T.C. Summary Opinion 2006-143
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
CURTIS D. CUSTIS, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 5725-05S. Filed September 13, 2006.
Curtis D. Custis, pro se.
Ronald S. Collins, Jr., for respondent.
RUWE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to section 74631
in effect when the petition was filed. The decision to be
entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
should not be cited as authority.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue. Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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Respondent determined a deficiency of $4,788 in petitioner’s
Federal income tax for 2003. The issues for decision are: (1)
Whether petitioner is entitled to two dependency exemptions; (2)
whether petitioner is entitled to head of household filing
status; (3) whether petitioner is entitled to an earned income
tax credit; and (4) whether petitioner is entitled to an
additional child tax credit.
Background
Some facts have been stipulated and are so found. The
stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated
by this reference. When the petition was filed, petitioner
resided in Glassboro, New Jersey.
Respondent sent a notice of deficiency to petitioner setting
forth a deficiency of $4,788 in income tax for 2003. In the
notice of deficiency, respondent changed petitioner’s filing
status to single and disallowed petitioner’s two dependency
exemptions for petitioner’s son, IC,2 and niece, AC, the earned
income tax credit, and the additional child tax credit.
Petitioner and IC’s mother did not live together during
2003. IC lived with his mother during most of the year. IC’s
mother did not claim him as a dependent on her 2003 tax return.
Petitioner and IC’s mother orally agreed to let petitioner claim
their son as a dependent on his return in 2003, but IC’s mother
2
The Court uses only the initials of minor children.
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did not sign a written declaration allowing petitioner to take a
dependency exemption deduction for IC. During 2003, petitioner
took care of his son on weekends, not very often on weekdays, and
during the summer. Petitioner provided some financial support
for IC but did not produce canceled checks, credit card
statements, receipts, bills, or other records relating to IC’s
support during 2003.
During 2003, petitioner also helped care for his niece, AC,
whose father is petitioner’s brother. AC resided with petitioner
for less than half the time in 2003. AC resided with Alvenia
Brown, her mother. Petitioner provided clothes, “sneaks”, and
food for AC in 2003. Alvenia Brown received financial assistance
with regard to AC from petitioner, AC’s father (petitioner’s
brother), and AC’s cousin, Michael Green, in 2003. Petitioner
produced no testimony or documentation to substantiate amounts
expended for AC’s support for 2003.
During 2003, both IC’s mother and AC’s mother provided
financial support for IC and AC, respectively.
Discussion
As a general rule, the Commissioner’s determinations set
forth in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the
taxpayer bears the burden of proving that these determinations
are in error. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
(1933). Pursuant to section 7491(a), the burden of proof as to
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factual issues may shift to the Commissioner where the taxpayer
introduces credible evidence and complies with substantiation
requirements, maintains records, and cooperates fully with
reasonable requests for witnesses, documents, and other
information. Petitioner has not met the requirements of section
7491(a) because he has not met the substantiation requirements or
introduced credible evidence to support the deductions and
credits at issue.
1. Dependency Exemptions
Section 151(c) allows a taxpayer to deduct an annual
exemption amount for each dependent of the taxpayer. As applied
in this context, the definition of a “dependent” under section
152(a) includes a son3 or the daughter of a brother4 over half of
whose support was received from the taxpayer. “[W]here there is
no evidence as to the total amount expended for support of the
child during the taxable year and no evidence from which it can
reasonably be inferred, it is not possible to conclude that the
taxpayer has contributed more than one-half.” Stafford v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 515, 518 (1966). If a child receives over
half of his support during the calendar year from his parents,
who live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the
calendar year, and such child is in the custody of one or both of
3
Sec. 152(a)(1).
4
Sec. 152(a)(6).
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his parents for more than one-half of the calendar year, such
child shall be treated, for purposes of section 152(a), as
receiving over half of his support during the calendar year from
the parent having custody for a greater portion of the calendar
year (custodial parent). Sec. 152(e)(1). A child of parents
described in section 152(e)(1) will be treated as having received
over half of his support during a calendar year from the
noncustodial parent if the custodial parent signs a written
declaration that such custodial parent will not claim the child
as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such calendar
year, and the noncustodial parent attaches the written
declaration to the noncustodial parent’s return for the taxable
year beginning during such calendar year. Sec. 152(e)(2).
Section 152(e) applies to children of parents who were never
married. King v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 245, 251 (2003).
Petitioner has failed to provide any documentation
indicating the total amount expended to support either his son or
his niece. The record indicates that IC spent weekends and some
of the summertime with petitioner but spent most weekdays with
his mother, and that IC received support from both his mother and
petitioner. IC’s mother did not sign a written declaration
allowing petitioner to take a dependency exemption deduction for
IC. Petitioner stipulated that AC did not live with him for more
than half of 2003, and Alvenia Brown had financial assistance
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with regard to AC from sources other than petitioner. No
documentation concerning the support of either petitioner’s son
or niece was provided.
Petitioner failed to establish that he provided more than
one-half of the total support for either IC or AC. Additionally,
IC’s mother, and not petitioner, is IC’s custodial parent and did
not sign a written declaration allowing petitioner to take
dependency exemption deduction. For the foregoing reasons,
petitioner has not satisfied the burden of proof with regard to
the claimed dependency exemptions. Respondent’s determinations
disallowing the dependency exemptions are sustained.
2. Head of Household Status
Section 1(b) imposes a special income tax rate on an
individual filing as head of household. As applied in this
context, section 2(b) defines “head of household” as an unmarried
individual who maintains as his home a household which
constitutes for more than one-half of the taxable year the
principal place of abode of a son, or “any other person who is a
dependent of the taxpayer, if the taxpayer is entitled to a
deduction for the taxable year for such person under section
151”. Sec. 2(b)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).
Because petitioner did not maintain a household which was
for more than half the year IC’s principal place of abode and
because petitioner is not entitled to the dependency exemption
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deduction for AC pursuant to section 151, it follows that
petitioner is not entitled to head of household filing status.
Thus, respondent’s adjustment to petitioner’s filing status is
sustained.
3. Earned Income Tax Credit
Petitioner claimed an earned income credit on the basis that
he had two qualifying children. Subject to certain limitations,
section 32(a) provides for an earned income credit for an
eligible individual. Section 32(c)(1)(A)(i) defines an “eligible
individual” as “any individual who has a qualifying child for the
taxable year”.5 In this context, a qualifying child is one who
satisfies a relationship test, a residency test, an age test, and
an identification requirement. See sec. 32(c)(3). To satisfy
the residency test, the qualifying child must have the same
principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half
of the taxable year in which the credit is claimed. See sec.
32(c)(3)(A)(ii).
Because petitioner did not establish that either his son or
his niece had the same principal place of abode for more than
one-half of the taxable year in 2003, it follows that petitioner
5
Sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(ii) provides that a taxpayer can also be
an “eligible individual” without a qualifying child. Petitioner
does not meet the requirements for a credit as an eligible
individual under sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(ii) because his income exceeded
the completed phaseout amount prescribed by sec. 32(b) and Rev.
Proc. 2002-70, sec. 3.06, 2002-2 C.B. 845, 848, for the year
2003.
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is not entitled to any portion of the earned income tax credit.
Respondent’s determination disallowing petitioner’s earned income
tax credit is sustained.
4. Additional Child Tax Credit
The child tax credit is a nonrefundable personal credit.
Section 24(a) authorizes a child tax credit with respect to each
“qualifying child” of the taxpayer. In this context, a
“qualifying child” means an individual with respect to whom the
taxpayer is allowed a deduction under section 151, who has not
attained the age of 17 as of the close of the taxable year, and
who bears a relationship to the taxpayer as prescribed in section
32(c)(3)(B). Sec. 24(c)(1). If the child tax credit exceeds the
taxpayer’s Federal income tax liability for the taxable year, a
portion of the child tax credit may be refundable as an
“additional child tax credit” under section 24(d)(1).
We have already held that petitioner is not allowed a
deduction with respect to AC and IC as dependents under section
151. Because IC and AC are not qualifying children, petitioner
does not qualify for the child tax credit or the additional child
tax credit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.