T.C. Memo. 2010-139
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MULTI-PAK CORPORATION, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 21597-08. Filed June 22, 2010.
Kenneth G. Gordon, for petitioner.
Laura J. Mullin, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
GOEKE, Judge: Petitioner petitioned the Court to
redetermine the following deficiencies in Federal income taxes
and related section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties:1
1
Section references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the
applicable versions of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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Accuracy-Related Penalty
Year Deficiency Sec. 6662(a)
2001 $123,339 $24,668
2002 482,325 113,095
2003 395,663 79,133
The first issue for decision is whether petitioner may
deduct officer compensation of $2,020,000 and $2,058,000 claimed
on its 2002 and 2003 Federal income tax returns, respectively.
The 2001 deficiency is a computational adjustment resulting from
a net operating loss carryback from 2002 and 2003.2 Respondent
determined in the notice of deficiency that petitioner may deduct
only $655,000 and $660,000 for 2002 and 2003, respectively,
because petitioner has not shown that any greater amount was
reasonable and paid for services. We hold that petitioner may
deduct all of the claimed amount for 2002 but only $1,284,104 for
2003. The second issue for decision is whether petitioner is
liable for the accuracy-related penalty attributable to taxable
(calendar) years 2002 and 2003. We hold petitioner is not.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties’ stipulation of facts is incorporated herein by
this reference, and the facts stipulated are so found. At the
time the petition was filed, petitioner maintained its business
office in Chatsworth, California. Petitioner filed tax returns
on a calendar year basis.
2
For all purposes hereafter, the term “years at issue”
refers to 2002 and 2003.
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A. Multi-Pak’s Business
Petitioner, Multi-Pak Corp. (Multi-Pak, the company, or
petitioner) provides a packaging service called flexible wet
materials. Customers bring their products to Multi-Pak, which in
turn packages them according to the customers’ specifications and
returns them as finished goods which can then be sold to end
users. Multi-Pak constructs all the equipment it uses; it
operates as a packaging service primarily for nutritional and
pharmaceutical products in the form of pills or capsules.
Multi-Pak was incorporated in 1955 as a C corporation by
Ralph Unthank. Upon his death in 1972 his son, Randall Unthank
(Mr. Unthank), became the sole shareholder of the company. At
the time, Multi-Pak’s earnings were down and the company
considered filing for bankruptcy protection. Mr. Unthank bought
new equipment and attracted new accounts to help prevent the
company from filing for bankruptcy.
Mr. Unthank has been Multi-Pak’s president, CEO, and COO
from 1972 through the years at issue, and he controls all aspects
of Multi-Pak’s operations.3 Since 1972 Mr. Unthank has performed
all of Multi-Pak’s managerial duties and has made all personnel
decisions. During the years at issue Mr. Unthank was in charge
3
Mr. Unthank received stock ownership of Multi-Pak after his
father passed away in 1972.
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of Multi-Pak’s price negotiations, product design, machine design
and functionality, and administration.
B. Multi-Pak’s Financial Condition
For 2000 through 2003 petitioner’s total assets; revenue;
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
(EBITDA); net income; and total equity were as follows:
2000 2001 2002 2003
Total assets $2,714,100 $3,166,800 $3,320,900 $3,134,000
Revenue 5,929,500 7,947,300 9,483,800 8,770,900
EBITDA 92,200 449,600 508,500 (120,500)
Net income 24,600 246,800 140,700 (474,000)
Total equity 2,522,000 2,792,000 3,181,300 2,994,200
For 2002 and 2003, petitioner paid its payables currently
and was essentially debt free.
C. Multi-Pak’s Employee Compensation
Mr. Unthank’s salary and bonuses for 1996 through 2003 were
as follows:
Year Salary Bonus Total
1996 $150,000 $96,000 $246,000
1997 150,000 464,000 614,000
1998 150,000 712,000 862,000
1999 150,000 1,063,398 1,213,398
2000 150,000 988,900 1,138,900
2001 150,000 1,086,000 1,236,000
2002 150,000 1,870,000 2,020,000
2003 353,000 1,705,000 2,058,000
From 1996 to 2000 Mr. Unthank’s total compensation was
based in part on annual sales. Although he received a flat
salary, his bonus varied year to year depending on sales and
performance.
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Petitioner deducted the compensation paid to Mr. Unthank as
officer compensation on its Forms 1120, U.S. Corporation Income
Tax Return. In 2001 petitioner’s business improved, and sales
and revenue increased by 20 percent over the year 2000.
In 2002 and 2003 petitioner employed approximately 100
employees who were paid hourly. Petitioner also employed three
sons of Mr. Unthank, who were executives and were each paid a
base salary and a monthly bonus.
Mr. Unthank’s sons’ compensation for the years 2002 and 2003
was as follows:
2002 2003
Salary Bonus Salary Bonus
Erik $100,000 $465,000 $102,000 $330,000
Darin 80,000 425,000 81,000 295,000
Alan 60,000 270,000 61,000 235,000
The deductibility of the compensation paid to his sons is not an
issue in this case.4
At trial Mr. Unthank testified that he decided the amounts
of bonuses for himself and his sons at the end of every month.
He would decide the amounts on the basis of his and his sons’
performance during the month and on the profitability of the
company.
4
Respondent did not call the sons as witnesses or seek to
introduce evidence of their services.
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D. Nu-Skin
In 1996 petitioner acquired a new client, Nu-Skin Corp. (Nu-
Skin), a producer of skin-care products. Nu-Skin’s business
needs caused an increase in petitioner’s revenue from 1996 to
2000. During 2001 Nu-Skin informed Multi-Pak that it anticipated
a need to increase its packaging requirements. To meet Nu-Skin’s
needs, Multi-Pak rebuilt a packaging machine that was capable of
producing, before it was rebuilt, 4 packages per cycle at a rate
of 80 cycles per minute (a total capacity of 320 packages per
minute). After the extensive retooling, the machine’s capacity
was nearly doubled to 6 packages per cycle at 100 cycles per
minute (or a total capacity of 600 packages per minute).
The packaging requirements for Nu-Skin’s international
markets increased approximately 30 percent between 2001 and 2002.
The retooling efforts allowed Multi-Pak to meet Nu-Skin’s
increased demand without requiring Nu-Skin to find additional
packaging vendors.
Petitioner’s regular production schedule consisted of four
10-hour days for 51 weeks in each calendar year. The production
hours were extended in 2002 and 2003 to 56-plus hours per week to
accommodate customer needs, particularly those of Nu-Skin.
E. Expansion of Multi-Pak’s Office and Warehouse
From 1991 through 2000 Multi-Pak’s manufacturing operations,
inventory, storage facilities, and corporate headquarters were
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maintained in a 17,000-square-foot facility in Chatsworth,
California, purchased by Mr. Unthank and leased to the company at
market rates. In 2000 Multi-Pak began leasing a portion of a
35,000-square-foot adjoining building for storage. This building
became available for purchase in October 2001 and was acquired by
a partnership owned by the Unthank family and was leased in its
entirety to Multi-Pak, nearly tripling Multi-Pak’s space.
The building acquired by Mr. Unthank for Multi-Pak’s use was
not initially suitable for Multi-Pak’s packaging operations and
did not conform to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s)
standards for Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP). During the
first half of 2002, the building was extensively redesigned,
upgraded, and renovated to meet Multi-Pak’s and the FDA’s
requirements. The renovations included: (1) Developing a flow
pattern for receiving, storing, packaging, inspecting, and
shipping the finished goods to customers; (2) partitioning the
plant into different packaging rooms to prevent contamination and
product mixup; (3) designing gowning areas and “air/vacuum”
showers to further prevent contamination; (4) determining and
designing the heating and cooling loads and electrical
requirements and distribution in the various packaging rooms; and
(5) developing a compressed air system to serve the needs of the
packaging machinery throughout the plant. Mr. Unthank was
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directly and significantly involved in all phases of the design
and renovation of the facility.
On February 1, 2003, petitioner timely filed a Form 1120 for
2002 and reported $2,020,000 of compensation to Mr. Unthank. On
February 10, 2004, petitioner timely filed a Form 1120 for 2003
and reported $2,058,000 of compensation to Mr. Unthank. Scott
Brown (Mr. Brown) prepared Multi-Pak’s Forms 1120 for 2000, 2001,
2002, and 2003. Mr. Brown is a certified public accountant at
Roger A. Brown & Co. (Brown & Co.), which has been preparing
petitioner’s tax returns since 1965. Mr. Brown advised Mr.
Unthank and Multi-Pak on their compensation regularly. Mr. Brown
and his firm evaluated Mr. Unthank’s compensation and determined
it was reasonable for the years at issue.
Mr. Brown provided to the Court a written analysis of
petitioner’s finances as follows:
2000 2001 2002 2003
Net income $31,684 $370,183 $140,651 ($474,124)
Interest -0- 210 137 349
Taxes--Federal 7,044 123,339 47,649 -0-
Taxes--California 2,553 34,529 41,489 800
Depreciation 61,336 79,842 367,686 353,235
Depreciation--Schedule A 240,140 226,229 247,242 275,426
Amortization -0- -0- -0- -0-
EBITDA 342,757 834,332 844,854 155,686
Total equity 2,522,024 2,791,979 3,229,065 2,994,232
Return on equity 13.6% 29.9% 26.2% 5.2%
On June 19, 2008, respondent issued to petitioner a notice
of deficiency disallowing a portion of the deduction it claimed
for compensation paid to Mr. Unthank for each of the years 2002
and 2003. Petitioner timely filed its petition on September 2,
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2008. A trial was held on September 15, 2009, in Los Angeles,
California.
OPINION
I. Reasonable Compensation
Section 162(a)(1) permits a taxpayer to deduct ordinary and
necessary business expenses, including “a reasonable allowance
for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered”. A taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for
compensation if the payments were reasonable in amount and in
fact paid purely for services. Sec. 1.162-7(a), Income Tax Regs.
Although framed as a two-prong test, the inquiry under section
162(a)(1) generally turns on whether the amounts of the purported
compensation payments were reasonable. Elliotts, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1243-1245 (9th Cir. 1983), revg.
T.C. Memo. 1980-282.
Petitioner has the burden of proving that the payments to
Mr. Unthank were reasonable. See Rule 142(a). Petitioner
contends the amounts paid to its president and CEO, Mr. Unthank,
in the years at issue constituted reasonable compensation under
section 162(a)(1). Conversely, respondent contends Mr. Unthank’s
compensation for the years at issue was unreasonable. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which an appeal in this case
would normally lie, has addressed the issue of burden of proof in
estate tax valuation cases in a series of three decisions.
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Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner, 250 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001),
affg. in part, vacating in part and remanding 103 T.C. 520 (1994)
and T.C. Memo. 1997-461; Estate of Simplot v. Commissioner, 249
F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001), revg. and remanding 112 T.C. 130
(1999); Morrissey v. Commissioner, 243 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2001),
revg. and remanding Estate of Kaufman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1999-119. In each of these cases the Commissioner determined an
estate tax deficiency based upon an increase in the fair market
value, over that claimed on the tax return, of shares in a
closely held corporation. Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner,
supra at 698-699; Estate of Simplot v. Commissioner, supra at
1193; Morrissey v. Commissioner, supra at 1147. Subsequently,
the Commissioner submitted expert reports supporting his
concessions that the value of the subject stock was less than
that determined in the statutory notice. Estate of Mitchell v.
Commissioner, supra at 702; Estate of Simplot v. Commissioner,
supra at 1193-1194; Morrissey v. Commissioner, supra at 1147.
Confronting this scenario, the Court of Appeals in each
instance indicated that the Commissioner’s adoption of a
litigation posture deviating from the valuation stated in the
notice of deficiency resulted in a forfeiture of any presumption
of correctness and placed the burden of proof on the
Commissioner. Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner, supra at 702;
Estate of Simplot v. Commissioner, supra at 1193; Morrissey v.
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Commissioner, supra at 1148-1149. Under the rule of Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th
Cir. 1971), this Court will follow a Court of Appeals decision
which is squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies to
that Court of Appeals.
The notice of deficiency issued to petitioner determined Mr.
Unthank’s reasonable compensation to be $655,000 and $660,000 for
2002 and 2003, respectively. Respondent’s expert report and
posttrial briefs valued the reasonable compensation at $1,461,000
for 2002 and $670,100 for 2003. Nonetheless, the record in this
case is such that our conclusion would be the same regardless of
the burden of proof. We therefore shall base our ruling on the
preponderance of the evidence.
The Court of Appeals uses five factors to determine the
reasonableness of compensation, with no single factor being
determinative. Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 1245.
The parties agree that we should apply the factors in Elliotts,
Inc. The factors are: (1) The employee’s role in the company;
(2) comparison with other companies; (3) the character and
condition of the company; (4) potential conflicts of interest;
and (5) internal consistency in compensation. Id. at 1245-1248.
When officers who control the corporation set their own
compensation, careful scrutiny is necessary to determine whether
the alleged compensation is in fact a distribution of profits and
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a constructive dividend. Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1142, 1156 (1980).
II. Applying the Elliotts Factors
We will apply each factor in turn.
A. Role in the Company
This factor focuses on the employee’s importance to the
success of the business. Pertinent considerations include the
employee’s position, hours worked, and duties performed.
Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 1245.
During the years at issue Mr. Unthank was the sole
shareholder, president, CEO, and COO of Multi-Pak. Among the
services he performed were: (1) Engineering services; (2)
functioning as a draftsman; (3) designing machines; (4)
negotiating contracts; (5) ordering equipment; (6) making
financial arrangements to acquire products; (7) acquiring
inventory; (8) making payments on payables; (9) functioning as a
troubleshooter in the operation of the machines and business
overall; (10) developing new accounts; (11) making policy
decisions concerning operations and customer development, and
(12) determining the product liability insurance coverage and
risk management.
In 2002 Mr. Unthank reconfigured the new warehouse facility
to accommodate petitioner’s operations and meet FDA regulations,
drafted floor plans for the adjoining building, determined
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electrical distribution for each room, determined the compressed
air filtration system for each room, helped design the lighting
system, and designed the warehouse layout and flow pattern.
Mr. Unthank made every important decision for petitioner’s
operations during the years at issue. His devoting all of his
time to petitioner’s operations directly contributed to its
financial condition. This factor weighs in petitioner’s favor.
B. External Comparison
This factor compares the employee’s compensation with that
paid by similar companies for similar services. Elliotts, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d at 1246; see sec. 1.162-7(b)(3), Income
Tax Regs. Expert witness testimony is appropriate to help the
Court understand an area requiring specialized training,
knowledge, or judgment. See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Snyder v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 529, 534 (1989). Courts often use expert
witness opinions to evaluate the reasonableness of compensation.
Nonetheless, the Court is not bound by an expert’s opinion and we
may either accept or reject expert testimony in the exercise of
sound judgment. Helvering v. Natl. Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282,
295 (1938); Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir.
1976), affg. T.C. Memo. 1974-285. Furthermore, the Court may be
selective in determining what portions of an expert’s opinion, if
any, to accept. Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 562 (1986).
Both parties introduced expert witness reports in support of
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their respective positions, and these reports relate to our
analysis of comparable salaries.
1. Petitioner’s Expert
Petitioner presented the expert testimony of Kevin J. Murphy
(Professor Murphy), an adviser to the Special Master of executive
compensation for the Department of the Treasury and a professor
of economics and law at the University of Southern California.
Professor Murphy, in reaching his conclusion that petitioner’s
compensation was reasonable, focused on two inquiries: First,
whether the payments Mr. Unthank received were reasonable
relative to payments received by similarly situated executives in
similarly situated firms (competitive pay analysis); and second,
whether the payments Mr. Unthank received were commensurate with
his services rendered.
(a) Competitive Pay Analysis
Professor Murphy’s competitive pay analysis reflected his
belief that the skills and abilities necessary to lead Multi-Pak
are similar to the skills and abilities necessary to lead firms
in a variety of light manufacturing, engineering, and business
service industries. The competitive pay analysis compared Mr.
Unthank’s compensation with the average compensation received by
CEOs in the S & P SmallCap 600 (defined as small capitalization
firms excluding financial services and utilities) from 1993 to
2003. The data is derived from S & P’s “ExecuComp” database,
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which includes detailed executive compensation information
extracted from corporate proxy statements and 10-K statements for
companies in the S & P 500, S & P MidCap 400, and S & P SmallCap
600. Professor Murphy presented a regression model which allowed
him to compare Multi-Pak with the SmallCap 600 firms on a size-
adjusted basis. The median SmallCap 600 firms had revenues in
2003 of $510 million, which was roughly $501 million more than
Multi-Pak. Many firms in the SmallCap 600 paid their CEOs
through salary, bonuses, and stock options or restricted stock
grants while Mr. Unthank was paid from salary and bonuses.
For the years 2002 and 2003, after adjusting for
petitioner’s size in relation to the size of the companies in the
comparison group, Mr. Unthank’s salary and bonuses were at the
very top of the scale when compared with the salary and bonuses
received by CEOs of those companies and was in the 94th or 95th
percentile when compared with those CEOs’ total pay (including
grants to them of stock options and of restricted stock). If no
adjustment is made for the relative size of the companies, Mr.
Unthank’s salary and bonuses were at the 95th and 97th
percentiles in relation to the salary and bonuses received by
CEOs in the comparison group in 2002 and 2003, respectively, and
were in the 67th and 68th percentiles, respectively, when
compared with those CEOs’ total pay. Mr. Unthank’s 2002 and 2003
total compensation approximated the average total compensation
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received by SmallCap 600 CEOs but significantly exceeded the
average salary and bonus received by these executives.
Professor Murphy concluded that the payments Mr. Unthank
received in 2002 and 2003 are within a range of reasonable
compensation. He stated that although Mr. Unthank was highly
paid, there was nothing inappropriate or unreasonable per se in
paying an executive in the 95th percentile of total compensation
on a size-adjusted basis.
(b) Assessment of Services Rendered
Professor Murphy claimed that the 61-percent increase in
Multi-Pak’s revenues from 2000 to 2002 was in large part due to
Mr. Unthank and, as a result thereof, Mr. Unthank’s 75-percent
increase in compensation from 2001 to 2003 was not unreasonable.
According to Professor Murphy, the revenue increased because of
the extensive retooling/rebuilding of the packaging machine made
necessary by Nu-Skin and because of the acquisition of the second
production facility. In his expert report, Professor Murphy
stated that it was routine to give bonuses based on cumulative
performance over the past 3 to 5 years and that Mr. Unthank
accordingly received bonuses in 2002 and 2003 when the increase
in sales and revenue was realized from the acquisition of the
building and the increase in business from Nu-Skin.
In Professor Murphy’s opinion, even though petitioner’s
sales dropped in 2003, it is not unusual for a corporation to pay
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discretionary bonuses in a period when sales are in decline if it
is determined that the decline is not the fault of the executive.
An example would be bonuses paid when, by reason of a bad
economy, sales dropped. In addition, Professor Murphy did not
find any evidence that petitioner paid bonuses to Mr. Unthank for
the purpose of absorbing taxable profit.
2. Respondent’s Expert
Respondent presented expert testimony from David Fuller (Mr.
Fuller), an expert in the area of compensation. Mr. Fuller is
president of Valve, Inc., a financial consulting firm. Mr.
Fuller has been a valuation consultant for financial and tax
reporting purposes for 20 years. Mr. Fuller opined that
reasonable levels of compensation for Mr. Unthank would have been
$1,461,300 for 2002 and $670,100 for 2003.
Mr. Fuller analyzed whether an independent investor would be
satisfied with his or her return on an investment in petitioner
after Mr. Unthank’s compensation. Mr. Fuller conducted the
independent investor test under three distinct scenarios.
In the first scenario Mr. Fuller used eight publicly traded
companies that he said were as similar as possible to Multi-Pak
in terms of products, dynamics, and services. The eight publicly
traded companies were listed as follows:
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Total Assets Revenue EBITDA Net Income Total Equity
AEP Ind. $469,000,000 $660,600,000 $47,900,000 ($1,800,000) $61,600,000
BEMIS Co. 2,256,700,000 2,369,000,000 401,400,000 165,500,000 959,000,000
CCL Ind. 852,000,000 1,073,000,000 117,200,000 13,800,000 277,300,000
Chesapeake 1,352,900,000 822,200,000 112,400,000 21,900,000 476,600,000
Graphic Packaging 1,957,700,000 1,247,300,000 273,900,000 (11,200,000) 132,500,000
Pactiv Corp. 3,412,000,000 2,880,000,000 617,000,000 148,000,000 897,000,000
Sealed Air Corp. 4,260,800,000 3,204,300,000 680,000,000 (309,100,000) 813,000,000
Sonoco Products 2,436,400,000 2,701,400,000 405,300,000 135,300,000 867,400,000
In this scenario Mr. Fuller’s objective was to establish the
reasonable amount of compensation to Mr. Unthank from the
standpoint of an independent investor who owned the company
throughout the years 2002 and 2003. To do this, he estimated the
appropriate rate of return by observing pretax rates of return on
equity for the publicly traded companies identified above. He
started with Multi-Pak’s book value of equity and multiplied that
by the pretax rates of the public companies, producing a dollar
value of return that an independent investor would require for
each year. He then subtracted that value from Multi-Pak’s
earnings before interest or taxes. He opined that the difference
was the value of reasonable shareholder compensation. Scenario 1
resulted in estimated values of $1,462,000 and $1,030,600, for
2002 and 2003, respectively.
In the second scenario, Mr. Fuller undertook to estimate the
amount of compensation to Mr. Unthank that would be reasonable
from the standpoint of an independent investor who purchased the
company on December 31, 2001 or 2002. Mr. Fuller looked at the
Pratt Stats database, a national database that publishes
information relating to business valuations, to find purchases of
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companies similar to Multi-Pak. Mr. Fuller then estimated a
reasonable rate of return by observing rates of return based on
EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization) as a percentage of the market value of invested
capital for the similar companies. He then subtracted that rate
of return from Multi-Pak’s EBITDA rate of return on equity before
deductions for shareholder compensation and taxes. The remaining
amount after accounting for depreciation was then estimated to be
the indicated value of reasonable shareholder compensation. The
concluded levels for scenario 2 were $1,301,900 and $585,100 for
2002 and 2003, respectively.
In the third scenario, as in the second, Mr. Fuller sought
to estimate the amount of compensation to Mr. Unthank that would
be reasonable from the perspective of an independent investor who
had purchased the company on December 31, 2001 or 2002. But here
Mr. Fuller tried to estimate the appropriate rate of return
through the use of the buildup method. The buildup method
determines a reasonable rate of return on an investment based on
the expected return on assets with similar risk exposure. Mr.
Fuller then subtracted the rate of return, as so determined, from
Multi-Pak’s rate of return on equity before interest and taxes
and before deductions for shareholder compensation. The
remaining amount was then estimated to be the indicated value of
reasonable shareholder compensation. The concluded levels for
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scenario 3 were $1,180,600 and $394,600 for 2002 and 2003,
respectively.
Mr. Fuller reached an opinion as to reasonable compensation
based on each of his three scenarios and then averaged the three
conclusions, giving each equal weight, to come to his final
conclusion. Mr. Fuller’s report concluded that as a percentage
of revenue, the 2002 compensation levels were 18.4 percent, 16.4
percent, and 14.9 percent for scenarios 1, 2, and 3,
respectively, with an arithmetic average of 16.5 percent. The
2003 compensation levels were 10.9 percent, 6.2 percent, and 4.2
percent in scenarios 1, 2, and 3, respectively, with an
arithmetic average of 7.1 percent.
Mr. Fuller increased his estimate of reasonable compensation
for Mr. Unthank for 2002 to include an allowance of $146,500 for
working double shifts for a quarter of the year as an engineer,
and to compensate Mr. Unthank for the retooling efforts in 2001.
Mr. Fuller reached this number using the Zweig White survey,
which Mr. Fuller testified was used to observe reported
compensation levels for principals, partners, and owners of
multidiscipline engineering firms. According to the Zweig White
survey, the upper quartile annual compensation amount for
principals, partners, and owners of such companies in the Pacific
region was $293,000. Mr. Fuller then divided $293,000 by 2 and
gave $146,500 to Mr. Unthank as an added amount for the extra
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work he put in for the retooling effort in 2001. Mr. Fuller
opined that reasonable levels of compensation for Mr. Unthank
would have been $1,461,300 for 2002 and $670,100 for 2003.
According to Mr. Fuller, these amounts would properly compensate
Mr. Unthank for his efforts in the retooling process.
3. Conclusion
We do not find the opinion of either party’s expert
completely convincing. Neither expert’s comparables were similar
to petitioner. Petitioner’s expert selected the S & P SmallCap
600 as a comparison to petitioner, while respondent’s expert
selected eight publicly traded companies that he deemed similar.
The S & P SmallCap 600 includes companies from different sectors
of the market that on average have revenues 58 times greater than
petitioner’s while the eight publicly traded companies that
respondent’s expert deemed similar had revenues on average 200
times higher than petitioner’s. Although Mr. Fuller testified
that he adjusted his analysis to account for this size
difference, he did not explain how. Mr. Fuller acknowledged that
there are few companies that are actually comparable to
petitioner and therefore doing an external executive compensation
comparison is difficult. Thus, Mr. Fuller’s analysis of the
“amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like
enterprises under like circumstances” is not definitive. See
sec. 1.162-7(b)(3), Income Tax Regs.
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Mr. Fuller based his conclusion on an analysis of whether an
independent investor would be satisfied with his or her return on
an investment in petitioner after Mr. Unthank’s compensation. In
his first scenario, Mr. Fuller selected eight companies in the
packaging industry and compared each company’s CEO’s compensation
to that of Mr. Unthank. At trial Mr. Fuller testified, however,
that it would be a “mischaracterization” to believe he picked
these eight as the companies most reasonably comparable to
petitioner. In fact, Mr. Fuller stated that he did not select
these eight companies for purposes of determining compensation
but to determine what return on equity an independent investor
would expect from an investment in a healthy company in the
packaging industry.
Petitioner was virtually debt free and had few liabilities
on its balance sheet. But the average debt-equity ratio of the
eight companies that Mr. Fuller selected was 7 to 3 for both
years in question. Equity in a firm with such debt is inherently
riskier than equity in a firm without as much debt, and thus
shareholders will demand a higher rate of return on equity in the
former firm. “The riskier the venture the greater the rate of
return necessary to compensate for that risk.” Finkelman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-72, affd. without published opinion
937 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1991). “The greater the percentage of
debt, the riskier that company will be as an investment (all
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other things being equal), and the greater the rate of return
will have to be in order to attract investors.” Celebrity
Cruises, Inc. v. Essef Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 440, 452 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
Additionally, Mr. Fuller stated that he gave Mr. Unthank an
allowance of $146,500 for working double shifts for one quarter
in 2001 as an engineer and to compensate Mr. Unthank for the
retooling efforts. Mr. Fuller testified that the Zweig White
survey is used in his practice for reasonable compensation cases
concerning engineering firms. We fail to see how this survey is
relevant to petitioner’s operations. First, petitioner is not an
engineering firm. Second, Mr. Unthank’s role in the company was
not only that of an engineer but also that of a designer and
developer who oversaw the decision to retool and managed the
retooling process while structuring the company’s contracts.
Because Mr. Fuller’s analysis was based on dissimilar companies
and because Mr. Unthank was not just an engineer on the retooling
project, we disagree with respondent’s expert testimony.
We now turn to petitioner’s expert, Professor Murphy. In
estimating whether Mr. Unthank’s compensation was reasonable,
Professor Murphy did not perform the analysis, required in the
applicable caselaw, of whether an independent investor would have
been satisfied by his or her return on investment. In addition,
Professor Murphy’s only point of comparison was the S & P
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SmallCap 600. The median 2003 revenue for the S & P SmallCap 600
is $510 million, which is significantly higher than petitioner’s
revenue of $8.77 million in 2003. Also, the S & P SmallCap 600
is not an index that focuses on companies similar in business to
petitioner. The S & P SmallCap 600 has businesses in the energy,
health care, and technology sectors. Although Professor Murphy’s
report, unlike Mr. Fuller’s, made adjustments in an attempt to
account for the difference between petitioner’s revenues and
those of the companies selected as comparables, Professor
Murphy’s report lacked an independent investor test and his
companies were too dissimilar to provide a comparison to
petitioner.
In summary, we have not found the analyses performed or the
opinions expressed by either of the parties’ experts to be
persuasive or reliable. Therefore, we find that the
comparison to the compensation paid by unrelated firms is a
neutral factor.
C. Character and Condition of the Company
This factor focuses on petitioner’s size as measured by its
sales, net income, or capital value; the complexities of the
business; and general economic conditions. See Elliotts, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d at 1246.
Petitioner is prominent in the industry of packaging
vitamins, pills, and other small items in the Western United
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States. While petitioner’s revenue increased from 2001 to 2002,
they declined from 2002 to 2003. Despite the decrease in 2003,
revenue remained almost 50 percent higher than in 2000, before
the major retooling efforts in 2001. Equity, revenue, and gross
profit in 2002 and 2003 were petitioner’s highest. However,
petitioner’s net income remained low even though revenues had
increased. For the years in issue, net income after taxes was
$93,000 and negative $474,000, respectively.5
Petitioner’s business was complex. It involved purchasing a
new warehouse in 2001, remodeling it, adding new machines, and
hiring additional workers. In addition, petitioner’s ability to
quickly respond to the increased production demands in 2001 of
Nu-Skin, its major customer, by increasing hours and purchasing
more warehouse space contributed significantly to its rise in
total sales in 2002 and 2003. The acquisition of the adjoining
building in October 2001 added 35,000 square feet, more than
tripling petitioner’s plant capacity, starting in 2002 and
continuing in subsequent years. Petitioner did this work while
assuming no debt during the years at issue, and thus the company
had very small liabilities on its balance sheet.
Although petitioner’s net income in 2002 and 2003 was low
when compared to revenues, other factors such as equity, revenue,
5
Petitioner had total tax liabilities of $47,600 and $0 in
2002 and 2003, respectively.
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and gross profit point towards a successful operation. Neither
party presented direct evidence by which we can definitively
compare petitioner’s operations with those of similar businesses.
However, the evidence does suggest that petitioner was one of the
more successful companies of its kind. Accordingly, we find that
this factor favors petitioner.
D. Conflict of Interest
This factor examines whether a relationship exists between
the company and the employee which would permit the company to
disguise nondeductible corporate distributions as section
162(a)(1) compensation payments. Close scrutiny may be used when
the paying corporation is controlled by the compensated employee,
as in the instant case. Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at
1246-1247. However, the mere fact that the individual whose
compensation is under scrutiny is the sole shareholder of the
company, even when coupled with an absence of dividend payments,
“does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the amount of
compensation is unreasonably high”. Id. at 1246. There is no
question in this case that Mr. Unthank, as the sole shareholder,
president, and CEO occupied a position deserving scrutiny.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the
reasonableness of compensation should be evaluated from the
perspective of a hypothetical independent investor. Under the
independent investor test, a company’s annual return on equity
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usually begins with a company’s net income after taxes for that
year. Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir.
1998), vacating T.C. Memo. 1995-135; Labelgraphics, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-343, affd. 221 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2000). If the company’s earnings on equity after payment of the
compensation at issue remain at a level that would satisfy a
hypothetical independent investor, there is a strong indication
that the employee is providing compensable services and that
profits are not being siphoned out of the company disguised as
salary. Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 1247. The
Court of Appeals in Elliotts, Inc. calculated the return on
equity using the yearend shareholders’ equity. Id.
Petitioner’s accountant, Mr. Brown, calculated petitioner’s
return on equity to be 26.2 percent and 5.2 percent for 2002 and
2003, respectively. In those computations Mr. Brown added back
interest, taxes, and depreciation into his estimation of
petitioner’s net income. Respondent’s expert, Mr. Fuller,
calculated the return on equity to be 4.4 percent and -15.8
percent for 2002 and 2003, respectively. Mr. Fuller did not add
back interest, taxes, and depreciation into his calculation.
Dividing petitioner’s net profit (after payment of
compensation and a provision for income taxes) by the yearend
shareholder’s equity as reflected in its financial statements
yields return on equity of 2.9 percent and -15.8 percent in 2002
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and 2003, respectively. See John L. Ginger Masonry, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-251.
In Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 1247, the Court
of Appeals found that a 20-percent average rate of return on
equity would satisfy a hypothetical independent investor. But
the Court of Appeals also stated that there could be a situation
in which a corporation might suffer a loss or an inadequate
return on equity yet compensation paid to employees is
reasonable. “[A] formula should reasonably compensate for the
work done, the performance achieved, the responsibility assumed,
and the experience and dedication of the employee.” Id. at 1248.
Petitioner became the president of Multi-Pak in 1973 when it
was near bankruptcy and has since helped to bring it financial
stability. During the years in issue, its sales were at or near
all-time highs and it had little or no debt. Mr. Unthank was
present during all client negotiations and managed the redesign
and expansion of the corporation to triple its original size. He
has been the active president, CEO, and COO for all years at
issue. Though an independent investor may prefer to see higher
rates of return, we believe an independent investor would note
that Mr. Unthank was the sole reason for this company’s
significant rise in sales in 2002 due to his agreement with Nu-
Skin and the subsequent expansion of the company. Mr. Unthank
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made every important decision for petitioner and had the most
important role in increasing its sales and limiting its debt.
However, we agree with respondent that a negative 15.8-
percent return on equity in 2003 calls into question the level of
Mr. Unthank’s compensation for that year. When compensation
results in a negative return on shareholder equity, we cannot
conclude, in the absence of a mitigating circumstance, that an
independent investor would be pleased. Donald Palmer Co. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-65, affd. without published opinion
84 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1996).
We find this factor to favor petitioner in 2002 and
respondent in 2003.
E. Internal Consistency of Compensation
Finally, evidence of an internal inconsistency in a
company’s treatment of payments to employees may indicate that
the payments go beyond reasonable compensation. Elliotts, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d at 1247. “Bonuses that have not been
awarded under a structured, formal, consistently applied program
generally are suspect * * * On the other hand, evidence of a
reasonable, longstanding, consistently applied compensation plan
is evidence that the compensation paid in the years in question
was reasonable.” Id. The bonus should not be decided after
perusing the year’s profits. Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Commissioner,
503 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1974), affg. T.C. Memo. 1971-200.
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Payment of bonuses at yearend when the corporation knows its
revenue for that year may enable it to disguise dividends as
compensation. Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d
1315 (5th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1985-267; Estate of
Wallace v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 525, 556 (1990), affd. 965 F.2d
1038 (11th Cir. 1992).
In Vitamin Vill., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-272,
this Court found that the bonuses paid were not awarded under a
structured, formal, or consistently applied program but were paid
under the taxpayer’s plan to award a bonus for present hard work
and prior years’ lack of compensation when the taxpayer became
more profitable. Generally, incentive compensation plans are
designed to increase the compensation to employees by some
fraction of the benefit the corporation derives from the
employee’s efforts. See Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at
1248 (stating that “Incentive payment plans are designed to
encourage and compensate that extra effort and dedication which
can be so valuable to a corporation.”).
Petitioner argues that the record shows a reasonable and
relatively consistently applied compensation schedule that was
based on the employees’ monthly productivity. After Mr. Unthank
took over in 1972, petitioner paid Mr. Unthank a monthly bonus
dependent on petitioner’s performance and profits for that month.
Mr. Unthank testified that there was no established monthly
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amount but that he determined at the end of each month the amount
he and his sons received on the basis of performances. In 2002
and 2003 Mr. Unthank paid himself a monthly bonus of $100,000 to
$250,000 in 19 of the 24 months. In four other instances, Mr.
Unthank paid himself a bonus of $50,000 or less; and in another,
he paid himself about $375,000. In addition, Mr. Unthank’s sons,
Alan, Darin, and Erik, each had monthly bonuses that ranged from
zero to $90,000.
Petitioner awarded bonuses every month based on both Mr.
Unthank’s and his sons’ performances. This Court has previously
found that a taxpayer’s payment of bonuses throughout the year
and the declaration of the amount at the end of the year does not
indicate unreasonableness. Escrow Connection, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-17. The fact that the recipient is
a shareholder-employee does not make the plan unreasonable.
Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 1248.
Accordingly, we find that petitioner’s treatment of Mr.
Unthank’s bonuses was under a consistent business policy.
F. Conclusion
Mr. Unthank, as petitioner’s sole executive officer and
president, was the driving force behind petitioner’s success.
His dedication and hard work resulted in the company’s record
sales for the years at issue. When revenues and sales rose in
2002, almost all of the rise could be attributed to Mr. Unthank.
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We believe that an independent investor would accept a 2.9-
percent return on equity for 2002 in the light of the roughly $3
million growth in sales from 2000 and the long-term potential of
the company. We find that petitioner’s compensation paid was
reasonable for that year.
In 2003 Multi-Pak saw a drop in sales and revenue, but
petitioner still gave Mr. Unthank more compensation than he had
received in 2002. Even though the 2003 revenue and equity
numbers were the second highest in petitioner’s history, return
on equity in 2003 was -15.8 percent, an amount which would not be
acceptable for an independent investor. Mr. Unthank’s total
compensation from 1999 to 2001 averaged $1,196,099. For 2002 we
have found that an independent investor would have been willing
to accept a 2.9-percent return on equity in the light of the
impressive sales growth of the business. Accordingly, with a
drop in sales in 2003, an independent investor would expect lower
compensation. If Mr. Unthank’s salary is reduced to $1,284,104
in 2003, the return on equity for petitioner rises to 10 percent
in 2003. We believe this would be sufficient given the overall
character of the company. The Court therefore finds that
petitioner is entitled to deduct $2,020,000 and $1,284,104 in
2002 and 2003, respectively, under section 162(a)(1).
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III. Accuracy-Related Penalty for 2002 and 2003
Respondent determined that petitioner was liable for
accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) for negligence
or intentional disregard of rules and regulations for tax years
2002 and 2003. Petitioner argues that it is not liable for these
penalties because it relied reasonably on its accountant’s advice
in preparing its returns. We have found that petitioner’s 2002
compensation to Mr. Unthank was proper. Consequently, there is
no underpayment of tax for 2002 on which the accuracy-related
penalty under section 6662(a) may be imposed.
As relevant herein, section 6662(a) and (b)(1) imposes a
20-percent accuracy-related penalty on the portion of an
underpayment that is due to negligence or intentional disregard
of rules or regulations. Negligence includes a failure to
attempt reasonably to comply with the Code, whereas disregard
includes a careless, reckless, or intentional disregard. Sec.
6662(c).
A section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty shall not be
imposed to the extent that the taxpayer shows that an
underpayment is due to the taxpayer’s having reasonable cause and
acting in good faith. Sec. 6664(c); secs. 1.6662-3(a),
1.6664-4(a), Income Tax Regs. Reasonable cause requires that the
taxpayer exercise ordinary business care and prudence as to the
disputed item. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985). A
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good-faith reasonable reliance on the advice of an independent,
competent professional as to the tax treatment of an item may
meet this requirement. Id. at 250; sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income
Tax Regs. Whether a taxpayer relies on professional advice and
whether such reliance is reasonable hinge on the facts and
circumstances of the case and the law that applies to those facts
and circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(c)(1), Income Tax Regs.
For a taxpayer to rely reasonably upon professional advice
to negate a section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty, the
taxpayer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
taxpayer meets each requirement of the following three-prong
test: (1) The adviser was a competent professional who had
sufficient expertise to justify reliance; (2) the taxpayer
provided necessary and accurate information to the adviser; and
(3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser’s
judgment. Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1995-610; see also Rule 142(a)(2).
The record convinces us that petitioner has met each of
these requirements for 2003. We do not find anything in the
record that causes us to believe that Mr. Brown was not a
competent professional with sufficient expertise to justify
reliance. Mr. Brown testified that Mr. Unthank would call him
with the bonus amounts and that Brown & Co. made a decision on
reasonableness at the end of the year. Because petitioner
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actually relied in good faith on its accountant’s advice as to
the matters at hand and the reliance was reasonable, we decline
to sustain respondent’s determination as to the accuracy-related
penalty for 2003.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.