T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-96
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MAGDALENA STEGAWSKI, Petitioner,
AND CHRISTOPHER STEGAWSKI, Intervenor v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 2126-06S. Filed June 16, 2009.
Magdalena Stegawski, pro se.
Christopher Stegawski, pro se.
Anita A. Gill, for respondent.
RUWE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions
of section 74631 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the
petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code as amended.
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be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.
After this case was set for trial, respondent filed a motion
for summary judgment (motion), which the Court set for hearing on
the date set for trial. Arguments on the motion were heard, but
the Court did not rule on the motion. Rather, the Court
proceeded to try the case since the arguments and evidence
relevant to the motion and the issues for trial as framed by the
parties were essentially the same.
At the time the petition was filed petitioner and intervenor
resided in Ohio. Petitioner challenges respondent’s
determination denying her relief under section 6015 from unpaid
joint and several liabilities for the taxable years 1997 and
1999.
Discussion
Petitioner submitted a Form 8857, Request for Innocent
Spouse Relief, for taxable years 1997 and 1999, which was
received by the Internal Revenue Service on October 18, 2005. On
December 29, 2005, respondent sent to petitioner a Notice of
Determination Concerning Your Request for Relief from Joint and
Several Liability under Section 6015 (notice of determination)
denying petitioner any relief under section 6015(b), (c) or (f).
There is no question that relief is not available under section
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6015(b) or (c) since the 1997 and 1999 unpaid tax liabilities
were reported on the returns.
Section 6015(f) provides:
SEC. 6015(f). Equitable Relief.--Under procedures
prescribed by the Secretary, if--
(1) taking into account all the facts
and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold
the individual liable for any unpaid tax or
any deficiency (or any portion of either);
and
(2) relief is not available to such
individual under subsection (b) or (c),
the Secretary may relieve such individual of such
liability.
Respondent’s only reason for denying relief under section
6015(f), as stated in the notice of determination, was as
follows:
We denied your claim because it was not filed within
two years of the first collection activity. The first
collection activity was a Collection Due Process notice
issued to you on July 21, 2003, which you signed for on
July 25, 2003. In order to be considered timely, your
claim needed to be filed by July 21, 2005. Since your
claim was not filed until October 18, 2005, we cannot
consider your request for relief.
The only argument respondent made in the motion for summary
judgment, in the pretrial memorandum, and during the trial was
that petitioner was not entitled to section 6015(f) relief
because she did not file her claim for spousal relief within 2
years of the first collection activity. Unlike subsections (b)
and (c) of section 6015, subsection (f) does not contain a
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requirement that relief must be sought within 2 years of the
first collection activity. However, respondent relies on section
1.6015-5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., which provides that relief
under section 6015(f) is not available for claims that are not
filed within 2 years of the first collection activity.
It is clear that petitioner’s claim was not filed within 2
years after the first collection activity. However, this Court
has recently held that section 1.6015-5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.,
is an invalid interpretation of section 6015. Lantz v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op. at 33).
Accordingly, we refused to apply the 2-year limitations period to
a taxpayer’s request for relief under section 6015(f). Id. In
accordance with this Court’s Opinion in Lantz, we refuse to apply
the 2-year limitations period.
At trial petitioner credibly testified and produced
documents that establish that during the years in issue she was
raising her young children; that she earned very little income
(approximately $200 per year); that almost all of the income
reported on the returns was attributable to her husband, who was
a doctor; that she had refused to sign the returns that were
filed for 1997 and 1999; and that she delayed in requesting
spousal relief because she did not think the returns for 1997 and
1999 were hers.
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The returns for 1997 and 1999 were filled out as joint
returns. However, on the copy of the return for 1999 that was in
respondent’s records, the space for petitioner’s signature
(spouse’s signature) contains no signature. Instead, the
following words were handwritten: “Spouse delays signature she
has paid her share of tax due”. Respondent had not retained a
copy of the 1997 return, but petitioner produced a copy of the
1997 return and credibly testified that she had not signed that
return.
After the trial the Court suggested that respondent consider
whether the returns were actually joint returns and gave the
parties time to possibly resolve the question of petitioner’s
purported joint liability on that ground.2 The parties were
unable to do so. In a posttrial report respondent requested that
the Court decide the case on the ground that petitioner’s request
for relief was not filed timely.
Respondent’s only argument for denying petitioner relief
from joint liability pursuant to section 6015(f) is that she did
not file her claim within 2 years of the first collection action
as required by section 1.6015-5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. As
2
If the 1997 and 1999 returns did not give rise to joint
liabilities for petitioner, then it appears likely that she had
no tax liability. On the other hand, if petitioner had not filed
joint returns for 1997 and 1999, she would not be entitled to
relief in this proceeding under sec. 6015. See Raymond v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 191 (2002).
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previously mentioned, this Court rejected that argument in Lantz
v. Commissioner, supra. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is
entitled to relief from joint liability for 1997 and 1999
pursuant to section 6015(f).
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered.