T.C. Memo. 2006-177
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
LARRY J. LUNDGREN AND ANITA L. LUNDGREN, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 10174-03, 6083-04. Filed August 23, 2006.
Ps failed to report certain farming income for the
1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 taxable years and a capital
gain for the taxable year 2001. R determined
deficiencies and asserted penalties under sec. 6662,
I.R.C., which Ps contested primarily on the basis of
tax protester arguments.
Held: Ps are liable for the deficiencies
determined by R for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002
including self-employment taxes pursuant to sec. 1401,
I.R.C., and a capital gain for 2001.
Held, further, Ps are liable for penalties under
sec. 6662, I.R.C., for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002.
Larry J. Lundgren and Anita L. Lundgren, pro sese.
Joan E. Steele, for respondent.
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MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
WHERRY, Judge: Respondent determined the following Federal
income tax deficiencies and penalties with respect to
petitioners’ Federal income taxes:
Accuracy-Related Penalty
Year Deficiency Sec. 6662
1999 $4,750 $950.00
2000 6,710 1,342.00
2001 10,090 2,018.00
2002 2,577 515.40
The issues for decision are:
(1) Whether the income from the Lucky Kirt Irrevocable Trust
(Lucky Kirt Trust) should be attributed to petitioners;
(2) whether petitioners are liable for self-employment taxes
under section 14011 for the taxable years 1999 through 2002;
(3) whether petitioners are liable for tax on a capital gain
in taxable year 2001;
(4) whether petitioners are liable for accuracy-related
penalties under section 6662 for the taxable years 1999 through
2002; and
(5) whether the Court should impose a penalty, sua sponte,
under section 6673.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for
the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Background
The exhibits2 of the parties are incorporated herein. These
cases were consolidated for purposes of trial, briefing, and
opinion. At the time these petitions were filed, petitioners
resided in Gove, Kansas.
Respondent issued petitioners notices of deficiency for the
1999 taxable year on March 24, 2003, and for the 2000, 2001, and
2002 taxable years on January 6, 2004. Petitioners timely filed
a petition on September 8, 2003, for the 1999 taxable year and a
petition on April 8, 2004, for the 2000, 2001, and 2002 taxable
years.
Larry J. Lundgren (Mr. Lundgren) was a farmer, and Anita L.
Lundgren (Mrs. Lundgren) was a registered nurse and the secretary
of the Lucky Kirt Trust from 1999 through at least a portion of
2001.
The Lucky Kirk trust was formed at the request of Raymond
Roemer, father of Mrs. Lundgren, and was allegedly created on
October 11, 1990. Neither of petitioners was present during the
formation of the trust or the signing of the trust document.
Dennis Roemer, brother of Mrs. Lundgren, was present during trust
formation discussions between his father and Jimmy Clayton
2
Although requested by the Court, the parties did not file
a stipulation of facts. On the basis of religious beliefs, Mr.
Lundgren refused to stipulate anything except petitioners’ names.
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Chisum,3 a.k.a. J.C. Chisum (Mr. Chisum), the Lucky Kirt Trust’s
trustee; however, Dennis Roemer was not present during the
signing of the trust documents, nor did he read the trust
documents. To fund the trust, Raymond Roemer transferred land
located in Gove County, Kansas, to Lucky Kirt Trust by warranty
deed dated December 14, 1992, and recorded July 28, 1993.4
Upon the purported creation of the Lucky Kirt Trust, Mrs.
Lundgren signed the “Minutes of Lucky Kirt” in the capacity of
secretary, and her handwritten name appears on the signature line
for the general manager. In the same document, Mr. Lundgren
signed in the capacity of the assistant general manager, and Mr.
Chisum signed in the capacity of the managing agent on behalf of
the trust’s trustee, The Prudent Man Trustee Co. (Prudent Man
Trustee). Mr. Chisum did not have any documentation relating to
his authority via the Prudent Man Trustee or Lucky Kirt Trust to
sign documents as managing agent and did not provide a copy of
the Lucky Kirt Trust document. Petitioners did not at any time
3
Jimmy Clayton Chisum is a known promoter of tax-avoidance
schemes. Aspects of his tax-avoidance schemes are described in
Lipari v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-280 (sec. 6673 penalty
imposed on taxpayers who claimed they were unable to obtain
records from Mr. Chisum, “trustee” of their “trust”) and George
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-381 (“trust” of which Mr. Chisum
was “trustee” was a sham, and payments received by that “trust”
were income of osteopathic physician who performed services that
generated the income).
4
The record contains references to Lucky Kirt II trust and
Lucky Kirt Trust II. There was never a trust named Lucky Kirt
II, rather Lucky Kirt II was the name given to the Legg Mason
Wood Walker (Legg Mason) option trading account.
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during either the audit or at trial provide a copy of the trust
agreement.
Raymond Roemer, who was the initial beneficiary of Lucky
Kirt Trust, died on April 27, 1994. After the death of Raymond
Roemer, Mrs. Lundgren’s name was listed as the 100-percent
beneficiary of Lucky Kirt Trust, the 100-percent member of Lucky
Kirt Trust, or the sole entity receiving payment on several
documents submitted to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
In addition, she signed other documents submitted to the USDA as
participant, owner, operator, manager, or agent on behalf of
Lucky Kirt Trust. These documents were signed for multiple
years, among these, the 1999, 2000, and 2001 years in issue.
Hall and Strong, LC (Hall and Strong) at a date undisclosed
by the record became the successor trustee to the Prudent Man
Trustee. Mr. Chisum did not have any documentation at trial
supporting Hall and Strong’s appointment as trustee of Lucky Kirt
Trust. The signature card of The Farmers State Bank of Oakley,
Kansas, for the Lucky Kirt Trust listed the signatures of Mr.
Chisum, Raymond Roemer, and the signature stamp of “JC Chisum” as
authorized signers on the account. Mrs. Lundgren was authorized
during at least some of the years at issue to sign checks for the
Lucky Kirt Trust using the signature stamp of Mr. Chisum. Mr.
Chisum gave Mrs. Lundgren the authority to perform certain duties
in her capacity as the secretary of Lucky Kirt Trust.
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An option trading account at Legg Mason was created on or
about May 9, 1994, and Mrs. Lundgren signed the account’s
documentation on May 10, 1994. The account statements during the
years at issue list Raymond F. Roemer as Trustee, although by
then he was deceased. On April 18, 2001, the Legg Mason account
reflected a sale of a U.S. Treasury note with a face value of
$20,000 for $20,430.
In 2001, Lucky Kirt Trust disbursed $195,000 to Mr. Lundgren
allegedly as a “gentleman’s loan” for farming purposes. The
“loan” was not memorialized in a written agreement, and there was
no repayment schedule, no final payoff date, and no interest
rate.
Lucky Kirt Trust also disbursed money to petitioners’
daughter to buy a car. The “loan” to petitioners’ daughter was
not reduced to a written agreement. Although Mr. Chisum
confirmed that regular payments were made on this loan, he did
not provide any proof of the payments, and there was no interest
rate applied to the loan. Mr. Chisum did not charge interest on
these loans.
Petitioners farmed the land held by Lucky Kirt Trust as
tenant farmers under a crop shares agreement, which provided for
petitioners to live on the land and bring in crops in lieu of
rent payments. The crop share was adjusted to reflect the
profitability of the crops and approximate rental value of the
land. The crop shares agreement was not in writing.
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Mr. Chisum was a part-time consultant, who consulted in
business planning, business management, estate planning, and
estate management, including the creation of trust documents such
as the Lucky Kirt Trust. Mr. Chisum held a high school degree
and was specially trained in nuclear engineering while in the
Navy. He did not learn to read until the age of 40 and learned
about tax planning through his accountant, Richard Gilmore and
seminar-type courses, rather than any formalized tax education.
Mr. Chisum did not hold any professional licenses, nor did he
seek legal advice in creating these trusts to determine the
trusts’ treatment by the Internal Revenue Service.
OPINION
I. Contentions of the Parties
On the premises of tax protester arguments, petitioners
contend that they were not required and should not be required to
pay income taxes.5 Specifically, petitioners argue that they did
not earn any income from, receive any distributions from, and
were not involved with Lucky Kirt Trust a.k.a. Lucky Kirt II
Trust. Petitioners maintain that they are merely tenant farmers
5
Petitioners at various junctures have alluded to the
Sixteenth Amendment. As the Court noted at trial, our tax
system, the Internal Revenue Code, and the Tax Court have been
firmly established as constitutional. See Crain v. Commissioner,
737 F.2d 1417, 1417-1418 (5th Cir. 1984); Ginter v. Southern, 611
F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir. 1979). Specifically, the Court notes
that the “Federal income tax laws are constitutional. * * * The
whole purpose of the 16th Amendment was to relieve all income
taxes when imposed from apportionment and from a consideration of
the source whence the income was derived.” Abrams v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 403, 406-407 (1984).
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and caretakers of land owned by Lucky Kirt Trust, not owners of
or in control of any Lucky Kirt Trust assets or income.
Petitioners assert that the period of limitations for attacking
the validity of the Lucky Kirt Trust expired in 1994, that the
income tax is one of voluntary self-assessment and they have
correctly self-assessed and paid, that the revenue agent exceeded
her authority, and that this Court has no jurisdiction to decide
these cases.6 Therefore, petitioners conclude there are no
penalties due from petitioners for the taxable years in issue.
Respondent asserts that petitioners earned income through
the sham Lucky Kirt Trust and that the Lucky Kirt Trust should be
disregarded for tax purposes due to its lack of economic
substance. Thus, the income from Lucky Kirt Trust should be
attributed to petitioners, and as a result, petitioners also have
a capital gain in 2001 and are liable for self-employment taxes
for all the years in issue. Morever, respondent contends that
petitioners’ defenses to the deficiencies and penalties comprise
only self-serving testimony and tax protester arguments.
6
Petitioners’ arguments are frivolous. Respondent timely
issued the notices of deficiency in these cases in accordance
with the statute of limitations. Petitioners’ arguments
regarding the legitimacy of the Federal income tax system have
been universally rejected as frivolous and warrant no further
comment. See Crain v. Commissioner, supra at 1417-1418 (“We
perceive no need to refute these arguments with somber reasoning
and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that
they have some colorable merit.”). In the instant cases, the Tax
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitioners’ disputed
income taxes. See sec. 6214(a); Marino v. Brown, 357 F.3d 143,
145 n.5 (1st Cir. 2004).
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II. Burden of Proof
In general, the Commissioner’s determination of a taxpayer’s
tax liability is presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the
burden of proving that the Commissioner’s determination is
improper. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
(1933). The “presumption of correctness” is appropriate where
the Commissioner has furnished evidence linking the taxpayer to
the “tax generating activity”. Gold Emporium, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 910 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1990), affg. Malicki
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-559.
Where the Commissioner introduces evidence that the taxpayer
received unreported income, as respondent did here, the burden
generally is on the taxpayer to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the deficiency was arbitrary and erroneous. Hardy
v. Commissioner, 181 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1997-97; see also Palmer v. IRS, 116 F.3d. 1309, 1312 (9th
Cir. 1997) (“The Commissioner’s deficiency determinations and
assessments for unpaid taxes are normally entitled to a
presumption of correctness so long as they are supported by a
minimal factual foundation.”)(emphasis added)); Edwards v.
Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1982).
However, section 7491 may shift the burden to the
Commissioner in specified circumstances, for example, where the
taxpayer produces “credible evidence” and meets other
requirements. Sec. 7491(a)(1); see also H. Conf. Rept. 105-599,
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at 240-241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 994-995 (reciting the
definition of credible evidence). In addition, to shift the
burden of proof, taxpayers must maintain all records required by
the Code and regulations and cooperate with reasonable requests
by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents, meetings,
and interviews. Sec. 7491(a)(2).
Petitioners did not satisfy the prerequisites under section
7491(a)(1) and (2) to shift the burden of proof to respondent.
They did not produce any evidence or documentation disputing
respondent’s determinations or supporting their claims as to the
economic substance of the Lucky Kirt Trust. Specifically, they
failed to provide either a copy of the trust document for Lucky
Kirt Trust or any documentation authorizing Mrs. Lundgren or Mr.
Chisum to act on behalf of the trust or present any credible
evidence other than their own self-serving testimony that the
trust had economic substance or even existed. Similarly,
petitioners did not provide any evidence regarding the capital
gain determination for 2001 and self-employment tax liabilities
for 1999 through 2002. Consequently, except for any penalties
subject to section 7491(c), as to which respondent bears the
initial burden of production, the general premise of Rule 142(a)
remains applicable.
III. Lucky Kirt Trust as a Disregarded Entity
Taxpayers are generally allowed to arrange and conduct their
affairs and structure their transactions to minimize any adverse
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tax implications. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469
(1935); Markosian v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1235, 1241 (1980).
However, where the creation of a trust lacks economic effect and
has no other cognizable economic relationship, we may ignore the
trust as a sham. See, e.g., Zmuda v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 714
(1982), affd. 731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984); Markosian v.
Commissioner, supra; Muhich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-192,
affd. 238 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 2001).
A fundamental principle of tax law is that income is taxed
to the person who earns it. See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337
U.S. 733, 739-740 (1949); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115
(1930). A taxpayer cannot avoid income taxation by assigning
income which a taxpayer controlled to a trust, thereby
effectively shifting the burden of tax. Vnuk v. Commissioner,
621 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1980), affg. T.C. Memo. 1979-164.
Petitioners, by assigning income from their farming operations,
have attempted to shift their income to Lucky Kirt Trust.
The Court looks behind the trust and will disregard the
trust if it lacks economic substance and was created for tax
avoidance purposes. To determine whether a trust has economic
substance, we consider these factors: (1) Whether the taxpayer-
grantor’s relationship to the transferred property differed
materially before and after the trust’s creation; (2) whether the
trust had an independent trustee; (3) whether an economic
interest passed to other trust beneficiaries; and (4) whether the
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taxpayer respected the restrictions placed on the trust’s
operation as set forth in the trust documents; i.e., whether the
taxpayer felt bound by any trust restrictions or the law of
trusts. See, e.g., Markosian v. Commissioner, supra at 1243-
1244; Muhich v. Commissioner, supra. As discussed below, each of
these factors supports a conclusion that Lucky Kirt Trust did not
have any economic substance.
A. Raymond Roemer’s Relationship to Lucky Kirt Trust
There is no indication that Raymond Roemer’s relationship to
the land he transferred to Lucky Kirt Trust before or after the
formation of the trust differed in any material way. Petitioners
did not provide any evidence of any material change in Raymond
Roemer’s relationship to the land after the trust’s formation.
The transfer of land to the trust failed to alter “any cognizable
economic relationship” between Mr. Roemer and the property
transferred. See Markosian v. Commissioner, supra at 1241.
Petitioners did not provide the trust agreement or any evidence
to the contrary. Consequently, it is apparent that Raymond
Roemer retained his same relationship to the property after the
transfer that he had before the transfer.
B. Independence of Lucky Kirt Trust Trustee
Petitioners have failed to establish that the trustee was
actually independent of Lucky Kirt Trust. Mr. Chisum, as the
Prudent Man Trustee, claimed to be the original trustee for the
trust. Then, he claimed that Hall and Strong was the trustee
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following the Prudent Man Trustee; however, neither Mr. Chisum
nor petitioners provided any documentation evidencing such a
change in the trust’s trustee. Although Mr. Chisum was
purportedly the named trustee, it was Mrs. Lundgren, the 100-
percent beneficiary after Raymond Roemer’s death, who appeared to
make all the decisions regarding the trust and signed documents
on behalf of the trust. This included Mrs. Lundgren’s
authorization to sign checks for Lucky Kirt Trust as she was one
of the names listed on the preprinted checks for the Lucky Kirt
Trust account.
Although Mrs. Lundgren claimed that she signed checks and
other documents pertaining to the trust using the signature stamp
of Mr. Chisum in her role as secretary for Lucky Kirt Trust,
there is no evidence, other than petitioners’ self-serving
testimony, that Mr. Chisum actually controlled the manner in
which she used the signature stamp. Thus, there was no
convincing evidence that Mrs. Lundgren’s authority to use the
signature stamp of Mr. Chisum was restricted in any meaningful
way.
Raymond Roemer was listed as the trustee on the Legg Mason
documents for the Lucky Kirt Trust II account for the years in
issue. Mrs. Lundgren signed a client option agreement for the
Legg Mason account on May 10, 1994, and for the years in issue,
all Legg Mason account statements for the Lucky Kirt Trust II
account were sent to Mrs. Lundgren’s address. Morever, there is
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nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Chisum exercised any
power or authority over the Legg Mason account. These facts
demonstrate the lack of an independent trustee for the purported
Lucky Kirt Trust.
C. Economic Interests of Beneficiaries
The Lucky Kirt Trust arrangement does not reflect an
economic interest’s being transferred to any other beneficiaries.
Raymond Roemer had the power to revoke or amend the trust, and
petitioners did not provide any evidence to the contrary. Thus,
Raymond Roemer essentially had unlimited power to control the
trust property in any manner, and upon his death, Mrs. Lundgren
in practice replaced her father as the trustee.
Mrs. Lundgren signed several documents for the USDA,
identifying herself in capacities such as the heir or beneficiary
of Lucky Kirt Trust and on behalf of Lucky Kirt Trust as
participant, owner, operator, manager, or agent. After Raymond
Roemer’s death in 1994, Mrs. Lundgren was the only one with
access and control over the Lucky Kirt Trust II bank account
because, as secretary, she was the only other person listed on
the account. Because the Lucky Kirt Trust had no other
beneficiaries than Mrs. Lundgren and because the Lucky Kirt Trust
II bank account was completely controlled by Mrs. Lundgren after
her father’s death, petitioners had the power to allocate all the
income and property of the trust to themselves to the detriment
of other potential trust beneficiaries.
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D. Respect for Trust Restrictions
Petitioners did not demonstrate that they respected the
restrictions of the trust or the law of trusts as they did not
show they felt bound by restrictions or trust law. Further, they
did not show that the trust imposed any substantial restrictions
on petitioners’ use of the trusts’ property or the Legg Mason
bank account.
As an example of petitioners’ disregard for trust
restrictions, Lucky Kirt Trust’s $195,000 loan to Mr. Lundgren in
2001, which was purportedly made for “good will”, lacked any
documentation. The loan agreement, if one existed, was not in
writing, and the loan did not provide for a repayment schedule, a
payoff date, or an interest rate. Although Mr. Chisum testified
that the payments on the loan were being made, petitioners did
not provide any evidence to corroborate Mr. Chisum’s statement.
Similarly, the Lucky Kirt Trust loan to petitioners’
daughter shows that petitioners were not bound by any trust
restrictions. The loan was for the personal purchase of a car
merely because petitioners’ daughter desired a car. As before,
there was no written loan agreement, no interest rate, and no
proof of any loan payments. Mr. Chisum’s statement that he
preferred never to charge interest is inconsistent with his
fiduciary responsibilities and is not a valid reason for a trust
to provide an interest-free loan.
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The Lucky Kirt Trust loans to Mr. Lundgren and petitioners’
daughter will not be respected as bona fide loans. A bona fide
loan requires a debt-creditor relationship and the expectation of
repayment. Fisher v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 905, 909-910 (1970).
The Court considers the following factors as relevant here in
determining whether a valid debtor-creditor relationship existed:
(1) Whether the purported loan was evidenced by a written
promissory note; (2) whether a reasonable market rate of interest
was charged; (3) whether a schedule for repayment or a stated
maturity date was established; (4) whether security or collateral
for the loan existed; and (5) whether the loan was actually
repaid by the stated maturity date. Clark v. Commissioner, 18
T.C. 780, 783 (1952), affd. 205 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1953); Meier v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-94.
The loans from Lucky Kirt Trust to Mr. Lundgren and
petitioners’ daughter did not contain any of the elements that
would support the creation of a bona fide loan. Because of the
relationship between petitioners and the trust, these transfers
will be highly scrutinized. See Clark v. Commissioner, supra at
783 (holding that “intrafamily transactions are subject to rigid
scrutiny”). The loans are conclusive evidence that in practice
the trust was petitioners’ alter ego, and petitioners were not
bound by the restrictions of the trust, if there really was one,
or the law of trusts.
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The combination of these factors and the apparent lack of
any substantive trust purpose other than tax avoidance compels a
finding that Lucky Kirt Trust shall be disregarded for Federal
income tax purposes. See Markosian v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. at
1244-1245. Therefore, petitioners will be taxed on the income
attributed to Lucky Kirt Trust. See sec. 61(a).
IV. Self-Employment Tax
Section 1401 imposes, in addition to other taxes, a tax on
the self-employment income of every individual. Subject to
exclusions not applicable in the instant case, “self-employment
income” refers to the “net earnings from self-employment derived
by an individual”. Sec. 1402(b). Section 1402(a) defines “net
earnings from self-employment” as “the gross income derived by an
individual from any trade or business carried on by such
individual, less the [claimed] deductions [in the year in issue]
allowed by this subtitle which are attributable to such trade or
business”.
The burden of proof to show that respondent’s determination
was in error remains with petitioners. They offered no evidence
and advanced no arguments with respect to liability for self-
employment taxes. The burden does not shift to respondent under
section 7491.
Petitioners farmed the land held in the Lucky Kirt Trust and
assigned their income from farming activities to the trust.
Because we have determined that Lucky Kirt Trust is a sham trust,
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petitioners earned farming income as sole proprietors or
partners. Thus, their income is subject to self-employment tax.
See, e.g, Pelham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-173; Whitehead
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-455, affd. without published
opinion 17 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioners did not provide
any evidence that they were entitled to nor did they attempt to
claim any further deductions arising from their farming
activities.
V. Unreported Capital Gain
Respondent determined that petitioners are liable for tax on
an unreported capital gain for 2001 from the April 18, 2001, sale
of a U.S. Treasury note. Gross income includes any gain on
property. Sec. 61(a)(3). The amount of any gain on property is
the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis of the
property. See sec. 1001(a). Generally, the adjusted basis for
determining gain or loss from the sale or disposition of property
is the cost of such property. Secs. 1011(a), 1012. Where
property is acquired from a decedent, the basis is the fair
market value of the property at the date of death, unless the
alternate valuation date is elected. Sec. 1014. A taxpayer must
establish the basis of the property for purposes of determining
the amount of gain or loss the taxpayer must recognize. “Proof
of basis is a specific fact which the taxpayer has the burden of
proving.” O’Neill v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 44, 50 (9th Cir.
1959), affg. T.C. Memo. 1957-193.
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Although it is highly probable that the Treasury note had a
material tax basis, petitioners did not provide any evidence or
documentation regarding the basis of the Treasury note.7
Petitioners’ contention that the income is that of Lucky Kirt
Trust is unavailing because the Lucky Kirt Trust is disregarded
for Federal income tax purposes. The Court, therefore, sustains
respondent on this issue.
VI. Section 6662 Penalty
With respect to examinations beginning after July 22, 1998,
the Commissioner bears the burden of production in any court
proceeding involving an individual’s liability for penalties or
additions to tax. Sec. 7491(c). To meet this burden, the
Commissioner must come forward with sufficient evidence
indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty
or addition to tax. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446
(2001). In instances where an exception to the penalty or
addition to tax is afforded upon a showing of reasonable cause,
the taxpayer bears the burden of showing such cause. Id. at 447.
Section 6662(a) provides for an accuracy-related penalty in
the amount of 20 percent of the portion of an underpayment
attributable to (among other things): (1) Any negligence or
7
The Court highlighted this issue at the start of the trial
by suggesting to petitioners that the Court should hear any
evidence pertaining to the amount they paid for the note or any
other evidence that could be relevant to their tax liability.
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disregard of the rules or regulations or (2) any substantial
understatement of income tax. Sec. 6662(b).
Section 6662(c) and section 1.6662-3(b)(1) and (2), Income
Tax Regs., define “negligence” as including any failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the Code and define the term
“disregard” as including any “careless, reckless, or intentional
disregard”. Negligence is a “lack of due care or failure to do
what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under
the circumstances.” Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506
(5th Cir. 1967), affg. on this issue 43 T.C. 168 (1964) and T.C.
Memo. 1964-299; ASAT, Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 147, 175
(1997); Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985).
A substantial understatement of income tax exists for an
individual where the amount of the understatement exceeds the
greater of (1) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the
return or (2) $5,000. Sec. 6662(d)(1)(A).
An “understatement” is defined as the excess of the amount
of tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable year
over the amount of tax imposed which is shown on the return,
reduced by any rebate. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(A). The amount of the
understatement shall be reduced by that portion of the
understatement attributable to the tax treatment of any item by
the taxpayer if there is or was substantial authority for such
treatment or as to any item if (1) “the relevant facts affecting
the item’s tax treatment are adequately disclosed in the return
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or in a statement attached to the return”, and (2) “there is a
reasonable basis for the tax treatment of such item by the
taxpayer.” Sec. 6662(d)(2)(B). Where a taxpayer can show there
is reasonable cause for any portion of the underpayment and that
the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to that portion of
the underpayment, then no penalty shall be imposed under section
6662(a) with respect to that portion of the underpayment. Sec.
6664(c).
Petitioners did not report any income for any of the years
in issue. They chose to hide their income by attributing their
earnings to a sham trust and failed to provide any books or
records of Lucky Kirt Trust, or even the trust document itself.
Moreover, petitioners did not offer any substantial authority or
reasonable cause for failing to report their income.
Accordingly, they are liable for a penalty under section 6662 for
each of the years in issue. Respondent is sustained on this
issue.
VII. Section 6673 Penalty
Section 6673 allows this Court to award a penalty to the
United States in an amount not in excess of $25,000 for
proceedings instituted by the taxpayer primarily for delay or for
proceedings in which the taxpayer’s position is frivolous or
groundless. “A petition to the Tax Court, or a tax return, is
frivolous if it is contrary to established law and unsupported by
a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law.” Coleman
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v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986) (imposing
penalties on taxpayers who made frivolous constitutional
arguments in opposition to the income tax). Courts have ruled
that constitutional defenses to the filing requirement, such as
petitioners present, are groundless and wholly without merit.
Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir. 1979); see also
Brunner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-187, affd. per curiam
142 Fed. Appx. 53 (3d Cir. 2005); Williams v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1999-277; Morin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-240;
Sochia v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-294 (all of which imposed
a section 6673 penalty for tax protester arguments).
Groundless litigation diverts the time and
energies of judges from more serious claims; it imposes
needless costs on other litigants. Once the legal
system has resolved a claim, judges and lawyers must
move on to other things. They cannot endlessly rehear
stale arguments. Both appellants say that the
penalties stifle their right to petition for redress of
grievances. But there is no constitutional right to
bring frivolous suits, see Bill Johnson’s Restaurants,
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 2170,
76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983). People who wish to express
displeasure with taxes must choose other forums, and
there are many available. * * * [Coleman v.
Commissioner, supra at 72.].
Respondent did not request a section 6673 penalty; however, the
Court chooses to impose a penalty today. This Court warned
petitioners at trial that they might be liable for a penalty
under section 6673 for raising frivolous arguments. However, at
trial and on brief, Mr. Lundgren continued to present
petitioners’ case using meritless and groundless arguments such
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as employing religious doctrine instead of presenting legal
arguments. The Court is satisfied that a penalty in this case is
appropriate, and, therefore, chooses to exercise its discretion
sua sponte under section 6673(a)(1) in requiring petitioners to
pay a penalty in the amount of $1,500 to the United States for
each of these dockets for a total penalty of $3,000.
The Court has considered all of petitioners’ contentions,
arguments, requests, and statements. To the extent not discussed
herein, we conclude that they are meritless, irrelevant, or moot.
To reflect the foregoing,
Appropriate decisions
will be entered.