Hall v. Commissioner

AUDREY MARIE HALL, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT

Docket No. 30685–08. Filed September 22, 2010.

The parties have entered into a stipulation that P is enti-
tled to relief under sec. 6015(f), I.R.C., but for the 2-year
limitation for claiming such relief under sec. 1.6015–5(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs. We must decide whether we will follow
Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), revg.
132 T.C. 131 (2009), in jurisdictions other than the Seventh
Circuit. The present case would normally be appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Held: We will continue
to take the position that sec. 1.6015–5(b)(1), Income Tax
Regs., is an invalid interpretation of sec. 6015(f), I.R.C.

Ljubomir Nacev, for petitioner.
Emily J. Giometti, for respondent.
OPINION

GOEKE, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s
request for relief under section 6015(f).1 We have jurisdiction
under section 6015(e).
The specific issue is whether petitioner is entitled to equi-
table relief under section 6015(f), notwithstanding her failure
to request such relief before the 2-year deadline imposed by
section 1.6015–5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

Background
The facts have been stipulated and are so found.
At the time of filing the petition, petitioner resided in Cin-
cinnati, Ohio. Petitioner and Etheridge Hall (Mr. Hall) were
married on October 9, 1965. Petitioner and Mr. Hall filed
joint Federal income tax returns for the tax years 1998 and
2001 (the years in issue). For the year 1998 petitioner
and Mr. Hall included a payment with their return but did
not pay the full amount due. For the year 2001 petitioner
1 Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at

all relevant times.

374

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 (374) HALL v. COMMISSIONER 375

and Mr. Hall filed a return but did not pay any of the
amount due. However, since the filing of their 2001 return,
petitioner and Mr. Hall made several payments for the tax
year 2001, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) applied
several credits to their account.
On April 17, 2003, petitioner and Mr. Hall divorced. Pursu-
ant to their divorce decree, Mr. Hall had a legal obligation
to pay his and petitioner’s joint income tax liabilities. How-
ever, petitioner did not know at the time she filed her joint
returns for the years at issue whether Mr. Hall would pay
the tax due for said years.
On July 6, 2004, respondent initiated collection activity
against petitioner and Mr. Hall’s outstanding tax liabilities
for the years 1998 and 2001 by issuing an intent to levy notice.
On August 1, 2008, petitioner signed and submitted to
respondent Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief,
for her 1998 and 2001 tax years. On August 14, 2008, the IRS
issued a preliminary determination denying petitioner relief
under section 6015(f) for the years in issue because peti-
tioner’s claim was not filed within the 2-year period. On or
about August 22, 2008, petitioner filed a Form 12509, State-
ment of Disagreement, protesting the IRS’ denial of innocent
spouse relief and stating that she was not aware that collec-
tion activity had been initiated against her. In addition, peti-
tioner stated in her Form 12509 that the ‘‘statements’’ she
had received ‘‘always had on the statement * * * [that] I had
two years to call. * * * If your [sic] telling me I [was] sup-
pose to do this last year, I’m still receiving statements saying
I still have two years. Could you explain this please.’’
By letter dated September 10, 2008, respondent’s Appeals
Office acknowledged receipt of petitioner’s case for consider-
ation and informed petitioner of the Appeals officer assigned
to it.
On November 17, 2008, the Appeals officer held a con-
ference with petitioner at which she was informed that the
IRS could not grant her relief because she had not timely filed
her request. The Appeals officer explained that the IRS had
issued a collection notice to her on July 6, 2004, and peti-
tioner was required to file a Form 8857 by July 6, 2006; the
Form 8857 was received on July 31, 2008, making the
request untimely. On November 20, 2008, respondent issued
a final Appeals determination denying petitioner relief from

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 376 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (374)

joint and several liability under section 6015(f) for the years
at issue.
On December 22, 2008, petitioner timely petitioned this
Court, contesting respondent’s denial of relief.
On November 5, 2009, respondent sent petitioner’s case to
the Cincinnati Centralized Innocent Spouse Operations Unit
to reconsider the merits of her request. The result was again
denial of relief. However, in a stipulation of settled issues,
dated June 1, 2010, respondent agreed that ‘‘petitioner would
be entitled to equitable relief on the merits’’ if her request
had been timely. Petitioner agreed in the same stipulation of
settled issues that she had submitted her request more than
2 years after collection activities had commenced.

Discussion
This case presents the same issue as this Court’s Opinion
in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131 (2009), revd. 607
F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010). In that case this Court held that
the 2-year limitation imposed by section 1.6015–5(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs., is an invalid interpretation of section
6015(f). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed this holding, finding that the regulation was within
the Secretary’s discretion to prescribe procedures for the
application of section 6015(f). Appeal of this case would nor-
mally lie to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, so the
rule of deference is not applicable. See Golsen v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.
1971). However, given the reversal of Lantz, it is appropriate
that this Court revisit the issue.
I. Seventh Circuit Analysis
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Lantz held
that ‘‘audible silence’’ was not a guide to congressional
meaning because there was nothing unusual in the fact that
Congress chose not to include a statute of limitations in sec-
tion 6015(f). The Court of Appeals noted that courts often
borrow statutes of limitations from other laws and that Con-
gress was aware that agencies often make up their own
deadlines through regulations.
The Court of Appeals also held that while the doctrine of
laches might substitute for the lack of a statute of limitations

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 (374) HALL v. COMMISSIONER 377

in a situation applying equitable principles, it cannot do so
for section 6015(f). The Court of Appeals reasoned that if sec-
tion 6015(f) has no strict deadline, ‘‘the two-year deadlines in
subsections (b) and (c) will be set largely at naught because
the substantive criteria of those sections are virtually the
same as those of (f).’’ Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d at
484.
Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that section 6015(f) is
a safety valve by which the IRS may grant relief to a tax-
payer under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Because
Congress authorized the Secretary to grant discretionary
relief under procedures that the Secretary was to devise, the
court held that judicial deference to the regulation was
required and the Secretary was empowered to set a deadline
for applying for section 6015(f) relief. Id. at 486.
The analysis by the Court of Appeals concluded with the
recognition that the result was ‘‘harsh’’ but suggested Mrs.
Lantz might be provided relief under section 6343(a)(1)(D).
Id.
II. Procedural Rule
In Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d at 483, the Court of
Appeals recognized that equity traditionally did not include
a strict ‘‘statute of limitations’’; but as stated previously, the
Court of Appeals rejected ‘‘laches’’ as a means to apply sec-
tion 6015(f). Traditionally, in cases of equity there was no
statute of limitations, but delay in filing a claim was consid-
ered as a factor in deciding whether equity would be served
by granting relief. Id. By adopting a statute of limitations,
the Court of Appeals accepted that cases invoking inequi-
table circumstances will be denied relief without considering
the facts and circumstances. The cause of the delay in filing
and the circumstances, no matter how extreme, are irrele-
vant. The Court of Appeals rejected the traditional method to
address delay in the equity context because of subsections (b)
and (c) of section 6015 and the 2-year limitations provision
in those subsections, which it found supports the use of the
2-year standard for subsection (f ). 2
2 Sec. 6015(b), (c), and (f) provides as follows:
SEC. 6015(b). PROCEDURES FOR RELIEF FROM LIABILITY APPLICABLE TO ALL JOINT FILERS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if—
Continued

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 378 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (374)

(A) a joint return has been made for a taxable year;
(B) on such return there is an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of
one individual filing the joint return;
(C) the other individual filing the joint return establishes that in signing the return he
or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such understatement;
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other
individual liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such under-
statement; and
(E) the other individual elects (in such form as the Secretary may prescribe) the benefits
of this subsection not later than the date which is 2 years after the date the Secretary has
begun collection activities with respect to the individual making the election,
then the other individual shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penalties,
and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such liability is attributable to such
understatement.
(2) APPORTIONMENT OF RELIEF.—If an individual who, but for paragraph (1)(C), would be
relieved of liability under paragraph (1), establishes that in signing the return such individual
did not know, and had no reason to know, the extent of such understatement, then such indi-
vidual shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and other amounts)
for such taxable year to the extent that such liability is attributable to the portion of such
understatement of which such individual did not know and had no reason to know.
(3) UNDERSTATEMENT.—For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘‘understatement’’ has the
meaning given to such term by section 6662(d)(2)(A).
SEC. 6015(c). PROCEDURES TO LIMIT LIABILITY FOR TAXPAYERS NO LONGER MARRIED OR TAX-
PAYERS LEGALLY SEPARATED OR NOT LIVING TOGETHER.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in this subsection, if an individual who has made a
joint return for any taxable year elects the application of this subsection, the individual’s li-
ability for any deficiency which is assessed with respect to the return shall not exceed the
portion of such deficiency properly allocable to the individual under subsection (d).
(2) BURDEN OF PROOF.—Except as provided in individual subparagraph (A)(ii) or (C) of para-
graph (3), each individual who elects the application of this subsection shall have the burden
of proof with respect to establishing the portion of any deficiency allocable to such individual.
(3) ELECTION.—
(A) INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE TO MAKE ELECTION.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—An individual shall only be eligible to elect the application of this sub-
section if—
(I) at the time such election is filed, such individual is no longer married to, or is
legally separated from, the individual with whom such individual filed the joint return
to which the election relates; or
(II) such individual was not a member of the same household as the individual with
whom such joint return was filed at any time during the 12-month period ending on
the date such election is filed.
(ii) CERTAIN TAXPAYERS INELIGIBLE TO ELECT.—If the Secretary demonstrates that as-
sets were transferred between individuals filing a joint return as part of a fraudulent
scheme by such individuals, an election under this subsection by either individual shall
be invalid (and section 6013(d)(3) shall apply to the joint return).
(B) TIME FOR ELECTION.—An election under this subsection for any taxable year may be
made at any time after a deficiency for such year is asserted but not later than 2 years
after the date on which the Secretary has begun collection activities with respect to the indi-
vidual making the election.
(C) ELECTION NOT VALID WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES.—If the Secretary dem-
onstrates that an individual making an election under this subsection had actual knowl-
edge, at the time such individual signed the return, of any item giving rise to a deficiency
(or portion thereof) which is not allocable to such individual under subsection (d), such elec-
tion shall not apply to such deficiency (or portion). This subparagraph shall not apply where
the individual with actual knowledge establishes that such individual signed the return
under duress.
(4) LIABILITY INCREASED BY REASON OF TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY TO AVOID TAX.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, the portion of

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 (374) HALL v. COMMISSIONER 379

The Court of Appeals’ application of the 2-year limits in
subsections (b) and (c) makes subsection (f) ineffective in
situations where an innocent spouse is unaware of the need
to or unable to contact the IRS for some of the very reasons
that Congress considered in enacting section 6015. For
example, a spouse is sometimes subject to abuse by a
partner. The abuse can take many forms. Where a spouse is
prevented from acting by fear, intimidation, or fraud, an
administrative procedural hurdle would eliminate consider-
ation of relief by the IRS. The Secretary did not allow any
exception even for extreme cases, but rather adopted a strict
time bar that requires the IRS to deny relief without any
consideration of the facts and circumstances. See sec. 1.6015–
5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. In our view, a regulation which
rejects claims for relief without considering the facts and cir-
cumstances is contrary to the specific statutory requirement
that all the facts and circumstances be taken into account.
Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 147. We concluded that
the regulation, which bars relief from inequity solely upon
the ground that it was requested beyond a specified period,
failed to consider all the facts and circumstances. Id. at 150.
Respondent contends that this is a procedural rule clearly
within the Secretary’s discretion. However, a time bar is not
simply a procedural rule. In the case of equity, it has the
the deficiency for which the individual electing the application of this subsection is liable
(without regard to this paragraph) shall be increased by the value of any disqualified asset
transferred to the individual.
(B) DISQUALIFIED ASSET.—For purposes of this paragraph—
(i) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘disqualified asset’’ means any property or right to property
transferred to an individual making the election under this subsection with respect to a
joint return by the other individual filing such joint return if the principal purpose of the
transfer was the avoidance of tax or payment of tax.
(ii) PRESUMPTION.—
(I) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of clause (i), except as provided in subclause (II), any
transfer which is made after the date which is 1 year before the date on which the first
letter of proposed deficiency which allows the taxpayer an opportunity for administra-
tive review in the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals is sent shall be presumed
to have as its principal purpose the avoidance of tax or payment of tax.
(II) EXCEPTIONS.—Subclause (I) shall not apply to any transfer pursuant to a decree
of divorce or separate maintenance or a written instrument incident to such a decree
or to any transfer which an individual establishes did not have as its principal purpose
the avoidance of tax or payment of tax.
SEC. 6015(f). EQUITABLE RELIEF.—Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if—
(1) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the indi-
vidual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either); and
(2) relief is not available to such individual under subsection (b) or (c),
the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability.

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substantive effect of making one circumstance, the time of
the claim, the only relevant factor. The statute requires
consideration of all facts and circumstances to decide
whether there is inequity. Sec. 6015(f). Specifying a period
not provided in the statute overrides all the other potential
causes of inequity and is fundamentally inconsistent with the
language and purpose of the statute.
III. Subsection (f) in the Context of Subsections (b) and (c)
The relationship of subsections (b) and (c) to subsection (f)
is fundamental to the issue before us. The Court of Appeals
found that without a 2-year statute of limitations for sub-
section (f), the limitations for subsections (b) and (c) are
made ineffective. Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d at 484.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that silence in sub-
section (f) did not support a different rule but rather that the
context of subsection (f) after subsections (b) and (c) required
the same rule. Id. at 484–485. We believe the Court of
Appeals’ opinion overlooks the very specific and different
purpose of subsection (f). 3
As applied by the IRS in Rev. Proc. 2003–61, 2003–2 C.B.
296, subsection (f) requires a decision about whether col-
lecting a joint liability yields an inequitable result. The rev-
enue procedure and this Court have consistently looked
beyond the taxable year at issue to apply subsection (f). The
facts relevant to subsections (b) and (c) are primarily those
of the taxable year in issue and whether the party claiming
relief is liable for a joint deficiency. In the case of subsection
(f), relief from the deficiency under subsections (b) and (c) is
not available and underpaid taxes already assessed on the
basis of the joint return as filed are possibly subject to relief.
Rev. Proc. 2003–61, secs. 4.01(2), 4.02, 4.03, 2003–2 C.B. at
297–298. While facts from the year the return was filed may
be relevant in applying subsection (f), those facts are not
exclusive. The application of subsection (f) also depends on
current economic hardship and marital circumstances after
the year of the joint liability. Id. sec. 4.03(2)(a)(i) and (ii),
2003–2 C.B. at 298. Such circumstances are to be weighed
3 In an article addressing the question whether the 2-year rule should apply to sec. 6015(f),

Professor Bryan T. Camp argues that subsec. (f) has a different role from that of subsecs. (b)
and (c) and that application of the 2-year rule from subsecs. (b) and (c) to subsec. (f) is not ap-
propriate. Camp, ‘‘Interpreting Statutory Silence’’, 128 Tax Notes 501 (Aug. 2, 2010).

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together with the events during the year in question, and no
one factor is determinative. Id. The consideration of contem-
poraneous circumstances distinguishes subsection (f) analysis
from the taxable year factual analysis required under sub-
sections (b) and (c).
IV. Deference
The IRS, faced with serious budget constraints, must
handle many claims for relief, and we appreciate that some
recognition of the timeliness of claims is necessary. But a
refusal to consider or outline exceptional circumstances runs
squarely contrary to the statutory mandate to prevent
inequity. The need for expediency and the concern with
drafting a rule that reconciles subsections (b), (c), and (f) of
section 6015 effectively are not valid reasons for the Sec-
retary to ignore the statutory mandate to prevent inequity.
The Secretary has wide latitude to implement section 6015(f)
but does not have carte blanche to ignore the purpose and
defeat the application of the section for a substantial number
of otherwise deserving taxpayers.
The Court of Appeals in Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d
at 485, cites Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 238 (2001), and
asks the rhetorical question:
Since the government can refuse to grant equitable relief to someone
who meets the statutory criteria and applies within two years of the first
collection action, why can’t it decide to deny relief to a class of applicants
defined as those who waited too long? * * *

If we can suggest an answer, it would be to consider two fea-
tures of section 6015 (e) and (f). Section 6015(f) imposes a
requirement that ‘‘all the facts and circumstances’’ be consid-
ered in a determination of whether the collection of the joint
tax liability will result in inequity, and section 6015(e) pro-
vides for judicial review of that determination as a matter of
right. The Secretary has written a regulation that eliminates
consideration of all the facts and circumstances. There is no
doubt there will be situations where denial of an untimely
request will be inequitable because the party seeking relief
was denied access to the necessary information by a mali-
cious or deceitful spouse. As indicated, the IRS recognizes
post-taxable-year facts are relevant under subsection (f) that
are not otherwise relevant under subsections (b) and (c). This

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 382 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (374)

recognition establishes that insisting on a statute of limita-
tions in subsection (f) based upon subsections (b) and (c) is
a false premise. Congress intended a broader role for sub-
section (f), and the IRS has long recognized this in revenue
procedures. The Court of Appeals’ question and later discus-
sion recognized that harsh and inequitable results are likely
under Lantz. We simply disagree that such results are allow-
able within a reasonable interpretation of the statute and the
related congressional intent.
V. Standard of Review
Applying the law of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, to which an appeal in this case would lie, we must apply
the analysis of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984), to the regulation
at issue. Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 348
F.3d 136, 140 (6th Cir. 2003), affg. 107 T.C. 73 and 107 T.C.
116 (1996).
For the reasons we stated in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132
T.C. at 137, we hold that section 1.6015–5(b)(1), Income Tax
Regs., fails both prongs of the Chevron test.
VI. Section 6343
With all due respect to the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit’s reference to section 6343(a)(1)(D), that section
was enacted before section 6015(f); and if Congress had found
it sufficient, presumably section 6015(f) would not have been
enacted. One difference is that section 6343(a)(1)(D) may
apply if economic hardship is present; section 6015(f) may
apply on more general equitable grounds. In addition, there
is a practical problem: the Internal Revenue Manual provides
little direction to IRS employees regarding application of eco-
nomic hardship to case decisions. National Taxpayer Advo-
cate, 2008 Annual Report to Congress (Vol. 1) 21–22 (2008).
Additionally, in many cases the IRS does not consider the loss
of a taxpayer’s home and retirement assets an economic
hardship. National Taxpayer Advocate, Report to Congress,
Fiscal Year 2009 Objectives, at xxxvi (2008).

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 (374) HALL v. COMMISSIONER 383

VII. Conclusion
Respondent’s practice in this and similar cases has been to
agree that the taxpayer is entitled to relief if the regulation
is deemed invalid. Respondent has chosen not to inquire
whether petitioner’s delay was not excusable and whether
the delay is a factor favoring the denial of relief based upon
a facts and circumstances test. For the reasons explained
hereinbefore, we determine that,
Decision will be entered for petitioner.
Reviewed by the Court.
COLVIN, COHEN, WELLS, MARVEL, WHERRY, KROUPA, and
PARIS, JJ., agree with this majority opinion.

WELLS, J., concurring: I agree with the majority that the
period of limitations provided in section 1.6015–5(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs., is invalid. I write separately to advance
an additional reason I think the regulation is invalid.
By regulation, the Commissioner is attempting to place an
absolute, ironclad 2-year limitations period on making a
request for equitable relief under section 6015(f), even
though section 6015(f) contains no limitations period. The
majority opinion properly characterizes respondent’s position
in this case and the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 (7th
Cir. 2010), revg. 132 T.C. 131 (2009), as follows:
By adopting a statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals accepted that
cases invoking inequitable circumstances will be denied relief * * *
[regardless of] the facts and circumstances. The cause of the delay in filing
and the circumstances, no matter how extreme, are irrelevant. The Court
of Appeals rejected the traditional method to address delay in the equity
context because of subsections (b) and (c) of section 6015 and the 2-year
limitations provision in those subsections which it found supports the use
of the 2-year standard for subsection (f). [Majority op. p. 377; emphasis
added; fn. ref. omitted.]

I believe that respondent’s position in this case and the
Court of Appeals’ opinion in Lantz are contrary to the pur-
pose of section 6015(f), which is ‘‘to provide equitable relief
in appropriate situations’’. H. Conf. Rept. 105–599, at 251
(1998), 1998–3 C.B. 747, 1005. In addition to the reasons

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 384 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (374)

already stated in the majority opinion and in our Lantz
Opinion, 1 I believe that the regulation, which provides no
exceptions to the 2-year period for extraordinary cir-
cumstances, is contrary to the concept of ‘‘equitable tolling’’. 2
Respondent has stipulated that petitioner is entitled to relief
under section 6015(f) if her claim is timely. Respondent
refuses to consider any facts regarding the 2-year limit; i.e.,
we should just count the days and ignore the facts. Respond-
ent’s position appears to be that if the absolute 2-year rule
is valid, respondent prevails; and, if the 2-year rule is not
valid, petitioner prevails. On that basis, petitioner should
prevail.
The specific purpose of section 6015(f) is to provide equi-
table relief, and a fundamental form of equitable relief is to
relieve a party from strict compliance with a limitations
period when the failure to take timely action was due to
extraordinary circumstances. This form of equitable relief is
known as ‘‘equitable tolling’’. 3 On June 14, 2010, the
Supreme Court articulated the principles of equitable tolling
that would apply to provide relief even from a very specific
period of limitations imposed by statute. In Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. ll, ll, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010),
the Supreme Court stated:
We have previously made clear that a nonjurisdictional federal statute
of limitations is normally subject to a ‘‘rebuttable presumption’’ in favor ‘‘of
equitable tolling.’’ Irwin, 498 U.S., at 95–96; see also Young v. United
States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (‘‘It is hornbook law that limitations periods
are ‘customarily subject to ‘‘equitable tolling’’ ’ ’’ (quoting Irwin, supra, at
95)).

The dissent in Holland v. Florida, supra at ll, 130 S. Ct.
at 2569 (Scalia, J., dissenting) agreed with these principles:
1 I do not believe that either the majority opinion or our Opinion in Lantz v. Commissioner,

132 T.C. 131 (2009), revd. 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), stands for the proposition that there
can be no period of limitations under sec. 6015(f).
2 Judge Gustafson in his concurring opinion suggests that I am invoking the ‘‘doctrine of ‘equi-

table tolling’ ’’. Concurring op. note 2. However, I actually have chosen not to use the term ‘‘doc-
trine’’ here, because I am referring only to the principles of equitable tolling. I believe that re-
spondent’s failure to incorporate any relief from his strict 2-year regulatory limitations period
for extraordinary circumstances is improper because it is contrary to the equitable ‘‘principles’’
underlying equitable tolling. I do suggest infra note 5 that the ‘‘doctrine’’ of equitable tolling
would apply in the event the regulation in question were to be held valid.
3 An additional, but similar, form of equitable relief may be available; i.e., ‘‘equitable estoppel’’.

Equitable estoppel applies when one of the litigants does something to prevent the other from
making a timely claim. See Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1996) (dif-
ference between equitable tolling and equitable estoppel discussed).

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The Court is correct, ante, at * * * [130 S. Ct. at 2560–2561], that we
ordinarily presume federal limitations periods are subject to equitable
tolling unless tolling would be inconsistent with the statute. Young v.
United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002). That is especially true of limitations
provisions applicable to actions that are traditionally governed by equi-
table principles—a category that includes habeas proceedings. See id., at
50. * * *

In holding that the principle of equitable tolling was
applicable, in spite of a limitations period that was specifi-
cally spelled out in the statute, the Supreme Court distin-
guished its prior holding in United States v. Brockamp, 519
U.S. 347 (1997), which held that equitable tolling was not
applicable to the period of limitations on tax refunds pro-
vided in section 6511. In Holland, the Supreme Court noted
that in Brockamp it had interpreted the section 6511 limita-
tions period as foreclosing application of that doctrine but
had emphasized that section 6511:
(1) ‘‘se[t] forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form’’; (2) used
‘‘highly detailed’’ and ‘‘technical’’ language ‘‘that, linguistically speaking,
cannot easily be read as containing implicit exceptions’’; (3) ‘‘reiterate[d] its
limitations several times in several different ways’’; (4) related to an
‘‘underlying subject matter,’’ nationwide tax collection, with respect to
which the practical consequences of permitting tolling would have been
substantial; and (5) would, if tolled, ‘‘require tolling, not only procedural
limitations, but also substantive limitations on the amount of recovery—
a kind of tolling for which we . . . found no direct precedent.’’ * * * [Hol-
land v. Florida, supra at ll, 130 S. Ct. at 2561, quoting United States
v. Brockamp, supra at 350–352.]

Four of the five factors that were used to decide that equi-
table tolling did not apply to section 6511 are absent in sec-
tion 6015(f) or the regulation; the only common factor
present in both section 6015(f) and section 6511 is that both
involve Federal tax. A major distinction between the two
statutes is that section 6511 provides exclusively a limita-
tions period, while section 6015(f) does not even mention a
limitations period.
An equally compelling argument that equitable tolling
principles should be considered in any reasonable regulatory
limitations period that might apply to section 6015(f) relief is
that the specific statutory purpose of section 6015(f) is to
avoid inequity. Moreover, section 6015(f) itself was enacted
during 1998 in conjunction with section 6511(h). Section
6511(h) effectively overruled the result reached by the

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 386 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (374)

Supreme Court in Brockamp and allowed for equitable tolling
of the section 6511 limitations period when taxpayers were
unable to manage their financial affairs. Indeed, section
6015(f) was enacted in the Internal Revenue Service Restruc-
turing and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105–206,
sec. 3201, 112 Stat. 734, and section 6511(h) was enacted in
RRA 1998 sec. 3202, 112 Stat. 740, the very next section of
the same act. The two sections were packaged together in the
conference committee report under the heading ‘‘Relief for
Innocent Spouses and for Taxpayers Unable to Manage Their
Financial Affairs Due to Disabilities’’. H. Conf. Rept. 105–
599, supra at 249, 1998–3 C.B. at 1003. Both of those provi-
sions were considered and enacted as part of the same bill.
It seems clear that Congress would not have provided for
equitable tolling in section 6511(h) and then simultaneously
allowed the Commissioner to disregard equitable tolling prin-
ciples in the companion statutory provision that gives the
Commissioner and the Tax Court the power to avoid inequi-
table results by considering all the facts and circumstances. 4
In Pollock v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 21 (2009), we consid-
ered whether equitable tolling could extend the 90-day period
provided by section 6015(e) for filing a petition in this Court.
We held that the filing period in section 6015(e) was not
susceptible to equitable tolling because it was jurisdictional.
We stated:
The most important point to notice is that the Code here actually uses
the word ‘‘jurisdiction’’—giving us ‘‘jurisdiction’’ if someone files her peti-
tion within the 90-day time limit. Statutes granting a court ‘‘jurisdiction’’
if a case is filed by a stated deadline look more like jurisdictional time
limits. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393–94.

* * * * * * *

4 Disregarding this legislative history, in his brief to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-

cuit in Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), revg. 132 T.C. 131 (2009), the Com-
missioner argued, quoting the dissent in this Court, that there is no ‘‘indication in the legislative
history that in devising § 6015(f), Congress was concerned with giving taxpayers a longer time
within which to seek relief ’’ and that ‘‘ ‘[we] find nothing in this legislative history suggesting
Congress wanted the Secretary to use his new discretion under subsection (f) to give relief to
those who missed the statutory deadlines for relief under subsections (b) and (c).’ ’’ The Court
of Appeals expressed ‘‘doubt that Congress would want to preclude the Treasury from imposing
a deadline designed to reduce the flow to manageable proportions.’’ Id. at 486. The legislative
history quoted above would support a contrary view.

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 (374) HALL v. COMMISSIONER 387

Courts also commonly distinguish statutes of limitation from jurisdic-
tional deadlines by the complexity of a statute’s language. Brockamp, 519
U.S. at 350–51. * * *

* * * * * * *
Statutes of limitation, on the other hand, have no such jurisdictional
identifiers, and courts construe them with a presumption that they were
written against a backdrop of legal default rules and doctrines that they
can legitimately apply when the statute is silent and the facts of a par-
ticular case warrant it. And one of these default rules, as the Supreme
Court recently clarified, is a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable
tolling’s availability in suits brought by a private party against the
Government. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 136–138.
[Id. at 30–32; fn. ref. omitted.]

In Pollock, we discussed the crucial distinction between a
mere period of limitations and a jurisdictional limitation:
This gets us directly to the Commissioner’s most compelling point—that
the District Court misconstrued section 6015’s 90-day deadline to be a
statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional requirement. This
distinction is crucial: A statute of limitations simply prescribes a period in
which a court may enforce certain rights. Young v. United States, 535 U.S.
43, 47 (2002). Courts may equitably toll them unless it would be incon-
sistent with the particular terms of the relevant statute. Id. at 49; John
R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 133. They ‘‘protect a defendant’s case-
specific interest in timeliness,’’ John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at
133, and courts may be able to look past delay because a limitations period
is, like other affirmative defenses, subject to exceptions such as waiver,
estoppel—or equitable tolling, Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393; In re Intl. Admin.
Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689, 701 (11th Cir. 2005). [Id. at 28–29.]

I do not believe that anyone could reasonably claim that
the regulation providing a 2-year limitations period in section
1.6015–5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., is a restriction on our
jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s denial of section
6015(f) relief.
I believe that the foregoing analysis supports the conclu-
sion in the majority opinion and provides an additional basis
for invalidating the regulation. 5
COLVIN, COHEN, GOEKE, WHERRY, and KROUPA, JJ., agree
with this concurring opinion.
5 Even if the period of limitations in sec. 1.6015–5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., is valid, I believe

that such a period of limitations would be subject to the ‘‘doctrine’’ of equitable tolling. In that
regard, the ‘‘doctrine’’ of equitable tolling may apply if the litigant can prove that (1) the litigant
has been pursuing the litigant’s rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in the litigant’s way and prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ll, ll,
130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010). The facts before us include a statement that petitioner was advised
by respondent that she still had 2 years to make her claim.

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 388 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (374)

GUSTAFSON, J., concurring: I concur with the result
reached by the majority—i.e., that the two-year deadline
imposed in 26 C.F.R. section 1.6015–5(b)(1), Income Tax
Regs., is invalid. I part company with the majority only in
aspects of its rationale that do not affect the outcome (dis-
cussed in parts I–III below); and I still conclude—for the rea-
sons that we stated in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131,
138–144 (2009), revd. 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), and that
I summarize below in part IV—that the IRS’s two-year dead-
line is invalid because it is at odds with the congressional
intent evident in the statute.
I. ‘‘[A]ll the facts and circumstances’’
The majority states today: ‘‘the regulation, which bars
relief from inequity solely upon the ground that it was
requested beyond a specified period, failed to consider all the
facts and circumstances’’, for purposes of section 6015(f)(1).
Majority op. p. 379. 1 This reasoning would apparently dis-
allow the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from imposing by
regulation any set deadline for filing requests for equitable
relief from joint liability under section 6015(f), because any
set deadline, when applied, would ‘‘mak[e] one circumstance,
the time of the claim, the only relevant factor’’, majority op.
p. 380, rather than having ‘‘all the facts and circumstances’’
govern the outcome.
However, the Internal Revenue Code is replete with ‘‘facts
and circumstances’’ provisions that are subject to procedural
deadlines. Nearby section 6015(b)(1)(D) has identical lan-
guage (‘‘taking into account all the facts and circumstances,
it is inequitable’’ (emphasis added)), but the relief provided
in section 6015(b) depends on an election’s being made before
a two-year deadline. Sec. 6015(b)(1)(E). That is, under section
6015(b) Congress both required that ‘‘all the facts and cir-
cumstances’’ be taken into account and provided in effect
that, if an election was not made within two years, the single
fact of timing would govern the outcome. The ‘‘all the facts
and circumstances’’ provision in section 6015(f) thus does not,
in and of itself, preclude a deadline for an equitable claim.
1 For this ‘‘facts and circumstances’’ proposition the majority cites our Opinion in Lantz v.

Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131, 150 (2009), revd. 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010). We did not explicitly
so state in Lantz.

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 (374) HALL v. COMMISSIONER 389

Consequently, I conclude that a statute may provide a sub-
stantive standard for equitable relief that takes into account
‘‘all the facts and circumstances’’ while, at the same time,
providing or permitting a procedural deadline for the submis-
sion of a request for that relief.
II. ‘‘Equitable Relief ’’
The majority observes critically that the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit ‘‘rejected ‘laches’ ’’, majority op. p. 377
citing Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d at 483; and the
majority thereby seems to edge toward the position (not
taken by this Court in Lantz) that the ‘‘Equitable Relief ’’ of
section 6015(f) embodies concepts of equity, as opposed to
law. At law, time limits are expressed in statutes of limita-
tion; but equity jurisprudence developed instead the more
flexible defense of laches (prejudicial delay) and the doctrine
of ‘‘equitable tolling’’ of statutes of limitation, 2 concepts that
would arguably be more congruent with the congressional
purpose behind section 6015(f) than the IRS’s blunt applica-
tion of the two-year rule of its regulation.
However, the title ‘‘Equitable Relief ’’ does not warrant the
conclusion that laches or equitable tolling inhere in section
6015(f) to the exclusion of a regulation that provides an
explicit limitations period. The word ‘‘equitable’’ may some-
times implicate the law-equity distinction; 3 but usually the
word ‘‘equity’’ means simply justice or fairness, ‘‘equitable’’
means just or fair, 4 and ‘‘inequitable’’ means unjust or
2 Judge Wells’s concurring opinion explains that the doctrine of ‘‘equitable tolling’’ may ‘‘re-

lieve a party from strict compliance with a limitations period when the failure to take timely
action was due to extraordinary circumstances.’’ Concurring op. p. 384. This raises an inter-
esting question—i.e., whether the doctrine of equitable tolling would apply to a nonjurisdictional
two-year limitations period like that in 26 C.F.R. section 1.6015–5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. It
appears that if the doctrine were pertinent here, then it would not invalidate the two-year dead-
line (since equitable tolling can happen only when there is a (valid) deadline to toll) but instead
would toll the deadline. The doctrine of equitable tolling might thus save the otherwise invalid
regulation, by making the nonjurisdictional two-year regulatory limitation of section 6015(f) sub-
ject to being tolled by equitable considerations that are inapplicable to the jurisdictional two-
year statutory limitation of section 6015(b) and (c). However, the parties did not brief the subject
of equitable tolling, so we have an insufficient basis for addressing this question.
3 See, e.g., secs. 3232 (‘‘civil actions, whether legal or equitable in nature’’), 6214(b) (‘‘equitable

recoupment’’), 6305(b) (‘‘legal or equitable’’), 6402(g) (‘‘legal or equitable’’, ‘‘legal, equitable, or ad-
ministrative’’).
4 See, e.g., secs. 417(f)(4) (‘‘A plan may take into account in any equitable manner (as deter-

mined by the Secretary) any increased costs’’), 2205 (‘‘entitled to reimbursement * * * by a just
and equitable contribution’’), 4975(d)(22)(H) (‘‘fair and equitable’’), 9037(b) (‘‘equitable distribu-
tion of funds’’); Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. 105–
Continued

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 390 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (374)

unfair. 5 Those common meanings are appropriate here, for
reasons stated by dissenting Judges Thornton and Holmes.
See dissenting op. pp. 391–392. The ‘‘equitable’’ vocabulary of
section 6015(f) does not implicitly or explicitly prohibit a
regulatory deadline.
III. ‘‘[P]rocedures prescribed by the Secretary’’
Section 6015(f) provides that equitable relief is to be
administered ‘‘[u]nder procedures prescribed by the Sec-
retary’’, and the IRS promulgated the regulatory deadline
under this authority; but the majority states that ‘‘a time bar
is not simply a procedural rule.’’ Majority op. p. 379. In this
context, however, a deadline is a ‘‘procedure’’: Congress
placed the two-year deadline of section 6015(b)(1)(E) under
the ‘‘Procedures For Relief From Liability Applicable to All
Joint Filers’’; and it placed the two-year deadline of section
6015(c)(3)(B) under the ‘‘Procedures To Limit Liability for
Taxpayers No Longer Married’’. (Emphasis added.) Congress
thus suggested that a time limit might be one of the ‘‘proce-
dures’’ for granting relief, and it authorized the IRS to
promulgate ‘‘procedures’’ for the ‘‘Equitable Relief ’’ provision
of section 6015(f). See also Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C.
at 155–156 (Thornton and Holmes, JJ., dissenting). I think
it cannot be said that Congress prohibited the IRS from
promulgating any deadline for applying for equitable relief.
IV. ‘‘[R]elief * * * not available * * * under subsection (b)
or (c)’’
If, as I conclude, section 6015(f) permits and authorizes the
IRS to promulgate by regulation a deadline for taxpayers who
request equitable relief, then the remaining issue is whether
the deadline that the IRS did promulgate is a permissible
deadline under the statute. I conclude it is not. Congress cre-
ated two forms of so-called ‘‘traditional relief ’’ and imposed
a two-year deadline on both. Sec. 6015(b)(1)(E), (c)(3)(B).
Congress next provided for ‘‘Equitable Relief ’’—the whole
purpose of which was to grant ‘‘relief * * * not available
* * * under subsection (b) or (c)’’. Sec. 6015(f)(2) (emphasis
added). For this broader equitable relief Congress did not
206, sec. 1204(b), 112 Stat. 722 (‘‘fair and equitable treatment of taxpayers’’).
5 See, e.g., secs. 4971(g)(5) (‘‘excessive or otherwise inequitable’’), 4980F(c)(4) (same),

4980I(e)(2)(C) (same).

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 (374) HALL v. COMMISSIONER 391

impose a two-year deadline—nor any deadline—and it
authorized the IRS to establish ‘‘procedures’’. Sec. 6015(f). For
the agency then to slap onto the equitable provision the same
two-year deadline that Congress had manifestly chosen not
to impose shows a failure to discern the Congressional pur-
pose in enacting this broader equitable relief. The two-year
deadline is not valid.

THORNTON and HOLMES, JJ., dissenting: We continue
respectfully to dissent from the majority and to think that
the regulation requiring taxpayers to apply for relief under
section 6015(f) within 2 years is valid under Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
We explained our reasons in our dissent in Lantz v. Commis-
sioner, 132 T.C. 131, 152–161 (2009). The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed the majority in that case,
607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), and the issue is already
pending in at least two other circuits, see Mannella v.
Commissioner, No. 10–1308 (3d Cir.) (argument set for
November 17, 2010), appealing 132 T.C. 196 (2009); Coulter
v. Commissioner, No. 10–680 (2d Cir.) (briefing completed
September 8, 2010), appealing a stipulated decision of this
Court.
The majority mostly repeats its original reasons for invali-
dating the regulation. We write again to respond to its new
argument hinted at in its observation that ‘‘equity tradition-
ally did not include a strict ‘statute of limitations’ ’’. Majority
op. p. 377. The majority seems to suggest that by using the
term ‘‘inequitable’’ in section 6015(f), Congress meant to
invoke traditional notions of equity jurisprudence that would
preclude the IRS from imposing any fixed deadline, notwith-
standing the statute’s expansive delegation of discretionary
authority for the IRS to provide relief ‘‘Under procedures pre-
scribed by the Secretary’’.
We think this argument reads too much into the word
‘‘inequitable’’ which, to an ordinary speaker of English, usu-
ally just means ‘‘unfair’’. See Merriam Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 638 (11th ed. 2008), http://mw1.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/inequitable. And that seems to be the
way Congress thought it was using ‘‘inequitable’’. Section

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 392 135 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (374)

6015(f) provides that the Secretary may provide relief if
‘‘taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax
or any deficiency’’. This language derives from former section
6013(e), which, as enacted in 1971, authorized the Secretary
to provide innocent spouse relief if various requirements
were met, including that ‘‘taking into account all other facts
and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other spouse
liable for the deficiency’’. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. 91–
679, sec. 1, 84 Stat. 2063. The contemporaneous reports of
the congressional tax-writing committees indicate identically
that the purpose of this legislation was to ‘‘correct the unfair-
ness in the situations brought to the attention of this com-
mittee and to bring government tax collection practices into
accord with basic principles of equity and fairness.’’ H. Rept.
91–1734, at 2 (1970) (emphasis added); S. Rept. 91–1537, at
2 (1970), 1971–1 C.B. 606, 607 (emphasis added).
Although the words ‘‘equity’’ or ‘‘equitable’’ might trigger
echoes of old chancery practice, ‘‘inequitable’’ should not—the
opposites of ‘‘equity’’ and ‘‘equitable’’ in the chancery sense
are not ‘‘inequity’’ or ‘‘inequitable’’, but ‘‘common law’’ and
‘‘legal’’. We think it exceptionally improbable that the word
‘‘inequitable’’ in section 6015(f) means, as the majority might
seem to suggest, ‘‘contrary to principles of equity jurispru-
dence, including its traditional aversion to strict statutes of
limitation.’’ A request for relief under section 6015(f) is called
a request for ‘‘equitable relief ’’ not because it is a request for
reformation, rescission, specific performance, or accounting,
but because to a reasonable decisionmaker at the IRS it
would be unfair to hold one spouse jointly liable with another
for a particular tax debt.
The majority believes that a fixed deadline is unfair
because in some cases it may result in denial of relief that
otherwise would be available. But, as Judge Posner observes,
this circumstance ‘‘does not bear on the validity of the dead-
line; any statute of limitations will cut off some, and often a
great many, meritorious claims.’’ Lantz v. Commissioner, 607
F.3d at 481.
Similarly, we respectfully disagree with those concurring
who believe that the concept of equitable tolling has any
bearing on the validity of the regulation. If, as they suggest,
equitable tolling might be available to provide relief from the

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 (374) HALL v. COMMISSIONER 393

regulatory deadline—a theory, incidentally, that neither
party has raised or addressed—this circumstance would
negate the assumption, central to the majority’s reasoning,
that the deadline is an absolute temporal bar to relief.
HALPERN, GALE, and MORRISON, JJ., agree with this dis-
sent.

f

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