T.C. Summary Opinion 2007-121
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DIANA L. GRAY, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10520-06S. Filed July 18, 2007.
Diana L. Gray, pro se.
Thomas M. Rath, for respondent.
RUWE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions
of section 74631 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the
petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
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be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.
Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner’s 2003 and
2004 Federal income taxes of $1,974 and $2,000, respectively.
After concessions,2 the only issue remaining is whether
petitioner is entitled to a tuition and fees deduction of $4,000
in 2004.
Petitioner submitted a Form 1098-T, Tuition Statement,
demonstrating that she was billed for qualified tuition and
related expenses of $4,007 in 2004. On her 2004 Federal income
tax return, petitioner deducted $4,000 for tuition and fees
expenses. Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to the
deduction for tuition and fees if the Court finds that petitioner
is entitled to single filing status.
Discussion
Generally, petitioner bears the burden of proof. Rule
142(a). Respondent, however, bears the burden of proof with
respect to any new matter. Id. An assertion is treated as a new
matter when it either increases the original deficiency or
requires the presentation of different evidence. Shea v.
2
The parties agreed that petitioner is entitled to itemized
deductions for charitable contributions of $1,040 in both 2003
and 2004. Petitioner did not contest the adjustments in the
notice of deficiency not discussed in this opinion.
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Commissioner, 112 T.C. 183, 191 (1999); Wayne Bolt & Nut Co. v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 500, 507 (1989).
In the notice of deficiency, respondent’s basis for
disallowing petitioner’s 2004 tuition and fees deduction was that
petitioner “did not furnish information needed to support the
claimed deduction.” At trial, when the Court asked respondent’s
counsel what information petitioner needed to support the tuition
and fees deduction, respondent replied: “I think it was proving
that they were qualified tuition expenses, which the Respondent
no longer disputes.”
Respondent’s position at trial was that petitioner must also
prove that she was entitled to single, as opposed to married
filing separately, filing status in order to be entitled to the
tuition and fees deduction. See sec. 222(d)(4). The notice of
deficiency does not provide this as a reason for disallowing
petitioner’s tuition and fees deduction. Respondent did not file
an answer to the petition.3 Respondent first argued that a
married filing separately filing status caused petitioner to be
ineligible for a tuition and fees deduction when the case was
called for trial.
3
Rule 173(b), as in effect for small tax cases in which the
petition was filed before Mar. 14, 2007, provides that no answer
is required to be filed, except where there is an issue on which
the Commissioner bears the burden of proof or where the Court
otherwise directs.
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The issue concerning the effect of petitioner’s filing
status on the tuition and fees deduction constitutes new matter
because it would require the presentation of different evidence.
It follows that respondent has the burden of proving that
petitioner was a married individual within the meaning of section
7703. See sec. 222(d)(4). He has failed to meet that burden.4
Because petitioner provided sufficient evidence to refute
respondent’s original determination that petitioner had failed to
substantiate her tuition expenses, we hold that petitioner is
entitled to the tuition and fees deduction for 2004.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.
4
While petitioner made an attempt to show that she was
legally separated within the meaning of sec. 7703(a)(2) in 2004,
and indeed provided evidence to support that she was living
separately from her husband pursuant to a court order, she could
not reasonably have been expected to adequately contest the issue
with such inadequate notification.