James Bruce and Laura Anne Thornberry v. Commissioner

JAMES BRUCE THORNBERRY AND LAURA ANNE THORNBERRY,
PETITIONERS v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, RESPONDENT
Docket No. 580–10L. Filed April 19, 2011.

The IRS issued notices of intent to levy and notices of Fed-
eral tax lien filing to Ps for unpaid income taxes assessed for
2000, 2001, and 2002 and a civil penalty under sec. 6702,
I.R.C., assessed for 2007. Ps timely requested an administra-
tive hearing under secs. 6320 and 6330, I.R.C. Ps set forth the
grounds for their request in an attachment they downloaded
from the Internet. The IRS Office of Appeals (Appeals Office)
sent letters to Ps stating that the Appeals Office had deter-
mined Ps’ request for a hearing consisted of frivolous positions
that meet the requirements of sec. 6702(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii),
I.R.C., and, therefore, the Appeals Office was disregarding the
request. The letters stated that the Appeals Office was
returning Ps’ request to the IRS collection office and that
‘‘Collection may proceed with collection action as if the
hearing request was never submitted.’’ Held: The statements
in the Appeals Office letters that the IRS collection office
could proceed with collection action are determinations for
purposes of sec. 6330(d)(1), I.R.C. Held, further, sec. 6330(g),
I.R.C., denies further administrative or judicial review of the
portions of a request for an administrative hearing under sec.
6320 or 6330, I.R.C., that the Appeals Office determined are
frivolous but it does not deny judicial review of that deter-
mination. Held, further, this Court has jurisdiction to review
the determination under sec. 6330(g), I.R.C., issued to peti-
tioners in response to their timely request for a hearing
pursuant to secs. 6320 and 6330, I.R.C. Held, further,
respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction will be
denied.

James Bruce Thornberry and Laura Anne Thornberry,
pro se.
James R. Bamberg, for respondent.

356

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00001 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 (356) THORNBERRY v. COMMISSIONER 357

OPINION

DAWSON, Judge: This collection case is before the Court on
respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the
ground that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Office of
Appeals (the Appeals Office) did not issue petitioners a notice
of determination pursuant to section 6320 or 6330. 1
Respondent contends that the Appeals Office determined
that petitioners’ requests for an administrative hearing in
their entirety met the requirements of section 6702(b)(2)(A)(i)
or (ii) and, pursuant to section 6330(g), treated the requests
as if they were never submitted. Respondent further con-
tends that a determination under section 6330(g) is not sub-
ject to any review by this Court.

Background
The IRS sent petitioners Notices of Intent to Levy and
Notice of Your Right to a Hearing (levy notices) regarding
petitioners’ unpaid Federal income tax liabilities for 2000,
2001, and 2002 and an unpaid section 6702 penalty assessed
against Mr. Thornberry for 2007. Shortly thereafter, the IRS
issued to petitioners Notices of Federal Tax Lien Filing and
Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (lien notices)
informing them that notices of Federal tax lien had been
filed for their unpaid Federal income tax liabilities for 2000,
2001, and 2002 and for the unpaid section 6702 penalty
assessed for 2007.
Petitioners timely sent to the Appeals Office Forms 12153,
Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing,
requesting a hearing regarding the lien notices and levy
notices for petitioners’ unpaid Federal income tax liabilities
for 2000, 2001, and 2002 and Mr. Thornberry’s unpaid sec-
tion 6702 penalty for 2007. Petitioners checked almost every
box on the Forms 12153, with a statement ‘‘SEE ATTACHED
PAGES’’. Petitioners thereby indicated that they (1) requested
an installment agreement or an offer-in-compromise as a
collection alternative, (2) requested subordination, discharge,
or withdrawal of the lien, and (3) indicated that other
grounds for disagreement with the filing of the lien notices
and levy notices were set forth in the attachments to the
1 Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00002 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 358 136 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (356)

forms. Petitioners had obtained the attachment from the Web
site of an organization with a history of promoting frivolous
arguments and activities that delay or impede the adminis-
tration of the Federal tax laws. Each attachment lists 23
boilerplate items of which, 21 were checked and 2 were
unchecked. The list was printed from the Web site that way;
i.e., the 21 items were not checked by petitioners. By the
checked items, petitioners, inter alia, (1) purported to assert
that collection action would place an undue hardship on
them and they requested collection alternatives; (2) pur-
ported to assert that they qualified for subordination and
requested that the notice of lien be withdrawn; and (3) pur-
ported not to have received notices of deficiency for the
assessed income taxes or the section 6702 penalty and had
not otherwise had an opportunity to contest the tax liabilities
and requested reconsideration of the income tax deficiencies
and the section 6702 penalty. The checked items also pur-
ported to withdraw any constitutional, moral, political, reli-
gious, or conscientious arguments that petitioners might pre-
viously have made and withdrew any legal positions that are
classified and published by the IRS as frivolous or groundless,
including any arguments that the courts have determined
are frivolous or groundless.
A settlement officer in the Appeals Office sent petitioners
a boilerplate Letter 4380, Appeals Received Your Request for
a Collection Due Process and/or Equivalent Hearing,
addressing statements in their requests for a hearing related
to unpaid Federal income tax liabilities for 2000, 2001, and
2002 and the section 6702 penalty for 2007 (the SO Letter
4380). The settlement officer stated that he had reviewed
petitioners’ requests for a hearing and determined that their
disagreement was either (1) a specified frivolous position
identified by the IRS in Notice 2008–14, 2008–1 C.B. 310, or
(2) a frivolous reason not specified in Notice 2008–14, supra,
but reflecting a desire to delay or impede Federal tax
administration, or (3) a moral, religious, political, constitu-
tional, conscientious, or similar objection reflecting a desire
to delay or impede Federal tax administration (collectively,
the frivolous issues). The settlement officer did not specify
which statements or individual grounds listed in petitioners’
requests or the attachments thereto were frivolous issues or
otherwise identify anything in the request, the attachment,

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00003 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 (356) THORNBERRY v. COMMISSIONER 359

petitioners’ administrative file, or petitioners’ conduct that
reflected a desire to delay or impede Federal tax administra-
tion. The SO Letter 4380 informed petitioners that they
could amend their hearing requests by withdrawing the
frivolous issues and raising any legitimate issues. The SO
Letter 4380 stated that legitimate issues include:
• Collection alternatives to levy such as full payment of the liability,
installment agreement, or offer-in-compromise. Although they may not nec-
essarily be considered an ‘‘alternative’’ to a notice of lien filing, these
collection options may also be discussed at a lien hearing.
• Challenges to the appropriateness of collection action. If this is a lien
hearing, you may ask us to determine if the notice of lien filing was appro-
priate and if you qualify for a lien withdrawal or other lien options, such
as subordination.
• Spousal defenses, when applicable.
• Liability challenges, i.e., whether you owe the amount due, but only if
you did not receive a statutory notice of deficiency or have not otherwise
had an opportunity to dispute your liability with Appeals.

The settlement officer requested that, within 30 days of the
date of the SO Letter 4380, petitioners either (1) amend their
requests in writing to state a legitimate issue and withdraw
the frivolous issues or (2) withdraw their entire hearing
requests. He informed petitioners that, if they submitted a
legitimate reason for their dispute, he would send a con-
ference letter scheduling their hearing, in which case he
would need (1) a completed Form 433–A, Collection Informa-
tion Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individ-
uals (collection information statement), with proof of income
and expenses and (2) their Federal income tax returns for
2006 and 2007.
The settlement officer warned petitioners that if they did
not withdraw the frivolous issues and submit legitimate
ones, he would disregard their hearing requests and return
their case to the IRS collection office that had referred it to
Appeals and the IRS could impose a $5,000 penalty pursuant
to section 6702(b). Finally, the settlement officer advised
petitioners that ‘‘if Appeals disregards your CDP hearing, you
will not be able to file with the Tax Court for a judicial
review of our disregard determination.’’
Petitioners responded to the SO Letter 4380 in a letter in
which they asserted that they had raised legitimate issues,

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00004 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 360 136 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (356)

none of which were frivolous, and stated that they did not
withdraw any of their numerous grounds for requesting a
hearing.
A team manager in the Appeals Office sent petitioners two
boilerplate letters titled ‘‘Appeals is disregarding your
request for a Collection Due Process and/or Equivalent
Hearing’’ (collectively, the determination letters). The first,
dated December 7, 2009, addressed petitioners’ request for a
hearing regarding the unpaid Federal income tax liabilities
for 2000, 2001, and 2002. The second, dated December 17,
2009, addressed the hearing request regarding the section
6702 penalty for 2007 and was in all other respects identical
to the December 7 letter.
The determination letters stated that petitioners did not
respond to the SO Letter 4380 with a legitimate reason or
withdraw the frivolous issues within the specified timeframe.
The determination letters again listed the legitimate issues
that could be raised in a hearing that were previously set
forth in the SO Letter 4380. The determination letters
informed petitioners that, under the authority of section
6330(g), the Appeals Office was disregarding their request for
an administrative hearing because it had determined that
their disagreement is:
• a ‘‘specified frivolous position’’, identified by the IRS in Notice 2008–14
(for Notice 2008–14, refer to the IRS Internet website at http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0..id=177519,00.html); or
• a reason that is not a ‘‘specified frivolous position,’’ but is a frivolous
reason reflecting a desire to delay or impede federal tax administration; or
• a moral, religious, political, constitutional, conscientious, or similar
objection to the imposition or payment of federal taxes that reflects a
desire to delay or impede the administration of federal tax laws.

The determination letters stated that the Appeals Office was
returning petitioners’ requests to the IRS collection office and
that ‘‘Collection may proceed with collection action as if the
hearing request was never submitted.’’ The determination
letters did not specify which statements or individual
grounds listed in petitioners’ requests or the attachments
thereto were frivolous issues or otherwise identify anything
in the request, the attachment, or petitioners’ administrative
file or conduct that reflected a desire to delay or impede Fed-
eral tax administration.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00005 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 (356) THORNBERRY v. COMMISSIONER 361

Petitioners timely filed their petition under section
6330(d)(1) seeking review of the determination that the IRS
collection office could proceed with collection. They assert
that they were denied a proper hearing under section 6330.
Petitioners resided in Florida when they filed their petition.
Respondent filed the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the Appeals Office has made no
determination concerning collection action or any other deter-
mination that would confer jurisdiction on this Court with
respect to petitioners’ taxable years 2000, 2001, 2002, and
2007. Respondent contends that the Appeals Office deter-
mined that all of petitioners’ requests for an administrative
hearing met the requirements of section 6702(b)(2)(A)(i) or
(ii) and, pursuant to section 6330(g), treated the requests as
if they were never submitted. Respondent further contends
that a determination under section 6330(g) is not subject to
any review by this Court.

Discussion
I. Collection Procedures Generally
Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights to property belonging to a per-
son who is liable for Federal taxes and neglects or refuses to
pay them after demand for payment has been made. If a tax-
payer liable for Federal taxes fails to pay the taxes within 10
days after notice and demand, the Secretary may collect the
tax by levy on the taxpayer’s property. Sec. 6331.
Section 6320(a)(1) requires the Secretary to give a taxpayer
written notice that a tax lien has been filed upon that tax-
payer’s property (lien notice). Section 6330(a)(1) requires the
Secretary to give a taxpayer written notice that the Commis-
sioner intends to levy upon the taxpayer’s property (levy
notice). The notices must inform the taxpayer of the right to
request a hearing in the Appeals Office (the administrative
hearing). Secs. 6320(a)(3)(B), (b)(1), 6330(a)(3)(B), (b)(1).
The taxpayer must make a timely request for an adminis-
trative hearing in response to a lien or levy notice, stating
the grounds for the requested hearing. Secs. 6320(a)(3)(B),
(b)(1), 6330(a)(3)(B), (b)(1). Upon request, the taxpayer is
entitled to a fair hearing conducted by an impartial officer

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00006 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 362 136 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (356)

from the Appeals Office. Secs. 6320(b), 6330(b); Mason v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. 301, 315 (2009).
During the administrative hearing the Appeals officer is
required by statute to verify that the requirements of any
applicable law or administrative procedure have been met,
sec. 6330(c)(1), (3), and must do so regardless of whether the
taxpayer raised it at the hearing, Hoyle v. Commissioner, 131
T.C. 197, 200–203 (2008). During the administrative hearing
the taxpayer may raise any relevant issue, including appro-
priate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of
collection actions, and collection alternatives. Sec.
6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer may raise challenges to the exist-
ence or amount of the underlying tax liability if he/she did
not receive a notice of deficiency for that liability or did not
otherwise have an opportunity to dispute it. Sec.
6330(c)(2)(B).
However, the taxpayer may not raise an issue that meets
either of the requirements of section 6702(b)(2)(A)(i) or (ii);
i.e., is based on a position which the Secretary has identified
as frivolous under section 6702(c) or reflects a desire to delay
or impede the administration of Federal tax laws. Sec.
6330(c)(4)(B). If the Appeals officer determines that any por-
tion of the taxpayer’s request for a hearing meets a section
6702(b)(2)(A)(i) or (ii) requirement, he may treat that portion
as if it were never submitted. Sec. 6330(g).
After the administrative hearing is completed, the Appeals
Office issues a written notice of determination indicating
whether the notice of Federal tax lien should remain and/or
whether the proposed levy may proceed. Sec. 6330(c)(3);
secs. 301.6320–1(e)(3), Q&A–E8, 301.6330–1(e)(3), Q&A–E8,
Proced. & Admin. Regs. The Appeals officer must base his
determination on the verification that all legal and proce-
dural requirements have been followed, the issues properly
raised by the taxpayer had been addressed, and whether any
proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient
collection of taxes with the taxpayer’s legitimate concern that
any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.
Sec. 6330(c)(3).
The taxpayer may, within 30 days of a determination made
by the Appeals Office under section 6330, appeal that deter-
mination to the Tax Court, and the Court will have jurisdic-

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00007 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 (356) THORNBERRY v. COMMISSIONER 363

tion with respect to the matter. Sec. 6330(d)(1); sec.
301.6330–1(f)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is at
issue in a collection review proceeding, the Court will review
that issue de novo. Hoyle v. Commissioner, supra; Davis v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 39 (2000). Generally, we review
other issues regarding the collection action determined by
the Appeals Office for abuse of discretion. Goza v. Commis-
sioner, 114 T.C. 176 (2000). However, section 6330(g) pro-
vides the following limitation on the scope of the Court’s
review:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if the Secretary deter-
mines that any portion of a request for a hearing under this section or sec-
tion 6320 meets the requirement of clause (i) or (ii) of section 6702(b)(2)(A),
then the Secretary may treat such portion as if it were never submitted
and such portion shall not be subject to any further administrative or
judicial review. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, pursuant to section 6330(g), if the Appeals Office
determined that a portion of the taxpayer’s request for the
hearing is based on a position identified by the Secretary as
frivolous under section 6702(c) or reflects a desire to delay or
impede the administration of Federal tax laws and treated
that portion as if it were never submitted, the Court may not
review that portion of the request.
II. Jurisdiction
Respondent contends that the Court must dismiss this case
for lack of jurisdiction on the ground respondent has made
no determination concerning collection action or any other
determination that would confer jurisdiction on this Court
with respect to petitioners’ taxable years 2000, 2001, 2002,
and 2007. Respondent also contends that the determination
letters, titled ‘‘Appeals is disregarding your request for a
Collection Due Process and/or Equivalent Hearing’’, are not
determinations that would confer jurisdiction on this Court.
Our jurisdiction under section 6330(d)(1) depends upon the
issuance of a valid notice of determination and a timely peti-
tion for review. Sarrell v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 122, 125
(2001); Offiler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 492, 498 (2000);
Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 182. When the Appeals
Office has issued a decision letter to the taxpayer in response

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00008 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 364 136 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (356)

to a timely request for a hearing, the ‘‘decision’’ regarding the
collection action reflected in the decision letter may be a
‘‘determination’’ for purposes of section 6330(d)(1). Craig v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 259 (2002); Lunsford v.
Commissioner, 117 T.C. 159, 164 (2001). The name or label
of a document does not control whether the document con-
stitutes a determination, and a written notice to proceed with
the collection action may constitute a determination confer-
ring jurisdiction on this Court under section 6330(d)(1).
Lunsford v. Commissioner, supra at 164; see also Craig v.
Commissioner, supra at 259 (a form decision letter issued
after an ‘‘equivalent hearing’’ constituted a determination
conferring jurisdiction under section 6330(d)(1)).
Petitioners timely requested a hearing in response to the
lien notices and the levy notices pursuant to sections
6320(a)(3)(B) and 6330(a)(3)(B), and the Appeals Office
issued the determination letters to petitioners in response to
their requests for a hearing. The Appeals Office stated in
those letters that ‘‘Collection may proceed with the collection
action’’; i.e., the IRS collection office could proceed with the
proposed levy to collect petitioners’ unpaid Federal income
taxes for 2000, 2001, and 2002 and the section 6702 penalty
for 2007 and the notice of Federal tax lien should remain for
those unpaid liabilities.
The fact that determination letters were titled ‘‘Appeals is
disregarding your request for a Collection Due Process and/
or Equivalent Hearing’’, rather than ‘‘Notice of Determina-
tion’’, does not negate the fact that petitioners received a
‘‘determination’’ within the meaning of section 6330(d)(1).
The different names assigned to the documents are merely a
distinction without a difference when it involves our jurisdic-
tion to review the determination after a hearing was timely
requested. Craig v. Commissioner, supra at 258.
Respondent asserts that the Appeals Office determined
that petitioners’ entire request for an administrative hearing
met the requirements of section 6702(b)(2)(A)(i) or (ii) and,
pursuant to section 6330(g), treated the request as if it were
never submitted. Essentially, respondent’s position is that
because the Appeals Office treated petitioners’ request in toto
as if it were never submitted, the determination to proceed
with collection was not in response to a request for an
administrative hearing. Respondent asserts that the Appeals

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00009 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 (356) THORNBERRY v. COMMISSIONER 365

Office’s determination regarding petitioners’ request is not
subject to any judicial review by this Court pursuant to sec-
tion 6330(g).
We have jurisdiction to determine whether we have juris-
diction. Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 70 (2010);
Hambrick v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 348 (2002); Pyo v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 626, 632 (1984); Kluger v. Commis-
sioner, 83 T.C. 309, 314 (1984).
Section 6330 was amended to add subsection (g) and sub-
section (c)(4)(B) by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006, Pub. L. 109–432, div. A, sec. 407, 120 Stat. 2960, in
conjunction with the amendment of section 6702 to increase
the penalty for filing frivolous returns from $500 to $5,000
and to impose a new $5,000 penalty on specified frivolous
submissions. The legislative history, S. Rept. 109–336, at 49–
50 (2006), explains:
PRESENT LAW
The Code provides that an individual who files a frivolous income tax
return is subject to a penalty of $500 imposed by the IRS. 58 The Code also
permits the Tax Court 59 to impose a penalty of up to $25,000 if a taxpayer
has instituted or maintained proceedings primarily for delay or if the tax-
payer’s position in a proceeding is frivolous or groundless. 60
REASONS FOR CHANGE
The Committee believes that frivolous returns and submissions consume
resources at the IRS and in the courts that can better be utilized in
resolving legitimate disputes with taxpayers. Expanding the scope of the
penalty to cover all taxpayers and tax returns promotes fairness in the tax
system. The Committee believes that adopting this provision will improve
effective tax administration.
EXPLANATION OF PROVISION
The provision modifies the penalty on frivolous returns by increasing the
amount of the penalty to up to $5,000 and by applying it to all taxpayers
and to all types of Federal taxes.
The provision also modifies present law with respect to certain submis-
sions that raise frivolous arguments or that are intended to delay or
impede tax administration. The submissions to which the provision applies
are requests for a collection due process hearing, installment agreements,
offers-in-compromise, and taxpayer assistance orders. First, the provision
permits the IRS to disregard such requests. Second, the provision permits
the IRS to impose a penalty of up to $5,000 for such requests, unless the
taxpayer withdraws the request after being given an opportunity to do so.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00010 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 366 136 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (356)

The provision requires the IRS to publish a list of positions, arguments,
requests, and submissions determined to be frivolous for purposes of these
provisions.
EFFECTIVE DATE
The provision applies to submissions made and issues raised after the
date on which the Secretary first prescribes the required list of frivolous
positions.
58 Sec.
6702.
59 Because
the Tax Court is the only pre-payment forum available to tax-
payers, it addresses most of the frivolous, groundless, or dilatory argu-
ments raised in tax cases.
60 Sec. 6673(a).

Section 6702(b) imposes a $5,000 penalty on any person
who submits a ‘‘specified submission’’ that constitutes a
‘‘specified frivolous submission’’. Specified submissions
include requests for an administrative hearing under sections
6320 and 6330 and applications for an installment agreement
under section 6159, an offer-in-compromise under section
7122, or a taxpayer assistance order under section 7811. Sec.
6702(b)(2)(B). A specified submission is a ‘‘specified frivolous
submission’’ if any portion of the submission (i) is based on
a position which the Secretary has identified as frivolous
under section 6702(c) or (ii) reflects a desire to delay or
impede the administration of Federal tax laws. Sec.
6702(b)(2)(A). Section 6702(c) requires the Secretary to pre-
scribe and periodically revise a list of positions which the
Secretary has identified as being frivolous for purposes of
section 6702(c).
Section 6702(b)(3) provides a taxpayer who has submitted
a specified frivolous submission the opportunity to avoid the
imposition of the $5,000 penalty by withdrawing the submis-
sion within 30 days after the Secretary provides the taxpayer
with notice that the submission is a specified frivolous
submission. If the request is not withdrawn, the IRS will
assess the penalty imposed by section 6702(b) and may do so
without issuing a statutory notice of deficiency. Sec. 6703(b).
Because the taxpayer does not receive a statutory notice of
deficiency before a penalty under section 6702(b) is assessed,
the taxpayer may challenge his liability for the penalty in an

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00011 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 (356) THORNBERRY v. COMMISSIONER 367

administrative hearing under section 6320 or 6330. 2
Callahan v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 44, 49–50 (2008). In any
proceeding involving the issue of whether any person is liable
for a penalty under section 6702, the Secretary has the bur-
den of proof with respect to that issue. Sec. 6703(a).
Sections 6702(b) and 6330(g) were enacted together and
should be interpreted and applied in pari materia. See
Espinosa v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 146, 152–153 (1996).
Section 6703(a) provides that in any proceeding involving the
issue of whether any person is liable for a penalty under sec-
tion 6702, the Secretary has the burden of proof with respect
to that issue. In such a proceeding, the Secretary has the
burden of proving that a portion of the submission is based
on a position identified by the Secretary as frivolous under
section 6702(c) or reflects a desire to delay or impede the
administration of Federal tax laws. Section 6703(a) clearly
contemplates judicial review of a determination by the
Appeals Office that a specified submission, including a
request for an administrative hearing under sections 6320
and 6330, is a specified frivolous submission. Consequently,
while section 6330(g) prohibits judicial review of the portion
of a request for an administrative hearing that the Appeals
Office determined is based on an identified frivolous position
or reflects a desire to delay, it does not prohibit judicial
review of that determination by the Appeals Office.
If the Appeals Office determines that a portion of the tax-
payer’s request for an administrative hearing is based on a
position identified by the Secretary as frivolous under section
6702(c) or reflects a desire to delay or impede the adminis-
tration of Federal tax laws and issues a notice of determina-
tion to proceed with collection and the taxpayer timely peti-
tions for review, we have jurisdiction under section
6330(d)(1) to review the determination. If we sustain that
determination, we may not further review the frivolous por-
tion of the taxpayer’s request.
Thus, we have jurisdiction in this case to decide whether
the Appeals Office determined that all portions of petitioners’
requests for an administrative hearing meet the require-
2 Alternatively, a taxpayer who has paid all or a requisite portion of the penalty may challenge

it in a refund suit.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00012 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 368 136 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (356)

ments of clause (i) or (ii) of section 6702(b)(2)(A) and properly
treated the entire request as if it were never submitted.
Section 6330(g) permits the Secretary to treat only that
portion of a request for an administrative hearing that is
based on a position which the Secretary has identified as
frivolous under section 6702(c) 3 or reflects a desire to delay
or impede the administration of Federal tax laws as if it had
not been submitted.
Effective for petitioners’ request for an administrative
hearing, the list of positions the Secretary has identified as
frivolous for purposes of section 6702(c) is published in
Notice 2008–14, supra. 4 In addition to the Secretary’s list of
frivolous positions, Notice 2008–14, 2008–1 C.B. at 313,
states:
Returns or submissions that contain positions not listed above, which on
their face have no basis for validity in existing law, or which have been
deemed frivolous in a published opinion of the United States Tax Court or
other court of competent jurisdiction, may be determined to reflect a desire
to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax laws and thereby sub-
ject to the $5,000 penalty.

Section 6330(g) requires that before the Appeals Office
may treat a portion of the request as if it had not been sub-
mitted, an Appeals officer must make a specific determina-
tion that a portion of a taxpayer’s request for a hearing
either is based on a position listed in Notice 2008–14, supra,
or reflects a desire to delay or impede the administration of
Federal tax laws. If the Appeals officer makes such a deter-
mination, it will notify the taxpayer of the specific deter-
mination; and judicial review of the portion of the request
specifically determined to be frivolous or reflecting a desire
to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax laws
will be prohibited.
If a taxpayer submits a request for an administrative
hearing pursuant to section 6320 or 6330 and the Appeals
3 The importance of the Secretary’s identifying the frivolous positions and publishing the list

of those positions cannot be overstated. Indeed, Congress specifically delayed the effective date
of secs. 6702(b) and 6330(g) until after the date on which the Secretary first prescribed the re-
quired list of frivolous positions.
4 The Secretary first published the list on Mar. 16, 2007, in Notice 2007–30, 2007–1 C.B. 883,

effective for submissions made between Mar. 16, 2007, and Jan. 14, 2008. In accordance with
sec. 6702(c), the Secretary revised the list in Notice 2008–14, 2008–1 C.B. 310, effective for sub-
missions made between Jan. 15, 2008, and Apr. 7, 2010, and again in Notice 2010–33, 2010–
17 I.R.B. 609, effective for submissions made after Apr. 7, 2010. Notice 2008–14, supra, was in
effect when petitioners submitted their requests for an administrative hearing.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00013 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 (356) THORNBERRY v. COMMISSIONER 369

Office determines that a portion of the request is based on
a position identified by the Secretary as frivolous under sec-
tion 6702(c) or reflects a desire to delay or impede the
administration of Federal tax laws, the Appeals Office must
notify the taxpayer of that determination before assessing
the $5,000 penalty imposed by section 6702(b). The taxpayer
may then avoid the penalty by withdrawing the frivolous or
desire-to-delay portion of the request. The ability to with-
draw the offending portion of a request for an administrative
hearing under section 6320 or 6330 is crucial because the
request must be timely. Thus, the notification should provide
enough information to allow the taxpayer to identify the por-
tion or portions of the request that need to be withdrawn.
A taxpayer who is notified that a portion of the request is
based on a position identified by the Secretary as frivolous
under section 6702(c) can easily identify the offending por-
tion by reference to the Secretary’s published list. However,
a taxpayer who is notified that an unspecified portion of the
request, while not based on a published frivolous position,
reflects a desire to delay or impede the administration of
Federal tax laws may not be able to identify and withdraw
that portion without further explanation.
Here the parties’ use of boilerplate forms has undermined
the purposes of sections 6330(g) and 6702(b). Petitioners
were required to set forth their grounds for the issues they
wished to raise at their administrative hearing. Instead, they
attached a prechecked laundry list of items they obtained
from the Web site of an organization known to promote frivo-
lous arguments and activities that delay or impede the
administration of Federal tax laws. While some items may
apply to petitioners’ case, many do not, and some read as gib-
berish.
On the other hand, the settlement officer was required to
make a specific determination that portions of petitioners’
requests for a hearing either are based on positions listed in
Notice 2008–14, supra, or reflect a desire to delay or impede
the administration of Federal tax laws. The boilerplate deter-
mination letters sent to petitioners stated that the Appeals
Office had determined that petitioners’ disagreement was:

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00014 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 370 136 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (356)

• a ‘‘specified frivolous position’’, identified by the IRS in Notice 2008–14
(for Notice 2008–14, refer to the IRS Internet website at http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0..id=177519,00.html); or
• a reason that is not a ‘‘specified frivolous position,’’ but is a frivolous
reason reflecting a desire to delay or impede federal tax administration; or
• a moral, religious, political, constitutional, conscientious, or similar
objection to the imposition or payment of federal taxes that reflects a
desire to delay or impede the administration of federal tax laws.

However, petitioners did not raise in their requests any
‘‘specified frivolous position’’ identified by the IRS in Notice
2008–14, supra, nor did they raise any moral, religious, polit-
ical, constitutional, conscientious, or similar objection.
Indeed, the attachments stated that petitioners specifically
withdrew any constitutional, moral, political, religious, or
conscientious arguments that they may have previously
made and any legal positions that are classified and pub-
lished by the IRS as frivolous or groundless, including any
arguments that the courts have determined are frivolous or
groundless.
Moreover, petitioners raised issues in their requests
similar to those that the determination letters specified were
legitimate issues that could be raised. The legitimate issues
included collection alternatives to levy, including an install-
ment agreement or an offer-in-compromise. Petitioners
requested an installment agreement and an offer-in-com-
promise as collection alternatives on page 2 of their requests
and in the attachments to the requests. They agreed to pro-
vide the requested financial information and to obey the tax
laws.
The legitimate issues also included challenges to the
appropriateness of collection action. Petitioners asserted that
collection action was inappropriate and that collection would
be intrusive and place an undue hardship on them. The
determination letters stated that in a lien hearing legitimate
issues included requests that the settlement officer deter-
mine whether the notice of lien filing was appropriate and
whether petitioners qualified for a lien withdrawal or other
lien options, such as subordination. In the attachments, peti-
tioners requested that the notice of lien be withdrawn and
asserted they qualified for subordination.
The determination letters specified that legitimate issues
also included challenges to the underlying tax liability, but

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00015 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 (356) THORNBERRY v. COMMISSIONER 371

only if petitioners had not received a statutory notice of defi-
ciency or otherwise had an opportunity to dispute their liabil-
ities with Appeals. In the attachment, petitioners stated that
they did not receive a notice of deficiency, that they had not
otherwise had an opportunity to contest the liabilities, and
that they wanted to do so in a ‘‘CDP hearing’’. They requested
a reconsideration of the deficiency and agreed to furnish com-
pleted forms and file what the law requires.
Petitioners stated in the attachments that they had not
received a notice of deficiency for the assessment of the sec-
tion 6702 penalty. They asserted that they had not otherwise
had an opportunity to contest the liabilities and that they
wanted to do so in a ‘‘CDP hearing’’. As we previously
observed, deficiency procedures do not apply to the section
6702 penalty. Sec. 6703(b); see sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). Because no
notice of deficiency was sent with respect to the section 6702
penalty, Mr. Thornberry was entitled to contest the assessed
penalty at a hearing. See, e.g., Blaga v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2010–170; Rice v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009–
169. Consequently, he could properly assert that ground in
his request for a hearing.
The determination letters do not specifically identify any
statement in petitioners’ requests or any paragraph in the
attachment that reflects a desire to delay or impede Federal
tax administration. The determination letters do not explain
the basis upon which the Appeals Office determined that
petitioners’ requests reflect a desire to delay or impede Fed-
eral tax administration. We think that it was improper for
the Appeals Office to treat those portions of petitioners’
requests that set forth issues identified as legitimate in the
determination letters as if they were never submitted with-
out explaining how the requests reflect a desire to delay or
impede Federal tax administration.
Respondent argues that the Appeals Office properly dis-
regarded petitioners’ requests because petitioners obtained
the attachment from the Web site of an organization that
advocates tax avoidance activities as well as the frustration
and delay of the IRS’ efforts to collect taxes. However, neither
the SO Letter 4380 nor the determination letters make any
reference to the source of the attachments to petitioners’
requests, nor do they inform petitioners of the reason the

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00016 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 372 136 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (356)

attachment reflects an intent merely to delay the collection
of the tax.
We think some of the grounds set forth in the attachments
apply to petitioners and fall within the legitimate reasons set
forth in the SO Letter 4380; e.g., petitioners properly may
raise challenges to the section 6702 penalty, which was
assessed without the issuance of a notice of deficiency. On its
face the SO Letter 4380 was contradictory and did not iden-
tify the portions of the request that needed to be withdrawn.
The letter did not advise petitioners to withdraw those por-
tions of the request that did not apply to their case; e.g., that
the notice of filing of the notice of tax lien was not sent
within 5 days of filing the notice of tax lien. The SO Letter
4380 did not explain why the otherwise legitimate reasons
did not apply in petitioners’ case; e.g., whether the settle-
ment officer verified that notices of deficiency were properly
mailed to petitioners’ last known address and were not
returned undelivered to the IRS.
We are unable to ascertain from the SO Letter 4380 and
the determination letters the basis for the settlement officer’s
determination that petitioners’ requests for an administra-
tive hearing to contest the lien notices and the levy to collect
their unpaid income taxes reflect an intent or a desire to
delay or impede the administration of Federal tax laws.

Conclusion
The delay in resolving this case has been caused by both
parties’ using boilerplate ‘‘one size fits all’’ forms. Thus, in
these circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction, and
respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction will be
denied. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the
settlement officer could not treat petitioners’ entire request
as if it were never submitted. Section 6330(g) requires the
Appeals Office to determine the specific portions of peti-
tioners’ request for a hearing that are regarded as frivolous
or reflect a desire to delay or impede the administration of
Federal tax laws, leaving for hearing only the legitimate and
bona fide issues petitioners raised. The Appeals Office has
not yet done this. Petitioners, on the other hand, have set
forth in their administrative hearing request a litany of
recitations lifted from an Internet Web site, many of which

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00017 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA
 (356) THORNBERRY v. COMMISSIONER 373

tend to show an attempt to delay or impede the administra-
tion of Federal tax laws. We have in this Opinion notified
petitioners that merely attaching a list downloaded from the
Internet that includes grounds that clearly do not apply to
their case without identifying specific issues and grounds rel-
evant to their hearing request does not satisfy the require-
ments of sections 6320(b)(1) and 6330(b)(1). Accordingly, the
Court will require petitioners to identify the specific issues
and the grounds they wish to raise before taking further
action in this case.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be issued.

f

VerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:41 May 30, 2013 Jkt 372897 PO 20009 Frm 00018 Fmt 2847 Sfmt 2847 V:\FILES\THORN.136 SHEILA