T.C. Memo. 2011-110
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MICHAEL ROSENFELD, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 12373-07. Filed May 23, 2011.
Ned Leiba, for petitioner.
Michael W. Berwind, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
DEAN, Special Trial Judge: For 2003 respondent determined a
deficiency in petitioner’s Federal income tax of $2,609 and an
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a)1 of $521.80. The
1
Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section and chapter
references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for
the year at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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issues for decision2 are whether petitioner: (1) Was an
independent contractor or a common law employee of the British
Consulate General (BCG) in 2003; (2) overcontributed to a
simplified employee pension (SEP) plan; (3) is liable for the
excise tax under section 4973(a) for excess SEP plan
contributions; and (4) is liable for the accuracy-related penalty
under section 6662(a).
Preliminary Matters
Respondent seeks to introduce into evidence the United
States Engaged Staff Handbook (Handbook) issued in 2002 by the
British Embassy in Washington D.C. as Exhibit 15-R.3 Petitioner
objects to the admission of the Handbook on the grounds that it
would cause confusion of the issues and constitutes hearsay.
Respondent contends that the Handbook is admissible under the
exception to the hearsay rule under rule 807 of the Federal Rules
2
Petitioner presented no evidence and made no argument with
respect to expenses reported on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From
Business, that included deductions for business expenses and
expenses associated with the business use of his home; the Court
deems these issues conceded. See Money v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
46, 48 (1987); Stutsman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1961-109.
Petitioner’s deduction for self-employed health insurance is a
computational adjustment to be determined consistent with this
opinion.
3
Respondent proffered a document as a copy of the Handbook,
introduced as Exhibit 4-R, obtained from a Web site during the
course of his examination of petitioner’s 2003 Federal income tax
return. Petitioner has not stipulated its authenticity, nor has
respondent provided testimony or otherwise credible evidence to
demonstrate its authenticity. Accordingly, this document is
inadmissible.
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of Evidence, or in the alternative, under rule 106 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.4
The Court need not and does not decide whether the Handbook
is admissible under rule 807 or 806 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Because the Court finds for respondent without it, the
Court need not consider the Handbook in reaching a decision.5
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulations of fact and the exhibits received into evidence
are incorporated herein by reference. When petitioner filed his
petition, he resided in California.
I. Petitioner’s Employment History
Petitioner graduated from the University of Southern
California with a master’s degree in journalism and has worked as
a corporate marketing executive, financial writer, and journalist
for over 20 years. In 1985 he started his own consulting
4
Respondent raised, in his pretrial memorandum, the
possibility that the Handbook is admissible under the hearsay
exception of Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Respondent did not set forth
the argument in his pretrial memorandum or offer argument post
trial. The argument is deemed conceded. See Money v.
Commissioner, supra at 48.
5
Petitioner’s proffer of a copy of a Handbook, issued in
2005, as evidence to provide context to the Handbook issued in
2002 is rendered moot.
Respondent reserved a hearsay exception to petitioner’s
letter of appointment in the event the Handbook was not received
into evidence. Because the Court’s decision is unaffected by the
Handbook, the Court finds that it is not unfair to consider the
letter of appointment without the “context” of the Handbook.
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business, representing clients in a variety of professional
services. In 1994 he left his consulting business to work in
corporate communications and marketing. In 1999 he reestablished
his business, and he continues to work as a consultant for his
business.
In July or August 2003, in an effort to expand into the
British investment community, petitioner met with the deputy
consul general, Brian Conley (Mr. Conley), of the BCG in the
United States. During the meeting Mr. Conley indicated that the
BCG might be interested in using petitioner’s services to promote
British companies seeking to invest in the United States and to
assist U.S. companies interested in investing in the United
Kingdom.
After several meetings discussing petitioner’s
qualifications, the BCG formally offered petitioner a full-time
appointment for a 3-year defined term. Petitioner signed a
letter of appointment (letter) dated September 22, 2003, and was
appointed at the level of “Trade Officer Grade US8”. The letter
provided for annual increases to his salary dependent upon
satisfactory services, as determined by the BCG. The award of an
annual increase could be “withheld or withdrawn for reasons of
discipline or inefficiency”.
The BCG, as a foreign employer of a U.S. citizen,
categorized petitioner as self-employed “for tax purposes”. The
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BCG did not withhold taxes from petitioner’s salary, and
petitioner was responsible for all Federal, State, and local
taxes and for self-employment taxes.
II. The Deficiency
Petitioner timely filed a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income
Tax Return, for 2003. On Schedule C, petitioner reported total
gross receipts of $109,926, total expenses of $37,280, and
business use of home expenses of $6,783 for his “financial
journalist corporate relations consultant” (consultant) business.
As a self-employed individual, petitioner contributed to an SEP
plan on the basis of his consultant earnings. Petitioner
reported gross receipts from the BCG on Schedule C and also
contributed to an SEP plan on the basis of these earnings.6 In
2003 he contributed $12,242 to his SEP plan.7
In the notice of deficiency respondent determined in
pertinent part that petitioner was: (1) A common law employee of
the BCG and consequently was not entitled to report gross
receipts and expenses associated with his work for the BCG on
6
The record does not indicate whether petitioner established
two separate SEP plans–-one for his consulting firm earnings and
one for his BCG earnings. Petitioner testified, however, that he
believed that the BCG was a client of his consulting firm and
there is no indication that he established a separate SEP plan
for his BCG earnings in 2003.
7
Petitioner testified that he “was fairly successful” at
fully funding his SEP plan each year, and in fact petitioner’s
counsel represented that he did fully fund his SEP plan for 2003.
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Schedule C for 2003; (2) subject to an excise tax pursuant to
section 4973 for excess contributions to an SEP plan for 2003;
and (3) liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section
6662(a) for 2003.
OPINION
I. Burden of Proof
Petitioner has moved to shift the burden of proof to
respondent, maintaining that he has satisfied the requirements
under section 7491(a). Section 7491(a)(1) provides that, subject
to certain limitations, where a taxpayer introduces credible
evidence with respect to a factual issue relevant to ascertaining
the taxpayer’s tax liability, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner with respect to that issue.
In a case where the standard of proof is based on a
preponderance of the evidence, as it is here, the Court may
decide the case on the weight of the evidence and need not decide
it on an allocation of the burden of proof. See FRGC Inv., LLC
v. Commissioner, 89 Fed. Appx. 656 (9th Cir. 2004), affg. T.C.
Memo. 2002-276; Knudsen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-340.
The Court, therefore, need not and does not decide the
allocation of the burden of proof under section 7491(a). The
outcome of this case is decided on the preponderance of the
evidence and thus is unaffected by section 7491. See FRGC Inv.,
LLC v. Commissioner, supra. Petitioner’s motion will be denied.
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II. Petitioner’s Employment Status
The term “employee” is not defined in the Code.
Consequently, whether an individual is a common law employee is a
factual question that depends on the application of common law
concepts. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
322-323 (1992); Weber v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378, 386 (1994),
affd. per curiam 60 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir. 1995); Profl. & Exec.
Leasing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 225, 232 (1987), affd. 862
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1988). Among the relevant factors in
determining the substance of an employment relationship are: (1)
The degree of control exercised by the principal over the details
of the individual’s work; (2) the taxpayer’s investment in
facilities; (3) the taxpayer’s opportunity for profit or loss;
(4) permanency of the relationship between the parties; (5) the
principal’s right of discharge; (6) whether the work performed is
an integral part of the principal’s business; (7) what
relationship the parties believe they are creating; and (8) the
provision of employee benefits. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, supra at 323-324; Weber v. Commissioner, supra at 387;
Profl. & Exec. Leasing, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 232-233;
sec. 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2), Employment Tax Regs. (setting forth
criteria for identifying common law employees). No one factor is
determinative. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 752 (1989). Instead, all aspects of the relationship must
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be assessed and weighted. NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254,
258 (1968). The Court addresses the foregoing factors below.
A. Degree of Control
All that is necessary for a finding of control is that the
principal have the right to control the details of the person’s
work. McGuire v. United States, 349 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir.
1965); Thomas Kiddie, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 1055,
1058 (1978). It is not necessary for the principal to actually
exercise that control. Potter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-
356. To retain the requisite control over the details of an
individual’s work, the employer need not stand over the
individual and direct every move made by the individual. Weber
v. Commissioner, supra at 388.
Petitioner argues that he was not subject to the direction
and control of the BCG. In support, petitioner cites section
31.3121(d)-1(c)(2), Employment Tax Regs., which provides:
if an individual is subject to the control or direction
of another merely as to the result to be accomplished
by the work and not as to the means and methods for
accomplishing the result, he is an independent
contractor. An individual performing services as an
independent contractor is not * * * an employee under
the usual common law rules. Individuals such as
physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians,
construction contractors, * * * engaged in the pursuit
of an independent trade * * * in which they offer their
services to the public, are independent contractors and
not employees.
Petitioner argues that he is an independent contractor; he
practices a public calling, and the services he provided to the
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BCG were within the scope of the pursuit of his consultant
business.
Petitioner testified that his supervisor provided only
limited and periodic reviews of his work. He was not required to
submit a timesheet or sign in when he worked on site at the BCG.
Petitioner further contends that the BCG could not unilaterally
alter his employment agreement; namely, it could not assign him
to projects outside the scope of his professional expertise and
it could not change his hours, move him to another department,
prevent him from working for other clients, or require him to use
its facilities.
Although petitioner alleged that he was not subject to the
BCG’s direction and control, petitioner admitted that the head of
the consulate could ask him to prepare or stop assignments and to
attend conferences and meetings. His letter of appointment also
specified that increases in his annual salary would be awarded
only upon satisfactory service. Furthermore, contrary to
petitioner’s assertions, the BCG did have the right to modify his
employment arrangement. His letter of appointment explicitly
stated that the BCG reserved the right to alter his conditions of
service at any time.8 See Urban Redev. Corp. v. Commissioner,
8
Petitioner alleges that the letter of appointment contained
no specific controls that dictated the details of his work, but
simply that it could change what might be required and that
petitioner might or might not agree to continue rendering
(continued...)
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294 F.2d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 1961) (the court may reject a
taxpayer’s uncorroborated, self-serving testimony), affg. 34 T.C.
845 (1960); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986)
(same). In addition, petitioner was required to work 40 hours
per week and was not permitted to have outside business interests
that could be furthered by virtue of his employment.
The Court is convinced that the BCG had the right to
exercise control over petitioner’s work; this factor favors
respondent.
B. Investment in Facilities
Petitioner paid many of the costs associated with his work.
He used his own computer and cell phone, and he used his personal
check/credit card.
The BCG provided petitioner a desk, a phone, a computer, and
business cards. Petitioner argues that because there is no
evidence that the BCG incurred additional capital expenses to
accommodate him, it is not a distinguishing factor that the BCG
8
(...continued)
services. Petitioner further alleges that the more relevant
evidence is his own testimony in which he asserts that if the BCG
had attempted to control the details of his work, “I would not
have worked under those conditions. I would not have taken them
on as a client.” He further argues that the portion of the
letter about his not having outside business interests did not
apply to him.
Petitioner’s testimony does not comport with the terms of
the letter of appointment. Petitioner unequivocally accepted the
terms of the letter of appointment when he signed the letter
despite his assertions and testimony to the contrary regarding
his relationship with the BCG.
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provided an office space for him. Petitioner’s argument ignores
the legal implications of the provision of facilities, regardless
of the impact on the BCG’s capital expenses. If petitioner was
provided facilities, whether additional costs were imposed on the
BCG as a result or whether petitioner in fact used those
facilities is irrelevant. Taking into consideration that
petitioner paid many of the costs associated with his work and
used his personal work equipment, the Court finds that this
factor is neutral.
C. Opportunity for Profit or Loss
The BCG paid petitioner a fixed salary for his services as a
trade officer. Petitioner testified that he submitted monthly
invoices to the BCG; however, there is no evidence that the
invoices were actually submitted to the BCG, that the BCG
actually reimbursed petitioner, or that his monthly salary was
contingent on those invoices. In fact, the evidence indicates
that petitioner received his fixed monthly salary before the
dates indicated on the invoices. Petitioner explained that
although he was paid a fixed amount by the BCG, that practice is
similar to and consistent with his standard business practice.
Although the record reflects that petitioner drafted
invoices to the BCG for incurred expenses, the record does not
reflect whether he submitted the invoices to the BCG, nor does
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the record reflect that the BCG reimbursed petitioner for these
expenses. This factor favors respondent.
D. Permanency of Relationship
Petitioner signed a 3-year defined-term contract with the
BCG. The contract’s renewal was solely at the discretion of the
BCG, with a maximum period of 9 years or three defined terms.
Petitioner’s employment relationship was not defined as long term
but was eligible for extension. This factor is neutral.
E. Principal’s Right of Discharge
During 2003 both parties could terminate the employment
relationship without cause; this factor is neutral.
F. Integral Part of Business
The BCG presents British policies to Americans and the U.S.
Government, explains American policies and views to the British
Government, and promotes British interests in the United States.
The BCG is also responsible for press and cultural relations and
for visa and consular services. Petitioner provided consulting
and communications services related to commercial opportunities
in the United States for British companies. Petitioner’s
services furthered the BCG’s goals. This factor favors
respondent.
G. Relationship Parties Believe They Created
Petitioner testified that he was hired by the BCG as an
independent contractor for his consultant services. In support,
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petitioner refers to the work invoices that he submitted to the
BCG. He alleges that even though he was paid a fixed salary,
submitting work invoices and obtaining contracts with fixed
payments were consistent with his standard business practice.
Petitioner also cites the letter of appointment, which specified
that he was self-employed for tax purposes.
Petitioner further argues that the phrase “Self Employed for
tax purposes” in the letter of appointment did not reflect the
BCG’s understanding of petitioner’s employment status; it does
not refer to the Internal Revenue Code, and there is no reasoning
given by the BCG which reflects the BCG’s understanding of
petitioner’s employment status.
As discussed supra, the evidence does not indicate that the
BCG paid petitioner a salary based on petitioner’s invoices. The
BCG offered petitioner a position as a trade officer at the
“Grade US8” salary level.
In addition, the letter of appointment specified that the
BCG would not withhold taxes from petitioner’s gross salary
because, as a U.S. citizen, he was categorized as self-employed
for tax purposes. Section 3121(b)(11) specifically provides
that, for purposes of chapter 21 Federal Insurance Act taxes,
employment by a foreign Government is excepted from the term
“employment”. The phrase “Self Employed for tax purposes” in the
letter of appointment did not reflect the BCG’s understanding of
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petitioner’s employment status. Rather, it reflected the tax
consequences for a U.S. citizen employed by a foreign
Government.9 The letter of appointment was unambiguous regarding
petitioner’s employment relationship.10 The BCG offered him a
full-time appointment as a Trade Officer US8 with a fixed monthly
salary. The record does not reflect that the BCG intended to
hire petitioner as an independent contractor. This factor favors
respondent.
9
The Internal Revenue Service is unable to levy on a foreign
Government the employer tax portion of Federal Insurance
Contributions Act taxes; instead, citizens employed by foreign
Governments are treated as self-employed individuals for purposes
of Self-Employment Contributions Act taxes. See S. Rept. 1856,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1960, 1960-2 C.B. 792, 795.
10
Petitioner alleges that because the letter of appointment
did not refer to the Code, the Court cannot infer that the BCG’s
understanding of the relationship was only tax motivated as a
result of the statement that petitioner was “Self Employed for
tax purposes”.
While acknowledging petitioner’s position, the Court notes
that the letter of appointment referred to the numerous tax
consequences for its employees. This portion of the letter was
not a specific reference to petitioner; rather it was a general
reference to the tax consequences for any U.S. citizen employed
by the BCG. If the Court were to read the language as petitioner
would have us read it, all U.S. citizens employed by the BCG
would be independent contractors. The letter of appointment also
provided the tax consequences for employees that were not U.S.
citizens. It specified, generally, the tax consequences that any
number of its employees might face on the basis of citizenship.
The language in the letter of appointment specifically
categorized petitioner as self-employed for tax purposes because
he was a U.S. citizen employed by a foreign Government.
Regardless of whether the letter of appointment specified a Code
section, the parties do not dispute that petitioner’s services
are statutorily excepted from employment, for purposes of ch. 21,
pursuant to sec. 3121(b)(11).
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H. Employee Benefits
Receipt of employee benefits is an important factor in
determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists.
Packard v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 621, 632 (1975).
Petitioner testified that he did not receive sick pay,
overtime pay, retirement benefits, or life insurance and received
only minimal remuneration for health and dental insurance. But
in 2003 petitioner accrued annual and sick leave and had the
opportunity to participate in the BCG’s health insurance and
pension plans but declined to do so. See Feaster v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-157 (the availability and not the
receipt of benefits is the determinative factor); see also Weber
v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. at 393-394; Colvin v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-157, affd. 285 Fed. Appx. 157 (5th Cir. 2008).
Petitioner’s access to and receipt of employee benefits at the
BCG further supports a finding that he was a common law employee.
Petitioner contends that on the basis of the foregoing
factors the Court should find that he was an independent
contractor of the BCG. In support, petitioner cites Levine v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-86, and argues that the facts in
his case more strongly support his status as an independent
contractor than did the facts support the taxpayer in Levine.
In Levine, the taxpayer entered into a personal services
contract with the U.S. State Department (Department) to manage
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and implement the Department’s worldwide industrial hygienist
field technical services program. The taxpayer provided
significant explanatory evidence of her position with the
Department, including her employment contract. The employment
contract described, in detail, her employment duties, how she
performed her duties, and how she interacted with employees and
supervisors.
In contrast, petitioner provided the Court with mere
generalities as to his tasks, his employment position, and the
control the BCG exercised over his position.
Additional factors considered by the parties as addressed in
Levine include: (1) The skill required by the worker to solve a
problem; (2) the method of payment; and (3) whether the hiring
party pays Social Security taxes.
Petitioner asserts that he was hired to solve a specific
problem for the BCG. However, petitioner failed to demonstrate
that he was hired for the purpose of providing public relations
work as an independent contractor and not as a common law
employee. The letter of appointment indicated that he was hired
as a Trade Officer; there is no indication he was hired to fill a
specified public relations function performed by his firm as an
independent contractor. This factor favors respondent.
Petitioner also asserts that he was paid on a retainer basis
by the BCG and that he submitted monthly invoices commensurate
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with his work for the BCG. The record indicates, however, that
he was paid a fixed salary and that regardless of the invoices,
petitioner was paid the same fixed salary for the months of
October, November, and December.11
Finally, the fact that the BCG did not withhold taxes from
petitioner’s pay is a neutral factor for purposes of determining
petitioner’s employment status. Under section 3121(b)(11),
“service performed in the employ of a foreign government” is
excepted from “employment” for purposes of Social Security and
Medicare taxes. See sec. 31.3121(b)(11)-1, Employment Tax Regs.
Services excepted from employment do not constitute employment
for tax purposes. See. sec. 31.3121(b)-4, Employment Tax Regs.
The fact that the BCG did not withhold taxes from petitioner’s
pay does not establish either his or the BCG’s intent regarding
his relationship with the BCG.
Although petitioner testified that he provided the same
services to the BCG as to his other clients in 2003, the Court is
unable to conclude that petitioner is not a common law employee
of the BCG. As the only material witness at his own trial,
petitioner has a vested interest in the outcome of this case. It
is well settled that the Court need not accept at face value a
witness’s testimony that is self-interested or otherwise
11
The record indicates that petitioner received his paycheck
each month before the dates indicated on his monthly invoices to
the BCG.
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questionable. See Archer v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 270, 273 (5th
Cir. 1955), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Weiss v.
Commissioner, 221 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1955), affg. T.C. Memo.
1954-51; Schroeder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-467.
The Court is not compelled to believe evidence that seems
improbable or to accept as true uncorroborated, although
uncontradicted, evidence from an interested witness. Blodgett v.
Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Marcella v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 1955),
affg. in part and vacating in part a Memorandum Opinion of this
Court), affg. T.C. Memo. 2003-212.
None of the relevant factors discussed above support
petitioner’s position. Considering the record and all the facts
and circumstances, the Court concludes that petitioner was a
common law employee of the BCG.
III. Excess Contributions to a Simplified Employee Pension Plan
In 2003 petitioner contributed to an SEP plan on the basis
of his earnings from both his consultant business and the BCG.
Respondent challenges petitioner’s deduction for excess SEP plan
contributions attributable to his BCG earnings.
An SEP plan is a qualified plan pursuant to which an
employer makes direct contributions to its employees’ individual
retirement accounts or individual retirement annuities as defined
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under section 408(a) and (b). Sec. 408(k); Levine v.
Commissioner, supra.
Section 404(a)(8) permits an employer to deduct certain
contributions to an employee’s SEP plan. See sec. 404(a)(8)(C),
(h) (contributions to an SEP plan on behalf of an employee within
the meaning of section 401(c)(1) shall be considered to satisfy
the conditions of section 162 or 212 to the extent such
contributions do not exceed the earned income of such individual
derived from the trade or business with respect to which such
plan is established). For purposes of section 404(a)(8), the
term “employee” includes an individual who is an employee within
the meaning of section 401(c)(1), and the employer of such an
individual is the person treated as his employer under section
401(c)(4).
Self-employed individuals and sole proprietors are treated
as their own employers and employees for purposes of SEP plan
deductions. See secs. 401(c), 404(h), 408(k)(7); sec. 1.401-
10(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. (for purposes of applying sections 401
through 404, if a self-employed individual is engaged in more
than one trade or business, each business shall be considered a
separate employer). A self-employed individual shall be treated
as his own employer if he satisfies the definition of employer
under section 401(c)(4). Secs. 402(i), 404(a)(8), 408(k)(7) (the
terms “employee” and “employer” shall have the respective
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meanings given by section 401(c)); see also Kellough v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-282. Additionally, a self-employed
individual must also be his own employee and shall be treated as
such if he satisfies the definition of employee under section
401(c)(1). Sec. 408(k)(7).
Petitioner argues that he satisfies the requirements of
section 401(c) and is qualified to make and deduct contributions
to his SEP plan derived from both his consultant business and BCG
earnings.12 Respondent does not contest that petitioner is
entitled to deduct contributions to his SEP plan from the
earnings derived from his consultant business. Therefore, the
remaining determination is whether petitioner is entitled to
deduct the contributions he made to his SEP plan with respect to
his BCG earnings.
Petitioner alleges that as an employee of a foreign
Government, he is self-employed pursuant to section 3121(b)(11)
and is treated as his own employee under section 401(c)(1) and
(2).13 Next, he contends that even if the Court concludes that
12
Sec. 1.401-10(b)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs., provides that an
individual who is a common law employee is not a self-employed
individual with respect to income attributable to such
employment, even though such income constitutes net earnings from
self-employment as defined in sec. 1402(a). Petitioner contends
that this regulation is an invalid interpretation of sec. 401(c).
The Court, however, need not reach this issue because this case
rests on the plain language of sec. 401(c).
13
Sec. 3121(b)(11), for the purposes of ch. 21 Federal
Insurance Contribution Act taxes, excludes from the definition of
(continued...)
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he is a common law employee of the BCG, as the Court has found,
he is still his own employer with respect to his BCG earnings.
Consequently, he is entitled to deduct the contributions to his
SEP plan that are attributable to his BCG earnings.
Petitioner directs the Court to section 415(c) in support of
his assertion that he satisfies the definition of employer
pursuant to section 401(c)(4).14
Petitioner also cites the legislative history of section
401(c) in support of his argument that he is his own employer
with respect to his BCG earnings. Petitioner cites the House
13
(...continued)
“employment” any service performed in the employ of a foreign
government.
14
Sec. 415(c) provides the contribution limits for qualified
plans such as an SEP plan. See sec. 415(a). Petitioner invites
the Court’s attention to sec. 415(c)(3), which defines a
“participant’s compensation” for purposes of determining the
limit of a contribution. A participant’s compensation is defined
as “the compensation of the participant from the employer for the
year”. Sec. 415(c) also provides a special definition of a
participant’s compensation for self-employed individuals. In the
case of a self-employed individual who is considered an employee
pursuant to sec. 401(c)(1), the participant’s compensation is
defined as “‘the participant’s earned income (within the meaning
of section 401(c)(2)’”. Sec. 415(c).
Petitioner contends that according to sec. 415(c), the Court
need not look to sec. 401(c)(4) for the definition of employer.
He argues that if an individual has earned income, as defined
under sec. 401(c)(2), then ipso facto he has compensation from
the employer, because in the case of a self-employed individual,
a participant’s compensation under sec. 415(c) is defined as the
“compensation of the participant from the employer” and in the
case of a self-employed individual, it is defined as “the
participant’s earned income”. Therefore, according to
petitioner, any argument about who is an employer is settled by
this passage.
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report, which defines an employee, for purposes of retirement
plan contributions, as a self-employed individual. See H. Rept.
378, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1961), 1962-3 C.B. 261, 279-280.
Petitioner concludes that on the basis of the legislative
history a common law employee who has self-employment earnings is
treated as an owner-employee and is entitled to make retirement
plan contributions and deduct those contributions on the basis of
the self-employment income.
Petitioner asserts that the definition of an “owner-
employee” remained unchanged and that section 401(c)(3) contains
the same definition of “owner-employee” as the proposed language
in the House bill. However, the codified language of section
401(c)(3) does in fact differ from that proposed in the House
bill. See H. Rept. 378, supra at 89, 1962-3 C.B. at 279-280.
Section 401(c)(3) defines an owner-employee, in pertinent part,
as an employee who owns the entire interest in an unincorporated
trade or business. Therefore, petitioner’s assertion that the
legislative history of section 401(c) supports his argument that
he is his own employer with respect to his BCG earnings is in
error.
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Furthermore, petitioner’s arguments15 completely disregard
section 401(c)(4) and the mandate of section 404(a)(8), rendering
section 401(c)(4) superfluous. See sec. 402(i); Weinberger v.
Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633 (1973) (an
interpretation that renders a statutory provision superfluous
should be avoided since it would offend “the well-settled rule of
statutory construction that all parts of a statute, if at all
possible, are to be given effect”). The Court must make its
decision in accordance with the mandate of the Code.
Accordingly, the Court turns to section 401(c)(4) to determine
whether petitioner satisfies the definition of employer.
Section 401(c)(4) defines an employer as “an individual who
owns the entire interest in an unincorporated trade or business”.
Kellough v. Commissioner, supra. While petitioner owned the
entire interest in and maintained a qualified SEP plan for his
consultant business, he may deduct contributions made to that SEP
plan only with respect to the earned income from that business.
See sec. 401(d). With respect to his work for the BCG,
15
Petitioner alleges that sec. 401(c)(4) was adopted to
exclude corporate owner-employees and that the term “owner-
employee” is intended to exclude shareholder-employees of
corporations from that definition. See sec. 401(c)(3) and (4);
H. Rept. 378, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 89 (1961), 1962-3 C.B.
261, 279-280.
Whether sec. 401(c)(4) was adopted to exclude shareholder-
employees from the definition of “owner-employee” is irrelevant,
and the question still remains as to whether petitioner was his
own employer with respect to his earnings attributable to the
BCG.
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petitioner does not satisfy the definition of employer under
section 401(c) because he does not own the entire interest in the
BCG. Petitioner, as a common law employee of the BCG, does not
satisfy the definition of “employer” for purposes of section
401(c)(4); he is not his own employer for purposes of his BCG
earnings. Therefore, he is not entitled to a deduction with
respect to the contributions that are attributable to his BCG
earnings.
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IV. Section 497916 Excise Tax17
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
excise tax of $178 for excess contributions to his Schedule C SEP
plan. Section 408(k)(6)(C)(i) provides that any excess
contribution under an SEP plan shall be treated as an excess
contribution for purposes of section 4979. See sec. 4979(e)(4).
Section 4979 imposes a 10-percent18 tax on employers who make
excess contributions to an SEP plan.
Petitioner asserts that even if he did make an excess
contribution to his SEP plan, he nonetheless should not be taxed
for any excess contributions for 2003. He notes that section
4973 requires that the Court determine the excess funding amount
as of the close of the taxable year; i.e., 2003.19 Because he
did not make his SEP plan contribution until 2004, petitioner
16
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
excise tax of $178 under sec. 4973(a) for overfunding his
consultant business SEP plan. Sec. 4973 imposes a 6-percent tax
on individuals who make excess contributions to individual
retirement accounts (IRA), annuities, or similar plans. An
excess contribution is defined as an amount contributed to an IRA
less any qualified rollovers and less the amount allowable as a
deduction under sec. 219. See secs. 4973(b)(1), 404(h), (k)(6)
(C)(i).
Sec. 219, however, does not apply with respect to an
employer contribution to an SEP plan. See sec. 219(b).
17
Petitioner alleged that respondent abandoned this issue.
Respondent raised the issue in his pretrial memorandum as well as
in his reply brief; the issue was not abandoned or conceded.
18
Respondent asserted only a 6-percent excise tax;
consequently, respondent is limited to the 6-percent excise tax.
19
Sec. 4979 contains a similar provision. See sec. 4979(a).
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suggests that any excess contribution would have been made in
2004.
Section 404 addresses this inaccurate assumption. Section
404(a) provides the general rules relating to retirement savings
and specifies the time when contributions to a retirement plan
are deemed made. Under section 404(a)(6), a taxpayer shall be
deemed to have made a contribution for a taxable year if the
contribution is made on account of the taxable year and is made
not later than the time prescribed by law for filing the return
for the taxable year. See also sec. 404(h)(1)(B). Accordingly,
for purposes of the excise tax calculation, petitioner’s 2003 SEP
plan contribution, although paid in 2004, is deemed paid in
2003.20 Therefore, petitioner’s argument based on timing fails.
Respondent’s determination that petitioner must pay a 6-percent
excise tax of $178 on the excess contribution is sustained.
V. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a). Section 6662(a)
imposes a 20-percent penalty on the portion of an underpayment
attributable to any one of various factors, including negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations. See sec. 6662(b)(1).
“Negligence” includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to
20
Petitioner timely filed his 2003 Federal income tax return
and does not contest that he computed his SEP plan contribution
on the basis of his 2003 BCG and consulting firm earnings.
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comply with the provisions of the Code, including any failure to
keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items
properly. See sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax
Regs. Under section 7491(c), respondent has the burden of
production with respect to the accuracy-related penalty. See
Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001).
Section 6664(c)(1) provides an exception to the section
6662(a) penalty if it is shown that there was reasonable cause
for any portion of the underpayment and the taxpayer acted in
good faith. The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account all the pertinent facts and
circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. The most
important factor is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to assess
his proper tax liability. Id. Circumstances that may indicate
reasonable cause and good faith include an honest
misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in view of the
taxpayer’s experience, knowledge, and education. Id.
Reliance on the advice of a professional, such as a
certified public accountant, may also constitute reasonable cause
as a defense to an accuracy-related penalty if, under all the
facts and circumstances, such reliance is reasonable and the
taxpayer acted in good faith. Secs. 6662(a), 6664(c)(1); Freytag
v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 888 (1987), affd. 904 F.2d 1011
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(5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). However, a taxpayer
is not relieved from liability for the addition to tax for
negligence merely by shifting the responsibility to a tax
professional. Enoch v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 781, 802 (1972).
Reliance on an expert is not an absolute defense but is a factor
to be considered. Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at 888. A
taxpayer’s reliance must be in good faith and demonstrably
reasonable. Ewing v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 396, 423 (1988),
affd. without published opinion 940 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1991);
Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at 888-889. In such a case, a
taxpayer will be entitled to rely upon an expert’s advice, even
if the expert’s advice should prove to be erroneous. Jackson v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 492, 539 (1986), affd. 864 F.2d 1521 (10th
Cir. 1989).
Petitioner has been a sole proprietor for many years and has
paid his own Federal income and self-employment taxes. In
addition to his own understanding of his relationship with the
BCG, petitioner had the assistance of a tax return preparer, who
had prepared his tax returns for over 25 years and prepared his
2003 return. Petitioner’s tax return preparer also agreed, on
his understanding of petitioner’s employment relationship with
the BCG, that his earnings were reportable on Schedule C.
Petitioner relied, in good faith, on his tax return preparer.
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Under petitioner’s unique circumstances, the similarity of
his consultant work to his work for the BCG, and the difficulty
of the interplay between sections 3121 and 401(c), the Court
finds that it was reasonable for petitioner to rely on the advice
of his tax return preparer in determining that he was an
independent contractor of the BCG. Therefore, respondent’s
determination of a section 6662(a) penalty is not sustained.
Other arguments made by the parties and not discussed herein
were considered and rejected as irrelevant, without merit, or
moot.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will
be issued denying petitioner’s
motion to shift the burden of
proof, and decision will be
entered under Rule 155.