income of a taxpayer. Sec. 446; Petzoldt v.

Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 639 (1989). Generally, such

computation is made using the taxpayer’s regularly employed

method of accounting. Sec. 446(a). If the taxpayer’s method of
 - 18 -

accounting does not clearly reflect income, then the method used

shall be the method, which, in the Commissioner’s opinion,

clearly reflects income. Sec. 446(b); see Palmer v. United

States, supra at 1312. Respondent is afforded great latitude in

determining a taxpayer’s liability and is entitled to use any

reasonable method to reconstruct a taxpayer’s income, especially

where a petitioner refuses to cooperate in ascertaining her

income. Petzoldt v. Commissioner, supra; Giddio v. Commissioner,

54 T.C. 1530, 1533 (1970).

Petitioner did not provide any evidence regarding her

liability, and respondent was able to acquire petitioner’s bank

records only by summons. Respondent used the bank deposits

method to determine that petitioner earned the income attributed

to her in the statutory notices of deficiency for 1999 and 2000.

“Where the Commissioner’s method of calculating income is

rationally based, courts afford a presumption of correctness to

the Commissioner’s determination.” Palmer v. United States,

supra at 1312. “The use of the bank deposit method for computing

income has long been sanctioned by the courts.” Estate of Mason

v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651, 656 (1975)(and cases cited

thereat), affd. 566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977). “A bank deposit is

prima facie evidence of income, and respondent need not prove a

likely source of that income.” Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
 - 19 -

74, 77 (1986)(citing Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, supra at

656-657).

“The bank deposits method assumes that all money deposited

in a taxpayer’s bank account during a given period constitutes

taxable income, but the Government must take into account any

nontaxable source or deductible expense of which it has

knowledge.” Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 645-646

(1994). “When a taxpayer keeps no books or records, has large

bank deposits, and offers no plausible explanation of such

deposits, the Commissioner is not arbitrary or capricious in

resorting to the bank deposit method for computing income.”

Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, supra at 657.

At trial, Mr. Johnson thoroughly explained the method used

to reconstruct petitioner’s income for 1999 and 2000.

Mr. Johnson reviewed each of the bank deposits to determine

whether the deposit was from a taxable or nontaxable source.

Petitioner did not offer into evidence any books, records, or

receipts on her behalf, nor did she offer any evidence

challenging respondent’s income calculations.

C. Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment

Petitioner argues that any 1999 or 2000 LLC income cannot be

attributed to her because respondent did not issue Miroyal or

National Land Bank an FPAA before issuing her notice of
 - 20 -

deficiency. Generally, the Commissioner may not assess a

deficiency attributable to any partnership item until the 150th

day after the day on which the FPAA was mailed to the tax matters

partner. Sec. 6225.

For purposes of sections 6221 through 6234, a partnership is

defined by section 6231(a)(1)(A) to mean in general “any

partnership required to file a return under section 6031(a).”

Section 6231(a)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to the definition

of a “partnership” for small partnerships. The term

“partnership” for this purpose does not include “any partnership

having 10 or fewer partners each of whom is an individual (other

than a nonresident alien), a C corporation, or an estate of a

deceased partner.” Miroyal is a partnership with only two

partners: Petitioner and Gerald Ricke. Both partners are

individuals; thus, Miroyal falls within the section 6231(a)(1)(B)

“partnership” exception.

However, a small partnership can elect to have Subchapter C

of Chapter 63 apply. See sec. 6231(a)(1)(B)(ii).10 Miroyal did

not make this election in 1999 or 2000. Because Miroyal falls

10
A partnership may elect to have Subchapter C apply to the
tax treatment of partnership items by checking the proper box on
Form 1065, Schedule B and by “attaching a statement to the
partnership return for the first taxable year for which the
election is effective.” Sec. 301.6231(a)(1)-1(b)(2), Proced. &
Admin. Regs. Miroyal neither checked the box on line 4 of Form
1065, Schedule B on its 1999 or 2000 Form 1065, nor did it attach
a statement to the Form 1065 electing to have Subchapter C of
Chapter 63 apply.
 - 21 -

under the exception to the definition of a partnership as

provided in section 6231(a)(1)(B) and did not elect out of the

exception, respondent was not required to issue it an FPAA before

mailing the deficiency notice to petitioner.

National Land Bank does not fall within the small

partnership exception because one of its partners, Speck, is a

trust and not an individual. However, respondent used the

indirect bank deposit method to calculate petitioner’s income.

Section 6231(c)(1)(C) establishes a special rule where “indirect

methods of proof of income” are utilized. This rule permits

respondent to treat what would otherwise be partnership items, as

nonpartnership items for purposes of sections 6221 through 6234.11

The rule applies to the extent regulations issued by the

Secretary provide that treatment of an item as a partnership item

will interfere with the effective and efficient enforcement of

the revenue laws.

Section 301.6231(c)-6T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs.,

52 Fed. Reg. 6793 (Mar. 5, 1987), provides that the treatment of

items as partnership items with respect to a partner whose income

is determined by an indirect method of proof will interfere with

11
A partnership item with respect to a partnership is
defined as “any item required to be taken into account for the
partnership’s taxable year under any provision of subtitle A to
the extent regulations prescribed by the Secretary provide that,
for purposes of this subtitle, such item is more appropriately
determined at the partnership level than at the partner level.”
Sec. 6231(a)(3).
 - 22 -

the effective and efficient enforcement of internal revenue laws.

Consequently, the partnership items of such partner, arising in a

partnership taxable year ending on or before the last day of the

taxable year of the partner for which a deficiency notice based

upon an indirect method of proof is mailed to the partner, shall

be treated as nonpartnership items as of the date on which the

deficiency notice is mailed. Therefore, respondent was not

required to issue National Land Bank an FPAA before mailing the

statutory notice of deficiency to petitioner.

D. Miroyal Income

At trial, petitioner asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege

and refused to admit or deny whether she provided real estate

services in 1999 and 2000. Similarly, petitioner refused to

confirm or deny whether she managed real property in 1999 and

2000 on the same Fifth Amendment reasoning.

Respondent for lack of substantiation disallowed Miroyal’s

claimed deductions for 1999 as follows: $20,165 for repairs and

maintenance, $15,696 of interest, and $14,107 of other deductions

(i.e., insurance $5,913, miscellaneous $6,351, and utilities

$1,843). Petitioner signed Miroyal’s 1999 and 2000 Federal tax

returns, naming herself the tax matters partner for 2000, yet she

provided no receipts or records but provided only a typed list

showing the total amounts Miroyal allegedly expended on the
 - 23 -

claimed deductions.12 She did not offer any testimony, receipts,

or canceled checks regarding any of Miroyal’s claimed deductions.

The list she prepared will not suffice as substantiation;

therefore, respondent’s disallowance of the claimed deductions in

1999 is sustained.

Respondent attributed 95 percent of Miroyal’s 1999 income to

petitioner as her distributive share. However, Miroyal’s Form

1065, Schedule K-1 for 1999, which respondent introduced into

evidence, showed that petitioner was only a 50-percent member of

Miroyal during that year. Respondent’s revenue agent apparently

did not distinguish between 1999 and 2000 when testifying that

petitioner held a 95-percent interest in Miroyal. Miroyal’s Form

1065, Schedule K-1 for 2000 reflected this ownership split, and

neither the revenue agent nor respondent presented any other

basis for or facts explaining the revenue agent’s conclusion that

the reported 50-percent membership percentage evidenced by

petitioner’s Form 1065, Schedule K-1 for 1999 was inaccurate.

Thus, respondent’s conflicting evidence presents the Court with a

conundrum.

The filed 1999 Form 1065, Schedule K-1, which was prepared

before petitioner commenced her overt tax protester activities,

12
Miroyal did not designate a tax matters partner for 1999.
In any event, a tax matters partner is necessary only for
partnerships subject to secs. 6221 through 6233. As previously
discussed, Miroyal is not subject to secs. 6221 through 6233.
 - 24 -

has independent tax significance as it allocated $1,190 of

taxable income to the other reported 50-percent member, Gerald

Ricke, who presumably paid tax on this amount. This is a

substantial indicium that he was in fact a 50-percent member in

1999. Because respondent stipulated Miroyal’s 1999 Form 1065,

through his own Rule 91(f) motion, and also introduced it as

evidence at trial, the Court finds, based on a preponderance of

the evidence, that petitioner’s distributive share of Miroyal’s

income for 1999 was 50 percent of $32,116 (i.e., $16,058 of which

$1,190 was reported, leaving an adjustment of $14,868).13

For 2000, respondent allowed Miroyal a deduction for taxes

and licenses of $2,231 as substantiated by the revenue agent via

Miroyal’s canceled checks. On the basis of an examination and

analysis of Miroyal’s bank deposits, the revenue agent determined

that Miroyal had unreported income for 2000 of $57,639.51.

Petitioner introduced no evidence to challenge or refute

respondent’s determination and therefore failed to carry her

burden of proof. Because Miroyal’s filed 2000 Federal tax return

13
Miroyal’s Form 1065, Schedule K-1 for 1999 did not
contain an address or Social Security number. for Gerald Ricke;
however, the Form 1065, Schedule K-1 for 2000 contained a Social
Security number but no address for Gerald Ricke. Utilizing the
supplied taxpayer identification number, respondent’s revenue
agent could have checked Gerald Ricke’s 1999 Federal tax return
to see whether it was filed and whether it properly reported the
$1,190 of allocated income. If not, evidence to that effect
would have supported the revenue agent’s conclusion, but
respondent never claimed this to be the fact.
 - 25 -

signed by petitioner reflected that in 2000 she was a 95-percent

member, respondent correctly attributed 95 percent of Miroyal’s

$55,408.51 of ordinary income for that year (i.e., $52,638) to

petitioner.

E. Speck and National Land Bank Income

1. Taxable Year 199914

a. Income From Speck

A fundamental principle of tax law is that income is taxed

to the person who earns it. See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337

U.S. 733, 739-740 (1949); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115

(1930).

“Attempts to subvert * * * [the fundamental principle
that income is taxed to the person who earns it] by
diverting income away from its true earner to another
entity by means of contractual arrangements, however
cleverly drafted, are not recognized as dispositive for
Federal income tax purposes, regardless of whether such
arrangements are otherwise valid under State law.”
[Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2001-297 (quoting Barmes v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2001-155).]

Under the assignment of income doctrine, gross income from

personal services must be included in the income of the person

who earned it. Lucas v. Earl, supra at 114. Such income is

taxable to the person who earned it even though the taxpayer

makes an anticipatory assignment of income and delivers a payor’s

14
With respect to National Land Bank income for 1999, see
supra note 2.
 - 26 -

check to a third party. See United States v. Allen, 551 F.2d

208, 212 (8th Cir. 1977).

Respondent determined that petitioner provided personal real

estate marketing services to Krismon Buttes for which $70,000 was

paid and that this $70,000 was taxable to petitioner. Petitioner

testified that marketing services were provided to Krismon Buttes

but denied providing them in her own name, stating they were

provided through Speck. Respondent sought to attribute all the

income of Speck to petitioner. Petitioner, however, introduced

no evidence that Speck was an independent taxable entity rather

than a sham, assignee, or grantor trust as contended by

respondent. Where a sham transaction has no economic effect, it

will not be recognized for tax purposes. Zmuda v. Commissioner,

731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Thompson v.

Commissioner, 631 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1980), affg. 66 T.C.

1024 (1976)), affg. 79 T.C. 714 (1982).

The address for Speck on National Land Bank’s 1999 Form

1065, Schedule K-1, was the same as petitioner’s: 20 N. Gilbert

Road, Gilbert, Arizona 85234. On National Land Bank’s amended

1999 Form 1065, the address for Speck on the attached Form 1065,

Schedule K-1 was changed to 5804 W. Vista Drive, #347, Glendale,

Arizona 85301. Changing Speck’s address on the Form 1065,

Schedule K-1 attached to National Land Bank’s 1999 amended Form
 - 27 -

1065 and completely omitting Speck’s address on the Form 1065,

Schedule K-1 attached to National Land Bank’s 2000 Form 1065 in

the context of this case appears to the Court to be deliberately

deceptive and does not, given Mr. McGlothlin’s testimony,

establish two different taxable entities.

b. Krismon Buttes’s $70,000 Check Is Taxable to

Petitioner

Petitioner did not provide any evidence demonstrating an

independence from or a dissociation with Speck or Property

Resources. Speck issued Krismon Buttes an invoice in the amount

of $70,000 for marketing services rendered. Krismon Buttes

issued Speck check No. 1023, which never cleared Krismon Buttes’s

checking account. Subsequently, Krismon Buttes issued check No.

1027 in the amount of $70,000 to Property Resources as a

replacement for check No. 1023. The Court is skeptical that

Speck would provide marketing services worth $70,000 to Krismon

Buttes but, absent a quid pro quo, allow Krismon Buttes to

deliver payment to Property Resources. Petitioner fails to

explain this. Instead, at trial, petitioner asserted a Fifth

Amendment privilege when asked whether she was compensated for

marketing services she provided to Krismon Buttes.

This is an indication that any facts which could have been

presented by her at trial would have been unfavorable to her

position. Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 691 (1989)
 - 28 -

(“The failure of a party to call such available witnesses that

purportedly have knowledge about relevant facts provides

sufficient basis to infer that the testimony of such witnesses

would not have been favorable to the party.”); see also McKay v.

Commissioner, 886 F.2d 1237, 1238 (9th Cir. 1989), affg. 89 T.C.

1063 (1987); Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner,

6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946), affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947);

Little v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-270. Petitioner has not

met her burden of proof; accordingly, the $70,000 paid to

Property Resources is taxable to petitioner in 1999.15

2. Taxable Year 2000

Petitioner’s Form 1040 for 2000 reported no income from

National Land Bank. Respondent made adjustments to National Land

Bank’s income using the bank deposits method because respondent

did not receive any audit cooperation or documents from

petitioner for 2000. Using the bank deposits method and the fact

that petitioner had signatory authority over the account at San

15
National Land Bank did not report the $70,000 on its 1999
Form 1065 presumably because Krismon Buttes, at Speck’s request,
reissued the check to Property Resources. However, because the
check was originally issued to Speck in payment of Speck’s
invoice for services rendered and because Speck is a disregarded
entity for Federal tax purposes, the $70,000 is taxable to
petitioner.

Because the parties did not raise the timing issue of
constructive receipt of the $70,000 in the 1998 taxable year when
the original check was made payable to and delivered to Speck,
the Court does not address this issue.
 - 29 -

Tan Credit Union under the name of National Land Bank LLC

(Account No. 8198), respondent effectively connected the deposits

from taxable sources to National Land Bank’s account. Petitioner

introduced no evidence to refute this adjustment.

Respondent’s bank deposit method is an acceptable means to

determine the amount of income received by National Land Bank in

2000. Moreover, Speck in 2000 is treated as a disregarded entity

for Federal tax purposes; therefore, all the income earned by

National Land Bank ($35,200), including Speck’s share, is

attributed to petitioner.

F. Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden Income

Petitioner refused to confirm or deny that she maintained

the business, Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden. Respondent provided

bank records showing checks payable to Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden

deposited into an account at Norwest Bank Arizona, N.A. in the

name of “Sue Taylor d|b|a Natures Herb & Tea Garden”. The

uncontroverted evidence of bank deposits being made to the

account controlled by petitioner is sufficient to link petitioner

to the income from Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden. Because

petitioner offered no evidence regarding her association with

Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden, she has failed to rebut the
 - 30 -

presumption that respondent’s deficiency determination with

respect to her income from that source was correct.16

G. Deductions

Section 162 generally allows a taxpayer to deduct “all the

ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the

taxable year in carrying on a trade or business”. An “ordinary”

expense is one that is normal, usual, or customary in the type of

business involved. See Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495

(1940). A “necessary” expense is one that is “appropriate and

helpful” to the taxpayer’s business. Welch v. Helvering, 290

U.S. 111, 113 (1933).

Deductions are a matter of legislative grace. New Colonial

Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Taxpayers have

the burden to show they are entitled to any deduction claimed on

their returns, and they must be able to point to some particular

statute and demonstrate that they come within its terms. Deputy

v. Du Pont, supra at 493; New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,

supra. Where taxpayers do not substantiate their claimed

deductions, the Commissioner is not arbitrary or unreasonable in

determining that the claimed deductions should be denied.

Roberts v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 834, 837, (1974).

16
On petitioner’s 1999 Form 1040, Schedule C, she reported
income from the business, “Natures Herbs”, admitting her
relationship with this business during that year.
 - 31 -

Where a taxpayer claims a business expense, but cannot fully

substantiate it, the Court may approximate the allowable amount.

Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930).

However, the taxpayer must provide reasonable evidence from which

to estimate the deductible amount. Vanicek v. Commissioner,

85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). If the evidence presented by the

taxpayer is not sufficient to identify the nature of or estimate

the extent of the expense, then the taxpayer is not entitled to

the benefits of the Cohan rule. See Williams v. United States,

245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). Furthermore, where the

taxpayer fails to cooperate with the Commissioner and this Court,

we have no obligation to apply the Cohan rule. Lerch v.

Commissioner, 877 F.2d 624, 628-629 (7th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C.

Memo. 1987-295.

Petitioner claimed Form 1040, Schedule C deductions for

expenses of Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden. Accompanying

petitioner’s 1999 return was a list of expenses, listing only the

total amounts allegedly incurred; i.e., $642 of office expense

and $15,384 for supplies. Petitioner did not provide any

evidence to substantiate these claimed expenses. Petitioner’s

list of expenses is not sufficient to substantiate such expenses

or to enable us to apply the Cohan rule and estimate a deductible

amount. The adjustments disallowing Schedule C expenses are

sustained.
 - 32 -

H. Self-Employment Tax

Section 1401 imposes, in addition to other taxes, a tax on

the self-employment income of every individual. Subject to

exclusions not applicable in the instant case, “self-employment

income” refers to the “net earnings from self-employment derived

by an individual”. Sec. 1402(b). Section 1402(a) defines “net

earnings from self-employment” as “the gross income derived by an

individual from any trade or business carried on by such

individual, less the [claimed] deductions [in 1999] allowed by

this subtitle which are attributable to such trade or business”.

The burden of proof to show that respondent’s determination

was in error remains with petitioner. She offered no evidence

and advanced no arguments with respect to liability for self-

employment taxes. The burden did not shift to respondent under

section 7491.

Petitioner’s income from real estate services and rental

payments is documented by her receipt of several checks. By

filing her Form 1040 for 1999, petitioner admitted her Schedule C

Nature’s Herb & Tea Garden business income was subject to self-

employment tax. Petitioner is liable for the self-employment

taxes in the amounts of $4,743 and $7,738 for 1999 and 2000,

respectively.17

17
For 1999, the notice of deficiency reported that
(continued...)
 - 33 -

IV. Penalties

A. Section 6662

With respect to examinations beginning after July 22, 1998,

the Commissioner bears the burden of production in any court

proceeding involving an individual’s liability for penalties or

additions to tax. Sec. 7491(c). To meet this burden, the

Commissioner must come forward with sufficient evidence

indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty

or addition to tax. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446

(2001). In instances where an exception to the penalty or

addition to tax is afforded upon a showing of reasonable cause,

the taxpayer bears the burden of showing such cause. Id. at 447.

Section 6662(a) provides for an accuracy-related penalty in

the amount of 20 percent of the portion of an underpayment

attributable to (among other things): (1) Any negligence or

disregard of the rules or regulations or (2) any substantial

17
(...continued)
petitioner had $33,569.51 of self-employment income.
Petitioner’s Form 1040, Schedule C reported 16,365 of income, and
respondent made an adjustment of $17,543.51 to Form 1040,
Schedule C income. Petitioner’s reported self-employment income
($16,365) combined with respondent’s adjustment ($17,543.51)
total $33,908.51. After subtracting Form 1040, Schedule C taxes
and licenses of $472 as allowed by respondent, there remains a
difference of $133, which was the amount of loss reported on
petitioner’s 1999 Form 1040, Schedule C. However, because the
$70,000 Krismon Buttes payment is also self-employment income,
the Court concludes that respondent has shown at least $33,569.51
of self-employment income for 1999.
 - 34 -

understatement of income tax. Sec. 6662(b). An “understatement”

is defined as the excess of the amount of tax required to be

shown on the return for the taxable year over the amount of tax

imposed which is shown on the return, reduced by any rebate.

Sec. 6662(d)(2)(A).

Section 6662(c) and section 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax

Regs., define “negligence” as including any failure to make a

reasonable attempt to comply with the Code and define the term

“disregard” as including any “careless, reckless, or intentional

disregard”. Negligence is a “lack of due care or failure to do

what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under

the circumstances.” Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506

(5th Cir. 1967), affg. on this issue 43 T.C. 168 (1964) and T.C.

Memo. 1964-299; ASAT, Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 147, 175

(1997); Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985).

A substantial understatement of income tax exists for an

individual where the amount of the understatement exceeds the

greater of (1) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the

return or (2) $5,000. Sec. 6662(d)(1)(A).

The amount of the understatement shall be reduced by that

portion of the understatement attributable to the tax treatment

of any item by the taxpayer if there is or was substantial

authority for such treatment or as to any item if (1) “the

relevant facts affecting the item’s tax treatment are adequately
 - 35 -

disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the

return”, and (2) “there is a reasonable basis for the tax

treatment of such item by the taxpayer.” Sec. 6662(d)(2)(B).

Where a taxpayer can show there is reasonable cause for any

portion of the underpayment and that the taxpayer acted in good

faith with respect to that portion of the underpayment, then no

penalty shall be imposed under section 6662(a) with respect to

that portion of the underpayment. Sec. 6664(c).

Petitioner failed to report her correct income from Miroyal,

National Land Bank, or Nature’s Herbs & Tea Garden for 1999 and

2000. She had a substantial understatement of tax for 1999 and

2000. The understatement amount exceeds $5,000 per year and 10

percent of the amount required to be shown on the return.

Petitioner did not offer any substantial authority or reasonable

cause for failing to report her correct income; thus, she is

liable for a penalty under section 6662 for 1999 and 2000.

Respondent is sustained on this issue.18

B. Section 6673

Section 6673 allows this Court to award a penalty to the

United States in an amount not in excess of $25,000 for

18
The Court need not determine whether petitioner was
negligent in failing to report her income for 1999 and 2000
because there was a substantial understatement on her 1999 and
2000 returns.
 - 36 -

proceedings instituted by the taxpayer primarily for delay or for

proceedings in which the taxpayer’s position is frivolous or

groundless. “A petition to the Tax Court, or a tax return, is

frivolous if it is contrary to established law and unsupported by

a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law.” Coleman

v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986)(imposing

penalties on taxpayers who made frivolous constitutional

arguments in opposition to the income tax). Courts have ruled

that constitutional defenses to the filing requirement, such as

petitioner presents, are groundless and wholly without merit.

Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir. 1979); see also

Brunner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-187, affd. per curiam

142 Fed. Appx. 53 (3d Cir. 2005); Williams v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 1999-277; Morin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-240;

Sochia v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-294 (all of which imposed

a section 6673 penalty for tax protester arguments).

Groundless litigation diverts the time and energies of
judges from more serious claims; it imposes needless costs
on other litigants. Once the legal system has resolved a
claim, judges and lawyers must move on to other things.
They cannot endlessly rehear stale arguments. Both
appellants say that the penalties stifle their right to
petition for redress of grievances. But there is no
constitutional right to bring frivolous suits, see Bill
Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743, 103
S.Ct. 2161, 2170, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983). People who wish to
express displeasure with taxes must choose other forums, and
there are many available. * * * [Coleman v. Commissioner,
supra at 72.].
 - 37 -

Respondent sought a section 6673 penalty in respondent’s pretrial

memorandum, but respondent did not request a penalty during trial

or on brief, and the Court declines to impose such a penalty

today. However, the Court explicitly admonishes petitioner that

she may, in the future, be subject to a penalty under section

6673 for any further proceedings instituted or maintained

primarily for delay or for any proceedings which are frivolous or

groundless.

The Court has considered all of petitioner’s contentions,

arguments, requests, and statements. To the extent not discussed

herein, we have found them to be meritless, irrelevant, or moot.

To reflect the foregoing and concessions made by respondent,

Decision will be entered

under Rule 155.