WILLIAM PRENTICE COOPER, III, PETITIONER v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
RESPONDENT
Docket Nos. 24178–09W, 24179–09W. Filed July 8, 2010.
P filed two claims for a whistleblower award with R under
sec. 7623(b)(4), I.R.C. R sent a letter to P denying the claims
because an award determination could not be made under sec.
7623(b), I.R.C. P subsequently filed petitions in this Court
seeking review of R’s denial of the whistleblower claims. R
filed motions to dismiss these cases for lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that no determination notice under sec. 7623(b),
I.R.C., was sent to P, to which P objected that the letter R
sent was a valid determination notice. Held: R’s letter was a
determination conferring jurisdiction on this Court. We shall
therefore deny R’s motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Joseph G. Giannola and Robert J. Mauceri, for petitioner.
Holly H. Styles and Alex Shlivko, for respondent.
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(70) COOPER v. COMMISSIONER 71
OPINION
KROUPA, Judge: These cases are before the Court on
respondent’s motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We
decide for the first time whether a letter sent by respondent
to petitioner denying petitioner’s whistleblower claims con-
stitutes a ‘‘determination’’ within the meaning of section
7623(b)(4) 1 that would confer on us jurisdiction to review
denial of the claims. We find that the letter was a determina-
tion and that we therefore have jurisdiction.
Background
The following information is stated for purposes of
resolving the pending motions. At the time of filing the peti-
tions, petitioner resided in Nashville, Tennessee.
Petitioner, an attorney, submitted two Forms 211, Applica-
tion for Award for Original Information, to the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) in 2008 concerning alleged violations of
the Code. He alleged in the two claims that certain parties
had failed to pay millions of dollars in estate and generation-
skipping transfer tax.
Petitioner alleged in one claim that a trust having over
$102 million in assets was improperly omitted from the gross
estate of Dorothy Dillon Eweson (Ms. Eweson), resulting in
a possible $75 million underpayment in Federal estate tax.
He learned of the alleged omission by representing the widow
of Ms. Eweson’s grandson, who is also the guardian of a pur-
ported beneficiary of the trust. He also verified the informa-
tion by examining the public records and the records of his
client.
Petitioner alleged in the other claim that Ms. Eweson
impermissibly modified two trusts as part of a scheme to
avoid the generation-skipping transfer tax. The trusts at
issue had a combined value of over $200 million at the time
of Ms. Eweson’s death in 2005. Petitioner learned of the
alleged violation through his representation of the widow of
Ms. Eweson’s grandson. He also verified the information by
examining the public records and the records of his client.
Petitioner submitted additional information to support the
allegation several months after filing the claim. He provided
1 All section and Code references are to the Internal Revenue Code unless otherwise indicated.
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72 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (70)
newly discovered filings from a New York Surrogate’s Court
proceeding in which a corporate trustee challenged the trust
modifications as designed primarily to evade taxation. Peti-
tioner also provided a legal memorandum and draft legal
documents from Ms. Eweson’s attorneys that indicated the
trusts were modified as part of a scheme to avoid the genera-
tion-skipping transfer tax.
Respondent’s Whistleblower Office (Whistleblower Office)
notified petitioner that it had received the whistleblower
claims. The Office explained that petitioner’s information
would be used to determine whether to further investigate
the alleged violations. The Whistleblower Office also told
petitioner that he would be informed at the conclusion of the
review and investigation whether petitioner’s information
met the criteria for paying an award.
The Whistleblower Office did not contact petitioner again
until nine months later when the Office sent him a letter
denying the claims (the letter). The letter stated that
respondent had considered petitioner’s whistleblower claims.
It explained that ‘‘an award determination * * * [could not]
be made under section 7623(b)’’ 2 because petitioner ‘‘did not
identify * * * federal tax issue[s] upon which the IRS will
take action.’’ The letter further explained that an award was
not warranted for either claim because petitioner’s informa-
tion did not ‘‘result in the detection of the underpayment of
taxes.’’
Petitioner filed two separate petitions in this Court in
response to respondent’s denial of the whistleblower claims.
Respondent filed motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in
both proceedings on the ground that no determination notice
had been issued to petitioner. Petitioner objected to the
motions that the letter constituted a determination confer-
ring jurisdiction on this Court under section 7623(b)(4) to
review respondent’s denial of the whistleblower claims.
Discussion
We decide for the first time whether respondent’s letter
denying petitioner’s whistleblower claims constitutes a
‘‘determination’’ that gives this Court jurisdiction under sec-
tion 7623(b)(4). We begin with the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.
2 The full text of sec. 7623(b) is set forth in the appendix.
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(70) COOPER v. COMMISSIONER 73
The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and may
exercise jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by Con-
gress. Judge v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175, 1180–1181
(1987); Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). The
Tax Court is without authority to enlarge upon that statu-
tory grant. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 92
T.C. 885, 888 (1989). We nevertheless have jurisdiction to
determine whether we have jurisdiction. Hambrick v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 348 (2002); Pyo v. Commissioner, 83
T.C. 626, 632 (1984); Kluger v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 309,
314 (1984). We turn now to an overview of our jurisdiction
regarding whistleblower claims.
I. Overview of the Whistleblower Award Program
The Secretary has long had the discretion to pay awards
to persons providing information that aids in (1) detecting
underpayments of tax and (2) detecting and bringing to trial
and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal rev-
enue laws. Sec. 7623(a). The discretionary whistleblower
awards have been arbitrary and inconsistent, however,
because of a lack of standardized procedures and limited
managerial oversight. See Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration Rept. 2006–30–092, The Informants’
Rewards Program Needs More Centralized Management
Oversight (June 2006). It took an average of 71⁄2 years for a
discretionary award to be paid and an average of 61⁄2 months
for a claim to be rejected. Id. at 8–9. Moreover, most rejected
claims did not provide the rationale for the reviewer’s deci-
sion because of concerns about disclosing confidential return
information to the whistleblower. Id. at 7.
Congress enacted legislation in 2006 to address perceived
problems with the discretionary award regime (the 2006
legislation). Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA),
Pub. L. 109–432, div. A, sec. 406, 120 Stat. 2958 (effective
Dec. 20, 2006). The 2006 legislation amended section 7623 to
require the Secretary to pay nondiscretionary whistleblower
awards and to provide this Court with jurisdiction to review
such awards. A whistleblower is now entitled to a minimum
nondiscretionary award of 15 percent of the collected pro-
ceeds if the Commissioner proceeds with administrative or
judicial action using information provided in a whistleblower
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74 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (70)
claim. 3 Sec. 7623(b)(1). The whistleblower has 30 days from
the issuance of a non-discretionary award determination to
file a petition in this Court. Sec. 7623(b)(4).
The 2006 legislation also directed the Secretary to issue
guidance for the operation of a Whistleblower Office adminis-
tered by the IRS. 4 TRHCA sec. 406(b)(1), 120 Stat. 2959. The
Whistleblower Office is responsible for reviewing submitted
whistleblower claims or assigning them to the appropriate
IRS office for review. Id. sec. 406(b)(1)(B), 120 Stat. 2960. The
Office is authorized to seek additional assistance from the
whistleblower if necessary. Id. sec. 406(b)(1)(C), (2).
The Commissioner issued guidance to taxpayers on filing
nondiscretionary whistleblower award claims in early 2008.
See Notice 2008–4, 2008–1 C.B. 253. Whistleblowers must
fully complete and submit a Form 211. Id. sec. 3.02, 2008–
1 C.B. at 254. The Whistleblower Office will acknowledge
receipt of the claim in writing. Id. sec. 3.05, 2008–1 C.B. at
255. The Whistleblower Office will send correspondence to
the whistleblower once a final determination regarding the
claim has been made. Id. sec. 3.11, 2008–1 C.B. at 256. Final
Whistleblower Office determinations regarding awards may
be appealed to this Court. Id. Awards will not be paid, how-
ever, until there is a final determination of the tax liability
and the amounts owed are collected. Id. sec. 3.08, 2008–1
C.B. at 255.
The Commissioner also issued procedural guidance on how
whistleblower claims will be processed. See Internal Revenue
Manual (IRM) pt. 25.2.2 (Dec. 30, 2008). 5 In general, whistle-
blower claims will be denied where the information
provided does not (a) identify a Federal tax issue upon which
the IRS will act; (b) result in the detection of an under-
payment of taxes; or (c) result in the collection of proceeds.
See id. pt. 25.2.2.12(2). The whistleblower will be notified by
3 The award is reduced in certain circumstances. For example, the award is reduced where
the whistleblower planned or initiated the actions that led to the underpayment of tax. Sec.
7623(b)(2) and (3). Furthermore, an award is available only if the taxpayer had gross income
exceeding $200,000 for any year at issue and if the amount in dispute (including tax, penalties,
additions to tax and additional amounts) exceeds $2 million. Sec. 7623(b)(5), 120 Stat. 2960.
4 The 2006 legislation also requires the Secretary to provide an annual report to Congress on
whistleblower claims filed and awards issued under sec. 7623. Tax Relief and Health Care Act
of 2006, Pub. L. 109–432, div. A, sec. 406(c), 120 Stat. 2960.
5 IRM pt. 25.2.2 was updated on June 18, 2010, to provide additional guidance for evaluating
a whistleblower claim.
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(70) COOPER v. COMMISSIONER 75
the Whistleblower Office once an award decision has been
made. See id. pt. 25.2.2.5(13).
II. Analysis
We must now decide whether respondent’s letter con-
stituted a determination under section 7623(b)(4).
Respondent argues that there was no award determination
because petitioner’s information was not used to detect
underpayments of tax or to collect proceeds. Respondent
argues that there can be a determination for jurisdictional
purposes only if the Whistleblower Office undertakes an
administrative or judicial action and thereafter ‘‘determines’’
to make an award. Respondent incorrectly interprets section
7623(b)(4). The statute expressly permits an individual to
seek judicial review in this Court of the amount or denial of
an award determination. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax-
ation, Technical Explanation of H.R. 6408, The ‘‘Tax Relief
and Health Care Act of 2006’’, at 89 (J. Comm. Print 2006)
(‘‘The provision permits an individual to appeal the amount
or a denial of an award determination to the United States
Tax Court * * * within 30 days of such determination.’’).
Accordingly, we find that our jurisdiction is not limited to the
amount of an award determination but includes any deter-
mination to deny an award.
Respondent further contends that the letter was not a
determination because it was not labeled a determination.
We find the labeling not dispositive. We have held that the
name or label of a document does not control whether the
document constitutes a determination. See Wilson v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. 47 (2008). Moreover, we have held in
other contexts that our jurisdiction is established when the
Commissioner issues a written notice that embodies a deter-
mination. Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252 (2002) (a form
decision letter issued after an ‘‘equivalent hearing’’ con-
stituted a ‘‘determination’’ conferring jurisdiction under sec-
tion 6330(d)(1)); Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 159, 164
(2001) (a written notice to proceed with the collection action
constitutes a determination); Offiler v. Commissioner, 114
T.C. 492, 498 (2000) (a determination notice is the jurisdic-
tional equivalent of a deficiency notice pursuant to section
6212).
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76 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (70)
Respondent’s letter was issued in accordance with the
award determination procedures. These procedures were
established in the IRM and Notice 2008–4. Respondent issued
the letter to petitioner after receiving and reviewing the
whistleblower claims. Respondent issued the letter to peti-
tioner after several months of investigating whether to
pursue the claims. The letter states respondent’s final conclu-
sion that petitioner is not entitled to an award and provides
an explanation for this conclusion. Moreover, respondent’s
reasons for denying the claim are taken verbatim from the
IRM list of possible reasons for denying claims. See IRM pt.
25.2.2.12(2). There is no dispute that the letter put Mr.
Cooper on sufficient notice to file a petition with this Court
as he did so timely. Respondent’s letter is therefore a deter-
mination because it constitutes a final administrative deci-
sion regarding petitioner’s whistleblower claims in accord-
ance with the established procedures. Accordingly, we find
that we have jurisdiction to review the denial of the claims.
For the foregoing reasons, we shall deny respondent’s
motions to dismiss.
Appropriate orders will be issued.
APPENDIX
Section 7623(b) provides as follows:
SEC. 7623(b). AWARDS TO WHISTLEBLOWERS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Secretary proceeds with any administrative or
judicial action described in subsection (a) based on information brought
to the Secretary’s attention by an individual, such individual shall, sub-
ject to paragraph (2), receive as an award at least 15 percent but not
more than 30 percent of the collected proceeds * * * resulting from the
action * * * or from any settlement in response to such action. The
determination of the amount of such award by the Whistleblower Office
shall depend upon the extent to which the individual substantially
contributed to such action.
(2) AWARD IN CASE OF LESS SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—In the event the action described in paragraph (1)
is one which the Whistleblower Office determines to be based prin-
cipally on disclosures of specific allegations (other than information
provided by the individual described in paragraph (1)) resulting from
a judicial or administrative hearing, from a governmental report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the Whistle-
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(70) COOPER v. COMMISSIONER 77
blower Office may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but
in no case more than 10 percent of the collected proceeds (including
penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts) resulting
from the action (including any related actions) or from any settlement
in response to such action, taking into account the significance of the
individual’s information and the role of such individual and any legal
representative of such individual in contributing to such action.
(B) NONAPPLICATION OF PARAGRAPH WHERE INDIVIDUAL IS ORIGINAL
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if the
information resulting in the initiation of the action described in para-
graph (1) was originally provided by the individual described in para-
graph (1).
(3) REDUCTION IN OR DENIAL OF AWARD.—If the Whistleblower Office
determines that the claim for an award under paragraph (1) or (2) is
brought by an individual who planned and initiated the actions that led
to the underpayment of tax or actions described in subsection (a)(2), then
the Whistleblower Office may appropriately reduce such award. If such
individual is convicted of criminal conduct arising from the role
described in the preceding sentence, the Whistleblower Office shall deny
any award.
(4) APPEAL OF AWARD DETERMINATION.—Any determination regarding
an award under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) may, within 30 days of such
determination, be appealed to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall
have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).
(5) APPLICATION OF THIS SUBSECTION.—This subsection shall apply
with respect to any action—
(A) against any taxpayer, but in the case of any individual, only if
such individual’s gross income exceeds $200,000 for any taxable year
subject to such action, and
(B) if the tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional
amounts in dispute exceed $2,000,000.
(6) ADDITIONAL RULES.—
(A) NO CONTRACT NECESSARY.—No contract with the Internal Rev-
enue Service is necessary for any individual to receive an award under
this subsection.
(B) REPRESENTATION.—Any individual described in paragraph (1) or
(2) may be represented by counsel.
(C) SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION.—No award may be made under
this subsection based on information submitted to the Secretary unless
such information is submitted under penalty of perjury.
f
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