T.C. Memo. 2010-187
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
BONNIE LOU MACGREGOR, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 12150-08. Filed August 23, 2010.
Bonnie Lou MacGregor, pro se.
Davis G. Yee, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
MARVEL, Judge: In a notice of deficiency dated February 11,
2008, respondent determined the following deficiencies and
additions to tax with respect to petitioner’s Federal income tax:
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Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1) Sec. 6651(a)(2) Sec. 6654
2001 $17,215 $3,873 $4,304 $688
2002 15,495 3,486 3,874 518
2003 6,171 1,388 1,419 162
2004 6,540 1,635 to be determined 190
2005 2,251 563 to be determined 90
Petitioner timely filed a petition contesting respondent’s
determinations. After concessions,1 the issues for decision are:
(1) Whether and to what extent petitioner failed to report income
for the years at issue; (2) whether and to what extent petitioner
is entitled to business expense deductions with respect to her
business activities; and (3) whether petitioner is liable for
additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1)2 for failing to file
her 2001-2005 Federal income tax returns, section 6651(a)(2) for
failing to pay her 2001-2005 Federal income tax liabilities, and
section 6654 for failing to pay estimated tax for the years at
issue.3
1
On brief petitioner states that respondent’s “estimate for
rent in 2001 and 2002 is about right, in round numbers.”
Petitioner also states that “estimates for Social Security
benefits are, I assume, correct” and the “estimate for dividends
are close enough for our purposes.” We construe these statements
as petitioner’s concessions with respect to the adjustments to
rental income in 2001 and 2002, Social Security income in 2001-
2003, and dividends in 2003.
2
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the years at
issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure. All monetary amounts have been rounded
to the nearest dollar.
3
Other adjustments proposed in the notice of deficiency are
(continued...)
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FINDINGS OF FACT
None of the facts have been stipulated because petitioner
refused to stipulate as required by Rule 91. Petitioner resided
in California when she filed her petition. During the years at
issue petitioner was not married and had no dependents.
I. Petitioner’s Background and Businesses
Petitioner graduated from college in 1961. Petitioner then
attended graduate courses in education at the University of
Washington for 1 year but did not complete her graduate degree.
Petitioner taught at the high school level, and in 1965-72 she
worked for IBM. After working for Royal Typewriter and Xerox in
the field of office automation, petitioner worked on a startup
team for a small company for 10 years. After a period of
unemployment petitioner established an independent consulting
practice. Between 1982 and 1994 petitioner owned and operated a
restaurant. At some point after 1994 petitioner became an
independent consultant in the restaurant and office management
industries.
During the years at issue petitioner, in addition to
operating her consulting business, occasionally worked part time
3
(...continued)
computational. With respect to the standard deductions allowed
for 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005 petitioner does not assert nor
does the record allow us to conclude that the itemized deductions
are greater than the standard deduction.
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for some clients. Petitioner depended mostly on word-of-mouth
advertising.
Petitioner did not keep a ledger, journal, or cash receipts
book to record receipts generated by her business. Petitioner
did not routinely issue any invoices or statements to her
customers and instead told her customers what they owed.
Petitioner used her bank statements to keep track of her income.
When customers paid petitioner by check, she usually deposited
the checks at a bank. Sometimes she cashed checks and deposited
cash at the bank only when needed. Once or twice customers paid
petitioner in cash, in which case petitioner put the payment in a
box at her house and deposited the money in her bank account when
needed.
In addition to running her consulting business, petitioner
marketed educational materials, such as lectures and seminars.
Petitioner either developed the educational materials herself or
purchased them from professional groups. This business involved
mostly telemarketing. Petitioner incurred various expenses
related to this business. She purchased prospect lists and
incurred costs for online back office, online training costs, and
online referral sites. In 2001 and 2002 petitioner incurred $620
of expenses related to this business.
In 2001-2002 petitioner worked part time for Leon Felton
(Mr. Felton) managing his personal assets. Petitioner deposited
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in her accounts checks from Mr. Felton totaling $36,111. Of
those deposits, several checks totaling $427 and $287 in 2001 and
2002, respectively, were reimbursements for various expenses.
In 2000-2004 petitioner owned a condominium at 799 Dahlia
Street, unit 601, Denver, Colorado (Denver condominium).
Petitioner purchased the Denver condominium for $89,900.
Petitioner partially financed the purchase by a nonrecourse loan,
which was secured by a mortgage on the property. Petitioner
began renting out the Denver condominium in 2001 but evicted the
tenants at some point in 2002. In 2004 the bank foreclosed on
the property. At the time of the foreclosure sale, the balance
of the nonrecourse loan was $86,000. Besides the mortgage
interest deduction that respondent allowed, petitioner incurred
expenses related to the Denver condominium totaling $371, $5,043,
and $2,792 in 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively.
In the 1990s petitioner invested in J-Mac Enterprises, a
real estate partnership. Petitioner owned the interest until the
partnership dissolved in 2004. Upon partnership dissolution,
petitioner received checks totaling $17,425 which she deposited
in her account.
At various points during the years at issue petitioner
maintained checking accounts in her name at Bank of America,
Northern Trust Bank of California (Northern Trust), and Bank of
Marin. In 2001-2005 petitioner also maintained a checking
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account at Northern Trust under the name “Highlander Clan”, which
was a trust that petitioner had set up. Petitioner was listed on
this account as a director.
Petitioner made deposits into the accounts as follows:4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Northern Trust
(trust) $40,526 $33,452 $6,826 $23,819 $2,927
Northern Trust
(personal) -0- 951 100 4,471 2,388
Bank of America 34,573 2,871 -0- -0- -0-
Bank of Marin -0- 29,706 24,549 -0- -0-
Total 75,099 66,980 31,475 28,290 5,315
In 2003, 2004, and 2005 petitioner’s cash expenditures
totaled $4,150, $11,049, and $9,398, respectively.5 Petitioner
occasionally withdrew cash or wrote checks payable either to
herself or to cash. Her withdrawals were as follows:
Checks payable Total
Year Cash to cash withdrawals
2001 $1,400 $5,600 $7,000
2002 800 25,311 26,111
2003 100 1,300 1,400
2004 3,125 -0- 3,125
2005 2,064 -0- 2,064
4
Consistent with respondent’s bank deposits analysis, we do
not include returned checks, credits and refunds, interaccount
transfers, a check from Title Services, Inc., and a check marked
as “for payment of escrow to mortgagor” in the deposits analysis.
5
The record contains only the totals of the receipts, but
petitioner does not allege that respondent calculated her cash
expenditures incorrectly.
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II. Substitute Returns Under Section 6020(b)
Beginning with her 1999 taxable year petitioner stopped
filing Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, and she
had not filed Forms 1040 to the date of trial. Petitioner never
made any estimated tax payments because “she did not know what
to estimate.”
Respondent undertook to reconstruct petitioner’s income by
analyzing petitioner’s bank deposits in 2001-2005 and cash
purchases in 2003-2005.6 Respondent treated petitioner’s cash
purchases in 2003-2005 as income on the ground that petitioner
must have had income in cash at least in the amount that she
spent which she never deposited. Respondent determined that
petitioner’s cash purchases totaled $4,150, $11,049, and $9,398
in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively, and he treated these
amounts as part of petitioner’s income subject to self-
employment tax.
Respondent then used the bank deposits and cash
expenditures analysis to prepare substitute returns under
section 6020(b) for petitioner’s years in issue. In the notice
of deficiency dated February 11, 2008, respondent determined
that petitioner’s taxable income was as follows:
6
Petitioner provided respondent with receipts for her
purchases, such as food, phone, clothing, and other.
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Year Taxable Income
2001 $59,877
2002 47,601
2003 18,885
2004 46,131
2005 3,230
Respondent also determined that petitioner was liable for
additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654.
Petitioner timely petitioned this Court to redetermine the
deficiencies and additions to tax. At trial respondent
introduced into evidence bank statements, copies of canceled
checks, deposit slips, withdrawal slips, and other financial
documents with respect to petitioner’s bank accounts. The
records were authenticated by the testimony of the banks’
custodians of the records.
OPINION
I. Procedural Matters
The primary issues in this case are the extent of
petitioner’s unreported income and whether petitioner is
entitled to any business deductions other than the ones
respondent allowed. Petitioner, who has the burden of proof,
see Rule 142(a), brought only a few documents to trial. She
raised a potentially legitimate cash hoard defense to the bank
deposits method of income reconstruction but failed to introduce
any credible evidence as to how much money she had on hand at
the beginning of each year at issue or what portion of that cash
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she deposited into her bank accounts. Petitioner testified that
she incurred various expenses for her businesses, but she did
not introduce any credible evidence regarding those expenses and
on brief failed to cite any specific references to the record to
support her assertions. When questioned by the Court about
expenses she incurred in 2003, petitioner could not recall and
stated: “I ran out of time to continue going through what I
have to make even these summary sheets like I did for ’01 and
’02. It was midnight last night when I was working on this.”
Petitioner’s lack of preparation is a problem of her own
making because she had adequate notice of the trial date.
Respondent mailed petitioner the notice of deficiency on
February 11, 2008, and petitioner mailed her petition on May 12,
2008. On December 5, 2008, more than 5 months before the trial
date, we served petitioner with a notice setting case for trial
in San Francisco, California, at the session beginning on May
11, 2009.7 Petitioner failed to comply with the Court’s orders
to prepare her case for trial and either obtain counsel or
undertake a good faith effort to prepare for trial herself.
On May 7, 2009, less than a week before the May 11, 2009,
date set for trial, the Court received petitioner’s motion for
continuance. Rule 133 provides that a motion for continuance
filed within 30 days of the trial date will be denied unless the
7
Petitioner did not recall receiving these documents.
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ground for continuance arose during that period or there is a
good reason for not having made the motion sooner.8 Petitioner
filed the motion on the ground that after receiving respondent’s
proposed stipulations on April 17, 2009, she realized that she
was unprepared to handle a trial by herself and would seek the
assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s motion was dilatory, and we
denied the motion. Petitioner’s delay in preparation for trial
or hiring counsel until receiving respondent’s proposed
stipulations may not serve as a ground for continuance. See
Rule 133. We explained to petitioner during a pretrial
conference call and at trial that we denied the motion because
it was untimely and because petitioner did not do anything to
prepare for trial.9
8
Rule 133 provides in part:
Continuances will be granted only in exceptional
circumstances. * * * A motion for continuance, filed
30 days or less prior to the date to which it is
directed, may be set for hearing on that date, but
ordinarily will be deemed dilatory and will be denied
unless the ground therefor arose during that period or
there was good reason for not making the motion sooner.
* * *
9
As we observed in another context in Brooks v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 413, 429-430 (1984), affd. without
published opinion 772 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1985):
The Office of the Court is in Washington, D.C., but
trial sessions are held in various cities * * * for the
convenience of the parties. Secs. 7445, 7446; Rules
10, 140. When cases are at issue, they are scheduled
on the next available calendar in the place requested
(continued...)
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When this case was called for trial at the calendar call,
petitioner stated that she was not ready to proceed to trial
that week. Petitioner also faxed documents entitled “Motion for
Reconsideration and Certificate of Unpreparedness”. Petitioner
sought to file the same documents again during trial. Because
such documents are not proper documents under the Rules, we
directed that the documents not be filed but construed them as a
request for continuance. We explained to petitioner during
trial that continuances are granted only in exceptional
circumstances and because petitioner did not do anything to
prepare the case for trial, we would not grant a continuance.
9
(...continued)
for trial, generally in order of filing, and notice of
trial is sent. * * * The judge, trial clerk, and
reporter are assigned, and the courtroom space is
reserved. When a case set for trial is not resolved
during a trial session in which time has been set aside
for it, a substantial waste of the Court’s resources
results.
Delays also affect other taxpayers who are
awaiting the opportunity to have their cases heard.
Only a certain number of cases can be placed on any
particular trial calendar. Each time that a case
scheduled for trial does not proceed, time is wasted
that could have been spent on other cases if they could
have been scheduled. Respondent’s counsel is required
to spend time preparing cases for trial which could be
spent working with taxpayers on other cases and
attempting to settle them. These unnecessary burdens
on the system are unreasonable and unfair from the
standpoint of everyone involved. [Citations and fn.
refs. omitted.]
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Throughout the calendar call and the trial and on brief
petitioner lamented that the Court “required her to defend
herself without assistance of counsel” while she is incapable of
doing so and blamed her unpreparedness on appearing without
counsel. In petitioner’s words, she “did not feel capable of
conducting * * * trial” and she could not afford counsel.10
In addition to failing to prepare for trial, petitioner
refused to cooperate with respondent’s counsel in the
stipulation process. Respondent’s counsel drafted numerous
stipulations of facts, but petitioner refused to sign them and
to stipulate the exhibits. After the calendar call, on May 15,
2009, respondent’s counsel again contacted petitioner regarding
the stipulations of facts before the trial was scheduled to
commence. However, petitioner again refused to sign the
stipulations. Instead, petitioner offered a two-paragraph
stipulation that respondent’s counsel did not sign because it
failed to encompass all of petitioner’s bank records.
As noted above, on December 5, 2008, we served petitioner
with a notice setting case for trial in San Francisco,
California, at the session beginning on May 11, 2009. The
notice directed the parties to “agree in writing to all facts
and all documents about which there should be no disagreement.”
10
At calendar call the Court encouraged petitioner to
consult one of the two volunteer attorneys who were present and
could have assisted her in reviewing stipulations.
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The notice was accompanied by the Court’s standing pretrial
order which required the parties to cooperate and stipulate
facts to the maximum extent possible. The standing pretrial
order states in pertinent part:
The parties shall begin discussions as soon as
practicable for purposes of settlement and/or
preparation of a stipulation of facts. * * * All
minor issues should be settled so that the Court can
focus on the issue(s) needing a Court decision.
* * * * * * *
Continuances will be granted only in exceptional
circumstances. See Rule 133, Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedures. (The Court’s Rules are
available at www.ustaxcourt.gov.) Even joint motions
for continuance will not routinely be granted.
* * * * * * *
To facilitate an orderly and efficient disposition of
all cases on the trial calendar, it is hereby
ORDERED that all facts shall be stipulated to the
maximum extent possible. * * * Objections may be
preserved in the stipulation. If a complete
stipulation of facts is not ready for submission at
the commencement of the trial or at such other time
ordered by the Court, and if the Court determines that
this is the result of either party’s failure to fully
cooperate in the preparation thereof, the Court may
order sanctions against the uncooperative party.
See also Rule 91(a). Petitioner’s refusal to stipulate and
failure to prepare for trial violated the Court’s standing
pretrial order.
At trial and on brief petitioner stated that she did not
know what respondent’s case would consist of, what witnesses
would testify, and what arguments respondent would rely on.
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Petitioner’s complaint is ungrounded. Forms 4549-A, Income Tax
Discrepancy Adjustments, attached to the notice of deficiency,
set out respondent’s adjustments. Petitioner received the Forms
4549-A along with the notice of deficiency on or after February
11, 2008, more than 1 year before the May 11, 2009, trial.
Petitioner also received respondent’s pretrial memorandum, which
set forth the issues in the case, witnesses that respondent
expected to call, summary of the facts, and synopsis of legal
authorities on which respondent relied.
II. Burden of Proof
The Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of deficiency
are presumed correct, and the taxpayer generally bears the
burden of showing they are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, to which an appeal in this case would
lie, absent a stipulation to the contrary, see sec.
7482(b)(1)(A), has held that for the presumption of correctness
to attach to the notice of deficiency in unreported income
cases, the Commissioner must establish “some evidentiary
foundation” connecting the taxpayer with the income-producing
activity, see Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 361-
362 (9th Cir. 1979), revg. 67 T.C. 672 (1977), or demonstrating
that the taxpayer actually received unreported income, Edwards
v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270-1271 (9th Cir. 1982)
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(holding that the Commissioner’s assertion of a deficiency is
presumptively correct once some substantive evidence is
introduced demonstrating that the taxpayer received unreported
income). If the Commissioner introduces some evidence that the
taxpayer received unreported income, the burden shifts to the
taxpayer, who must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the deficiency was arbitrary or erroneous. See Hardy v.
Commissioner, 181 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1997-97.
Petitioner deposited cash into her bank accounts, and bank
deposits evidence receipt of income. See Tokarski v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986). In addition, respondent
has introduced evidence that petitioner had income-producing
activities during the years at issue. Accordingly, the burden
of production shifted to petitioner to prove that respondent’s
adjustments in the notice of deficiency were arbitrary or
erroneous. Consequently, petitioner bears the burden of proof
and the burden of production with respect to all adjustments
affecting her liability for the tax deficiencies. In addition,
petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a) shifts the
burden of proof to respondent, nor does the record establish
that petitioner satisfies the section 7491(a)(2) requirements.
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III. Petitioner’s Income for 2001-2005
A. In General
Section 6001 requires a taxpayer to maintain sufficient
records to allow the determination of the taxpayer’s correct tax
liability. Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 686 (1989).
Petitioner failed to fulfill that responsibility.
When a taxpayer fails to keep adequate books and records,
the Commissioner is authorized to determine the existence and
amount of the taxpayer’s income by any method that clearly
reflects income. See sec. 446(b); Petzoldt v. Commissioner,
supra at 693. The Commissioner may use indirect methods, and he
is given latitude in determining which method of reconstruction
to apply when a taxpayer fails to maintain adequate books and
records. Petzoldt v. Commissioner, supra at 693. The
Commissioner’s reconstruction of a taxpayer’s income need only
be reasonable in the light of all surrounding facts and
circumstances. Id. at 687 (citing Giddio v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 1530, 1533 (1970), and Schroeder v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.
30, 33 (1963)).
One of the indirect methods of reconstructing income is the
bank deposits method. “The use of the bank deposit method for
computing income has long been sanctioned by the courts.”
Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651, 656 (1975), affd.
566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977). Bank deposits constitute prima
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facie evidence of income. Tokarski v. Commissioner, supra at
77; see also Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 645 (1994).
When a taxpayer keeps inadequate or incomplete books or records
and has large bank deposits, the Commissioner is not acting
arbitrarily or capriciously by resorting to the bank deposits
method. See DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 867-868 (1991),
affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992). The bank deposits method of
reconstruction assumes that all of the deposits into a
taxpayer’s account are taxable income unless the taxpayer can
show that the deposits are not taxable. See id. at 868; see
also Price v. United States, 335 F.2d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 1964).
The Commissioner need not show a likely source of the income
when using the bank deposits method, but the Commissioner must
take into account any nontaxable items or deductible expenses of
which the Commissioner has knowledge. See Price v. United
States, supra at 677.
Respondent introduced adequate evidence to show that
petitioner received unreported income in 2001-2005. The record
contains canceled checks, bank statements, deposit slips, and
other documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that at various
times during the years at issue she rented out her condominium,
engaged in the business of selling educational materials, worked
for Mr. Felton, offered services as an independent consultant,
and occasionally worked part time for various clients. We find
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that it was reasonable for respondent to use an indirect method,
i.e., the bank deposits and cash expenditures method, to
reconstruct petitioner’s income. Accordingly, the burden of
proof falls on petitioner to demonstrate that respondent’s
determinations are arbitrary or erroneous.
For each year at issue respondent applied the bank deposits
method. Respondent identified four bank accounts that
petitioner used in 2001-2005 and summoned the bank records.
Respondent analyzed each account and performed a bank deposits
analysis to identify unreported gross income. He totaled all
deposits into petitioner’s accounts during the years at issue.
Respondent’s revenue agent Michelle Jirasek (Ms. Jirasek)
credibly testified, and her bank deposits analysis spreadsheet
supports her testimony, that she eliminated from taxable
deposits the items that she identified as nontaxable, such as
interaccount transfers or returned checks.
With respect to 2003-2005 respondent also analyzed
petitioner’s expenditures in reconstructing her income. The
cash expenditures method assumes that the amount by which a
taxpayer’s expenditures during the relevant period exceed
reported income has taxable origins absent some explanation by
the taxpayer. Petzoldt v. Commissioner, supra at 694. The
relevant issue in a cash expenditures analysis is whether any
expenditures in excess of reported income can be attributed to
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assets available at the beginning of the relevant period or to
nontaxable receipts, such as loans, gifts, or inheritances. Id.
at 695 (citing Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 566
(1st Cir. 1968), affd. 394 U.S. 316 (1969)).
At trial respondent introduced a spreadsheet documenting
the bank deposits and cash expenditures analysis and copies of
petitioner’s bank statements, canceled checks, and deposit
slips. The burden is on petitioner to show that respondent’s
analysis is unfair or inaccurate. See Price v. United States,
supra at 677; Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. at 697.
Alternatively, petitioner may demonstrate a nontaxable source
for the cash. See Price v. Commissioner, supra at 677; Petzoldt
v. Commissioner, supra at 696-697. In sum, we accept
respondent’s reconstruction of petitioner’s income as reasonable
and accurate with the exception of the items addressed below.
B. Disputed Items of Income
The following items of income remain in dispute:
Item 2001 2002 2003 2004
2006
Other income--
not subject to self-
employment tax $22,171 -0- -0- -0- -0-
Other income--subject to
self-employment tax 31,360 $44,515 $26,118 $15,878 $13,644
Capital gain -0- -0- -0- 40,525 -0-
We consider each adjustment below.
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1. Other Income--Not Subject to Self-Employment Tax
(2001)
Petitioner contends that the $22,171 she received in 2001
represented proceeds of a personal injury settlement and is not
taxable. Generally, section 61(a) includes in gross income “all
income from whatever source derived” unless excluded by a specific
provision of the Code. This section is construed broadly to
encompass any accession to a taxpayer’s wealth. Commissioner v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327-328 (1995); United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426, 430 (1955). Exclusions from gross income are matters of
legislative grace and are construed narrowly to maximize the
taxation of any accession to wealth. United States v. Burke,
supra at 248 (Souter, J., concurring). Section 104(a)(2) excludes
from gross income “the amount of any damages (other than punitive
damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as
lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical
injuries or physical sickness”.
Where damages are received pursuant to a settlement
agreement, the nature of the claim that was the basis for the
settlement determines whether the damages are excludable from
gross income under section 104(a)(2). United States v. Burke,
supra at 237. To be excludable from gross income under section
104(a)(2), a settlement award must be paid to a taxpayer on
account of physical injury or physical sickness. See, e.g.,
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Longoria v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-162. The determination
of the underlying nature of the claim is factual and generally is
made by reference to the settlement agreement in the light of the
surrounding circumstances. Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.
116, 126 (1994), affd. in part, revd. in part and remanded on
another issue 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995); Seay v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 32, 37 (1972).
To justify excluding the $22,171 from income under section
104, petitioner must show the nature of the claim which was the
actual basis for the settlement and that her settlement proceeds
were in lieu of damages for physical injuries or physical
sickness. The record contains a copy of the check from Vasquez &
Vasquez. The check memo line notes: “MacGregor v. Alpine”.
Petitioner also attached to her brief a document entitled
“Settlement Statement” which purports to summarize the
calculation of the settlement amount. Petitioner did not offer
the settlement statement, which references medical bills and has
the handwritten notation “Foot injury”, in evidence at the trial.
A document that is attached to a posttrial brief but not admitted
into evidence at trial is not part of the record, and the
taxpayer may not rely on such a document. See Rule 143(c);
Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 114, 123 n.11 (2003).
Although petitioner appears in this proceeding pro se, her
failure to cooperate in preparing this case for trial gives us no
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reason to disregard our Rules. See Lopez v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2001-93. Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination
with respect to this adjustment.
2. Other Income--Subject to Self-Employment Tax
(2001-2005)
We summarize our findings with respect to respondent’s bank
deposits analysis in the appendix.
a. Petitioner’s Challenges
Relying on the bank deposits and cash expenditures analysis,
respondent determined petitioner’s category of income “Other
income--subject to self-employment tax” as follows:
Item 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cash $5,540 $17,713 $8,843 $2,574 $1,973
Paypal -0- -0- 2,550 -0- -0-
Mr. Felton 17,654 19,117 -0- -0- -0-
I-Promotion -0- 282 605 -0- -0-
Other 6,541 7,404 9,969 2,256 2,273
Elliot Mgmt. 1,625 -0- -0- -0- -0-
Cash expenditures -0- -0- 4,150 11,049 9,398
1 1 1
Total 31,360 44,516 26,117 15,879 13,644
1
The discrepancy with the notice of deficiency is due to
rounding.
For 2003, 2004, and 2005 respondent also added cash expenditures
of $4,150, $11,049, and $9,398, respectively.
Petitioner contests respondent’s determinations of the
amounts of income subject to self-employment tax. First,
petitioner contends that the checks from Mr. Felton deposited on
March 26 and July 9, 2002, were repayments of loans she had
advanced to him. The disputed checks bear notations “IGP GII
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Seminar Purchase”, “IGP GI Course”, and “Final”. Petitioner made
self-serving statements in her posttrial brief in support of her
argument but presented no evidence at trial that these checks were
repayment of loans. See Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. at 77.
Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination with respect to
these checks.
Second, petitioner contends that respondent failed to connect
amounts of cash deposits, “other deposits”, and cash expenditures
with an income-producing activity. Whether the Commissioner
produces evidence that the taxpayer received income affects the
allocation of the burden of proof, rather than the taxpayer’s
liability. Cf. Hardy v. Commissioner, 181 F.3d at 1004-1005. If
the Commissioner introduces some evidence that the taxpayer
received unreported income, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the deficiency was
arbitrary or erroneous. Kudo v. Commissioner, 11 Fed. Appx. 864,
866 (9th Cir. 2001), affg. T.C. Memo. 1998-404; Hardy v.
Commissioner, supra at 1004. Respondent produced evidence of
unreported income, see supra p. 17, and the record contains
evidence that petitioner engaged in income-producing activities
during the years at issue. Petitioner bears both the burden of
production and the ultimate burden of proof. We reject
petitioner’s argument that respondent failed to link the
unreported income with an income-producing activity.
- 24 -
Third, petitioner challenges respondent’s bank deposits
analysis on the ground that at trial respondent failed to explain
how he arrived at the amounts. Petitioner’s argument is
unfounded. At trial Ms. Jirasek explained how she calculated the
total amounts of income subject to self-employment tax for 2001
and 2002 and how the spreadsheet, which is part of the record,
supports her calculations. She also addressed how she calculated
petitioner’s cash expenditures for 2004 and then stated that she
used a similar process for other years. Respondent explained his
methodology with sufficient clarity, and we reject petitioner’s
argument.
b. Additional Findings With Respect to the Bank
Deposits Analysis11
Upon our review of petitioner’s bank records and
respondent’s bank deposits analysis, we also find as follows:12
11
The parties did not address the items discussed in this
part.
12
In addition to our findings in this section, we note that
we included the $660 check deposited on Mar. 21, 2002, as part of
the “other” category, rather than a payment from Mr. Felton
because the relevant check was issued to petitioner by Sausalito
Art Festival, LLC. The correction, however, does not change the
amount of income subject to self-employment tax.
Petitioner’s $100 deposit on Aug. 28, 2002, is properly
included in the “other” category of deposits rather than
nontaxable credit/refund. However, because respondent does not
assert an increased deficiency on brief with respect to this
deposit, we shall disregard the deposit in our analysis.
Petitioner’s $74 deposit dated Sept. 15, 2003, into her Bank
(continued...)
- 25 -
• For 2002 we decreased deposits into petitioner’s Bank
of Marin account by $316, which represents the total of
checks deposited on April 11 and July 9, 2002, because
the notations on the checks show those payments were
refunds.13
• We increased petitioner’s 2003 cash deposits by a $10
deposit into Bank of Marin dated August 29, 2003,
because respondent’s summary sheet omitted that
deposit.
• We decreased petitioner’s 2001 “other” deposits into the
trust account at the Northern Trust by $10 because the
record establishes the relevant check was in the amount
of $153 but was recorded in the analysis as
$163.
• We excluded a $500 deposit dated March 8, 2004, from
deposits into petitioner’s Northern Trust personal
account because the record establishes it was a
nontaxable transfer from petitioner’s trust account at
Northern Trust.
12
(...continued)
of Marin account bears the notation “postage for volunteer
letters”, but petitioner did not argue that this deposit is
nontaxable. Because petitioner bears the burden of proof, see
Rule 142, we sustain respondent’s determination with respect to
this item.
13
As refunds, such amounts do not represent income to
petitioner, and accordingly should not be part of deposits.
- 26 -
• We find that petitioner withdrew $500 from the trust
account on March 8, 2004, rather than $1,000 as
respondent determined.
• We find that on April 22, 2004, petitioner deposited
$354 of her Social Security check into the trust account
and withdrew $200 from the trust account. Respondent
had determined that on that date petitioner deposited
$854 and withdrew $500 from the trust
account.
• We find that on August 18, 2004, petitioner deposited
$754 of her Social Security check into the trust account
and withdrew $354. Respondent had determined that
petitioner deposited $854 and withdrew $454 from
the trust account.
• We find that on October 5, 2005, petitioner deposited
$753 of her Social Security check into the trust account
and withdrew $553. Respondent had determined
that petitioner had deposited $200.
• We exclude from the taxable deposits checks from Mr.
Felton totaling $427 and $287 that petitioner deposited
in 2001 and 2002, respectively, into her Bank of Marin
and Bank of America accounts. These checks bear
notations “reimb.-office supplies and equipment”,
“reimbursement-postage”, or a similar notation, and we
- 27 -
find Mr. Felton reimbursed petitioner for various
supplies, postage, or similar expenses.
c. The Cash Hoard and Redeposit Defenses
Petitioner contends on brief that respondent’s bank deposits
and cash expenditures analysis is unreliable because it ignores
the cash petitioner had on hand at the beginning of 2001.
Petitioner also claims that she had some assets offshore at the
beginning of 2001.14 Petitioner claims she prefers “the
anonymity of cash” to maintain her privacy and has kept
“significant sums in cash rather than in the bank” for at least
10 years. Petitioner testified and states on brief that in 2000
she sold her houseboat at a profit of over $100,000 and kept a
large part of the proceeds in cash. Petitioner claims that she
spent $33,220 of that cash when she purchased her Denver
condominium. Petitioner also states on brief that between 2000
and 2004 she invested $102,500 but lost her investments. At
trial petitioner estimated her real estate investments made with
cash, including the proceeds from the sale of the houseboat,
totaled approximately $225,000. According to petitioner, after
her investments she had approximately $5,000 or $6,000, and on
14
Petitioner’s application for a mortgage for the purchase
of the Denver condominium indicates that her assets offshore
totaled “100M”. Petitioner acknowledges that at the beginning of
2001 she had assets offshore but disputes that “100M” referred to
$100 million. We need not resolve the dispute regarding the
amount of cash petitioner had offshore because we reject the cash
hoard defense for lack of credible evidence in the record.
- 28 -
several occasions in 2003-2005 she deposited some of that cash
into her bank accounts. According to petitioner, she used her
“cash stash” to pay living expenses.
Petitioner failed to present any credible evidence to
corroborate her testimony. She presented no documentary evidence
that she sold her houseboat and received the proceeds in cash. No
witnesses with knowledge of petitioner’s cash at home testified at
trial. Petitioner did not explain the source of the over $200,000
she claimed she invested in real estate, nor did she credibly
quantify her gain from the sale of the houseboat; she testified
that it was $100,000. Even if we were to accept that petitioner
had cash on hand, petitioner failed to establish how much cash she
had at the beginning of each year at issue.
Although her argument is not entirely clear, petitioner
appears to challenge the bank deposits analysis on the ground
that she redeposited the cash she had withdrawn from her
accounts. The record supports a finding that in 2001-2005
petitioner withdrew $39,700 from her accounts and deposited
$35,953.15 However, on this record we cannot conclude that
petitioner’s cash deposits and withdrawals represented a circular
flow of cash. While it is possible that petitioner redeposited
15
Respondent’s bank deposits analysis includes a column for
cash withdrawals, but the analysis ignores checks written to
petitioner or to cash. Because checks written to petitioner or
to cash are equivalent to cash withdrawals, we include all such
withdrawals in our analysis.
- 29 -
some cash, petitioner presented no credible evidence to establish
the extent of any redeposits, and the record does not allow us to
conclude that all cash deposits were in fact redeposits. It is
petitioner who bears the burden of proof, see Rule 142, and
petitioner failed to carry that burden and establish the extent of
her redeposits.
Petitioner also challenges respondent’s cash expenditures
analysis for 2003-2005 on the ground that she kept cash “outside
the banking system.” The relevant issue is whether any of
petitioner’s expenditures in 2003-2005 can be attributed to assets
available at the beginning of 2003 or to nontaxable receipts. See
Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. at 695 (citing Taglianetti v.
United States, 398 F.2d at 566). Petitioner testified that she
invested most of the sale proceeds and on several occasions
deposited the remaining $5,000 or $6,000 in 2003-2005 into her
bank accounts. This testimony contradicts petitioner’s proffered
explanation that she used the cash she had left after the
houseboat sale for living expenses.
The record reveals that petitioner’s withdrawals from her
bank account totaled $33,111 in 2001-2002 and $6,589 in 2003-
2005.16 However, the record contains no evidence to support a
16
On brief respondent contends that in the bank deposits
analysis he “accounted for certain cash deposits” and refers to
deposits that equaled petitioner’s cash withdrawals. However,
respondent’s bank deposits analysis shows that although
(continued...)
- 30 -
finding that the sources of funds for the cash expenditures were
in fact petitioner’s cash withdrawals.
It is the taxpayer’s responsibility to maintain adequate
records that would allow the determination of the taxpayer’s
correct tax liability. See sec. 6001; Petzoldt v. Commissioner,
supra at 686-687; sec. 1.446-1(a)(4), Income Tax Regs. As
discussed above, the Commissioner’s determination has the
presumption of correctness, and the taxpayer bears the burden of
proof. Rule 142(a). In the absence of any credible evidence
regarding a cash hoard, cash withdrawals as the source of funds
for the cash expenditures, or redeposits, we decline to infer that
petitioner either redeposited the cash she had previously
withdrawn or paid her expenses in 2003-2005 with that cash.
3. Capital Gain (2004)
In the notice of deficiency respondent determined that in
2004 petitioner had a $40,525 capital gain. Respondent explains
that this adjustment consists of a $23,100 gain on the
foreclosure of the Denver condominium and a $17,425 gain related
to the sale of petitioner’s interest in J-Mac Enterprises.
16
(...continued)
respondent subtracted cash withdrawals from the total daily
deposits, the cash withdrawals did not affect the categories of
taxable deposits. Because respondent did not use the total daily
deposits column for calculating taxable income and instead added
specific categories to calculate petitioner’s self-employment
income, we find that respondent did not factor cash withdrawals
into his bank deposits analysis.
- 31 -
a. Gain on the Foreclosure Sale
In general section 61(a)(3) provides that gross income
includes gains derived from dealings in property. Section
1001(a) provides that gain from the sale or other disposition of
property is the excess of the amount realized over the property’s
adjusted basis and that loss from the sale or other disposition
of property is the excess of the property’s adjusted basis over
the amount realized. The transfer of property in consideration
of the discharge or reduction of indebtedness is equivalent to
the sale of property upon which gain or loss is realized.17 See
Frazier v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 243, 245 (1998).
For purposes of calculating gain or loss, the amount
realized is the sum of any money received plus the fair market
value of the property received. Sec. 1001(b). Generally, and
subject to exceptions not relevant in this case, the amount
realized from a sale or other disposition of property includes
the amount of liabilities from which the transferor is discharged
17
A debtor’s transfer of property to a creditor in
satisfaction of a nonrecourse liability is treated as a sale or
other disposition of property, and any resulting income
constitutes gain on the disposition of property, rather than
discharge of indebtedness income. Coburn v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2005-283. On the other hand, a debtor’s transfer of
property subject to a recourse liability results in gain from the
sale or other disposition of property to the extent that the fair
market value of the property exceeds its basis and, to the extent
that the liability exceeds the property’s fair market value, the
debtor realizes discharge of indebtedness income. Frazier v.
Commissioner, 111 T.C. 243, 245 (1998); Coburn v. Commissioner,
supra.
- 32 -
as a result of the sale or disposition. Sec. 1.1001-2(a), Income
Tax Regs. The amount realized from the transfer of the property
in consideration of the discharge or reduction of indebtedness
depends on whether the liability is recourse or nonrecourse. See
Frazier v. Commissioner, supra at 245. If the liability is
nonrecourse, the amount realized includes the full amount of the
remaining debt, and the fair market value of the property is
irrelevant. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983);
Frazier v. Commissioner, supra at 245. If the debt is recourse,
the amount realized is the fair market value of the property.
Frazier v. Commissioner, supra at 245.
The mortgage documents are not in the record. Respondent
assumed in making his determination that petitioner’s liability
was nonrecourse, and petitioner does not disagree. In fact, on
brief petitioner agrees that the amount realized was $86,000 as
respondent determined. Accordingly, we shall not disturb
respondent’s determination that the loan was nonrecourse and the
amount petitioner realized on the foreclosure sale was $86,000.
Petitioner, however, challenges respondent’s determination
that her basis in the property was $62,900. At trial Ms. Jirasek
did not remember how she had calculated petitioner’s basis and
guessed she had done so using information in the original loan
document. The original loan document is not part of the record.
The record contains only a “Uniform Residential Loan Application
- 33 -
Charterwest Mortgage, LLC” dated April 17, 2002 (loan
application), that relates to refinancing of the Denver
condominium. The loan application shows the original cost of the
condominium was $89,900 and the amount of existing liens was
$62,900. The $89,900 original cost specified in the loan
application is consistent with petitioner’s testimony that she
paid $89,900 for the Denver condominium and that she used some
cash proceeds from the sale of her houseboat and borrowed the
rest. On the other hand, respondent’s determination that the
basis was $62,900 appears inconsistent with the loan application,
and at trial Ms. Jirasek could not explain how she had arrived at
that number. We find that petitioner’s basis was $89,900 and
petitioner had no gain on the foreclosure.
Petitioner also suggests that her basis in the Denver
condominium should include $6,000 she spent to replace the
windows. However, the record contains no credible evidence
documenting that petitioner replaced windows in the Denver
condominium or the cost thereof, and statements in brief are not
evidence. Rule 143(c). Accordingly, we conclude that
petitioner failed to prove that an adjustment to basis for window
replacements in the Denver condominium is appropriate.
b. Gain on the Sale of the Partnership Interest
Respondent determined that petitioner realized and must
recognize gain on the sale of her interest in J-Mac Enterprises
- 34 -
on the basis of two cashier’s checks totaling $17,425.
Petitioner contends that respondent improperly treated the
cashier’s check deposits as proceeds from the sale of her
interest in J-Mac Enterprises. We disagree.
The record contains a summary of Ms. Jirasek’s interview
with petitioner on December 13, 2007. The notes show that during
the interview Ms. Jirasek asked petitioner about the deposits
from Jefferson Title Co. and that petitioner stated those
deposits were probably from the buyout of her partnership
interest. Petitioner also provided Ms. Jirasek with a Schedule
K-1, Partner’s Share of Income, Deductions, Credits, etc., for J-
Mac Enterprises for 2004, which respondent introduced into
evidence. Ms. Jirasek concluded that the proceeds were from the
sale of a partnership interest because the Schedule K-1 was
marked as a final schedule.
Petitioner also argues that respondent failed to give her
credit for any basis in the partnership interest. Petitioner,
however, did not present any evidence at trial regarding her
basis in the partnership interest, nor did she testify as to how
much she had invested in J-Mac Enterprises. Petitioner relies on
a handwritten page purporting to show her contributions to the
partnership totaling $23,150 in 1990-2003 that she attached to
her posttrial brief. The bottom of the page bears a notation:
- 35 -
“7-03 Prepared by Kristine Jasiecki[18] & I agreed”.
Petitioner’s reliance on statements and documents that were not
introduced into evidence at trial is improper. See Rule 143(c).
We sustain respondent’s determination with respect to the capital
gain on the sale of the partnership interest for 2004.
IV. Petitioner’s Business Expenses for 2001-2005
Generally, deductions and credits are a matter of legislative
grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that she is
entitled to any deduction or credit claimed. Rule 142(a); New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). This
includes the burden of substantiation. Hradesky v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.
1976).
Section 162(a) allows a taxpayer to deduct ordinary and
necessary expenses of carrying on the taxpayer’s trade or
business. To be engaged in a trade or business with respect to
which deductions are allowable under section 162, “the taxpayer
must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity”,
and “the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity
must be for income or profit.” Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480
U.S. 23, 35 (1987). A sporadic activity or a hobby does not
qualify. Id. An expense is ordinary if it is normal, usual, or
18
The record establishes that Kristine Jasiecki was another
partner in J-Mac Enterprises.
- 36 -
customary within a particular trade, business, or industry or
arises from a transaction “of common or frequent occurrence in the
type of business involved.” Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495
(1940). An expense is necessary if it is “‘appropriate and
helpful’” for the development of the business. Commissioner v.
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Association, 403 U.S. 345, 353 (1971) (quoting
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-690 (1966)). Section
212 allows deductions for expenses paid or incurred in connection
with an activity engaged in for the production or collection of
income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income.
When a taxpayer establishes that he paid or incurred a
deductible expense but does not establish the amount of the
expense, we may estimate the amount allowable in some
circumstances (the Cohan rule). See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39
F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). There must be sufficient
evidence in the record, however, to permit us to conclude that the
taxpayer paid or incurred a deductible expense in at least the
amount allowed. See Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560
(5th Cir. 1957). In estimating the amount allowable,
we bear heavily upon the taxpayer who failed to maintain required
records and to substantiate deductions as the Code requires. See
Cohan v. Commissioner, supra at 544.
- 37 -
Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to allow
deductions for certain business expenses, such as property taxes,
homeowners association fees, and utilities but does not point to
any evidence in the record that identifies specific rental
business expenses that she paid. Nevertheless, the record shows
that petitioner paid expenses related to the Denver condominium
totaling $371, $5,043,19 and $2,792 in 2001, 2002, and 2003,
respectively. Notations on the canceled checks that support this
additional deduction refer to “HOA fees”, “Dahlia”, or the
partial address of the Denver condominium. Accordingly, we allow
petitioner to deduct these expenses. However, we do not allow
any deductions for expenses petitioner testified she incurred for
title insurance; replacement of an air conditioner, microwave,
and windows; patching holes in the walls; and painting the Denver
condominium, because the record contains no credible evidence to
support deductions for those expenses.
With respect to petitioner’s marketing business, petitioner
testified that she incurred expenses for purchasing educational
materials, but she failed to produce credible evidence of those
expenses at trial. The record does contain three checks totaling
$620, dated January 16, 2001, and March 28, 2002, that show
19
Petitioner testified that maintenance and repair expenses
in 2002 were $6,988.53, but she produced no records at trial.
Petitioner attached to her brief a spreadsheet summarizing, inter
alia, her expenses. However, statements on brief are not part of
the record. See Rule 143(c).
- 38 -
petitioner purchased educational tapes. We find that these
expenses related to petitioner’s marketing business, and we allow
a deduction for these expenses.
Petitioner testified that some of her records were destroyed
by fire. She also admitted that she had some documentation but
that she had not brought it to Court. Because petitioner
introduced no credible evidence that she actually paid any
expenses other than those allowed above, the Cohan rule is not
applicable in this case.
V. Additions to Tax
Section 7491(c) provides that the Commissioner bears the
burden of production with respect to the liability of any taxpayer
for any penalty or addition to tax. To satisfy his burden of
production under section 7491(c), the Commissioner must produce
evidence that it is appropriate to impose the relevant addition to
tax. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). However,
section 7491(c) does not require the Commissioner to introduce
evidence regarding reasonable cause. Id.
In a proceeding before this Court, the Commissioner’s
obligation under section 7491(c) initially to come forward with
evidence that it is appropriate to apply a particular penalty
against a taxpayer is conditioned upon the taxpayer’s assigning
error to the Commissioner’s penalty determination. Funk v.
- 39 -
Commissioner, 123 T.C. 213, 217-218 (2004); Swain v. Commissioner,
118 T.C. 358 (2002). We have held that a taxpayer who fails to
assign error to a penalty or addition to tax is deemed under Rule
34(b)(4) to have conceded the penalty or addition to tax. See
Funk v. Commissioner, supra at 217-218 (holding that the
Commissioner’s burden of production under section 7491(c) with
regard to additions to tax is not applicable when a pro se
taxpayer’s petition failed to state a claim with respect to
additions to tax); Swain v. Commissioner, supra at 363 (holding
that a pro se taxpayer conceded penalties when she failed to
assign error to the Commissioner’s determination of penalties).
Respondent has determined that petitioner is liable for
additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654. The
petition contains no allegations regarding any of the additions to
tax that respondent determined in the notice of deficiency. We
deem petitioner to have conceded these issues and hold that
respondent has no burden of production under section 7491(c) as to
the additions to tax. See Funk v. Commissioner, supra at 217-218;
Swain v. Commissioner, supra at 363. We sustain respondent’s
determinations as to the additions to tax under sections
6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654.
We have considered the remaining arguments made by the
parties and, to the extent not discussed above, conclude those
- 40 -
arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.
- 41 -
APPENDIX
Social Mr. I- Energy Elliot Court Pship.
Security Cash Paypal Rent Felton Promotion 2000 Other Mgmt. Settlement Distrib.
2001
N. Trust
(trust) -0- $3,000 -0- $12,455 $17,227 -0- -0- $6,219 $1,625 -0- -0-
Bank of
America $9,549 2,540 $1 -0- -0- -0- -0- 312 -0- $22,171 -0-
Total 9,549 5,540 1 12,455 17,227 -0- -0- 6,531 1,625 22,171 -0-
2002
N. Trust
(trust) -0- -0- -0- $11,910 $18,170 $282 -0- $3,090 -0- -0- -0-
N. trust
(personal) -0- 800 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 151 -0- -0- -0-
Bank of
America $1,756 $1,115 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0-
Bank of Marin 9,401 15,798 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 4,507 -0- -0- -0-
Total 11,157 17,713 -0- 11,910 18,170 282 -0- 7,748 -0- -0- -0-
2003
N. Trust
(trust) -0- $683 $2,550 -0- -0- $605 $1,068 $1,920 -0- -0- -0-
N. Trust
(personal) -0- 100 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0-
Bank of Marin $8,430 8,070 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 8,049 -0- -0- -0-
Total 8,430 8,853 2,550 -0- -0- 605 1,068 9,969 -0- -0- -0-
2004
N. Trust
(trust) $3,310 $1,454 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- $1,630 -0- -0- $17,425
N. trust
(personal) 1,681 620 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 626 -0- -0- -0-
Total 4,991 2,074 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 2,256 -0- -0- 17,425
2005
N. Trust
(trust) $1,506 $1,400 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- $1,564 -0- -0- -0-
N. trust
(personal) 1,306 373 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 709 -0- -0- -0-
Total 2,812 1,773 -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 2,273 -0- -0- -0-