Forrest v. Comm'r

T.C. Memo. 2010-263

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

ERNESTINE FORREST, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 11513-08. Filed December 2, 2010.

After P failed to file a tax return for the 2004 tax
year, R filed a substitute for return and issued a notice of
deficiency determining a deficiency in P’s Federal income
tax and additions to tax under secs. 6651(a)(1) and (2) and
6654, I.R.C.

Held: P is liable for a portion of the deficiency to
the extent decided herein.

Held, further: P is liable for the applicable
additions to tax.

Ernestine Forrest, pro se.

Michael K. Park, for respondent.
 - 2 -

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

WHERRY, Judge: This case is before the Court on a petition

for redetermination of petitioner’s liability for income tax and

additions to tax for 2004 as determined by respondent. After

concessions by petitioner and respondent of certain income items

and deductions,1 the issues left for decision are:

(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction on

Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, for meal expenses;

(2) whether petitioner is entitled to a Schedule A deduction

for vehicle mileage expenses;

(3) whether petitioner is entitled to a Schedule A deduction

for telephone expenses;

(4) whether petitioner is entitled to a Schedule A deduction

for an employment-related legal fee of $400;

(5) whether petitioner is entitled to a Schedule A deduction

for a casualty loss;

1
Responded conceded meal expense deductions of $29.24,
leaving $50.95 of meal expense deductions at issue. Petitioner
concedes that she received $7,005 of pension distributions, a
separate taxable distribution from her retirement account of
$3,328, interest income of $129, savings bond interest income of
$67, dividends of $1,084, unemployment compensation of $10,660,
and $61,771 of wage income, all in 2004. The parties have agreed
that petitioner is entitled to Schedule A deductions for 2004 as
follows: State income taxes of $3,847.22; real estate taxes of
$1,860.07; personal property tax of $166; mortgage interest of
$7,245; charitable contributions of $160, and miscellaneous
itemized deductions of $10,928.07 before any consideration of the
adjusted gross income limitation on miscellaneous itemized
deductions.
 - 3 -

(6) whether petitioner is liable for the 10-percent

additional tax under section 72(t) on the distribution of $3,328

from her individual retirement plan;2

(7) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6651(a)(1)

addition to tax for the failure to file a timely return;3

(8) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6651(a)(2)

addition to tax for the failure to timely pay tax; and

(9) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6654

addition to tax for the failure to pay estimated income tax.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulation

of settled issues, the stipulated facts, and the accompanying

exhibits are hereby incorporated by this reference. At the time

she filed her petition, petitioner resided in California.

During January and the first 11 days of February 2004,

petitioner was a securities lawyer employed by the California

Department of Corporations. Although her employment was

terminated in February 2004, she continued receiving pay through

2
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 (Code), as amended and in effect for the tax year at issue,
and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure.
3
The amounts of all the additions to tax will be determined
in the Rule 155 computations to be made in accordance with this
opinion.
 - 4 -

June 2004.4 After petitioner’s employment was terminated, she

commenced a lawsuit for reinstatement and backpay. In connection

with that litigation, in April 2004 petitioner flew from her home

to Sacramento, and while in the Sacramento area consumed three

meals. At some time in 2004 petitioner was involved in an

automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. At the time of

the accident petitioner was insured by State Farm Insurance,

which has yet to resolve her claim.

Petitioner did not file a tax return for the 2004 tax year.

Respondent prepared a substitute for return for petitioner’s 2004

tax year which respondent filed on December 14, 2007. On

February 5, 2008, respondent issued petitioner a statutory notice

of deficiency determining an income tax deficiency for 2004 of

$16,260.80 and the following additions to tax: $1,438.83 under

section 6651(a)(1) for failure to file a tax return on time; an

amount to be determined under section 6651(a)(2) for failure to

pay tax on time; and $153.81 under section 6654(a) for failure to

pay estimated tax.

Petitioner timely filed a petition with this Court on May

13, 2008. In the petition, petitioner disputed the deficiency

4
We note that petitioner had previously been terminated from
her employment with the California Department of Corporations in
2000 and was subsequently reinstated in March 2003 after filing
suit against the State of California in 2003, of which we take
judicial notice. See Forrest v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-
228.
 - 5 -

and argued that “A tax of more than $16,000 has been proposed in

connection with the year 2004 with which the Taxpayer does not

agree” and that “the Taxpayer desires to preserve her rights and

position with regard to the year 2004. Relief from the proposed

tax is requested.” After concessions the issues left for

determination are those listed above. A trial was held in Los

Angeles, California, on July 1, 2009.5

OPINION

I. Burden of Proof

The Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency is presumed

correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the

determination is improper. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering,

290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). However, pursuant to section

7491(a)(1), the burden of proof as to a factual issue that

affects the taxpayer’s tax liability may be shifted to the

Commissioner. This occurs where the “taxpayer introduces

credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue”, and the

5
Petitioner has been given sufficient time to file a brief.
She has continually tested this Court’s patience with motions to
extend time to file and then ultimately failed to submit a brief.
Petitioner is a member of the California State Bar and, as such,
should be sensitive to any actual or perceived abuse of the
judicial process. The Court directs petitioner’s attention to
sec. 6673(a)(1), which allows the Court in its discretion to
require the taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in
excess of $25,000 whenever it appears that “(A) proceedings
before it have been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer
primarily for delay, (B) the taxpayer’s position in such
proceeding is frivolous or groundless, or (C) the taxpayer
unreasonably failed to pursue available administrative remedies”.
 - 6 -

taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with substantiation

requirements pursuant to the Code and “maintained all records

required under this title and has cooperated with reasonable

requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents,

meetings, and interviews”. Sec. 7491(a). Petitioner did not

argue that the burden should shift, and she failed to maintain

required records or comply with the substantiation and

cooperation requirements. Accordingly, the burden of proof

remains on petitioner.

II. Expense Deductions

A. General Rules

Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the

taxpayer must maintain adequate records to substantiate the

amounts of any deductions or credits claimed. Sec. 6001 (the

taxpayer “shall keep such records”); INDOPCO, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income

Tax Regs. Taxpayers must maintain records relating to their

income and expenses and must prove their entitlement to all

claimed deductions, credits, and expenses in controversy. See

sec. 6001.

Section 162(a) authorizes a deduction for “all the ordinary

and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year

in carrying on any trade or business”. A trade or business

expense is ordinary for purposes of section 162 if it is normal
 - 7 -

or customary within a particular trade, business, or industry,

and is necessary if it is appropriate and helpful for the

development of the business. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S.

467, 471 (1943); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). In

contrast, “personal, living, or family expenses” are generally

nondeductible. Sec. 262(a).

In certain circumstances, the taxpayer must meet specific

substantiation requirements to be allowed a deduction under

section 162. See, e.g., sec. 274(d). The heightened

substantiation requirements of section 274(d) apply to: (1) Any

traveling expense, including meals and lodging away from home;

(2) any item with respect to an activity in the nature of

entertainment, amusement, or recreation; (3) an expense for

gifts; or (4) the use of “listed property”, as defined in section

280F(d)(4), including any passenger automobiles. To deduct such

expenses, the taxpayer must substantiate by adequate records or

sufficient evidence to corroborate the taxpayer’s own statement:

(1) The amount of the expense or other item; (2) the time and

place of the travel, entertainment, amusement, recreation, or use

of the property; (3) the business purpose of the expense or other

item; and, (4) the business relationship to the taxpayer of the

persons entertained or receiving the gift. Sec. 274(d).

To satisfy the adequate records requirement of section 274,

a taxpayer must maintain records and documentary evidence that in
 - 8 -

combination are sufficient to establish each element of an

expenditure or use. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1) and (2), Temporary

Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016, 46017 (Nov. 6, 1985).

Although a contemporaneous log is not required, corroborative

evidence to support a taxpayer’s reconstruction “of the elements

* * * of the expenditure or use must have a high degree of

probative value to elevate such statement” to the level of

credibility of a contemporaneous record. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1),

Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra.

Where the heightened requirements discussed above do not

apply, however, the Court may allow the deduction of a claimed

expense even where the taxpayer is unable to fully substantiate

it, provided the Court has an evidentiary basis for doing so.

Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957);

Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930);

Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). But see

sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014

(Nov. 6, 1985). In these instances, the Court is permitted to

approximate the allowable expense, bearing heavily against the

taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his or her own making. Cohan

v. Commissioner, supra at 544.

B. Schedule A Deduction for Meal Expenses

The heightened or strict substantiation requirements of

section 274(d), discussed above, apply to meal expenses. To
 - 9 -

satisfy section 274(d) petitioner must present sufficient

evidence in addition to her testimony to satisfy the three

aspects of this requirement. The taxpayer must prove: (1) The

amount, (2) the time and place, and (3) the business purpose of

each expenditure. Sec. 1.274-5T(b), Temporary Income Tax Regs.,

50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985).

After respondent’s concessions, $50.95 of petitioner’s meal

expense deductions remains at issue. This amount stems from

three meals petitioner consumed during a trip she made to

Sacramento in April 2004 in connection with her employment

litigation. Petitioner claims that she is entitled to deductions

for meals purchased including: $10.45 at Denny’s, Inc., on April

24, 2004, $29.97 at the Bootlegger Restaurant on April 25, 2004,

and $10.53 at Awful Annies #1 on April 25, 2004, all in the

Sacramento and Auburn, California, area.

Petitioner presented a credit card statement showing the

above amounts and an airline receipt showing that she had

purchased a round-trip ticket from Los Angeles to Sacramento on

April 24, 2004, and returning on April 26, 2004. We find that

petitioner has produced enough evidence in conjunction with her

testimony to meet the first two parts of the heightened section

274 burden. She has shown both the amount of the expenditure and

the time and place of the travel. Remaining is the third,

required business purpose, showing.
 - 10 -

Petitioner testified that she incurred these expenses during

a trip to Sacramento to confer with the attorney working on her

reinstatement litigation. This litigation can be characterized

as an attempt to reestablish petitioner’s business of earning her

pay and, therefore, a business expense. See Kenton v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-13. Therefore, petitioner has met

the three requirements under the heightened burden of

substantiation with respect to the three meal expense deductions

and is entitled to a Schedule A deduction of $50.95.6

C. Schedule A Deduction for Vehicle Mileage Expenses

The strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d)

also apply to away-from-home business mileage expenses. Smith v.

Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1165, 1172 (1983). The taxpayer must prove

the amount, time, place, and business purpose of each

expenditure. Sec. 1.274-5T(b), Temporary Income Tax Regs.,

supra. The amount of the business travel may be substantiated by

the use of a contemporaneous log or by any reasonable means

establishing the number of miles traveled, the date, the place,

6
We note that under sec. 62(a)(20) as amended, effective
Oct. 22, 2004, “attorney fees and court costs” paid by the
taxpayer in connection with discrimination lawsuits “paid after
Oct. 22, 2004, with respect to any judgment or settlement
occurring after that date are allowed as a deduction in computing
adjusted gross income, with the result that they are not subject
to the AMT, and are not subject to the 2-percent floor.” Kenton
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-13. However, as petitioner is
deducting meal expenses here, not attorney’s fees and court
costs, these expenses do not fall within the favorable treatment
of sec. 62(a)(20) and are subject to the AMT and the 2-percent
floor. See secs. 56(b)(1)(A)(i), 67(a).
 - 11 -

and the business purpose of such miles. Smith v. Commissioner,

supra at 1172. “Congress has chosen to impose a rigorous test of

deductibility in the area of travel expenses. Each of the

foregoing elements must be proved for each separate expenditure.

General vague proof, whether offered by testimony or documentary

evidence, will not suffice.” Id. at 1171-1172.

Although petitioner claimed to have regularly used her

personal vehicle in connection with her reinstatement litigation,

the record is practically devoid of any evidence related to her

claimed mileage deduction. Evidence which is vague or

significantly incomplete is not credible. Harris v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-248; Weaver v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2004-108. Petitioner asserted that she has always

maintained a log of her vehicle travels, but “could not locate

it” and the only evidence accepted at trial was an exhibit

consisting of photocopies of parking receipts.7 Although we

7
At trial petitioner attempted to introduce a typed list of
expenses and places that did not include miles traveled. She
explained that this exhibit

describes taxpayer’s activities in relation to some of
the expenses that are being questioned, written
transcripts, * * * parking fees * * * in connection
with trying to get the back pay awarded to her * * *
similarly there is another chart referring to the
copies and other things that are incurred related to
travel to accomplish these things * * * to go to the
airport * * * to do a variety of business activities.

Respondent objects to the exhibit as “clearly prepared in
anticipation of [this] litigation”. We agreed with respondent
(continued...)
 - 12 -

agree with petitioner that she “had to drive to someplace to

park”, she did not even attempt to explain at trial where she had

driven when she received the parking receipts or that the miles

driven to the parking lots were in fact deductible. Petitioner

was unable to provide any substantiation for her claimed mileage

deduction, let alone meet the heightened requirements under

section 274. Therefore she is not entitled to a Schedule A

deduction for her claimed vehicle mileage expenses for the 2004

tax year.

D. Schedule A Deduction for Telephone Expenses

As discussed above, a taxpayer is generally permitted to

deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses, but is required

to keep sufficient records to substantiate the amount of any

deduction. Secs. 162(a), 6001. Under the Cohan doctrine, the

Court is permitted to estimate expenses; however, there must be

sufficient evidence that the expense was in fact incurred.

Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d at 560.

7
(...continued)
and refused to admit the evidence. This exhibit does not
constitute the kind of evidence contemplated by sec. 274(d) and
required to satisfy the higher burden of substantiation.

We also note that generally taxpayers may not “deduct the
daily cost of commuting to and from work, as such expense is
considered to be personal and nondeductible.” Brockman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-3 (citing Commissioner v. Flowers,
326 U.S. 465, 473-474 (1946)). Petitioner’s offered exhibit
listed under mileage included entries such as “kinko”, “mail”,
“copy”, and “buy supplies” that denote local and possibly
personal errands.
 - 13 -

At trial petitioner testified that she had more than one

telephone to support a dial-up modem and fax machine. She did

not present any evidence, testimonial or otherwise, regarding the

percentage of business use of the telephone. We note that “in

the case of an individual, any charge (including taxes thereon)

for basic local telephone service with respect to the 1st

telephone line provided to any residence of the taxpayer shall be

treated as a personal expense.” Sec. 262(b). Petitioner also

did not produce any telephone bills to substantiate a deduction.

Petitioner clearly has not met her burden and is not entitled to

a Schedule A deduction for her claimed telephone expenses for the

2004 tax year.

E. Schedule A Deduction for $400 Legal Fee

Petitioner claims to have made a $400 payment to her

attorney “for filing a writ petition to try to get the employer

to pay three years of back pay.” As we decided above,

petitioner’s litigation fees are ordinary and necessary business

expenses. See Kenton v. Commissioner, supra. However,

petitioner is still required to maintain adequate records to

substantiate those expenses under section 6001. Petitioner did

not present either a receipt for the $400 or a canceled check

evidencing such payment even though the Court allowed her time

after the trial, with numerous extensions, to gather evidence of

this payment. Petitioner has not met her burden and is therefore
 - 14 -

not entitled to a Schedule A deduction for a claimed employment-

related legal fee of $400 for the 2004 tax year.

F. Schedule A Deduction for Casualty Loss

Section 165(a) allows “as a deduction any loss sustained

during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or

otherwise.” See also sec. 165(c)(3) (casualty loss deductions

for individual taxpayers). A taxpayer may deduct a casualty loss

resulting from damage to his or her automobile whether used for a

business or personal purpose. Sec. 1.165-7(a)(3), Income Tax

Regs. The amount of the deduction, in the case of property not

used for business or held for the production of income, is the

lesser of either (i) the fair market value of the property before

the casualty minus the fair market value after the casualty; or

(ii) the adjusted basis of the property. Sec. 1.165-7(b)(1),

Income Tax Regs.

Petitioner explained that her 1978 BMW was “totaled” while

she was stalled on the Pasadena Freeway at some time during 2004.

While petitioner might qualify for a casualty loss deduction, we

conclude that she failed to establish her adjusted tax basis in

the car and that she claimed this deduction prematurely.

Petitioner admitted that her claim for damages with her

automobile insurance company has yet to be resolved. She

acknowledged there still exists a claim for reimbursement with a

reasonable prospect for recovery although she was unsure whether
 - 15 -

the insurance company would pay her at all. As we have

previously held, a taxpayer must establish the amount of the loss

before she may claim a casualty loss deduction. Clem v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-414 (citing Towers v. Commissioner,

24 T.C. 199, 239 (1955), affd. 247 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1957), affd.

sub nom. Bonney v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1957));

see also sec. 1.165-1(d)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs.

This is especially true in a case involving insurance.

Section 165(a) prohibits a taxpayer from deducting any amount

compensated by insurance. Since petitioner did not know, by the

close of the year in issue, how much, if anything, she would

receive from her insurance company as reimbursement for the

damages to her car, she cannot ascertain the amount of her

casualty loss. Petitioner is not entitled to a casualty loss

deduction.

G. Ten Percent Additional Tax Under Section 72(t) on the
Distribution From Petitioner’s Retirement Plan

In general, section 4974(c) defines qualified retirement

plans as including individual retirement accounts (IRA). Section

408 governs the treatment of IRAs. Specifically, section 408(d)

provides that distributions from an IRA are generally taxable in

the manner directed in section 72. Section 72(t) provides for an

additional tax on premature distributions.

Petitioner concedes that when she withdrew $3,328 from her

IRA at the Washington Mutual Bank in 2004 she was 55 years old.
 - 16 -

She testified that the reason she withdrew the money was that she

needed it for “some major expense or something it required.” At

no time has petitioner contended that any of the exceptions set

forth in section 72(t)(2) are applicable to her circumstance, nor

has she explained why she believed the section 72(t) additional

tax did not apply. Petitioner is liable for the 10-percent

additional tax under section 72(t) on the distribution of $3,328

from her retirement plan for the 2004 tax year.

III. Additions to Tax

Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for

additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654 for

the 2004 tax year. Pursuant to section 7491(c), respondent has

the burden of production with respect to these additions to tax

and is therefore required to “come forward with sufficient

evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant

penalty.” See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001).

However, “once the Commissioner meets his burden of production,

the taxpayer must come forward with evidence sufficient to

persuade a court that the Commissioner’s determination is

incorrect.” Id. at 447.

A. Section 6651(a)(1) Addition to Tax

Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax for failure to

file a timely return unless the taxpayer proves that such failure

is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. See United
 - 17 -

States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985). Petitioner concedes

that she did not file a Federal income tax return for her 2004

tax year. She has not argued, or introduced any evidence

suggesting, that her failure to file was due to reasonable cause

and not willful neglect. Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s

imposition of the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1).

B. Section 6651(a)(2) Addition to Tax

Section 6651(a)(2) imposes an addition to tax for failure to

timely pay the amount of tax shown on a return. This Court has

stated:

The Commissioner’s burden of production with
respect to the section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax
requires that the Commissioner introduce evidence that
a return showing the taxpayer’s tax liability was filed
for the year in question. In a case such as this where
the taxpayer did not file a return, the Commissioner
must introduce evidence that an SFR [substitute for
return] satisfying the requirements of section 6020(b)
was made. See Cabirac v. Commissioner, * * * [120 T.C.
163 (2003)]. * * *

Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 200, 210 (2006), affd. 521

F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008). The section 6651(a)(2) addition to

tax is not imposed if the taxpayer proves that the failure to pay

is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.

Under section 6651(g)(2), a return prepared by the Secretary

pursuant to section 6020(b) is treated as a return filed by the

taxpayer for the purpose of determining the amount of an addition

to tax under section 6651(a)(2). To constitute a section 6020(b)

return, “the return must be subscribed, it must contain
 - 18 -

sufficient information from which to compute the taxpayer’s tax

liability, and the return form and any attachments must purport

to be a ‘return’.” Spurlock v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-

124.

Petitioner concedes that respondent prepared a substitute

for return for her 2004 tax year under section 6020(b). Because

petitioner did not pay the tax liability as shown on the section

6020(b) return, respondent has met the burden of production with

respect to the section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax. Petitioner

has not argued or introduced any evidence suggesting that her

failure to pay was due to reasonable cause and not willful

neglect. We therefore sustain respondent’s imposition of the

addition to tax under section 6651(a)(2).

C. Section 6654 Addition to Tax

Section 6654(a) imposes an addition to tax for underpayment

of estimated income tax by an individual taxpayer. The addition

to tax is computed by reference to the four required installment

payments of the taxpayer’s estimated tax liability, each

constituting 25 percent of the “required annual payment.” Sec.

6654(d)(1)(A). For taxpayers whose adjusted gross income for the

preceding year was $150,000 or less, the “required annual

payment” is equal to the lesser of (1) 90 percent of the tax

shown on the individual's return for the year or, if no return is

filed, 90 percent of his or her tax for such year, or (2) if the
 - 19 -

individual filed a return for the immediately preceding taxable

year, 100 percent of the tax shown on that return. Sec.

6654(d)(1)(A) and (B).

Petitioner failed to file a 2004 Federal income tax return

and made no estimated tax payments for 2004. Petitioner did have

a tax liability for her 2003 taxable year.8 Consequently,

petitioner was required to make a payment of estimated tax. See

sec. 6654(d)(1)(B)(ii). Respondent has met his burden of

producing evidence that petitioner had a required annual payment

of estimated tax for 2004. The Court also concludes that

petitioner does not qualify for any of the exceptions to a

section 6654(a) addition to tax provided in section 6654(e).

Under section 6654(e), a section 6654(a) addition to tax

does not apply if the tax shown on the taxpayer’s return for the

year in question (or, if no return is filed, the taxpayer’s tax

for that year), reduced by the credit allowable by section 31, is

less than $1,000. The addition to tax will also not apply if the

taxpayer’s tax for a full immediately preceding 12-month taxable

year was zero and the taxpayer was, for the entire taxable year,

a citizen or resident of the United States. The Court has

8
Respondent was unable to present petitioner’s 2003 tax
liability at trial because it was the subject of another Tax
Court case that has since been decided. In Forrest v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-228, we sustained respondent’s
determination that in addition to the $9,666 of tax shown on her
2003 tax return, petitioner had a Federal income tax deficiency
of $1,882.
 - 20 -

determined that petitioner had a liability for income tax for

2004 that exceeded $1,000, net of any section 31 credit, and has

taken judicial notice of the fact that petitioner had a tax

liability in 2003. Therefore, the Court sustains respondent’s

determination of the addition to tax pursuant to section 6654(a).

The Court has considered all of petitioner’s contentions,

arguments, requests, and statements. To the extent not discussed

herein, we conclude that they are meritless, moot, or irrelevant.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered

under Rule 155.