T.C. Memo. 2009-137
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
STEVEN M. MCDANIEL, Petitioner,
AND DANIELLE AZCONA, Intervenor v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 24702-06. Filed June 15, 2009.
Paul M. Kohlhoff, for petitioner.
Danielle Azcona, pro se.
Julie A. Jebe, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: Respondent assessed
deficiencies in Federal income tax of $10,455 and $14,700 for
2002 and 2003, respectively, against Steven M. McDaniel
(petitioner) and Danielle Azcona (intervenor) based on their
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joint Federal income tax returns. Petitioner applied to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for relief from joint and several
liability, commonly called innocent spouse relief. After
receiving no response and waiting the requisite period petitioner
filed a stand-alone petition with this Court.1 After the
petition was filed and before trial respondent stipulated that
petitioner is entitled to full innocent spouse relief under
section 6015(c).
The petition also included a claim for abatement of interest
under section 6404(e). Respondent moved to dismiss petitioner’s
interest abatement request on the ground that the Court lacks
jurisdiction because petitioner had not applied for abatement of
interest and the IRS had not issued a determination denying an
abatement request. Petitioner replied that he did not oppose the
motion, because respondent had stipulated that he owed no tax and
therefore he owed no interest.
Because intervenor appeared at the trial and opposed the
innocent spouse relief, the issues for decision are: (1) Whether
under section 6015(c) petitioner is entitled to relief from joint
and several liability for 2002 and 2003; and (2) whether we
should grant respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of
1
A stand-alone petition in this context means that
petitioner requested relief from joint and several liability and
did not also request a redetermination of the deficiencies.
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jurisdiction regarding petitioner’s section 6404(e) interest
abatement request.
Unless otherwise indicated all section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All amounts are rounded
to the nearest dollar.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in
Indiana at the time he filed his petition.
After graduating from high school in 1990 petitioner
attended vocational school and worked at several jobs. Around
1993 petitioner met intervenor, the sister of a friend, while
intervenor was a student at Indiana University (I.U.).
Petitioner and intervenor lived together for 7 of the next 9
years. In 1994 he began working for United States Steel Corp.
(U.S. Steel) at its mill in Gary, Indiana. As of trial he
continued to work for U.S. Steel as an ironworker, specifically
as a safety representative.
Intervenor graduated from I.U. with dual majors in business
and computer science. In 2000 she began working for Small
Business Transportation, Inc. (SBT). Intervenor quickly moved
into sales and was a full-time sales representative during the 2
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years in issue. SBT is an independent third-party logistics
service provider whose principal business is buying cargo space
in bulk from regional, national, and international transportation
carriers and reselling the space to small and medium-sized
businesses that ship goods infrequently or in limited quantities.
Petitioner and intervenor married on October 6, 2001, in
Indiana. The marriage quickly experienced problems and
ultimately was short lived. Intervenor left the marital home in
Indiana and moved with her furniture to Florida in May 2002.
Petitioner filed for divorce, but the couple reconciled; and
intervenor moved back with him in September 2002. The
reconciliation did not last, and petitioner moved out for good in
January or February 2004. Intervenor filed for a no-fault
divorce, which petitioner did not contest. After Indiana’s
statutory 6-month waiting period had passed, the divorce became
final in August or September 2004. Petitioner and intervenor had
no children.
During the first 6 months of their marriage they tried to
maintain a joint checking account, but disputes ensued; and for
the rest of the marriage they maintained separate checking and
savings accounts at separate banks. They had their paychecks
deposited directly into their separate accounts. They also
maintained separate credit cards and independently paid their own
credit card bills.
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From an inheritance he had received about 15 or 20 years
earlier from his grandmother petitioner provided either $70,000
or $100,000 to purchase the lot and to begin construction on
their home. He also used the proceeds from a bank construction
loan to complete the construction. Petitioner built most of the
home himself. Intervenor contributed about $25,000 toward
furniture. The couple finished the basement and added a deck to
the back of the house. The record does not clarify petitioner’s
and intervenor’s testimonial disagreement as to whether
intervenor paid all the monthly mortgage payments of $1,301 or
they evenly divided the monthly payments.
They ate out for many of their meals, and, depending on the
timing of their paydays, one or the other would pay the check.
Similarly, they shopped and paid for groceries separately.
In 2003 petitioner leased and made the payments of $400 a
month on a Dodge Ram truck worth $35,000. Petitioner also
financed the purchase of a custom Titan motorcycle worth $28,000.
Intervenor helped on the downpayment, but petitioner made the
monthly payments. Additionally, petitioner financed a four-wheel
ATV worth $10,000 on which intervenor helped with the monthly
payments. Petitioner paid for the insurance on all of his
vehicles. Intervenor similarly leased, made the monthly lease
payments on, and paid for the insurance on a vehicle which she
used for her work with SBT and for her own recreation vehicle.
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For the years in issue petitioner received Forms W-2, Wage
and Tax Statement, from U.S. Steel reporting $47,277 and $51,999
in wages for 2002 and 2003, respectively.
Intervenor, on the other hand, received distinct Forms W-2
and Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, from SBT reporting
wages of $25,117 and $35,526 for 2002 and 2003, respectively, and
independent contractor payments to her of $50,831 and $65,939 for
2002 and 2003, respectively. SBT’s purpose in issuing separate
forms was to make it easier for intervenor to report her business
expenses related to her sales activity. During a subsequent IRS
examination the revenue agent considered the issue of
intervenor’s independent contractor versus employee status but
decided not to pursue the matter because “the tax effect was not
substantial.” In 2003 intervenor also started from her home her
own transportation logistics company called Maximum Logistics.
Petitioner had no involvement in intervenor’s businesses.
He did attend one SBT-related business trip with her to Las
Vegas. Except for an SBT-sponsored social dinner on the first
evening, petitioner did not attend any of the business meetings
or company functions. He met some friends and spent the days
with them or gambled or relaxed by the pool while intervenor was
conducting business. SBT did not require petitioner to attend
the business trip, and petitioner paid for his own airplane
ticket and meals.
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Despite the separations and the marital difficulties, the
couple filed joint Federal income tax returns for 2002 and 2003.
At the suggestion of a relative of intervenor they went to Doris
Tax Service in Kouts, Indiana, for help in preparing their
returns for both years. The tax preparer worked in an office
converted from her garage.
We take judicial notice that on November 14, 2008, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana in United
States v. Stowers, docket No. 07-CR-00173 sentenced Doris Stowers
of Doris Tax Service in Kouts, Indiana, to imprisonment for up to
24 months for one count of “assisting in the preparation of a
false United States individual income tax return in violation of
Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(2).” The indictment
shows that for years 2002 and 2003 (the years at issue here) Ms.
Stowers willfully advised clients to claim false deductions on
their Federal income tax returns for charitable contributions,
educational credits and expenses, medical expenses, miscellaneous
expenses, and job expenses.
In regard to their returns for 2002 and 2003 intervenor and
petitioner both attended the annual meetings with the tax
preparer, but each met separately with the preparer and presented
his or her own forms and expense receipts while the other sat on
a couch nearby reading magazines. Petitioner spent about 10 to
15 minutes each year with the preparer while intervenor annually
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spent about an hour. For 2003 they also brought petitioner’s
mother, who conversed with petitioner while intervenor discussed
her expenses with the preparer.
Intervenor deducted a total of $34,408 and $48,781 in
business expenses on Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business,
for 2002 and 2003, respectively, pertaining to her business
activities. The categories of expenses that made up these
amounts were car and truck expenses, meals and entertainment,
repairs and maintenance, travel, and other business expenses.
Additionally, in both years their joint Federal income tax
returns reflected deductions on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions,
for State and local income taxes, real estate taxes, mortgage
interest, noncash and cash charitable contributions, and
miscellaneous expenses.
The tax preparer electronically filed the couple’s returns
and arranged for direct deposit of the refunds into intervenor’s
personal bank account. The refund for 2002 was $1,064, and the
refund for 2003 was $1,072.
In May 2005 after the couple had divorced, the IRS selected
their joint 2002 and 2003 Federal income tax returns for audit.
Petitioner and intervenor attended the audits separately.
The revenue agent made disallowances to three categories of
deductions on the 2002 and 2003 returns. The first category was
intervenor’s business expenses. At the audit intevenor was able
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to produce only a few receipts for her 2002 business expenses and
none for 2003. Respondent disallowed $19,153 or 56 percent of
intervenor’s business expense deductions for 2002. Because
intervenor lacked documentation for her business expense
deductions for 2003, the revenue agent looked to 2002 to
determine an estimate. The business expenses that the revenue
agent allowed for 2002 amounted to 30 percent of intervenor’s
2002 total business receipts. As a result the revenue agent
allowed the same 30 percent for 2003, resulting in a disallowance
of $28,999 or 59 percent of intervenor’s 2003 business expense
deductions.
The second set of disallowances was to the noncash and cash
charitable contributions. With regard to the noncash charitable
contributions intervenor had donated items to Goodwill.
Intervenor deducted $4,537 and $3,267 in noncash charitable
contributions for 2002 and 2003. On the basis of intervenor’s
substantiation respondent disallowed $603 and $777 for 2002 and
2003, respectively.
Regarding the cash charitable contributions, for 2002
respondent allowed only $10 of the $6,585 deduction, and for 2003
respondent allowed only $50 of the $7,585 deduction. The
record’s only discussion of the cash contributions was the
revenue agent’s adjustment report, which stated that for
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contributions “the amounts claimed on the return were overstated
and have been allowed as adequately verified.”
Third, the revenue agent disallowed miscellaneous itemized
deductions totaling $4,350 for 2002 and $8,068 for 2003. The
record does not identify the expenses for which these disallowed
deductions were claimed. However, none of the amounts that
petitioner claimed as miscellaneous itemized deductions for union
dues and specialized work clothing was disallowed.
Intervenor conceded the examination changes that the revenue
agent proposed and agreed to an immediate assessment of the
Federal income tax deficiencies of $10,455 and $14,700 for 2002
and 2003, respectively. Respondent therefore did not issue her a
notice of deficiency.
Conversely, petitioner contested the examination changes.
After the audit petitioner filed a Form 8857, Request for
Innocent Spouse Relief, dated November 3, 2005, seeking relief
from joint and several liability for 2002 and 2003 under section
6015(c).
The IRS sent a notice of deficiency dated January 11, 2006,
to petitioner determining the above-mentioned income tax
deficiencies of $10,455 and $14,700 for 2002 and 2003,
respectively, arising from the same disallowances that the
revenue agent proposed. Petitioner did not petition the Court
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for a redetermination of the deficiencies; consequently,
respondent assessed them.
On December 4, 2006, after waiting 13 months and still not
receiving a response from the IRS to his application for innocent
spouse relief, petitioner filed a stand-alone petition with this
Court for relief from joint and several liability under section
6015(c). As noted above petitioner also included requests in the
petition for abatement of interest for 2002 and 2003 under
section 6404(e). Respondent notified intervenor of petitioner’s
requests for relief, and intervenor filed a notice of
intervention on June 15, 2007.
The Court set a trial date for the trial session commencing
February 28, 2008, in Chicago, Illinois. In the interim,
petitioner and his attorney discussed the request for relief with
respondent. Intervenor similarly engaged in correspondence and
telephone conversations with respondent indicating that she
opposed relief. On January 9, 2008, about 7 weeks before trial,
respondent entered into a settlement agreement with petitioner in
the form of a brief stipulation of settled issues conceding that
“no income tax is due from petitioner after application of
Internal Revenue Code [section] 6015(c).”
When the case was called from the calendar, respondent and
petitioner’s attorney appeared, as did intervenor. However, on
advice of his attorney petitioner did not appear. The Court
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began the trial receiving intervenor’s testimony and permitting
cross-examination.
The Court continued the trial the next day to allow
petitioner to be heard; but because the mother of petitioner’s
attorney died overnight, the attorney could not appear. The
Court set the case for further trial via video conference at a
special session on May 28, 2008, commencing at 10 a.m. eastern
time in the electronic courtroom connected to the Tax Court
building in Washington, D.C.
When the case was called at 10 a.m. on May 28, 2008,
respondent’s counsel, petitioner, and his attorney appeared via
the live video conference from Chicago; however, intervenor did
not appear. The Court heard petitioner’s testimony and, since
intervenor did not appear, closed the record. Intervenor
appeared later at the video conferencing site in Chicago claiming
that she had erroneously thought that the trial was to begin at
10 a.m. central time. Intervenor did not move to reopen the
record.
As noted above respondent then moved to dismiss petitioner’s
section 6404(e) interest abatement requests for 2002 and 2003 for
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner replied but did not oppose the
motion because of the stipulation granting relief. The Court
took the motion under advisement.
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OPINION
I. Jurisdiction
Usually our jurisdiction in an innocent spouse case is
founded on a notice of determination denying a requesting
spouse’s application for relief. Sec. 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(I). In
this case, even though petitioner never received a notice of
determination we have jurisdiction under section
6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(II) because petitioner filed his petition more
than 6 months after applying to the IRS for section 6015 relief.
II. Burden of Proof
The spouse requesting relief normally bears the burden of
proof in section 6015 cases. Rule 142(a); Alt v. Commissioner,
119 T.C. 306, 311 (2002), affd. 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir.
2004). However, section 6015(c) specifically provides that the
Secretary bears the burden of proving that a spouse electing
relief had actual knowledge at the time of signing the return of
any item giving rise to the deficiency in joint tax. King v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 198, 204 (2001); sec. 1.6015-3(c)(2),
Income Tax Regs.
At both parts of the trial respondent conducted minimal
cross-examination and presented no evidence to show that
petitioner had actual knowledge of the facts underlying the
disallowed deductions. Petitioner disclaimed any actual
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knowledge of the facts that caused those deductions to be
disallowed.
Intervenor has stepped forward to oppose the section 6015
relief which respondent had stipulated. In a similar section
6015(c) case where an intervenor appeared to oppose stipulated
relief we weighed the evidence by using the preponderance of the
evidence standard. See Stergios v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2009-15. Similarly, we will inquire whether actual knowledge has
been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
III. Standard of Review
Intervenor was not a party to the stipulation. Furthermore,
section 6015(e)(4) provides the nonelecting spouse a right to be
heard in judicial proceedings. Corson v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
354, 365 (2000). Additionally, “we have always applied a de novo
scope and standard of review in determining whether relief is
warranted under subsections (b) and (c) of section 6015.” Porter
v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. __, __ (2009) (slip op. at 11). For
the foregoing reasons we will review the record de novo.
IV. Overview of Statutory Relief From Joint and Several
Liability
When a husband and wife file a joint return their liability
is normally joint and several with respect to any tax they show
on the return and to any tax the Commissioner finds to be owing.
Sec. 6013(d)(3). However, section 6015 provides three avenues of
relief from joint and several liability: (1) Section 6015(b)
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permits relief if the requesting spouse establishes that in
signing the return he “did not know, and had no reason to know”
of the items that caused the understatement of tax; (2) section
6015(c) allows a separated or divorced spouse to request an
allocation of liability if the requesting spouse did not have
“actual knowledge” of the items giving rise to the understatement
of tax; and (3) section 6015(f) allows the IRS or the Court to
confer equitable relief depending on the particular facts and
circumstances but only in situations where relief under section
6015(b) and (c) is not available. See King v. Commissioner, 115
T.C. 118, 121 (2000).
V. Two Prerequisites for Relief Under Section 6015(c)
Section 6015(c) is the avenue of relief that petitioner
chose and as discussed below is the one that best fits his
situation. Under section 6015(c) the requesting spouse elects to
be treated as if he had filed a separate return, thereby limiting
his tax liability to that portion of the deficiency properly
allocable to him. Rowe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-325.
To be eligible for relief under section 6015(c) the electing
spouse must satisfy the following two pertinent conditions as of
the time of the election. First, he must no longer be married
to, must be legally separated from, or must have lived for the
entirety of the preceding 12-month period in a different
household from the individual with whom he filed the joint
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return. Sec. 6015(c)(3)(A). Second, he must have made the
election no later than 2 years after the date on which the
collection activity began. Sec. 6015(c)(3)(B).
Petitioner satisfies these two conditions. The divorce was
finalized in August or September 2004. Thus he was no longer
married to intervenor on November 3, 2005, the date on which he
filed Form 8857 applying for relief. Likewise, respondent had
not commenced collection activity by November 3, 2005, the date
when petitioner had applied for relief. Consequently,
petitioner’s election was timely, and he has satisfied those two
pertinent conditions.
VI. Applicable Law
Section 6015(c) permits an individual to elect to limit the
liability arising from a joint Federal income tax deficiency to
the portion of the deficiency that is properly allocable to the
electing individual under section 6015(d). Estate of Capehart v.
Commissioner, 125 T.C. 211, 214 (2005); Barnes v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2004-266; sec. 1.6015-3(a), Income Tax Regs. However,
the relief is not available to the extent “the Secretary
demonstrates that an individual making an election under this
subsection had actual knowledge, at the time such individual
signed the return, of any item giving rise to a deficiency (or
portion thereof)”. Sec. 6015(c)(3)(C).
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We interpret the actual knowledge requirement of section
6015(c) at issue here more narrowly than the “reason to know”
standard of section 6015(b) or (f). See Porter v. Commissioner,
supra at __ (slip op. at 14-15) (discussing the reason to know
standard). A Senate committee report accompanying the 1998
enactment of section 6015 highlights the distinction, stating
that “actual knowledge must be established by the evidence and
shall not be inferred based on indications that the electing
spouse had a reason to know.” See S. Rept. 105-174, at 59 (1998)
1998-3 C.B. 537, 595.
Our jurisprudence holds that the requesting spouse must have
more than mere “knowledge that the [improper] deduction appears
on the return”. King v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 205. Instead
the requesting spouse must have “actual knowledge of the factual
circumstances which made the item unallowable as a deduction.”
Id. at 204; sec. 1.6015-3(c)(2)(i)(B)(1), Income Tax Regs. (“In
the case of an erroneous deduction or credit, knowledge of the
item means knowledge of the facts that made the item not
allowable as a deduction or credit.”).
VII. Application of the Law to the Facts
Petitioner contends he is entitled to full relief from the
income tax deficiencies for 2002 and 2003 because all of the
disallowed deductions are allocable to intervenor. We agree.
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Intervenor had a college education with dual majors, and she
has a successful career in business. She received a portion of
her earnings as wages and the remainder as payments to her as an
independent contractor. This arrangement allowed her to claim a
portion of her business expenses on Schedule C rather than
Schedule A. Intervenor found the tax preparer. She spent a
significantly greater amount of time with the preparer.
Importantly, the refunds for 2002 and 2003 were deposited
directly into intervenor’s separate bank account.
Intervenor’s business expenses were overstated. When asked
at trial about the disallowances, intervenor acknowledged that
the tax preparer had provided misleading advice. Intervenor also
acknowledged that she had been waiting for the “shoe to fall”
because she had heard that other clients of Doris Tax Service had
also received letters from the IRS. Further, when the revenue
agent proposed the adjustments, intervenor quickly acquiesced.
Intervenor’s arguments miss the main point. Under section
6015(c) the question is whether petitioner had actual knowledge
of the facts underlying the disallowed deductions. Instead
intervenor contends that petitioner must have known from loan
applications, from the annual sessions with the tax preparer, and
from reviewing the returns before signing them how much income
intervenor earned. The deficiencies did not result from omitted
income but from disallowed deductions.
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Intervenor’s other arguments are similarly misplaced. She
contends that petitioner’s lifestyle benefited from her higher
earnings. She emphasizes that petitioner is also smart, and she
contends that by signing the joint returns petitioner knowingly
and freely accepted joint and several liability and accordingly,
in the interests of justice and fairness, should live up to his
responsibilities. These contentions are not probative of actual
knowledge for purposes of section 6015(c)(3)(C).
At trial petitioner’s testimony was credible,
straightforward, and without guile. Petitioner did not have a
level of financial acumen comparable to intervenor’s. He worked
in blue collar jobs, and his formal education ended after high
school.
Petitioner from the outset vehemently denied that at the
time of signing the returns he had knowledge of the facts that
resulted in respondent’s disallowance of deductions that
intervenor had claimed. He incurred the expense of hiring an
attorney to contest the disallowance whereas intervenor did not
hire a lawyer. Moreover, the revenue agent did not adjust
petitioner’s work expenses and did not attribute any of the
disallowance of expenses to petitioner. Likewise, respondent in
preparation of this case for trial reviewed the evidence and
stipulated that petitioner was entitled to full relief.
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We now address in turn the three specific sets of disallowed
deductions.
A. Disallowed Schedule C Business Expenses
We find credible petitioner’s characterization of his and
intervenor’s financial arrangements. Petitioner was busy at his
job as an ironworker while also building the house. He did not
participate in intervenor’s business, did not see her bank
account statements, did not sign her checks, and did not review
her records. Petitioner and intervenor primarily financed, made
the monthly payments on, and insured their own vehicles
separately. Their marriage was rocky and short lived. We
believe intervenor was not likely to have divulged the details of
her business, nor is it probable that petitioner would have had
much interest in the specifics.
As stated in King v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 204, the
inquiry under section 6015(c) is whether petitioner “had actual
knowledge of the factual circumstances which made the item
unallowable as a deduction.” No evidence establishes that
petitioner had actual knowledge of the facts causing respondent
to disallow intervenor’s business expense deductions. As a
result petitioner is entitled to relief from joint and several
liability with respect to intervenor’s disallowed business
expense deductions.
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B. Disallowed Deductions for Contributions
1. Noncash Contributions
A similar result applies with respect to the noncash
charitable contributions. Respondent disallowed $603 and $777 of
the $4,537 and $3,267 total deductions that intervenor claimed
for noncash charitable contributions in 2002 and 2003,
respectively.
Other than his general awareness that intervenor donated
items to Goodwill, we believe petitioner did not have precise
information regarding the circumstances of intervenor’s
deductions or the specifics of her valuations or the adequacy of
her substantiation. We find that petitioner lacked actual
knowledge respecting the disallowed noncash charitable
contribution deductions and is entitled to section 6015(c) relief
with regard to the portion of the deficiencies attributed to him.
2. Cash Contributions
Respondent allowed only $10 and $50 of the $6,585 and $7,585
itemized deductions for cash charitable contributions for 2002
and 2003, respectively. The revenue agent’s adjustment report
stated that the contributions “claimed on the return were
overstated and have been allowed as adequately verified.” No
evidence establishes petitioner’s actual knowledge with respect
to these items. We believe petitioner’s statement that
charitable contributions were intervenor’s responsibility. He is
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entitled to innocent spouse relief with respect to the disallowed
cash charitable contribution deductions.
C. Disallowance of Additional Miscellaneous Itemized
Deductions
The revenue agent disallowed $4,350 and $8,068 for 2002 and
2003, respectively, of the miscellaneous itemized deductions.
The revenue agent did not adjust petitioner’s separate
miscellaneous itemized deductions of $1,104 and $1,144 for 2002
and 2003, respectively, pertaining to union dues and specialized
work clothing. Although intervenor asserted in passing that at
least some of the disallowed deductions were for petitioner’s
schooling, she did not corroborate her statement; and petitioner
credibly denied it. Moreover, the revenue agent’s examination
report did not mention schooling or indicate that any of the
disallowed miscellaneous expenses were attributable to
petitioner. Similarly, respondent stipulated that petitioner was
not responsible for any portion of the unpaid liability.
In the end the lack of any evidence establishing
petitioner’s actual knowledge of the facts which made the
miscellaneous itemized deductions unallowable is decisive.
Consequently, petitioner is entitled to innocent spouse relief
with respect to them.
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VIII. Respondent’s Motion To Dismiss Petitioner’s Interest
Abatement Request
This Court has jurisdiction to review a section 6404(e)
interest abatement request only when the Commissioner has mailed
a final determination not to abate interest. Bourekis v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 20, 26 (1998); see also Rule 280(b).
Because petitioner did not request an abatement of interest from
respondent and respondent did not issue a determination denying
an abatement request, we lack jurisdiction to review the matter.
We note that petitioner’s request for abatement is moot because
of our grant of section 6015(c) relief. Accordingly, we will
grant respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s section 6404(e)
interest abatement request for lack of jurisdiction.
To reflect our disposition of the issues,
An appropriate order will be
issued granting respondent’s
motion, and decision will be
entered for petitioner.