T.C. Memo. 2010-78
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DONALD WM. TRASK, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 25469-06, 6105-07. Filed April 15, 2010.
Donald W. Trask, pro se.
Steven M. Roth, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
GOEKE, Judge: Respondent determined the following income
tax deficiencies and additions to tax and penalties:1
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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Additions to Tax Penalties
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1) Sec. 6662
2001 $138,491 $34,621.75 $27,698.20
2002 110,939 27,734.75 22,187.80
The issues for decision are:
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to redetermine
petitioner’s 2002 tax year liability. We hold that we do not;
2. whether petitioner was a real estate professional, and
if so, whether he elected to treat his rental real estate
activities as a single activity pursuant to section 469(c)(7)(A)
for 2001. We hold that petitioner was a real estate professional
but did not properly elect his rental real estate activities as a
single activity;
3. whether petitioner is entitled to a net operating loss
(NOL) carryover of $49,958 for 2001. We hold that he is not;
4. whether petitioner is entitled to a property tax
deduction of $14,829 in 2001 with respect to a parcel of land in
San Bernardino, California. We hold that he is;
5. whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction for
“Repairs” claimed on his Schedule E, Supplemental Income and
Loss, for 2001. We hold that petitioner is entitled to 78
percent of the deductions claimed;
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6. whether petitioner is entitled to amortization
deductions on his 2001 tax return. We hold that he is not;
7. whether petitioner is liable for an accuracy-related
penalty under section 6662 for 2001. We hold that he is; and
8. whether petitioner is liable for an addition to tax
under section 6651(a)(1) for 2001. We hold that he is.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in
California at the time he filed his petitions.
Petitioner owned more than 30 rental properties during 2001.
Petitioner had acquired these properties over the preceding 25
years.
Petitioner filed Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return, for 1994 through 1999 and 2001. Petitioner aggregated
his rental properties and reported his profits and losses on an
aggregated basis. Respondent has no record of petitioner’s
filing a Federal income tax return for 2000.
Petitioner’s 1995 return was examined, and a notice of
deficiency was issued. Petitioner timely petitioned this Court
for redetermination. On March 26, 2001, a stipulated decision
was entered in docket No. 15363-97 in which petitioner agreed to
an adjustment in income tax due for taxable year 1995 of $793
with no accuracy–related penalty. The stipulated decision
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reflected respondent’s disallowance of Schedule E losses in
excess of the $25,000 passive activity loss limitation. This led
to a decrease of $102,879 in the claimed passive loss. At trial
petitioner claimed that he filed an amended 1996 return with a
single activity election, but he failed to provide evidence that
a 1996 amended return was filed. Respondent maintains there is
no record of such a return being filed.
Petitioner filed a Schedule E with his 2001 Federal income
tax return. Petitioner claimed a net loss of $27,340 for 2001
from his rental real estate activities. Respondent has
stipulated that petitioner incurred expenses and depreciation of
at least $395,165 for 2001. Petitioner aggregated his rental
income and expenses as a single activity. Petitioner
consistently followed this practice on the Schedules E attached
to his 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003 Federal income tax
returns. Petitioner’s 1996 and 1997 returns are not a part of
this record; however, there is no evidence to suggest that
petitioner calculated his losses and profits differently during
those years.
Before 2001 petitioner held a mortgage on real property
owned by Occidental Financial Group, Inc. (Occidental), in San
Bernardino, California. Petitioner did not own shares in
Occidental but lent $400,000 to the company in exchange for a
deed of trust on the property. Petitioner lent the money to
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guarantee an interest income stream for himself. As owner of the
property, Occidental was liable to pay the property tax but went
bankrupt. The bankruptcy court revised the terms of petitioner’s
note, and Occidental made a few payments; but the payments
eventually ceased. To avoid the county’s seizure of the
property, petitioner paid $14,829 of real estate property tax in
2001.
On September 12, 2006, respondent mailed petitioner a notice
of deficiency for 2001 disallowing all claimed expenses from his
rental real estate activities. On December 1, 2006, respondent
mailed petitioner a notice of deficiency for 2002. On December
11, 2006, petitioner timely filed a petition with this Court for
redetermination of the deficiency for 2001. On March 13, 2007,
petitioner filed a petition with this Court for redetermination
of the deficiency for 2002. Petitioner’s petition was received
by the Court on March 13, 2007, in an envelope bearing a U.S.
Postal Service postmark dated March 6, 2007, 95 days after
respondent mailed petitioner the notice of deficiency for 2002.
A trial was held on May 7, 2009, in Los Angeles, California.
OPINION
I. Petitioner’s 2002 Tax Year
This Court’s jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency
depends on the issuance of a valid notice of deficiency and a
timely filed petition. Rule 13(a), (c); Levitt v. Commissioner,
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97 T.C. 437, 441 (1991). Section 6213(a) provides that a
petition for redetermination of a deficiency determined by the
Commissioner is timely filed if it is filed within 90 days after
the notice of deficiency is mailed (or 150 days if the notice is
mailed outside the United States). Petitioner’s petition was
received by the Court on March 13, 2007. The petition arrived at
the Court in an envelope bearing a U.S. Postal Service postmark
dated March 6, 2007--95 days after the notice of deficiency was
mailed to petitioner. The 90-day period had expired on March 1,
2007. A petition received and filed by the Court after the
expiration of the 90-day period may be deemed timely filed if it
was timely mailed, as evidenced by the postmark date in
conformity with section 7502 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.
We hold that the petition was not timely filed and thus
this Court does not have jurisdiction to redetermine petitioner’s
2002 tax liability, pursuant to either section 6213(a) or section
7502. Accordingly, we shall dismiss petitioner’s petition in
docket No. 6105-07 for 2002 for lack of jurisdiction on the
ground that the petition was untimely.
II. Petitioner’s 2001 Tax Year
As a general rule, the Commissioner’s determinations in a
notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears
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the burden of proving that the determinations are in error. Rule
142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the
taxpayer bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to any
claimed deductions. Rule 142(a)(1); INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). The burden of proof on a
factual issue that affects a taxpayer’s liability for tax may be
shifted to the Commissioner where the “taxpayer introduces
credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue.” Sec.
7491(a)(1). Petitioner has neither claimed nor shown that he
complied with the substantiation requirements of section 7491(a).
Therefore, the burden of proof remains on petitioner. See Rule
142(a).
A. Real Estate Professional
First we must decide whether petitioner elected for 2001 to
treat his rental real estate activities as one activity under
section 469(c)(7).
Petitioner claimed a loss of $27,340 from his rental real
estate activities for 2001. Generally, section 469(a) disallows
any passive activity loss. A passive activity loss is defined as
the excess of the aggregate losses from all passive activities
for the taxable year over the aggregate income from all passive
activities. Sec. 469(d)(1). Section 469(i) provides an
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exception to the general rule that passive activity losses are
disallowed. A taxpayer who “actively [participates]” in a rental
real estate activity can deduct a maximum loss of up to $25,000
per year (subject to phaseout limitations) related to the
activity. Sec. 469(i)(1), (2), and (3).
A passive activity includes the conduct of any trade or
business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate.
Sec. 469(c)(1). A rental activity generally is treated as a per
se passive activity regardless of whether the taxpayer materially
participates. Sec. 469(c)(2), (4). In establishing whether a
taxpayer’s real property activities result in passive activity
losses, each interest in rental real estate is treated as a
separate rental real estate activity unless the qualifying
taxpayer makes an election to treat all interests in rental real
estate as a single rental real estate activity. See sec.
469(c)(7)(A).
Petitioner on his 2001 income tax return claimed expenses of
$356,119 and reported gross rental receipts on his Schedule C,
Profit or Loss From Business, of $328,779, yielding a loss of
$27,340. Petitioner claims he is entitled to deduct more than
$25,000 from his Schedule E rental real estate activities for
2001. In order to receive this deduction, petitioner must
satisfy three requirements: (1) He must establish that he
qualifies as a real estate professional pursuant to section
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469(c)(7)(B) for 2001; (2) he has elected under section
469(c)(7)(A) to treat his rental real estate activities as a
single rental real estate activity at some point since 1994; and
(3) he materially participated in the combined rental real estate
activity. Respondent contends that petitioner failed to satisfy
these requirements.
Under section 469(c)(7)(B), a taxpayer may qualify as a real
estate professional and the rental real estate activity of the
taxpayer is not a per se passive activity if:
(i) More than one-half of the personal services
performed in trades or businesses by the taxpayer
during such taxable year are performed in real property
trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially
participates, and
(ii) such taxpayer performs more than 750 hours
of services during the taxable year in real property
trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially
participates.
See Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-223; sec. 1.469-
9(e)(1), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner owned 33 properties in Southern California
throughout 2001. Respondent argues that petitioner failed to
prove that he performed more than 750 hours of service in real
estate property trades or businesses in 2001.
“The extent of an individual’s participation in an activity
may be established by any reasonable means.” Sec.
1.469-5T(f)(4), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5727
(Feb. 25, 1988). This Court has acknowledged that although
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“reasonable means” is interpreted broadly, a postevent “ballpark
guesstimate” will not suffice. See Lee v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2006-193; Goshorn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-578. In
addition, the Court recognizes that the temporary regulations
cited above can be somewhat ambiguous concerning the records that
a taxpayer needs to maintain. Goshorn v. Commissioner, supra.
On the basis of the record and testimony provided at trial,
we find that petitioner has established that he spent more than
750 hours performing significant work on his rental properties
and that this was his sole business during 2001. Petitioner
provided evidence to support that he handled over 80 issues for
11 pieces of property. Respondent concedes that petitioner
performed repairs for larger projects himself and also hired
contractors. Petitioner presented work logs for his properties
identifying the portions of the properties being repaired and
whether a specific contractor was hired. Thus, we find that
petitioner is a qualified real estate professional within the
meaning of section 469(c)(7)(B).
Next, we must determine whether petitioner elected to treat
his rental real estate activities as a single activity pursuant
to section 469(c)(7)(A). The taxpayer must clearly notify the
Commissioner of his intent to make an election to treat various
rental real estate activities as a single activity. See
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 743 F.2d 781,
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795 (11th Cir. 1984). To make an election “the taxpayer must
exhibit in some manner * * * his unequivocal agreement to accept
both the benefits and burdens of the tax treatment afforded” by
the governing statute. Young v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 831, 839
(1984), affd. 783 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1986).
At trial petitioner claimed that during discussions with
respondent about the calculations which ultimately led to a
stipulated decision for the 1995 taxable year in 2001, he wrote
on a piece of paper that he wanted to aggregate his rental real
estate and tried handing it over to respondent. Petitioner
argues that by giving respondent this note, he was electing to
aggregate his rental real estate activities. Section 1.469-
9(g)(3), Proposed Income Tax Regs., 60 Fed. Reg. 2561 (Jan. 10,
1995), requires a taxpayer wishing to make such an election to
file a statement with the taxpayer’s original return declaring
that the election is under section 469(c)(7)(A). The final
regulation, which is substantially the same as the proposed
regulation, became final on December 22, 1995, and is generally
effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1,
1995, and to elections made under section 1.469-9(g), Income Tax
Regs., with returns filed on or after January 1, 1995. See sec.
1.469-11(a)(3), Income Tax Regs. Therefore, to satisfy the
requirements to make an election to treat all rental real estate
activities as a single activity under section 469(c)(7)(A), a
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taxpayer must make an explicit election with his or her original
return.
Since 1994 petitioner has aggregated his rental income and
expenses as if the rental real estate activities were a single
activity. Petitioner did not attach to any return a statement
electing to treat his rental real estate activities as a single
activity. The fact that petitioner consistently aggregated the
rental income and expenses from the rental properties on his
Schedules E is not a deemed election under the requirements of
section 469(c)(7)(A).
In Kosonen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-107, the
taxpayer aggregated his rental income and expenses in one column
on the Schedules E attached to his 1994, 1995, and 1996 returns.
The taxpayer in Kosonen argued that aggregating his rental
activity losses on his returns showed that he had elected to
treat his rental real estate activities as a single activity
under section 469(c)(7). This Court held that the fact that the
taxpayer aggregated his losses was not clear notice that he
intended to elect under section 469(c)(7). Kosonen v.
Commissioner, supra (citing Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v.
United States, supra at 795)). Accordingly, petitioner did not
elect to treat his rental real estate activities as a single
activity under section 469(c)(7)(A). Moreover, petitioner does
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not contend that he materially participated in each of his rental
activities when viewed separately.
On the record before us, we find petitioner was a real
estate professional during the years at issue but conclude that
petitioner does not satisfy the exception set forth in section
469(c)(7). Therefore he is not entitled to deduct real estate
losses in excess of $25,000 for 2001.
B. NOL Carryover
Section 172 allows a taxpayer to deduct an NOL for a taxable
year. A taxpayer’s NOL, with certain adjustments, generally
consists of the excess of deductions allowed over gross income.
Sec. 172(c). Section 172(a) allows an NOL deduction for the
aggregate NOL carrybacks and carryovers to the taxable year.
Section 172(b) provides for the manner in which an NOL is to be
carried back and carried forward.
Petitioner claimed NOL carryovers of $49,958 from 2000 into
2001. In the notice of deficiency respondent disallowed the 2001
NOL carryovers.
Generally, the period for an NOL carryback is 2 years and
the period for an NOL carryover is 20 years. Sec. 172(b)(1)(A).
However, a taxpayer may elect to waive or relinquish the 2-year
carryback period with respect to an NOL from a tax year. Sec.
172(b)(3). To make this election, a taxpayer is required to file
an election relinquishing the carryback period by the return due
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date for the year the NOL was incurred. Id. Once made, the
election is irrevocable; it waives the opportunity to carry back
the NOL. Plumb v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 632, 636 (1991).
Petitioner is not entitled to any NOL carryover for 2001
because he has not shown that he elected to relinquish his
carryback period as required by section 172(b)(3). There is no
evidence that petitioner filed a 2000 return. Further, there is
no evidence to suggest that petitioner had excess losses in 2000
had he filed a proper election to relinquish the carryback
period. Because petitioner has not shown that he had excess
losses in 2000 and that he properly elected to carry them
forward, petitioner’s claimed NOL carryovers for 2001 are
disallowed.
C. Property Tax Deduction
During 2001 petitioner held a mortgage and deed of trust in
a parcel of land owned by Occidental. The deed of trust is the
collateral for a promissory note given by Occidental, as owner of
the property, to petitioner. As owner, Occidental was liable to
pay the property tax. Occidental filed for bankruptcy, and the
bankruptcy court revised the note; but payments on the mortgage
stopped. Petitioner paid $14,829 of property tax in 2001 to
forestall seizure of the property by the county in satisfaction
of Occidental’s tax liability.
Section 162 allows a deduction for all ordinary and
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necessary expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer in carrying on
a trade or business, including rentals or other payments
required to be made as a condition to the continued use or
possession of property. Sec. 162(a)(3). Petitioner was a real
estate professional, and in order to keep possession of the
Occidental property, he was required to pay the property tax to
prevent the county from seizing it to collect for nonpayment.
Section 164(a) provides a deduction for the payment of real
property taxes and other specified taxes paid or accrued by the
taxpayer during the taxable year. In addition to specific taxes
deductible under section 164(a), the taxpayer may deduct State,
local, and foreign taxes paid or accrued in carrying on a trade
or business or in an investment-related activity. Sec. 164(a).
We hold petitioner is entitled to a property tax deduction
of $14,829.
D. Repairs
Petitioner claimed deductions for repairs on his 33 rental
real estate properties for 2001. Petitioner asserts that
beginning in 1996 he planned to capitalize all repair expenses
over $5,000 and increase that threshold 5 percent each year.
Respondent maintains that 78 percent of the amount claimed for
these repairs should be immediately deductible and 22 percent
should be capitalized. The parties have stipulated that
petitioner incurred $134,863 for repairs in 2001. As stated,
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respondent agrees that 78 percent of this amount, or $105,193, is
currently deductible in 2001. We are left to decide whether the
remaining 22 percent is currently deductible.
Section 263 generally prohibits deductions for capital
expenditures. Nondeductible capital expenditures include “Any
amount paid out * * * for permanent improvements or betterments
made to increase the value of any property”. Sec. 263(a)(1).
In contrast, deductible repair expenditures include those
made merely to maintain property in operating condition. See
Ill. Merchs. Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1926)
(“A repair is an expenditure for the purpose of keeping the
property in an ordinarily efficient operating condition.”). The
distinction between a nondeductible capital expenditure and a
deductible repair is summarized in section 1.162-4, Income Tax
Regs.:
The cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add
to the value of the property nor appreciably prolong its
life, but keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating
condition, may be deducted as an expense, provided the cost
of acquisition or production or the gain or loss basis of
the taxpayer’s plant, equipment, or other property, as the
case may be, is not increased by the amount of such
expenditures. Repairs in the nature of replacements, to the
extent that they arrest deterioration and appreciably
prolong the life of the property, shall either be
capitalized and depreciated in accordance with section 167
or charged against the depreciation reserve if such an
account is kept.
The deductibility of repair expenses also depends upon the
context in which the repairs are made. Courts have held that
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expenses incurred as part of a general plan of rehabilitation
must be capitalized even if they would have been deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses if separately incurred.
See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968);
Norwest Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 265, 280 (1997).
In June 2008 petitioner met with respondent and agreed that
$30,107 of the claimed $134,863 of repair expenses (22 percent)
for 2001 was for capital expenditures.
Petitioner now claims that he should be allowed to deduct
the remaining 22 percent of the amounts spent in 2001 to make up
for amounts that he was not permitted to deduct before 1995.
Petitioner has not substantiated this claim with any evidence,
and it is unclear how events before 1995 affect the years in
issue in any event. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to
deduct 22 percent of the repair expenses he incurred during 2001.
E. Amortization
Section 167(a) allows as a depreciation deduction a
reasonable allowance for the wear and tear, exhaustion, and
obsolescence of: (1) Property used in the trade or business, or
(2) property held for the production of income.
Section 168(e)(1) classifies property as 5-year property if
it has a class life of more than 4 years but less than 10 years.
Section 168(c) provides that the applicable recovery period of
the 5-year property is 5 years. Petitioner claims that he is
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entitled to an NOL for 2001 attributable to unused depreciation
deductions for the years 1996 through 1999 for property used in
his rentals. Petitioner claims the 5-year property was used for
the properties he owned in Ardmore and Newport. He claims
$98,860 was included for these properties, but the record
indicates that petitioner incurred a total of $33,126 on Ardmore
and $9,503 on Newport. In any event, petitioner cannot
substantiate that these expenditures generated NOL carryovers
that were available to reduce his tax liability for 2001.
Petitioner is not entitled to an additional amortization
deduction in 2001 for his claimed additional amounts from 1996,
1997, 1998, and 1999.
F. Section 6662 Penalty
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(1) for
2001. Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) imposes a 20-percent penalty on
the portion of an underpayment of tax attributable to negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations. Negligence is defined as
any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Sec. 6662(c); see Allen
v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1, 12 (1989), affd. 925 F.2d 348 (9th
Cir. 1991). The section 6662(a) penalty is not imposed with
respect to any portion of an underpayment to the extent that it
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is shown that the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and good
faith. Sec. 6664(c)(1).
Section 7491(c) provides that the Commissioner bears the
burden of production with respect to a taxpayer’s liability for a
penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount. See Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001), with respect to the
applicability of an accuracy-related penalty. Once this burden
has been met, the burden of proof then falls on the taxpayer.
See id. at 447. A taxpayer may carry the burden by proving that
he was not negligent; i.e., a reasonable attempt to comply with
the provisions of the Code was made and the taxpayer’s actions
were not careless, reckless, or an intentional disregard of rules
or regulations. Sec. 6662(c). Alternatively, a taxpayer can
demonstrate that his underpayment was attributable to reasonable
cause and he acted in good faith. Sec. 6664(c)(1).
On the record before us, we conclude that petitioner failed
to carry his burden of showing that there was reasonable cause
for the underpayment of tax for 2001. To the contrary, the
record establishes that some of petitioner’s practices were
negligent. Petitioner knew that he was not following the law
when he tried to deduct 100 percent of his repairs as ordinary
and necessary expenses. Petitioner planned to capitalize all
expenses over $5,000 and increase that threshold 5 percent each
year. This is not the proper standard for determining whether
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the amounts incurred for repairs should be capitalized. The
proper standard is whether the expenditures extended the life of
the properties, increased their value, or changed their
character. Petitioner admits that he replaced the roofs on his
properties. These expenditures extended the life of the rental
properties and therefore were not ordinary and necessary business
expenses.
Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is liable for the
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for the 2001 year
to the extent there is a deficiency after the parties’ Rule 155
computation.
G. Section 6651 Addition to Tax
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1). Section 6651(a)(1)
imposes an addition to tax for failure to timely file a Federal
income tax return by its due date with extensions. The addition
equals 5 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return
for each month, or fraction thereof, that the return is late, not
to exceed 25 percent. The addition to tax does not apply if the
failure was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. To
prove reasonable cause for a failure to file a timely return, the
taxpayer must demonstrate that he exercised ordinary business
care and prudence in filing the return, but was nevertheless
unable to file it on time. Sec. 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced. &
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Admin. Regs. Factors that constitute “reasonable cause” include
unavoidable postal delays, death or serious illness of the
taxpayer or an immediate family member, or reliance on a
competent tax professional in a question of law of whether it is
necessary to file a return. McMahan v. Commissioner, 114 F.3d
366, 369 (2d Cir. 1997), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-547.
Initially, the Commissioner bears the burden of producing
evidence that the return was filed late and that it was
appropriate to impose the addition to tax. Sec. 7491(c).
Thereafter, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the
late filing was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.
Rule 142(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 447.
Respondent determined an addition to tax under section
6651(a)(1) against petitioner for 2001 for failure to timely file
his individual income tax return. Petitioner signed the 2001
return on April 7, 2005.
Petitioner contends that he believed he was able to file his
2001 return late because he assumed that his NOLs would make his
liability zero. Petitioner’s argument that he thought his
liability was zero does not excuse the late filing. Petitioner
presented no evidence of reasonable cause for his failure to
timely file his return. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is
liable for the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax for 2001.
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To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155 in docket No.
25469-06.
An order of dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction will be
entered in docket No. 6105-07.