T.C. Memo. 2006-77
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
KENNETH DAVID PERRY AND LINDA RUTH PERRY, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 619-04, 18226-04. Filed April 18, 2006.
Ps’ claimed net capital losses were disallowed to the
extent they exceeded $3,000, on authority of sec. 1211(b),
I.R.C. 1986.
Held: This limitation does not prevent the taxes
imposed by secs. 1 and 55, I.R.C. 1986, from being taxes on
income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.
Kenneth David Perry and Linda Ruth Perry, pro sese.
Roger W. Bracken, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHABOT, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in
individual income tax against petitioners in the amounts of
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$2,465 for 2001 and $21,233.37 for 2003.1 On their 2003 income
tax return, petitioners claimed a $14,543.74 refund on account of
excess withholding. Respondent acknowledged the prepayment, but
withheld refund or credit of this amount. On brief, petitioners
renew their claim for refund.
After concessions by petitioners, the issue for decision is
whether the $3,000 capital loss allowance limitation of section
1211(b) keeps the sections 1 and 55 taxes from being taxes on
income, within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.2
Background
The instant cases were consolidated for trial, briefing, and
opinion. They were submitted fully stipulated; the stipulations
and the stipulated exhibits are incorporated herein by this
reference.
When the petitions were filed in the instant cases,
1
$252 of the 2003 determined deficiency is alternative
minimum tax under section 55; the remaining amount for 2003 and
the entire amount for 2001 are section 1 income tax.
Unless indicated otherwise, all section and subtitle
references are to sections and subtitles of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 as in effect for the years in issue.
2
Initially, petitioners also disputed whether the Congress
intended the $3,000 limitation to apply to real economic losses.
However, on reply brief, petitioners specifically abandon the
Congressional intent issue and ask us to determine only “whether
Congress exceeded its power granted in Amendment XVI of the US
Constitution.” See infra note 4.
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petitioners resided in Fairfax, Virginia.
Table 1 shows selected items from petitioners’ timely filed
income tax returns (Forms 1040) for 2001 and 2003.
Table 1
Item--Line on 2001 (2003) Form 1040 2001 2003
7. (7) Wages $253,598.43 $267,398.35
8a. (8a) Taxable interest 226.05 154.35
9. (9a) Ordinary dividends 217.85 189.11
13. (13a) Capital gain or
(loss) (9,256.63) (60,641.96)
33. (34) Adjusted gross income 244,785.70 207,099.85
39. (40) Taxable income 221,055.33 179,709.47
58. (60) Total tax 61,222.00 40,749.63
59. (61) Withholding 57,196.78 55,293.37
70. Amount owed 4,025.22
(70a) Overpayment to be
refunded 14,543.74
In 2001, petitioners realized and recognized a long-term
capital loss in the amount of $9,256.63, as they claimed on their
2001 tax return.3 In 2003, petitioners realized and recognized a
net long-term capital loss of $60,641.96, as they claimed on
their 2003 tax return.
In the notice of deficiency for each year, respondent
disallowed the claimed capital loss deduction for that year to
the extent the loss exceeded $3,000, and also made consequential
adjustments to itemized deductions and (for 2003) personal
exemption deductions. Also, the 2003 adjustments resulted in a
3
The parties’ stipulation that the loss was 1 cent less
than our finding is evidently a typographical error, as shown by
their stipulations as to petitioners’ proceeds and adjusted
basis.
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determination of a $252 alternative minimum tax. Petitioners do
not contest the mathematical correctness of respondent’s
computations.
Discussion
1. The Parties’ Contentions
Respondent maintains that the Sixteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution “permits Congress to impose ‘taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived’.” Further, “Congress,
within its sole discretion, may determine the extent to which, if
at all, taxpayers may claim deductions from income they are
required to report.” Finally, respondent contends--
Petitioners have not shown, however, as they
must, that sections 165(f) and 1211(b)
violate constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection or breach the
authority granted to the Congress pursuant to
the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Petitioners respond that respondent’s references to
deductions miss the point that “a capital loss is an income item.
A capital loss is not a deductible expense item.” By disallowing
that part of the loss that exceeds $3,000, petitioners contend,
respondent is taxing petitioners on “income that does not exist.
Petitioners believe that Section 1211(b) violates the power
granted Congress in the Sixteenth Amendment, and if the Court
agrees, it should rule accordingly.”
2. Summary and Conclusion
The Constitution does not require all income items to be
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treated identically. Capital gains and losses are treated
differently from other income items in several respects,
generally more favorably than most other income items. The
section 1211(b) limitation does not cause the sections 1 and 55
taxes to fall outside the sweep of the Sixteenth Amendment.
We agree with respondent’s conclusion.
3. Analysis
Article I, section 8, of the U.S. Constitution gives to the
Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes”. Under sections 2
(cl. 3) and 9 (cl. 4) of article I, “direct” taxes must be
apportioned among the States in proportion to census populations.
The Sixteenth Amendment has the effect of overriding the direct-
tax-apportionment requirement with respect to “taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived”.4 Section 61 provides as follows:
4
Thus, the Sixteenth Amendment is properly a limited
removal of a limited restriction on the Congress’s broad power to
tax income; the Sixteenth Amendment is not the source of the
power to tax income. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189, 205-206 (1920); Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 166
n.21 (4th Cir. 1962); Penn Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner,
32 T.C. 653, 659-666 (1959), affd. 277 F.2d 16, 19-20 (3d Cir.
1960). As a result, even if a tax does not qualify as an income
tax, that merely leads to whether the tax in question is a
“direct” tax; if the tax in question is not a direct tax, then
the tax in question still does not have to be apportioned.
Petitioners contend they should be allowed to deduct the
entire amounts of their realized and recognized capital losses,
in accordance with their tax returns. For petitioners to
prevail, they might have to persuade us of all the following:
(1) The limitation of section 1211(b) causes the sections 1 and
55 taxes to not be income taxes under the Sixteenth Amendment;
(continued...)
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SEC. 61. GROSS INCOME DEFINED.
(a) General Definition.--Except as
otherwise provided in this subtitle,
[subtitle A, relating to income taxes] gross
income means all income from whatever source
derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including
fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar
items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance
payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment
contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross
income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or
trust.
(b) Cross References.--
For items specifically included in gross
income, see part II (sec. 71 and following). For
4
(...continued)
(2) the sections 1 and 55 taxes as limited by section 1211(b)
constitute direct taxes that must be apportioned; and (3) full
deductibility of capital losses is the preferred way to save the
entire income tax from invalidation.
Because we hold that petitioners have failed to persuade us
as to the first of these three items, we do not explore the
second and third items.
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items specifically excluded from gross income,
see part III (sec. 101 and following).
A. Different Categories of Income
Nothing in the text of the constitutional provisions
requires all income categories to be treated identically, or
requires all income categories to be added together or offset, in
the case of losses in one or more categories.
United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937), was a suit for
refund of a 50-percent tax imposed on profits from transfers of
interests in silver bullion. In the course of the Supreme
Court’s analysis, the Court held that this was an income tax and
further held as follows (299 U.S. at 500):
It is not material that such profit is
taxed, along with other gains, under the
general income tax law, for Congress has
power to impose an increased or additional
tax if satisfied there is need therefor.
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 620-622.
Wilson Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.
1943), affg. 1 T.C. 389 (1943), involved an “unjust enrichment
tax” imposed by the Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680.
The Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the taxpayer’s
constitutional challenge as follows (138 F.2d at 251):
But the petitioner asserts that Congress
was without power to impose an unjust
enrichment tax upon a person in a year when
his operations as a whole resulted in a loss,
which is to say, in effect, that Congress, in
such a situation, may not segregate a
particular type of income and impose a
special tax upon it. The Supreme Court,
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however, has held that Congress may enact a
special income tax act and “impose an
increased or additional tax” upon certain
profits, although they are also taxable under
the general income tax law. United States v.
Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 500 * * *. It is our
opinion that, since Congress may impose an
additional tax upon a particular type of
income received by a taxpayer, it may do so
regardless of whether or not his operations
as a whole for the entire taxable year result
in a profit taxable under the provisions of
the general income tax law. * * *
Consistent with the foregoing, under present law many
categories of income are treated differently from other
types of income. For example, wages (sec. 61(a)(1)) received
with respect to most kinds of employment are subject to taxes
under section 3101 (F.I.C.A. taxes), in addition to the section 1
taxes on income. Self-employment income (sec. 61(a)(2)) is
subject to taxes under section 1401 (self-employment taxes), in
addition to the section 1 taxes on income. Premature
distributions from certain types of annuities (sec. 61(a)(9)) and
retirement arrangements (sec. 61(a)(11)) are subject to
additional taxes under several subsections of section 72. In
each of these instances, the base of the specially taxed category
of income is not reduced by losses from other categories of
income.
B. Capital Gains and Losses
Section 1 imposes income taxes on individuals. Over the
years, section 1(h) has provided limitations of various sorts on
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the income tax as applied to net capital gains (see sec.
61(a)(3)), such that the marginal tax rates on net capital gains
ordinarily are less than the marginal tax rates on other types of
income. More recently, section 1(h)(11) has provided similar
beneficial treatment to “qualified dividend income”. See sec.
61(a)(7).
Section 1655 provides generally for the treatment of losses
5
Section 165 provides in pertinent part as follows:
SEC. 165. LOSSES.
(a) General Rule.--There shall be
allowed as a deduction any loss
sustained during the taxable year
and not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise.
* * * * * * *
(c) Limitation on Losses of
Individuals.--In the case of an
individual, the deduction under
subsection (a) shall be limited
to--
(1) losses incurred in a
trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in
any transaction entered into
for profit, though not
connected with a trade or
business; and
* * * * * * *
(f) Capital Losses.--Losses from
sales or exchanges of capital
assets shall be allowed only to the
extent allowed in sections 1211 and
1212.
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in determining the base for the section 1 income tax. Section
165 limits the allowance of capital losses to what is allowed in
sections 1211 and 1212.
Section 1211(b) allows, for individuals, capital losses only
to the extent of capital gains, plus no more than $3,000.6
Section 1211(a) provides a much more limited capital loss
allowance for corporations. Section 1212 provides for capital
loss carrybacks and carryovers; those rules are in general more
generous to corporations than to individuals. Respondent noted
petitioners’ eligibility for capital loss carryovers treatment;
petitioners do not claim eligibility for carryback treatment.
As a result of the foregoing, although capital gains and
losses are thrown into the mix of income categories that result
6
Section 1211(b) provides as follows:
SEC. 1211. LIMITATION ON CAPITAL
LOSSES.
* * * * * * *
(b) Other Taxpayers.--In the case
of a taxpayer other than a
corporation, losses from sales or
exchanges of capital assets shall
be allowed only to the extent of
the gains from such sales or
exchanges, plus (if such losses
exceed such gains) the lower of--
(1) $3,000 ($1,500 in the case
of a married individual filing a
a separate return), or
(2) the excess of such losses
over such gains.
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in “taxable income”, for many purposes capital gains and losses
are treated differently from other categories of income.
It is apparent from the foregoing that over the decades the
Congress has chosen to treat capital gains and losses differently
from other categories of income; this category of income has been
only partially integrated into the section 1 ground rules.
C. “Income That Does Not Exist”
Petitioners claim that the effect of the $3,000 loss
limitation is to tax them on “income that does not exist.” They
are mistaken. Petitioners are being taxed under section 1 only
on the aggregate of the other categories of income that they in
fact realized, recognized, and reported--their income that does
exist. Supra table 1.
The tax treatment of capital losses has varied over the
years. As discussed in Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (2d
Cir. 1937), section 23(r) of the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47
Stat. 169, 183, allowed losses from the sale or exchange of
stocks and bonds held for less than 2 years only to the extent of
gains from the sale of such securities. The taxpayer in Davis
had $13,285 of what we now would call short-term capital losses,
which was greater than the amount of his net taxable income. 87
F.2d at 324. The taxpayer contended that, as a result, he did
not have net income for the taxable year, so that his “net
taxable income” was not income, and thus the tax on his net
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taxable income was not a Sixteenth Amendment-permitted income
tax. 87 F.2d at 324-325.
The Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the situation as
follows (87 F.2d at 325):
While the computation of income is made
with due and necessary regard to periods of
time, which are established years either
calendar or fiscal, it cuts altogether too
fine to say that true, and therefore taxable,
income can only be ascertained by putting
together all the profit and loss transactions
of the period and determining net income
accordingly regardless of the fact that they
may in whole or in part be quite unrelated
except for the time element and the fact that
they were those of the same taxpayer. If,
for instance, a separate and distinct
transaction during the year results in a net
realized gain to the taxpayer in and of
itself, income which is taxed has been
received, but Congress may, or may not, have
allowed deductions which as a matter of
computation will relieve that income in whole
or in part from the taxation to which
otherwise it would be subject. * * *
Accordingly, the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the section 23(r) limitation.
To the same effect is White v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1106
(1938). The taxpayer sustained a net loss in his securities
trading. 37 B.T.A. at 1109. After discussing Davis v. United
States, supra, we stated in White as follows (37 B.T.A. at 1110-
1111):
This petitioner, however, asserts that the
deduction he seeks is not a statutory
deduction, but falls within the first
classification of deductions made by the
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court in the Davis case, wherein the court
speaks of taking from all receipts “certain
necessary items like cost of property sold”,
and contends that the respondent’s action
denies him the right to deduct from gross
receipts the cost of all items purchased by
him in the conduct of his business. In other
words petitioner denies that he can have
income in any amount until he has recovered
his aggregate cost, and his entire argument
is based upon the proposition that the denial
of the right to reduce gross receipts by
aggregate cost creates income where none in
fact exists and, therefore, makes the
application of 23(r) unconstitutional as to
his business.
That portion of petitioner’s argument
relative to the denial of his right to use
cost is answered in part by the court in the
Davis case, supra, wherein it states that a
net gain realized by a taxpayer from a
separate and distinct transaction constitutes
income that may, or may not, be subject to
tax depending upon whether the Congress has
allowed deductions which as a matter of
computation will relieve that income in whole
or in part from taxation, and by the further
statement that “net income for any taxable
period need not necessarily be the same as
net taxable income for that period, and the
variation may be to the extent that Congress
has seen fit either to allow, to limit, or to
deny deductions within its control as a
matter of grace.” (Emphasis supplied.) The
facts in this proceeding illustrate the truth
of the court’s observations. This petitioner
as a matter of fact lost money upon the basis
of his operations over the entire year, and
if all his losses were deductible he could
have no statutory net income. However, in
the absence of a statutory right to reduce
other income by losses from stock
speculations, and in view of the specific
limitation of 23(r), petitioner’s computation
must show a statutory net income subject to
tax. * * *
The foregoing disposes of all of petitioners’ contentions,
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including the asserted constitutional distinction between a
“capital loss” and “a deductible expense item.”
Our analysis has dealt with the tax imposed by section 1.
The same analysis applies to the section 55 alternative minimum
tax, which is part of the 2003 determined deficiency, and which
was not separately argued by the parties.
Petitioners do not contend that the $3,000 limitation of
section 1211(b) is unconstitutional for any other reason,
including constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection. We do not decide theoretically possible
constitutional questions unless they are properly presented and
must be resolved in order to decide the case before us. Kessler
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1285, 1293-1294 (1986) (and cases there
cited), affd. without published opinion. 838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir.
1988).
In light of the foregoing,
Decisions will be entered
for respondent.