T.C. Summary Opinion 2011-17
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ANIETRA Y. HAMPER, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 22375-09S. Filed February 24, 2011.
Anietra Y. Hamper, pro se.
Anita A. Gill, for respondent.
DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to
the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to section
7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any
other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent
for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent
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section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Respondent determined the following deficiencies in
petitioner’s Federal income taxes and accuracy-related penalties:
Accuracy-Related Penalty
Year Deficiency Section 6662
2005¹ $3,242 $648.40
2006 4,138 827.60
2007 4,760 952.00
2008 4,352 870.40
¹Petitioner signed Form 872, Consent to Extend the Time to
Assess Tax, for 2005 but alleged she was pressured and tricked
into signing the document. She did not explain or otherwise
provide evidence that she did not understand Form 872 and its
contents.
The issues for decision are whether petitioner is entitled
to deduct unreimbursed employee business expenses claimed on
Schedules A, Itemized Deductions, and whether she is liable for
the section 6662 accuracy-related penalties for the years at
issue.1
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and supplemental stipulation of facts
and the exhibits received into evidence are incorporated herein
1
Respondent determined that petitioner failed to report
interest income of $29 and $24 for 2005 and 2007, respectively.
Petitioner did not present any credible evidence or otherwise
allege that she did not receive interest income in 2005 and 2007
as respondent determined. The issue is deemed conceded. See
Rule 34(b).
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by reference. At the time petitioner filed her petition, she
resided in Ohio.
On Schedules A of her Federal income tax returns for the
years at issue, petitioner claimed deductions for unreimbursed
employee business expenses of $20,713, $18,604, $22,602, and
$21,759, for 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. These
deductions for unreimbursed employee business expenses included
expenses for clothing, a cell phone, mileage expenses,
professional expenses, subscriptions, union dues, supplies,
promotional products, legal expenses, hair, nail, and makeup
expenses, office expenses, dry cleaning costs, educational and
self-defense class costs, and Internet expenses.
During the years at issue petitioner was employed as a
morning and noon television news anchor. As a television news
anchor petitioner is required to maintain a specified
professional appearance as described in the Women’s Wardrobe
Guidelines (guidelines). The guidelines provide that the “ideal
in selecting an outfit for on-air use should be the selection of
‘standard business wear’, typical of that which one might wear on
any business day in a normal office setting anywhere in the USA.”
The guidelines point out that there is no correlation between the
cost of an outfit and its appropriateness for use, and generally
a conservative outfit purchased “off the rack” at a local
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department store is more acceptable than excessively stylish
items purchased at a designer boutique.
The guidelines also recommend avoiding certain clothing such
as those with flamboyant or loud patterns which may be
distracting on camera, heavy tweed suits, and outfits with
buttons or accessories that are overly large, as television tends
to make them look even larger.
The general guideline is that petitioner maintain a
professional and conservative appearance. She must maintain her
hair in a neat and conservative cut and maintain her fingernails
at a reasonable length, finished with conservatively colored nail
polish.
In addition to her duties as a news anchor, which include
writing, selecting, and preparing news stories for broadcast,
petitioner is required to attend promotional appearances
throughout the year. Because she is an ambassador of her
station, she must maintain a professional image and demeanor at
all times. She is also required to have an overnight bag ready
at all times, in the event she is called out of town, in which
she maintains several changes of clothing.
Consistent with the requirement that petitioner maintain a
neat, professional, and conservative appearance, and as a part of
her community appearances, she incurred considerable expenses for
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clothing and for maintaining her appearance during the years at
issue.
On June 30, 2009, respondent issued to petitioner a notice
of deficiency disallowing a portion of her business expense
deductions2 asserting that they are nondeductible personal
expenses or do not otherwise satisfy the strict substantiation
requirements of section 274.
Discussion
I. Burden of Proof
Generally, the Commissioner’s determinations are presumed
correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that those
determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
Section 7491(a)(1) provides that, subject to certain
limitations, where a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with
respect to a factual issue relevant to ascertaining the
taxpayer’s tax liability, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner with respect to that issue.
Petitioner maintains that she has satisfied the requirements
of section 7491(a) and therefore the burden of proof should shift
2
Respondent stipulated that although petitioner did not
enter into evidence receipts for 2006, 2007, and 2008, she did in
fact substantiate a portion of her expenses as provided in the
stipulations.
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to respondent. She alleges that she fully cooperated with all
reasonable requests by respondent and provided all documentation
and information relating to her expense deductions.
Respondent stipulated most of the factual issues relating to
petitioner’s claimed expense deductions. In this case the
determination of whether an expense is an unreimbursed employee
business expense is a question of law; therefore, section 7491 is
inapplicable. To the extent respondent has not stipulated the
remaining factual determinations, the Court resolves those issues
on a preponderance of the evidence, without regard to the burden
of proof.
II. Claimed Business Expense Deductions
Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and
taxpayers must satisfy the specific requirements for any
deduction claimed. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at
84; New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
Taxpayers bear the burden of substantiating the amount and
purpose of any claimed deduction. See Hradesky v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 87 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976).
Section 262 expressly denies a deduction for “personal,
living, or family expenses.” On the other hand, section 162(a)
allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred in carrying on any trade or business. Generally, the
performance of services as an employee constitutes a trade or
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business. Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 377 (1970).
Whether expenditures are for ordinary and necessary business
expenses is a question of fact, and the taxpayer must demonstrate
that the purpose of the expenditure was primarily business rather
than personal and that the business in which the taxpayer is
engaged benefited or was intended to be benefited by the
expenditure. Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1266, 1289 (1980);
Chapman v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 358 (1967).
A. Clothing and Accessory Costs
Although a business wardrobe is a necessary condition of
employment, the cost of the wardrobe has generally been
considered a nondeductible personal expense pursuant to section
262. See Kennedy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1970-58, affd. 451
F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1971). The general rule is that where
business clothes are suitable for general wear, a deduction for
them is not allowable. See Donnelly v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d
411 (2d Cir. 1959), affg. 28 T.C. 1278 (1957); Hynes v.
Commissioner, supra at 1290; Roth v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1450
(1952). Such costs are not deductible even when it has been
shown that the particular clothes would not have been purchased
but for the employment. Stiner v. United States, 524 F.2d 640
(10th Cir. 1975); Donnelly v. Commissioner, supra.
There are recognized exceptions to the general rule where,
for example, the clothing was useful only in the business
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environment in which the taxpayer worked. See, e.g., Mortrud v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. 208 (1965); Harsaghy v. Commissioner 2 T.C.
484 (1943); Meier v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 458 (1943). The rules
for determining whether the cost of clothing is deductible as an
ordinary and necessary business expense are: (1) The clothing is
required or essential in the taxpayer’s employment; (2) the
clothing is not suitable for general or personal wear; and (3)
the clothing is not so worn. Yeomans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.
757, 767 (1958). When the cost of acquiring clothing is
deductible, then the cost of maintaining such clothing is
likewise deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. Mortrud v. Commissioner, supra.
During the years at issue petitioner purchased clothing for
her position as a news anchor. She wears her business clothing
only at work and maintains her business clothing separately from
her personal clothing. She explained that the requirement to
wear conservative clothing makes her business clothing unsuitable
for everyday wear.
Petitioner purchased most of her business clothing and
accessories from typical clothing stores such as Nordstrom’s,
Kohl’s, Victoria’s Secret, Macy’s, Old Navy, JCPenney, Sportmart,
Casual Corner, DSW, Ann Taylor Loft, Dick’s Sporting Goods,
Marshall’s, Charlotte Russe, and other local clothing stores.
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Petitioner’s clothing purchases for work consisted of such
items as traditional business suits, lounge wear, a robe,
sportswear, active wear, lingerie, cotton bikini and cotton thong
underwear, and evening wear. She also deducted expenses for an
Ohio State jersey, jewelry, bedding, running and walking shoes,
and dry cleaning costs.
Petitioner used a self-described criterion for determining
whether a clothing expense was deductible. She would ask herself
“would I be buying this if I didn’t have to wear this” to work,
“and if the answer is no, then I know that I am buying it
specifically” for work, and therefore, it is a deductible
business expense.
Hynes v. Commissioner, supra, involved a taxpayer in
circumstances very similar to petitioner’s. The taxpayer in
Hynes worked as a television news anchor and deducted business
expenses for wardrobe, laundry and dry cleaning, haircuts and
makeup, hotels and meals, and car expenses and depreciation. The
taxpayer purchased a particular wardrobe that was restricted in
terms of color and pattern that he was able to wear on the air.
The Court reasoned that the restriction on the taxpayer’s
selection of business attire, however, was not significantly
different from that applicable to other business professionals
who must also limit their selection of clothing to conservative
styles and fashions. The Court further reasoned that the fact
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that the taxpayer chose not to wear the business clothing while
away from the station did not signal that the clothing was not
suitable for private and personal wear. In fact, as the Court
noted, most professionals typically do not wear their business
clothes for private or personal wear.
Similarly, petitioner does not satisfy the requirement that
her clothing not be suitable for everyday personal wear.
Although she is required to purchase conservative business
attire, it is not of a fashion that is outrageous or otherwise
unsuitable for everyday personal wear. Given the nature of her
expenditures, it is evident that petitioner’s clothing is in fact
suitable for everyday wear, even if it is not so worn.
Consequently, the Court upholds respondent’s determination that
petitioner is not entitled to deduct expenses related to
clothing, shoes, and accessory costs, as these are inherently
personal expenses. Additionally, because the costs associated
with the purchase of clothing are a nondeductible personal
expense, costs for the maintenance of the clothing such as dry
cleaning costs are also nondeductible personal expenses.
B. Contact Lenses, Makeup, and Grooming Expenses
Petitioner incurred expenses for the purchase of contact
lenses in the years at issue and testified that she wears for
work a different contact lens prescription that enables her to
read the teleprompter. In addition to the cost of prescription
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contact lenses, she also deducted the costs for contact lens
solution and Softsoap morning mist pump soap. There is no
indication beyond her own testimony and she presented no credible
evidence that she was required to and did obtain an additional
prescription for work.
Petitioner also purchased makeup and testified that the
makeup was designed for on-the-air appearances and provided
significantly more coverage than ordinary makeup.3
Petitioner typically purchased her makeup from Nordstrom’s
and drugstores that sell ordinary cosmetics. The receipts
offered into evidence do not indicate purchases for special
makeup designed for on-camera use but simply indicate purchases
for ordinary makeup suitable for everyday wear. The Court is
unable to determine whether the makeup she purchased was
primarily for business use.
Petitioner also obtained regular haircuts and manicures.
Other maintenance expenditures included teeth whitening and skin
care product purchases.
Petitioner’s expenditures for manicures, grooming, teeth
whitening, and skin care are inherently personal expenditures.
Although these expenses may be related to her job, expenses that
are inherently personal are nondeductible personal expenses. As
3
Petitioner’s contract with NBC provided that NBC would
provide the makeup necessary for on-the-air performances. She
testified that her employer did not purchase on-the-air makeup.
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in Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. at 1292, the fact that
petitioner’s employment contract with the station required her to
maintain a neat appearance does not elevate these personal
expenses to a deductible business expense.
C. Self-Defense Class Expenses
Petitioner deducted, as a business expense, expenses she
incurred for self-defense classes in the form of gym membership
fees.
Petitioner’s position as a news anchor made her a public
figure in her local area. Petitioner was one of the unfortunate
public figures affected by stalking and was advised by the local
police to undertake self-defense classes as a protective measure.
Although petitioner testified that she enrolled in self-
defense classes with a private instructor, the only
substantiation relating to self-defense classes for the years at
issue was her gym membership dues at Lifetime Fitness.
Furthermore, petitioner’s daily log for 2005, which provided a
detailed account of her weekly schedule, does not indicate that
she attended self-defense classes. On an almost-daily basis
petitioner noted her workout for each day, which included
kickboxing, yoga, running, walking, weights, and cardio. But any
reference to self-defense classes was notably missing from the
log.
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Generally, costs incurred in maintaining good health are
inherently personal expenditures, and to be entitled to a
deduction, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the expenses were
different from or in excess of what he would have spent for
personal purposes. See, e.g., Fred W. Amend v. Commissioner, 55
T.C. 320, 325-326 (1970) (“some expenses are so inherently
personal that they simply cannot qualify for section 162
treatment irrespective of the role played by such expenditures in
the overall scheme of the taxpayers’ trade or business”), affd.
454 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1971); Sutter v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.
170, 173 (1953).
The Court recognizes that petitioner may have been the
target of stalkers. Unfortunately, petitioner has not shown how
her gym membership fees were related to her business, or that
they were otherwise an ordinary and necessary business expenses
for her position as a news anchor.
D. Professional Associations and Dues and Legal Fees
Respondent stipulated that petitioner incurred and
substantiated legal fees of $2,239 and professional dues of $75
in 2006. Respondent further stipulated that petitioner
substantiated expenses of $50 to the National Academy of
Television Arts and Sciences in both 2005 and 2007 and $207 for
legal fees in 2007. Finally, respondent stipulated that
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petitioner incurred and substantiated expenses of $50 paid for
professional dues in 2008.
Petitioner argues that these expenses are associated with
her business activities and her performance review, which affects
her contract, position, pay, and career.
The Court is satisfied that the foregoing expenses during
the years at issue were substantiated ordinary and necessary
business expenses. To the extent petitioner was unable to
substantiate her legal expenses for 2008, a deduction for the
unsubstantiated expense is denied.
E. Subscriptions
Petitioner testified that she is expected to have constant
access to news. Accordingly, she subscribes to cable television
and Internet, newspapers, magazines such as Cosmopolitan,
Glamour, Newsweek, and Nickelodeon, and satellite radio.
Subscribing to periodicals of general interest does not
generate an ordinary and necessary business expense within the
meaning of section 162. Specifically, the purchase of general
circulation newspapers is a personal expense that taxpayers may
not deduct. Stemkowski v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 40, 47 (2d Cir.
1982), affg. in part and revg. in part 76 T.C. 252 (1981).
Subscription expenses with respect to trade and professional
magazines relating to a taxpayer’s trade or business may be
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deductible under section 162. See Kasey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1642, 1650 (1970), affd. 457 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1972).
Although the foregoing news sources keep petitioner abreast
of relevant breaking news, expenses for access to these news
sources are inherently personal, and petitioner has not shown how
these expenses are ordinary and necessary business expenses. See
sec. 262. Basic cable television, similar to daily newspapers,
contains a significant amount of information which is inherently
personal. As with the purchase of a television or television
repair, cable television access is not deductible, and petitioner
has failed to show that her use of the cable television,
satellite radio, and newspaper subscriptions were ordinary and
necessary business expenses. In addition, petitioner failed to
demonstrate that her magazine subscriptions for Glamour,
Cosmopolitan, Newsweek, and Nickelodeon served a valid business
purpose for her position as a news anchor. Accordingly we hold
that petitioner is not entitled to deduct the foregoing expenses.
F. Section 274 Expenses
Section 274 imposes heightened substantiation requirements
for certain types of deductions, including deductions for car and
truck expenses, meals and entertainment, cellular phones, and
gifts. Secs. 274(d), 280F(d)(4). To claim deductions for these
expenses a taxpayer must keep adequate contemporaneous records
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showing the amount, business purpose, and business relationship
of the expense. Sec. 274(d).
1. Cell Phone Expense
Petitioner testified that she used her cell phone when she
was not at work in order to set up stories and solicit feedback
from viewers. Petitioner did not present credible evidence,
however, sufficient to satisfy the strict substantiation
requirements of section 274. See sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary
Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).
Accordingly, petitioner’s claimed deductions for the years at
issue are disallowed.
2. Vehicle Expenses
Pursuant to section 274(d), any deduction claimed with
respect to the use of a passenger automobile will be disallowed
unless the taxpayer substantiates specified elements of the use
by adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the
taxpayer’s own statement. See sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1), Temporary
Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).
To meet the adequate records requirements of section 274(d),
a taxpayer must maintain some form of records and documentary
evidence that in combination are sufficient to establish each
element of an expenditure or use. See sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2),
Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46017 (Nov. 6, 1985). A
contemporaneous log is not required, but corroborative evidence
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to support a taxpayer’s reconstruction of the elements of an
expenditure or use must have “a high degree of probative value to
elevate such statement” to the level of credibility of a
contemporaneous record. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1), Temporary Income
Tax Regs., supra.
The elements that must be substantiated to deduct expenses
for the business use of an automobile are: (1) The amount of the
expenditure; (2) the mileage for each business use of the
automobile and the total mileage for all use of the automobile
during the taxable period; (3) the date of the business use; and
(4) the business purpose of the use of the automobile. See sec.
1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra.
For 2005 petitioner presented a mileage log detailing her
business mileage. In addition, petitioner provided a maintenance
vehicle report in corroboration of her mileage log. The mileage
log and odometer readings, however, conflict with the maintenance
vehicle report. Given that petitioner’s mileage log for 2005
substantially conflicts with her vehicle history report, the
Court is unable to conclude that the mileage log is credible in
determining her business mileage for 2005.
As for the remaining years at issue, petitioner has not
presented credible evidence or documentation in support of her
claimed business mileage. Accordingly, respondent’s
determination is sustained in full.
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3. Business Gifts
The heightened substantiation requirements of section 274
also apply to business gifts. Sec. 274(d)(3). Petitioner has
introduced receipts as evidence in support of her claimed
deductions for business gifts for 2005. However, petitioner did
not explain the business purpose of the gifts and the business
relationship with the persons to whom the gifts were given. See
sec. 1.274-5T(b)(5), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg.
46016 (Nov. 6, 1985). Accordingly, the Court sustains
respondent’s determination with regard to the business gifts.
4. Meals and Entertainment
The elements required to prove a business expense for
entertainment include: (1) The amount of the expenditure; (2)
the time and place of the entertainment; (3) the business purpose
for the entertainment; and (4) the taxpayer’s business
relationship with the persons entertained. Sec. 1.274-5T(b)(3),
Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46015 (Nov. 6, 1985).
For 2005 petitioner offered into evidence a detailed day
planner documenting her activities throughout 2005. In
corroboration of her events in her day planner, petitioner
offered a limited number of receipts documenting meal
expenditures for 2005.
Although petitioner incurred meal expenses in the years at
issue, as stipulated by respondent, she failed to present any
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credible evidence as to the business purpose for those meal
expenditures and the business relationship with the person(s)
entertained. Accordingly, the Court must deny petitioner’s
claimed deductions for meal and entertainment expenses in the
years at issue.
G. Remaining Expenses
Petitioner claimed expense deductions for other expenses
which included professional expenses, promotional products, and
supplies for 2006 and 2008, items for speaking engagements for
2005, other expenses for 2007, and miscellaneous and office
expenses for 2008. Petitioner did not testify or otherwise
provide substantiating documentation for the foregoing expenses.
Accordingly, respondent’s determination regarding the foregoing
expenses is sustained.
III. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for each year.
Section 6662(a) and (b) imposes a 20-percent penalty on the
portion of an underpayment attributable to any one of various
factors, including negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations. “Negligence” includes any failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, including any failure to keep adequate books and
records or to substantiate items properly. See sec. 6662(c);
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sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Under section 7491(c),
respondent has the burden of production with respect to the
accuracy-related penalties. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C.
438, 446 (2001).
Section 6664(c)(1) provides an exception to the section
6662(a) penalty if it is shown that there was reasonable cause
for any portion of the underpayment and the taxpayer acted in
good faith with respect to such portion. The determination of
whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith
is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the
pertinent facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income
Tax Regs. The most important factor is the extent of the
taxpayer’s effort to assess his proper tax liability. Id.
Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith
include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is
reasonable in view of the taxpayer’s experience, knowledge, and
education. Id.
Petitioner alleges that she acted in good faith and with
reasonable cause in deducting her business expenses because the
tax law says that all business expenses that are ordinary and
necessary are deductible and that her deductions are specific to
the job she performs as a news anchor.
The law is well settled that expenditures that are
inherently personal are nondeductible despite the seeming
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relation to a taxpayer’s business. Petitioner has presented no
other credible evidence that she should not be subject to the
accuracy-related penalties for the years at issue. Therefore,
the Court sustains respondent’s determination as to the accuracy-
related penalties.
The Court has considered the other arguments of the parties,
and they are either without merit or not necessary in view of our
resolution of the issues in this case.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.