T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-57
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
CRISTINA A. OSORIO, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 25924-07S. Filed April 29, 2009.
Cristina A. Osorio, pro se.
Christine K. Lane, for respondent.
DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to
the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b),
the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court,
and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other
case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references
are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue,
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and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure.
For 2005 respondent determined a $2,728 deficiency in
petitioner’s Federal income tax. The issue remaining for
decision1 is whether petitioner is entitled to itemized
deductions in excess of the standard deduction.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the exhibits received into evidence
are incorporated herein by reference. When the petition was
filed, petitioner resided in Florida.
During 2005 petitioner worked for Southern Wine and Spirits
as a sales consultant. Her customer accounts were in the Greater
Miami area. She drove her own vehicles to service her customer
accounts, which were on an established route that she “had to
stick to to get orders.” She was not reimbursed by her employer
for her expenditures. Instead, she claimed $18,458 in
unreimbursed employee expenses on her Schedule A, Itemized
Deductions (before application of the section 67(a) 2-percent
floor). On her Form 2106, Employee Business Expenses, she
reported her expenses as follows:
1
Petitioner presented neither evidence nor argument that she
is entitled to her claimed $120 deduction for tax preparation
fees. Petitioner is therefore deemed to have conceded the issue.
See Nielsen v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 311, 312 (1973); Mikalonis
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-281.
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Description Amount
Vehicle expense $10,177
Parking fees, tolls, and
transportation 420
Travel expenses -0-
Unspecified business expenses 7,861
Meals and entertainment -0-
Total 18,458
Petitioner’s $10,177 deduction for vehicle expense was based
upon 23,520 business miles at standard mileage rates of 40.5 and
48.5 cents per mile for two vehicles. For vehicles 1 and 2 she
reported business miles of 3,993 and 19,527 and other miles of
545 and 2,510 for a total of 4,538 and 22,037 miles,
respectively. She did not claim a deduction on her Form 2106 for
the actual transportation expenses of her vehicles.
Discussion
I. Burden of Proof
The Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of deficiency
are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden to prove
that the determinations are in error. See Rule 142(a); Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). But the burden of proof on
factual issues that affect the taxpayer’s tax liability may be
shifted to the Commissioner where the taxpayer introduces
credible evidence with respect to the issue and the taxpayer has
satisfied certain conditions. See sec. 7491(a)(1). Petitioner
has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and she has neither
complied with the substantiation requirements nor maintained all
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required records. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Accordingly,
the burden of proof remains on her.
II. Unreimbursed Employee Expenses
Section 162(a) authorizes a deduction for all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business. But as a general rule,
deductions are allowed only to the extent that they are
substantiated. Secs. 274(d) (no deductions are allowed for
gifts, listed property,2 or traveling, entertainment, amusement,
or recreation unless substantiated), 6001 (taxpayers must keep
records sufficient to establish the amount of the items required
to be shown on their Federal income tax returns). If the
taxpayer establishes that he has incurred a deductible expense
yet is unable to substantiate the exact amount, the Court may
estimate a deductible amount in some circumstances. Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). But the Court
cannot estimate a taxpayer’s expenses with respect to the items
enumerated in section 274(d). Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.
823, 827 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969);
Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-22 (the strict
substantiation requirements of section 274(d) preclude the Court
and taxpayers from approximating their expenses).
2
The term “listed property” is defined to include passenger
automobiles and cell phones. Sec. 280F(d)(4)(A)(i), (v).
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Section 274(d) and the regulations thereunder require
taxpayers to substantiate their deductions by adequate records or
sufficient evidence to corroborate the taxpayer’s own testimony
as to: (1) The amount of the expenditure or use; (2) the time of
the expenditure or use; (3) the place of the expenditure or use;
(3) the business purpose of the expenditure or use; and (4) the
business relationship to the taxpayer of the persons entertained
or receiving the gift. See sec. 1.274-5T(a) and (b), Temporary
Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985).
As to the “Rules of substantiation”, the temporary
regulation provides that taxpayers must maintain and produce such
substantiation as will constitute proof of each expenditure or
use. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed.
Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985). Written evidence has considerably
more probative value than oral evidence, and the probative value
of written evidence is greater the closer in time it is to the
expenditure or use. Id. Although a contemporaneous log is not
required, a record made at or near the time of the expenditure or
use that is supported by sufficient documentary evidence has a
higher degree of credibility than a subsequently prepared
statement. Id. The corroborative evidence required to support a
statement not made at or near the time of the expenditure or use
must have a high degree of probative value to elevate the
statement and evidence to the level of credibility reflected by a
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record made at or near the time of the expenditure or use
supported by sufficient documentary evidence. Id.
To satisfy the “adequate records” requirement of section
274(d), the taxpayer shall maintain an account book, diary, log,
statement of expense, trip sheets, or similar record and
documentary evidence that in combination are sufficient to
establish each element of expenditure or use. Sec. 1.274-
5T(c)(2)(i), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46017 (Nov.
6, 1985). The adequate record must be prepared or maintained in
such manner that each recording of an element or use is made at
or near the time of the expenditure or use. Sec. 1.274-
5T(c)(2)(ii), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46017
(Nov. 6, 1985). “‘[M]ade at or near the time of the expenditure
or use’ means [that] the elements of an expenditure or use are
recorded at a time when, in relation to the use or making of an
expenditure, the taxpayer has full present knowledge of each
element of the expenditure or use’”. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii)(A),
Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46017 (Nov. 6, 1985).
The level of detail required in an adequate record to
substantiate the taxpayer’s business use may vary depending on
the facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii)(C),
Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46018 (Nov. 6, 1985).
For example, a taxpayer’s use of a vehicle for both business and
personal purposes and whose only business use of the vehicle is
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to make deliveries to customers on an established route may
satisfy the adequate record requirement by: (1) Recording the
total number of miles driven during the taxable year, the length
of the delivery route once, and the date of each trip at or near
the time of the trips; or (2) establishing the date of each trip
with a receipt, record of delivery, or other documentary
evidence. Id.
To substantiate petitioner’s claimed deduction for
unreimbursed employee expenses she submitted copies of her bank
statements for the period December 17, 2004, through December 15,
2005,3 a 2005 calendar that sets forth the customer’s name, the
purpose of the trip, and the various miles petitioner drove, a
“PM Route List”, an “ON PREMISE MARKETING REPORT”, and her
testimony.
A. Petitioner’s Deduction for Vehicle Expenses
1. Deduction Based on the Standard Mileage Rate
Petitioner testified that the mileage figures were
“approximations” of her mileage accrued between each account,
between an account and her employer’s office, between an account
and her home, or between her home and her employer’s office, on
occasions. She also testified that she had recorded “bits and
3
For the sake of completeness, petitioner admitted that she
is not entitled to deductions in 2005 for amounts expended during
the period Dec. 17 through 31, 2004. See also sec. 1.461-1(a)(1)
and (2), Income Tax Regs.
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pieces of it in 2005”, but she had to go back and “put some stuff
in there at the current year * * * and refill some stuff in,
based on my account list.” And she testified that she used her
vehicles for personal purposes “very locally, like locally”.
Petitioner’s testimony established that her mileage figures
were mere estimates of her business use and that she did not
accurately record her business mileage at or near the time of her
business use.4 See sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6)(i)(B), (c)(2), Temporary
Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016, 46017 (Nov. 6, 1985). The
Court therefore finds that petitioner is not entitled to her
deduction for mileage.5 See Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at
827; Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-22; see also sec.
4
Although sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii)(C), Temporary Income Tax
Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46018 (Nov. 6, 1985), provides that the
length of an established delivery route may be recorded once if
the recording takes place at or near the time of the trip, the
Court does not accord much weight to petitioner’s calendar. She
admitted that she did not accurately record the information at or
near the time of the trip and that she supplemented the
information based on information from the current year.
Putting aside sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii)(C), Temporary Income
Tax Regs., supra, the Court also does not accord much weight to
petitioner’s calendar because she admitted that she merely copied
the information from one week to the next; e.g., the descriptions
for each Monday (and the other days) are the same throughout
2005.
5
The Court notes that any mileage accrued or actual expenses
petitioner paid in commuting between her residence and either her
employer’s office or a customer account are nondeductible
personal expenses. See secs. 162, 262; Fausner v. Commissioner,
413 U.S. 838 (1973); secs. 1.162-2(e), 1.262-1(b)(5), Income Tax
Regs.
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1.274-5T(c)(1), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra (the
substantiation requirements are designed to encourage taxpayers
to maintain records and documentary evidence).
2. Deduction Based on Actual Expenses
Although petitioner did not claim a deduction on her Form
2106 for the actual costs of her transportation expenses, she now
asserts entitlement to a deduction for: (1) Gas of $1,519.49;
(2) car payments of $3,684.04; (3) insurance of $1,789.21; and
(4) repairs of $382.78.
As a general rule, however, taxpayers are prohibited from
claiming deductions for automobile expenses using both the actual
cost method and the standard mileage rate. See Tesar v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-207; Rev. Proc. 2004-64, sec. 5.03,
2004-2 C.B. 898, 900 (taxpayers generally may deduct an amount
based on the standard mileage rate or actual costs). In
addition, because the Court has concluded that petitioner’s
evidence was not sufficient to substantiate her claimed deduction
based on the standard mileage rate, it also does not sufficiently
substantiate her claimed deduction based on the actual costs of
her transportation expenses. Petitioner therefore is not
entitled to her claimed deduction based on the actual costs of
her transportation expenses. See Sanford v. Commissioner, supra
at 827; Rodriguez v. Commissioner, supra.
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3. Deduction for Parking Fees, Tolls, and
Transportation Expenses
Petitioner claimed a $420 deduction on her Form 2106 for
parking fees, tolls, and transportation expenses. Deductions for
these expenses may generally be deducted as a separate item. See
Rev. Proc. 2004-64, sec. 5.04, 2004-2 C.B. at 900.
Petitioner, however, has substantiated expenditures for
parking fees of only $21.25. The Court therefore finds that
petitioner is entitled to only a $21.25 deduction for parking
fees, subject to section 67(a) (relating to the 2-percent floor
on miscellaneous itemized deductions). See Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 544 (estimates of a taxpayer’s
deductions bear heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude
is of his or her own making).
B. Petitioner’s Deduction for Unspecified Business
Expenses6
1. Meals and Entertainment Expenses
Although petitioner did not claim a deduction on her Form
2106 for meals and entertainment expenses, she now asserts
entitlement to a $1,169.83 deduction for meals and entertainment
expenses. On several pages of petitioner’s bank statements, she
6
Petitioner testified that she did not know what her claimed
deduction of $7,861 for unspecified business expenses consisted
of. Except as otherwise noted herein, the Court sustains
respondent’s disallowance of petitioner’s deduction for
unspecified business expenses.
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handwrote: “Food w/customer”, “meals w/customer”, or “meals” for
charges for several dates at various restaurants.
Petitioner’s evidence, however, fails to prove the business
relationship to petitioner of the persons entertained. See sec.
1.274-5T(b)(3)(v), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46015
(Nov. 6, 1985) (requiring the record to show the name, title, or
other designation of the persons entertained sufficient to
establish the business relationship to the taxpayer). In
addition, it does not indicate the business reason for the
entertainment, the nature of the business benefit derived or
expected to be derived an account of the entertainment, or the
nature of any business discussion or activity. See sec. 1.247-
5T(b)(3)(iv), (c)(2)(ii)(B), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed.
Reg. 46015, 46018 (Nov. 6, 1985). Because petitioner did not
testify about this issue or provide any other corroborating
evidence, the Court finds that her handwritten notations are not
adequate to substantiate the business purpose of her meals and
entertainment expenses. See sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1), Temporary
Income Tax Regs., supra; see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 807;
Urban Redev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 328, 332 (4th Cir.
1961), affg. 34 T.C. 845 (1960); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 74, 77 (1986). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a
$1,169.83 deduction for meals and entertainment expenses. See
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Sanford v. Commissioner, supra at 827; Rodriguez v. Commissioner,
supra; see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 807.
2. Travel Expenses
Although petitioner did not claim a deduction on her Form
2106 for travel expenses, she now asserts entitlement to a
$127.75 deduction for travel expenses. On petitioner’s bank
statement for the period March 17 through April 14, 2005, she
handwrote: “travel for work” next to a charge for “Ioa
Admissions” in Orlando, Florida, on March 21, 2005.
Section 1.274-5T(b)(2)(iv) and (c)(2)(ii)(B), Temporary
Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46015, 46018 (Nov. 6, 1985),
provides that the taxpayer must record the business reason for
the travel or the nature of the business benefit derived or
expected to be derived on account of the travel unless the
business purpose is evident from the surrounding facts and
circumstances. “For example, in the case of a salesman calling
on customers on an established sales route, a written explanation
of the business purpose of such travel ordinarily will not be
required.” Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii)(B), Temporary Income Tax
Regs., supra. Petitioner’s evidence shows that her customer
accounts were within the Greater Miami area. The business
purpose of petitioner’s travel to Orlando, Florida, is therefore
not evident from the facts and circumstances. Because petitioner
did not testify about this issue or provide any other
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corroborating evidence, the Court finds that her handwritten
notation is not adequate to substantiate the business purpose of
her travel. See sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1), Temporary Income Tax Regs.,
supra; see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 807; Urban Redev. Corp. v.
Commissioner, supra at 332; Tokarski v. Commissioner, supra at
77. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a $127.25
deduction for travel expenses. See Sanford v. Commissioner, 50
T.C. at 827; Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-22.
3. Gift Expenses
Although petitioner did not claim a deduction on her
Schedule A for gift expenses, she now asserts entitlement to a
$410.32 deduction for gift expenses. On several pages of
petitioner’s bank statements, she handwrote: “gift for customer”
for charges for several dates at various merchants.
Petitioner’s evidence, however, does not describe the gifts.
See sec. 1.274-5T(b)(5)(iii), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed.
Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985). It does not substantiate the business
reason for the gifts or the nature of the business benefit
derived or expected to be derived on account of the gifts. See
sec. 1.274-5T(b)(5)(iv), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg.
46016 (Nov. 6, 1985). And it does not substantiate the business
relationship to petitioner of the gift recipients. See sec.
1.274-5T(b)(5)(v), (c)(2), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed.
Reg. 46016, 46017 (Nov. 6, 1985) (the taxpayer must record the
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occupation or other information relating to the gift recipient
including name, title, or other designation sufficient to
establish the business relationship). In addition, without a
receipt or other corroborative evidence to substantiate
petitioner’s claim that she purchased gifts for her customers,
the Court does not accept her self-serving statement that her
purchases were made for those purposes. See Urban Redev. Corp.
v. Commissioner, supra at 332; Tokarski v. Commissioner, supra at
77; sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra; see
also Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 807. Accordingly, petitioner is not
entitled to a $410.32 deduction for gift expenses. See Sanford
v. Commissioner, supra at 827; Rodriguez v. Commissioner, supra.
4. Cell Phone Expenses
Although petitioner did not claim a deduction on her Form
2106 for cell phone expenses, she now asserts entitlement to a
$2,893.44 deduction for cell phone expenses. On several pages of
petitioner’s bank statements, she handwrote: “verizon phone
bill”, “verizon phone”, “verizon pymt”, etc. for charges for
several dates by “Check”, which do not include the payee’s name,
or “CheckCard * * * Verizon Wireless”. Petitioner also testified
that she used her cell phone “Mostly for work” and “Rarely” used
it for personal purposes.
Petitioner’s evidence, however, does not substantiate the
amount of her business use or her total use. See sec. 1.274-
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5T(b)(6)(i)(B), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016
(Nov. 6, 1985). And it does not substantiate the business
purpose of each business use. See sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6)(iii),
Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).
In addition, without a receipt or other corroborative evidence to
substantiate petitioner’s claim of payments to Verizon for her
cell phone use by “Check”, the Court does not accept her self-
serving statement that the “Checks” were issued for that purpose.
See Urban Redev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d at 332; Tokarski
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. at 77; sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1), Temporary
Income Tax Regs., supra; see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 807.
Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a $2,893.44 deduction
for cell phone expenses. See Sanford v. Commissioner, supra at
827; Rodriguez v. Commissioner, supra; see also Fed. R. Evid.
801(c), 807.
5. Supplies Expenses
Although petitioner did not claim a deduction on her
Schedule A for supplies expenses, she now asserts entitlement to
a $117.96 deduction for supplies expenses. Petitioner’s
handwritten notations on her bank statements indicate that her
supplies consist of: (1) $83.31 for folders, pens, paper, etc.
purchased at CVS; and (2) $34.65 for “work-supplies” purchased at
Gulf Liquors.
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Petitioner, however, did not provide any receipts or
testimony to substantiate her deduction for supplies. Without
other corroborative evidence, the Court does not accept her self-
serving statement that the items were purchased for work
purposes. See Urban Redev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d at
332; Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. at 77; see also Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c), 807. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a
$117.96 deduction for supplies expenses.
6. Clothing, Shoes, and Dry Cleaning Expenses
Although petitioner did not claim a deduction on her
Schedule A for clothing, shoes, and dry cleaning expenses, she
now asserts entitlement to a $1,489.50 deduction for clothing,
shoes, and dry cleaning expenses. On several pages of her bank
statements, she handwrote: “clothes for work”, “clothing for
work”, and “dry cleaning”.
Clothing is a deductible expense only if it is required for
the taxpayer’s employment, is unsuitable for general or personal
wear, and is not so worn. See Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
1266, 1290 (1980); Yeomans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 757, 767
(1958). If the cost of acquiring clothing is deductible, then
the cost of maintaining the clothing is also deductible. Fisher
v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 218 (1954), affd. 230 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1956).
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Petitioner testified that she was sometimes required to wear
“logo’d shirts” that her employer provided, but her clothing
expenses did not include amounts for “logo’d shirts”. Rather,
her clothing expenses included amounts for clothing that she
purchased for professional-looking apparel and shoes. According
to petitioner, she did not “necessarily” wear the purchased
clothing outside of work, but “I guess” the purchased clothing
could have been worn outside of work. She also testified that
her dry cleaning expenses were for “the [purchased] clothing that
I wore to work and also for the logo’d shirts”.
Petitioner’s purchased clothing and shoes consist of items
that are suitable for general or personal wear, and she has
failed to prove otherwise. The Court therefore finds that the
amounts were expended for personal purposes and as such are not
deductible. See sec. 262(a) (which generally precludes
deductions for personal, living, or family expenses). Similarly,
the portion of the dry cleaning expenses for petitioner’s
purchased clothing was also expended for personal purposes and as
such is not deductible. See id.; Fisher v. Commissioner, supra.
The Court will, however, allow petitioner a deduction for the dry
cleaning of her “logo’d shirts” of $100.96, subject to section
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67(a) (relating to the 2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized
deductions).7 See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 544.
7. Grooming Expenses
Although petitioner did not claim a deduction on her
Schedule A for “Upkeep” (grooming expenses), she now asserts
entitlement to a $1,774.62 deduction for grooming expenses.
Petitioner’s grooming expenses relate to amounts she expended on
her nails and hair. Petitioner claims that she is entitled to
deduct these amounts because she believes they are “work related”
since she had to “have a certain look.”
Grooming, however, is an inherently personal expense and
amounts expended for grooming are not deductible regardless of
whether an employer requires a certain look. Hynes v.
7
This amount is based on one-half of the following
substantiated expenditures:
Date Description Amount
1-26 “SY8 Carriage Clea” $31.04
2-03 “SY8 Carriage Clea” 33.84
2-07 “SY8 Carriage Clea” 15.54
2-24 “SY8 Carriage Clea” 53.79
3-24 “Carriage Cleaners” 30.55
4-25 “Dry-Clean USA” 37.15
1
Total 201.91
1
The Court suspects that the amounts petitioner claims that
she paid for dry cleaning expenses at “Marks Café” were not paid
for those purposes. Because petitioner has not proven that the
amounts were paid for dry cleaning, the Court will not allow
deductions for those amounts. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d
540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930).
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Commissioner, supra at 1292. Accordingly, petitioner is not
entitled to a $1,774.62 deduction for grooming expenses.
III. Itemized Deductions
The Court has allowed petitioner a miscellaneous itemized
deduction for unreimbursed employee expenses of $122.21. See
supra pp. 10, 17-18 and note 7. The $122.21 amount, however,
does not exceed the 2-percent floor of section 67(a); thus,
petitioner is not entitled to the claimed deduction.8
Taking into account the Court’s determinations and
petitioner’s concession, see supra note 1, her remaining itemized
deductions are State sales taxes of $479 and charitable
contributions of $1,025. The total of $1,504 is less than the
$5,000 standard deduction for 2005. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, sec.
3.10, 2004-2 C.B. 970, 973. The Court assumes that petitioner
would want the greater amount and therefore sustains respondent’s
use of the standard deduction. See sec. 63; George v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-121 (taxpayers may either elect the
standard deduction or elect to itemize deductions).
Other arguments made by the parties and not discussed herein
were considered and rejected as irrelevant, without merit, and/or
moot.
8
Petitioners’ adjusted gross income for 2005 is $43,866. To
exceed the 2-percent floor of sec. 67(a), petitioner’s
miscellaneous itemized deductions must exceed $877.32.
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To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.