T.C. Memo. 2008-28
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
LISA H. GREEN, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 11678-06. Filed February 12, 2008.
Mitchell S. Fuerst, for petitioner.
Brian A. Pfeifer, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MARVEL, Judge: This matter is before the Court on
respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as
supplemented. After concessions,1 the issue for decision is
1
Respondent concedes that the Court has jurisdiction under
sec. 6015(e), I.R.C., to review the determination denying relief
under sec. 6015(f), I.R.C., for 1999 and 2000.
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whether we have jurisdiction under section 6015(e)2 over
petitioner’s stand-alone case asserting a claim for equitable
relief under section 6015(f) for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Background
Petitioner resided in Florida when the petition in this case
was filed.
Petitioner filed joint Federal income tax returns for the
years at issue with her former husband, Jonathan H. Green.
Petitioner paid the Federal income tax liabilities reported on
the 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 joint returns but did not pay the
tax liabilities reported on the 1999 and 2000 joint returns.
Respondent has not asserted a deficiency against petitioner for
any year at issue.
On February 3, 2003, respondent received petitioner’s Form
8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, with a Statement
Regarding Request for Equitable Relief (statement) for 1995
through 2000 attached. In the statement, petitioner requested a
refund of tax paid for 1995 through 2000 under section 6015(f).
On March 24, 2006, respondent issued to petitioner a Notice
of Determination Concerning Relief from Joint and Several
Liability Under Section 6015 for 1999 and 2000, in which he
denied petitioner’s request for relief. Respondent, however, did
2
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code.
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not issue a notice of determination for 1995, 1996, 1997, or
1998. Petitioner timely petitioned this Court, asserting that
respondent erred by denying her relief under section 6015 for
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.
On November 28, 2006, respondent’s motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction was filed. Respondent argues that we lack
jurisdiction under section 6015(e) over petitioner’s section
6015(f) claim for relief because respondent has not determined a
deficiency for any of the years at issue. Petitioner filed a
notice of objection to respondent’s motion.
In the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-
432, div. C, sec. 408(a), (c), 120 Stat. 3061, 3062 (TRHCA
section 408), Congress amended section 6015(e) to confer
jurisdiction on this Court over stand-alone requests for
equitable relief under section 6015(f), effective for tax
liabilities arising or remaining unpaid on or after December 20,
2006. On April 19, 2007, respondent filed a supplement to his
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent concedes
that TRHCA section 408 grants us jurisdiction to review
respondent’s determination denying relief under section 6015(f)
for 1999 and 2000. Respondent argues, however, that we lack
jurisdiction to determine petitioner’s eligibility for relief
under section 6015(f) for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 because the
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tax liabilities for those years were fully paid before
December 20, 2006.
On May 14, 2007, the Court held a hearing on respondent’s
motion at its trial session in Miami, Florida. Petitioner’s and
respondent’s counsel appeared and were heard. At the hearing, we
directed petitioner to submit a response to respondent’s
supplement and offered respondent the opportunity to reply to
petitioner’s response.
On June 15, 2007, petitioner’s response to respondent’s
supplement was filed. On July 12, 2007, respondent replied.
Discussion
I. Section 6015(e)
Section 6015(e) generally allows a spouse who has requested
relief from joint and several liability to contest the
Commissioner’s denial of relief under section 6015 by filing a
timely petition in this Court. Before the enactment of TRHCA
section 408, the Court had jurisdiction over such cases only if
the Commissioner had asserted a deficiency against the taxpayer.
See Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7 (2006). TRHCA section
408 amended section 6015(e) to confer jurisdiction on the Court
over stand-alone requests for equitable relief under section
6015(f), but only with respect to tax liabilities arising or
remaining unpaid on or after December 20, 2006.
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Petitioner asserts that she is entitled to equitable relief
under section 6015(f) in the form of a tax refund for each of the
years 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. Her argument reflects the fact
that she paid the tax liabilities for those years before December
20, 2006. Because petitioner’s 1995-98 tax liabilities did not
arise or remain unpaid on or after December 20, 2006, the Court
does not have jurisdiction under section 6015(e), as amended by
TRHCA section 408, over petitioner’s stand-alone claim for
equitable relief under section 6015(f) for 1995-98. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-117; Bock v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-41.
Petitioner argues, however, that TRHCA section 408 violates
her equal protection and due process rights under the United
States Constitution because it treats taxpayers who have paid
their tax liabilities before December 20, 2006, differently from
taxpayers who have not. Petitioner’s argument is unavailing. It
is well established that “Legislatures have especially broad
latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax
statutes.” Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
547 (1983). A taxpayer challenging the constitutionality of a
tax classification on equal protection grounds must bear the very
heavy burden of negating “every conceivable basis which might
support it.” Id. at 547-548; see also Durham v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2004-125.
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Petitioner has not argued, and she has failed to
demonstrate, that she is a member of any suspect classification
or that TRHCA section 408 interferes with a fundamental right.
Consequently, we must uphold TRHCA section 408 if it bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. See
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, supra at 547. We have
held that it is especially difficult to demonstrate that no
rational basis exists for a classification in a revenue act for
which the presumption that an act of Congress is constitutional
is particularly strong. See Black v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 505,
507-508 (1977); Cansino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-134.
Moreover, under the rational basis standard, a statute does not
violate the equal protection mandate “if any state of facts
rationally justifying * * * [the statute] is demonstrated to or
perceived by the courts.” United States v. Md. Savings-Share
Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970).
One obvious rational basis for Congress’s choice of an
effective date is administrative convenience. Administrative
convenience has been recognized as a sufficient reason for
legislative line drawing. See, e.g., N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp. v.
City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 580 (1938). In enacting TRHCA
section 408, Congress had to draw a line that would enable the
Internal Revenue Service and the courts to ascertain when TRHCA
section 408 would apply. Congress reasonably decided to use
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TRHCA’s enactment date, December 20, 2006, and limited the
application of TRHCA section 408 to those taxpayers whose
liability arose or remained unpaid on or after that date. We
perceive this to be a rational basis for the line drawn by
Congress, and we reject petitioner’s argument to the contrary.
Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that TRHCA section
408 violates her right to due process. Petitioner appears to
argue that TRHCA section 408 offends due process because it was
not made retroactive to a date that would have enabled her to
have her day in court with respect to the fully paid 1995-98
liabilities. Petitioner, however, has provided no support for
her argument. Moreover, a taxpayer who pays a tax in full and
complies with other jurisdictional prerequisites can pursue a
refund action in a U.S. District Court or in the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims. See sec. 7422(a). If petitioner believed that
she should not have been liable for the taxes for 1995-98 that
were reported and fully paid, she could have filed a refund claim
and related litigation. It does not follow from the fact that
petitioner is foreclosed from litigating in this Court because of
a rational decision on Congress’s part to establish an effective
date for TRHCA section 408 that petitioner’s constitutional right
to due process has been violated. We reject petitioner’s due
process argument as meritless.
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II. Equitable Jurisdiction
Petitioner argues that the Court should retain jurisdiction
to determine whether petitioner was a signatory to the joint
returns for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. Petitioner asserts that
because she signed the joint returns under duress and coercion,
she did not have the requisite intent to file a joint return. In
effect, petitioner is asking this Court to exercise jurisdiction
over petitioner’s claims under general equitable principles.
Petitioner has cited no statute or case that supports her
argument that we can or should exercise jurisdiction independent
of any conferred by section 6015(e). The only cases that she
cites in support of her argument that we have equitable
jurisdiction to decide whether she signed her 1995-98 joint
returns under duress are deficiency cases in which the
Commissioner issued notices of deficiency and the taxpayers
timely petitioned this Court. See Stanley v. Commissioner, 81
T.C. 634 (1983); Brown v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 116 (1968).
Petitioner never received a notice of deficiency for 1995-
98. Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to redetermine a
deficiency under section 6213(a). In addition, for reasons
described earlier in this opinion, we do not have jurisdiction
over petitioner’s section 6015(f) claims for 1995-98 under
section 6015(e) as amended. Petitioner has not asserted any
basis for us to exercise jurisdiction over her claims.
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In the light of the foregoing, we shall grant respondent’s
motion to dismiss petitioner’s 1995-98 section 6015(f) claims for
lack of jurisdiction, as supplemented.
An appropriate order
of dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction will be entered.