T.C. Memo. 2006-265
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
KAI-CHUNG C. AND MEEKHING T. LAM, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 14711-03. Filed December 14, 2006.
Forest J. Dorkowski, for petitioners.
Caroline R. Krivacka, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
KROUPA, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in and
penalties with respect to petitioners’ Federal income tax for
1994, 1995, and 1996 (the years at issue). For 1994, respondent
determined a $15,300 deficiency and a $3,060 accuracy-related
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penalty under section 6662(a).1 For 1995, respondent determined
a $25,759 deficiency and a $5,152 accuracy-related penalty. For
1996, respondent determined a $24,587 deficiency and a $4,917
accuracy-related penalty.
After concessions,2 there are three issues for decision.
The first issue is whether petitioners substantiated various
business expenses they claimed in each of the years at issue. We
hold that petitioners did not substantiate any of these expenses.
The second issue is whether petitioners failed to report $3,424
of rental income in 1996. We hold that they did. The third
issue is whether petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related
penalty for each of the years at issue. We hold that they are.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and accompanying exhibits, the
supplemental stipulation of facts, and the second supplemental
stipulation of facts are incorporated by this reference.
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years at issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise
indicated. Amounts have been rounded to the nearest dollar.
2
Petitioners conceded the increases in rental income
respondent determined for 1994 and 1995 and certain business
expenses respondent disallowed for each of the years at issue.
Respondent conceded certain disallowed business expenses that
petitioners claimed for each of the years at issue.
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Petitioners resided in Cordova, Tennessee, at the time they filed
the petition.
Mr. Lam (petitioner) was self-employed during the years at
issue.3 Petitioner owned and operated two businesses during the
years at issue; an investment and insurance business, and a real
estate business. All the business income and expenses in dispute
relate to the operation of these two businesses.
Petitioner’s “major business” is the investment and
insurance business, in which petitioner, a certified financial
planner, provided clients investment services and sold insurance
products. Petitioner also is a licensed realtor and operated his
real estate business, Cordova Realty, as a “sideline.” Cordova
Realty’s business included renting, managing, and selling
properties.
I. Income Tax Returns for the Years at Issue
Petitioners filed joint income tax returns that petitioner
prepared, including detailed depreciation schedules. Petitioners
reported the income and expenses from petitioner’s two businesses
on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business.
A. Schedule C Deductions
Petitioners claimed deductions for, among other things,
repair and maintenance, supplies, bad debt, office, insurance,
3
Mrs. Lam is a party to this case because she filed joint
returns with petitioner.
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interest, taxes and licenses, depreciation, advertising, legal
and professional, car and truck, travel, and meals and
entertainment expenses.
Petitioner presented documents and offered testimony
regarding the repair and maintenance expenses claimed as
deductions. Petitioner did not introduce a single receipt,
though, that showed he paid a repair or maintenance expense for
either of his businesses.
Petitioner suggested that some of the individuals and
businesses with whom he dealt did not differentiate between
receipts and invoices. Petitioner suggested that we therefore
treat the invoices he submitted as receipts.
Petitioner testified that he used service providers who did
not know how to read or write, so petitioner would occasionally
himself prepare the invoice for the work done. Petitioner also
presented invoices from a numbered “receipt book” he kept for use
by service providers who did not produce their own documentation.
Petitioner submitted a few documents that appear to have
been drafted by third parties, but the amounts listed were
crossed out, and petitioner wrote in different amounts.
Petitioner explained that he made these alterations after
negotiating a better price for the services, but he did not
explain why he, and not the third party, made the alteration.
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Petitioners introduced many undated documents. Petitioner
testified that he incurred some expenses in 1994 because he had
placed the documents for those expenses in the box meant to
contain only documentation of expenses incurred in 1994. Other
expenses, however, were supposedly incurred in 1995 because
petitioner had placed the documents for those expenses in the box
meant to contain only documentation of expenses incurred in 1995.
The invoices for repair and maintenance expenses that were
on another company’s letterhead and were dated did not show
whether petitioner actually paid them. For example, petitioner
submitted a $252 invoice for painting and a $145 invoice for lawn
care, but he introduced no corresponding documentary proof that
he paid for the services. Petitioner’s testimony was the only
evidence petitioner submitted indicating that he paid the repair
and maintenance expenses.
Petitioner also submitted more than 20 different invoices
from a hardware store to support his deduction for supplies.
Petitioner did not, however, submit corresponding receipts,
canceled checks, or credit card statements that would have shown
he paid the amounts indicated on these invoices.
Regarding bad debt expenses, petitioner testified that he
occasionally made small loans in his real estate business to
potential home buyers. He further testified that when a
purchaser needed larger sums of money, $10,000 or greater, he
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would have the purchaser sign a note and “put me on the lien on
the house.” Petitioner did not, however, introduce any of these
alleged notes or any other documentation regarding these “loans.”
Regarding office expenses, petitioner explained he operated
both of his businesses from one office and testified that the two
businesses shared expenses, such as phone lines, secretaries, and
other office workers. Petitioner did not introduce any
documentation, however, to show the amount of any of these office
expenses.
In addition, petitioner testified that he was licensed with
“realty commissions,” the “Insurance Department,” and the
National Association of Securities Dealers. Yet petitioner did
not introduce photocopies of any of these licenses, nor did
petitioner have any invoices or documented proof of payment for
the alleged annual licensing fees. Petitioner also testified
that he was annually assessed personal property tax on the assets
in his businesses, yet he did not introduce any documentation
regarding these expenses.
Regarding advertising expenses, petitioner testified that he
spent money on “leads”--mass mailings undertaken by advertising
companies, as part of his insurance and investment business, but
he did not testify or submit documentation regarding the
advertising expenses he incurred in his real estate business.
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For other categories of expenses, including insurance,
interest, depreciation, legal and professional, car and truck,
travel, and meals and entertainment expenses, petitioner offered
no testimony and submitted no documentation.
B. 1996 Rental Income
Petitioner did not present any documentation or offer any
testimony regarding the $3,424 of additional rental income
respondent determined petitioner earned in 1996.
II. Audit and Deficiency Notice
Respondent began examining petitioners’ returns for the
years at issue in October 1997. Respondent repeatedly asked
petitioners to submit documentation to support each of the items
they claimed on the returns. Petitioners failed to submit
documentation that would substantiate many of their expenses.
Respondent issued a deficiency notice in which he made
adjustments to the Schedule C expenses petitioners claimed,
increased petitioners’ income by the amounts of rental payments
they failed to include, and determined that petitioners are
liable for the accuracy-related penalty. Respondent disallowed
the Schedule C expenses on the grounds that they were not
ordinary and necessary business expenses, lacked sufficient
substantiation, or were personal in nature.
Petitioners timely filed a petition.
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OPINION
This is a substantiation case in which we are asked to
decide whether petitioners substantiated nearly a quarter of a
million dollars of business expenses that remain in dispute. The
business expenses that remain in dispute include $53,371 repair
and maintenance, $52,366 supplies, $48,486 bad debt, $19,579
office, $4,463 insurance, $650 interest, $12,583 taxes and
licenses, $7,552 depreciation, $693 advertising, $1,601 legal and
professional, $18,272 car and truck, $15,979 travel, and $5,390
meals and entertainment. We also must decide whether petitioners
failed to include $3,424 rental payments in income in 1996 and
are liable for the accuracy-related penalty. We first address
the general deductibility rules of business expenses under
section 162, then examine the additional strict substantiation
requirements of section 274(d).
I. Business Expenses Under the General Rule
We begin with two fundamental principles of tax litigation.
First, as a general rule, the Commissioner’s determinations are
presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving
that these determinations are erroneous.4 Rule 142(a); see
4
This principle is not affected by sec. 7491(a), because
respondent initiated the examination of petitioners’ returns for
the years at issue in October 1997, which is before the July 22,
1998, effective date of the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec.
3001(a), 112 Stat. 726.
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INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). Second,
deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer
must show that he or she is entitled to any deduction claimed.
Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940). This
includes the burden of substantiation. Hradesky v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.
1976).
A taxpayer must substantiate amounts claimed as deductions
by maintaining the records necessary to establish he or she is
entitled to the deductions. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner,
supra. A taxpayer shall keep such permanent records or books of
account as are sufficient to establish the amount of deductions
claimed on the return. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), (e), Income
Tax Regs. The Court need not accept a taxpayer’s self-serving
testimony when the taxpayer fails to present corroborative
evidence. Beam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-304 (citing
Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986)), affd. without
published opinion 956 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992).
If a taxpayer establishes that he or she paid or incurred a
deductible business expense but does not establish the amount of
the deduction, this Court may approximate the amount of the
allowable deduction, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose
inexactitude is of his or her own making. Cohan v. Commissioner,
39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). For the Cohan rule to
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apply, however, a basis must exist on which this Court can make
an approximation. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743
(1985). Without such a basis, any allowance would amount to
unguided largesse. Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560
(5th Cir. 1957). Against this background, we consider the
categories of expense for which there remain amounts in dispute.
First, petitioners contest respondent’s disallowance of
repair and maintenance expenses. At trial, petitioner presented
documents regarding these expenses, all of which we find
insufficient. Almost all the documents submitted were invoices
rather than receipts. While petitioner would have us believe
that receipts and invoices are one and the same thing, we
disagree. An invoice is a “written account of goods or services
to be provided,” while a receipt is a “writing acknowledging the
receiving of *** money.” Webster’s New International Dictionary
1190, 1894 (3d ed. 1993).
In addition to petitioner’s erroneous usage of invoices as
receipts, we find petitioner’s documents lacking in other
respects. Many of the documents are undated. Petitioner assured
the Court that each of these expenses was properly claimed in the
year it was allegedly incurred because he found the documentation
in a box with other dated documents. Yet petitioner offered no
testimony or evidence showing this record-keeping “system” was
free from error or manipulation. Petitioner introduced some
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dated documentation but failed to provide proof of payment. For
expenses attributed to a document that lacks a date or is
otherwise inadequate proof of payment, the only available
evidence that the expense was incurred in the year it was claimed
or was actually paid is petitioner’s own self-serving testimony,
which we are not required to accept, and which we do not, in
fact, find to be credible. See Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99
T.C. 202, 219 (1992).
Petitioner introduced some documents that indicate date and
payment; yet we find the documents or petitioner’s explanations
not credible. For example, petitioner submitted documents he
himself wrote because he claimed he used service providers that
could not read or write but did not offer testimony from any of
these alleged service providers. We also do not find
petitioner’s explanations for the invoices from his invoice book
and those with alterations to be credible. None of these
invoices was accompanied by third-party testimony.
Second, petitioners contest respondent’s disallowance of
supplies expenses. We note that petitioner submitted many
invoices to support his deductions for supplies. Petitioner
failed, however, to submit corresponding receipts, canceled
checks, or credit card statements that would have shown he paid
the amounts indicated on these invoices. The only available
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evidence to that effect is petitioner’s own self-serving
testimony, which we do not find to be credible. Id.
Finally, with respect to the office, bad debt, advertising,
and taxes and licenses expenses, petitioner vaguely described
what he incurred. Petitioner did not, however, introduce any
documentation to show the amount of any of these expenses. For
the insurance, interest, depreciation, and legal and professional
expenses, petitioners offered nothing.
We conclude that petitioners failed to substantiate any
repair and maintenance, supplies, bad debt, office, insurance,
interest, depreciation, advertising, taxes and licenses, and
legal and professional expenses, and thus they are not entitled
to any deduction beyond what respondent previously allowed. No
additional amount may be estimated under the Cohan rule because
there is no basis to do so. See Vanicek v. Commissioner, supra
at 742-743.
II. Section 274(d) Expenses
We turn next to the business expenses that are subject to the
strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d). In
addition to the general substantiation requirements, taxpayers
must substantiate certain business expenses, such as car and
truck, travel, and meals and entertainment expenses, by adequate
records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer’s
own statement. Sec. 274. The substantiation must show the
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amount of such expense or other item, the time and place of the
expense, the business purpose of the expense, and the business
relationship to the taxpayer of the person entertained. See sec.
274(d); sec. 1.274-5T, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg.
46014 (Nov. 6, 1985). We may not estimate expenses subject to
the strict substantiation requirements. Sanford v. Commissioner,
50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.
1969).
Petitioner contests respondent’s disallowance of car and
truck, travel, and meals and entertainment expenses. Petitioners
offered no testimony as to what car and truck, travel, and meals
and entertainment expenses were incurred and introduced no
documentation. We conclude that petitioners have failed to
substantiate any of the expenses subject to the strict
substantiation requirements of section 274(d) and therefore are
not entitled to any deduction beyond what respondent previously
allowed.
III. Unreported Rental Income
We now address whether petitioners failed to report $3,424
of rental income in 1996 as respondent determined. Petitioners
did not introduce any evidence at trial regarding respondent’s
determination of the unreported rental income and did not address
this determination in their brief. We conclude that petitioners
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have conceded this issue by not pursuing it on brief. See
Nicklaus v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 117, 120 n.4 (2001); Rybak v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 566 n.19 (1988).
IV. Accuracy-Related Penalty
We next consider whether petitioners are liable for the
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) due to negligence
for each of the years at issue, as respondent determined.
Petitioners bear the burden of production as well as the burden
of proof with respect to the accuracy-related penalty because the
examination commenced before section 7491(c) became effective.
Rule 142(a); Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 791-792 (1972).
A taxpayer is liable for an accuracy-related penalty for any
part of an underpayment attributable to, among other things,
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.5 Sec. 6662(a)
and (b)(1). Negligence is the lack of due care or failure to do
what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under
the circumstances. Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947
(1985). Negligence includes any failure by the taxpayer to keep
adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly.
Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
5
Respondent determined in the alternative that petitioners
are liable for the accuracy-related penalty for substantial
understatements of income tax under sec. 6662(b)(2) for the years
at issue. Because of our holding on the negligence issue, we
need not consider whether the underpayments were also substantial
understatements.
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Petitioners submitted insufficient documentation for a few
expenses, and had no documentation for the majority of the
expenses claimed. We have found that petitioners failed to
substantiate adequately any of the claimed business expense
deductions in dispute. Accordingly, we find that petitioners
were negligent in failing to substantiate any of their claimed
expenses.
The accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) does not
apply to any portion of an underpayment, however, if there was
reasonable cause for the taxpayer’s position with respect to that
portion and the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to that
portion. Sec. 6664(c)(1); sec. 1.6664-4(b), Income Tax Regs.
The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable
cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account all pertinent facts and circumstances, including the
taxpayer’s efforts to assess his or her proper tax liability and
the knowledge and experience of the taxpayer. Sec. 1.6664-
4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioners argue that they acted with reasonable cause
regarding the disallowed deductions, citing respondent’s
concessions. We disagree. While petitioners correctly assert
that many of the expense adjustments respondent determined have
been reduced by agreement of the parties, petitioners failed to
substantiate any of the disputed expenses. Petitioner is a
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knowledgeable and experienced businessman. He is a certified
financial planner, runs his own businesses, and prepared
petitioners’ returns, which included detailed depreciation
schedules. Despite this, petitioners claimed deductions for
hundreds of thousands of dollars of business expenses, none of
which they could substantiate. Petitioners failed to convince
the Court they took the requisite effort to determine their
proper tax liability considering petitioner’s knowledge and
experience. We find that petitioners did not prove that the
underpayments of income tax for the years at issue were due to
reasonable cause and that they acted in good faith. Accordingly,
we conclude that petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related
penalty for each of the years at issue.
To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the
parties,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.