EUGENE KOPROWSKI, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT
Docket No. 13048–10. Filed February 6, 2012.
P and W filed a joint return for 2006. R issued a notice of
deficiency, and P and W filed a petition asking this Court to
redetermine that deficiency. They elected to have the case
proceed under small tax case procedures pursuant to I.R.C.
sec. 7463. P signed the petition and all other filings. P and W
moved for summary judgment; R cross-moved for summary
judgment; and P and W opposed on various grounds,
including P’s entitlement to innocent spouse relief from joint
liability under I.R.C. sec. 6015. At a calendar call before the
Court, P spoke for himself and W. The parties withdrew their
cross-motions and submitted a stipulated decision document
by which P and W conceded the deficiency in full. The Court
entered decision accordingly in November 2009. While the
deficiency suit was pending, P had filed a Form 8857,
‘‘Request for Innocent Spouse Relief ’’, for 2006. In May 2010
R denied the request for relief, and P timely filed a petition
challenging that denial. R moved for summary judgment on
grounds of res judicata arising from the entry of decision in
the prior deficiency case. Held: Res judicata bars the relitiga-
tion of a liability determined in a small tax case under I.R.C.
sec. 7463. Held, further, res judicata precludes P’s attempted
litigation of his I.R.C. sec. 6015(f) claim for the year that was
the subject of the prior deficiency case. I.R.C. sec. 6015(g)(2)
does not prevent the operation of res judicata, since P’s claim
for relief was an issue in the prior case, and he did participate
meaningfully in the prior case.
Eugene Koprowski, for himself.
Michael T. Shelton, for respondent.
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(54) KOPROWSKI v. COMMISSIONER 55
OPINION
GUSTAFSON, Judge: Petitioner Eugene Koprowski seeks
this Court’s review, pursuant to section 6015(e), 1 of the
denial by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of his request
for relief from his liability for income tax for 2006, for which
he filed a joint return with his wife. The case is currently
before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by
respondent (the IRS) under Rule 121. We will grant that
motion and sustain the IRS’s determination on grounds of res
judicata.
Background
The following facts are based on the petition, our record in
Mr. Koprowski’s prior deficiency case (of which we take
notice pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201), and facts that the IRS
asserted and supported in its motion for summary judgment
that Mr. Koprowski has not disputed.
2006 income issues
Mr. and Mrs. Koprowski filed a joint Federal income tax
return for the year 2006. The IRS thereafter took the position
that Mrs. Koprowski had received in that year, from the
estate of her late father, taxable distributions that were not
reported on the Koprowskis’ income tax return. In October
2008 the IRS issued to the Koprowskis jointly a notice of defi-
ciency, determining a tax deficiency attributable to the inclu-
sion of those distributions in their taxable income.
2006 deficiency case
In January 2009 the Koprowskis filed a petition in this
Court challenging the IRS’s deficiency determination and
asserting that the distributions at issue were ‘‘non-taxable
inheritance’’. Both Mr. and Mrs. Koprowski signed the peti-
tion, on which they elected to have the case proceed under
small tax case procedures pursuant to section 7463. The defi-
ciency case proceeded as docket No. 1185–09S.
The Koprowskis made three additional filings in docket No.
1185–09S—(1) a motion for summary judgment, (2) a motion
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(26 U.S.C.), as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
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56 138 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (54)
to strike, and (3) an objection to a motion for summary judg-
ment filed by the IRS, combined with their cross-motion—all
of which were signed by both Mr. and Mrs. Koprowski. In the
objection and cross-motion (filed October 13, 2009), the
Koprowskis stated:
Petitioner Mr. Koprowski maintains an Affirmative Defense provided by
an Innocent Spouse Claim per the case law doctrine of King v. Commis-
sioner (115 TC No. 8 (2000)).
* * * * * * *
9. Petitioner Mr. Koprowski, as the IRS’s evidence demonstrates, did not
receive any income as a beneficiary of a trust or estate.
10. Petitioner Mr. Koprowski should be granted Innocent Spouse Relief
from the IRS regarding its Deficiency Notice. On October 11, 2009 after
he received the evidence requested from the IRS regarding the estate, he
immediately filed a request for innocent spouse relief with IRS. (See
Exhibit B of the Objections filing, IRS Form 8857, Request for Innocent
Spouse Relief.)
[Emphasis omitted.]
When the deficiency case was first called from the calendar
for trial on October 26, 2009, Mrs. Koprowski said only ‘‘Good
morning’’, and Mr. Koprowski spoke for the couple, to
schedule argument on the cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. Later that day a volunteer lawyer entered an appear-
ance on their behalf; and when the case was recalled, both
parties withdrew their motions for summary judgment. Two
days later the Koprowskis’ volunteer lawyer signed on the
Koprowskis’ behalf a stipulated decision document, by which
the Court entered decision on November 9, 2009, sustain-
ing the IRS’s deficiency determination. We assume that there-
after the tax was duly assessed against both the Koprowskis
as the joint and several liability of each of them.
The Koprowskis have not alleged in this case that there
was any defect in those proceedings in docket No. 1185–09S,
and they have not filed in docket No. 1185–09S any motion
to vacate or revise the decision in that case.
Mr. Koprowski’s request for relief
As is noted above, while the deficiency case was pending,
Mr. Koprowski submitted to the IRS in October 2009 a Form
8857, ‘‘Request for Innocent Spouse Relief ’’, seeking to be
relieved from liability for the tax attributable to the distribu-
tions from his wife’s father’s estate. Mr. Koprowski asserts
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(54) KOPROWSKI v. COMMISSIONER 57
(in his petition in the present case)—and we assume true for
purposes of the IRS’s pending motion—that, in conjunction
with his request to the IRS for innocent spouse relief, he pre-
sented to the IRS evidence showing that he ‘‘did not know and
had no reason to know of the understatement at the time the
return was signed.’’ In May 2010 the IRS denied the relief he
requested.
Proceedings in the present case
On June 8, 2010, Mr. Koprowski filed his petition com-
mencing the instant case seeking review of the IRS’s denial
of his request for innocent spouse relief. The petition
indicates that he resides in Illinois. His petition seeks relief
from joint liability on various grounds, including that ‘‘[a]ny
taxes owed on the gift should be paid for by the [wife’s]
father’s estate’’, and ‘‘IRS erred by not following the Internal
Revenue Manual (IRM) which details how to handle cases
hinging on the timely, good faith filing of tax returns.’’ The
IRS filed its answer to the petition on August 3, 2010.
On September 28, 2011, 2 respondent moved for summary
judgment on grounds of res judicata, i.e., that Mr.
Koprowski’s suit is precluded by the decision entered against
him in the deficiency case. By order of September 29, 2011,
the Court ordered Mr. Koprowski to file a response and
advised him:
If Mr. Koprowski disagrees with the facts set out in the IRS’s motion,
then Mr. Koprowski’s response should point out the specific facts in dis-
pute. The response should support Mr. Koprowski’s version of the facts by
attaching relevant documents and/or by attaching one or more affidavits
(i.e., written statements that are signed and sworn before a notary) or
unsworn declarations that are made ‘‘under penalty of perjury’’ (see 28
U.S.C. sec. 1746). If Mr. Koprowski disagrees with the IRS’s argument as
to the law, then his response should also set out his position on the dis-
puted legal issues.
Mr. Koprowski’s attention is directed to Tax Court Rule 121 (available
on the court’s website at www.ustaxcourt.gov), which sets out the prin-
ciples for filing, opposing, and resolving motions for summary judgment.
In particular, Mr. Koprowski should note that Rule 121(d) provides, ‘‘If the
2 Mr. Koprowski opposes the IRS’s motion on the grounds that ‘‘After 16 months of litigation,
and numerous briefs and pleadings, Respondent IRS suddenly raises the issue of res judicata
in its latest pleading, a motion.’’ Under Rule 121(a), however, a motion for summary judgment
is timely if raised ‘‘no later than 60 days before the first day of the Court’s session at which
the case is calendared for trial’’. Since this case is on a calendar set for February 27, 2012, the
IRS’s motion was timely.
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58 138 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (54)
adverse party [i.e., Mr. Koprowski] does not so respond [to a motion for
summary judgment], then a decision, if appropriate, may be entered
against such party’’—i.e., against Mr. Koprowski.
Mr. Koprowski’s attention is also directed to Harbin v. Commissioner,
137 T.C. No. 7 (Sept. 26, 2011), and Haag v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2011–87 (Apr. 19, 2011), slip op. at 18–20, two recent decisions of this
Court that discuss res judicata and section 6015(g)(2).
Mr. Koprowski filed his response on September 30, 2011. His
response did not discuss section 6015(g)(2). The Court’s order
of October 17, 2011, observed—
Mr. Koprowski’s recent response does make factual assertions, but it was
not accompanied by any documents, affidavits, or unsworn statements
under penalty of perjury. The Court will give him an opportunity to
supplement his response with such materials
—and ordered him to do so by October 31, 2011. On that date
Mr. Koprowski did file a supplement to his response. His
supplement argued generally that res judicata should not
apply, but it did not present any evidentiary materials, and
it did not discuss section 6015(g)(2).
Discussion
I. General legal principles
A. Relief from joint liability
Section 6013(d)(3) provides that when married taxpayers
file a joint return, the tax is computed on their aggregate
income, and their liability to pay the tax shown on the return
or found to be owing is joint and several. See also 26 C.F.R.
sec. 1.6013–4(b), Income Tax Regs. That is, each spouse is
liable for the entire joint tax liability. However, section 6015
provides several means for a taxpayer to seek relief from
joint liability; and if the IRS determines not to grant such
relief to a taxpayer, section 6015(e) gives this Court jurisdic-
tion to review that determination.
B. Small tax cases under section 7463
Section 7463(a) provides that, where a Tax Court petition
involves an amount not exceeding $50,000—
at the option of the taxpayer concurred in by the Tax Court * * *, pro-
ceedings in the case shall be conducted under this section. Notwith-
standing the provisions of section 7453, such proceedings shall be con-
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(54) KOPROWSKI v. COMMISSIONER 59
ducted in accordance with such rules of evidence, practice, and procedure
as the Tax Court may prescribe. * * *
The Tax Court has implemented this provision in Title XVII
of its Rules (i.e., Rules 170–175). Under Rule 174(b), ‘‘Trials
of small tax cases will be conducted as informally as possible
consistent with orderly procedure, and any evidence deemed
by the Court to have probative value shall be admissible.’’
Section 7463(b) provides as follows:
SEC. 7463(b). FINALITY OF DECISIONS.—A decision entered in any case
in which the proceedings are conducted under this section shall not be
reviewed in any other court and shall not be treated as a precedent for any
other case.
By precluding any appeal of the decision in a small tax case,
section 7463(b) deprives the electing petitioner of his oppor-
tunity to appeal an adverse decision, but it also protects him
from the difficulty of defending any appeal by the IRS of a
decision favorable to him. Presumably, Mr. and Mrs.
Koprowski weighed these considerations in deciding to elect
small tax case status for their prior deficiency case.
C. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
The IRS’s motion now before us invokes only the doctrine
of res judicata, and not the related doctrine of collateral
estoppel. Mr. Koprowski mentions both, but in fact collateral
estoppel is not implicated here. However, we nonetheless
include collateral estoppel in our discussion because the doc-
trines have important differences that affect our analysis.
Both these doctrines ‘‘have the dual purpose of protecting
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue
and of promoting judicial economy by preventing unnecessary
or redundant litigation’’, Meier v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 273,
282 (1988), but the reach of these two doctrines is not the
same.
1. Res judicata
Res judicata (Latin for ‘‘a thing adjudicated’’), or claim pre-
clusion, is an affirmative defense 3 developed by the courts to
3 Res judicata is not a jurisdictional defense but rather is an affirmative defense, see Rule 39,
that may therefore be waived, see Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010); Rizzo v.
Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 714 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, notwithstanding a prior deficiency case, a
Continued
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60 138 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (54)
bar repetitious suits on the same cause of action, and this
doctrine is applicable to tax litigation. As the Supreme Court
explained:
[W]hen a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on
the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies
are thereafter bound ‘‘not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.’’ * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * Income taxes are levied on an annual basis. Each year is the origin
of a new liability and of a separate cause of action. Thus if a claim of
liability or non-liability relating to a particular tax year is litigated, a judg-
ment on the merits is res judicata as to any subsequent proceeding
involving the same claim and the same tax year. * * *
[Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597–598 (1948) (quoting Crom-
well v. Cnty. of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); emphasis added).]
That is, each tax year is a separate cause of action, and res
judicata makes truly final a final judgment on that cause of
action. Where the cause of action of a taxpayer’s liability in
a given tax year has been litigated (as Mr. Koprowski’s tax
liability for 2006 was litigated in the deficiency case, docket
No. 1185–09S), the parties may thereafter be barred from re-
litigating that liability—whether by reference either to a
‘‘matter which was offered’’ in that prior suit (such as the
adjustments on the notice of deficiency) or to a ‘‘matter which
might have been offered’’ in the prior suit—unless there is an
exception that prevents the application of the doctrine of res
judicata.
2. Collateral estoppel
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the
relitigation of an issue that has been previously litigated
between the parties in one controversy but that recurs in
other litigation between them in different controversies.
Simply stated the difference between the two doctrines is
this:
section 6015 claim may be litigated where ‘‘[t]he parties previously agreed that any request by
petitioner for relief from joint and several liability under section 6015 would not be determined
in the’’ deficiency case. Greer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009–20, slip op. at 4–5, aff ’d, 595
F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2010). However, neither in the hearings in docket No. 1185–09S nor in the
stipulated decision document that the parties submitted in that case did the Commissioner
waive any res judicata defense against Mr. Koprowski’s section 6015 claim.
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(54) KOPROWSKI v. COMMISSIONER 61
Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes
the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have
been raised in that action. * * * Under collateral estoppel, once a court
has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision
may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of
action * * *. [Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).]
Collateral estoppel thus precludes relitigation not only in
connection with the cause of action previously litigated but
even in connection with different claims or causes of action.
Because collateral estoppel has this broader reach, the courts
have perceived that its rigid application might have unjust
results. The Supreme Court has observed that it might be—
unfair to apply offensive estoppel * * * where the second action affords
the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that
could readily cause a different result.15
15If, for example, the defendant in the first action was forced to defend in
an inconvenient forum and therefore was unable to engage in full dis-
covery or call witnesses, application of offensive collateral estoppel may be
unwarranted. Indeed, differences in available procedures may sometimes
justify not allowing a prior judgment to have estoppel effect in a subse-
quent action even between the same parties, or where defensive estoppel
is asserted against a plaintiff who has litigated and lost. * * *
[Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). 4]
Consequently, there are limits to the application of collat-
eral estoppel. Unlike res judicata, which binds the parties as
to any matter that ‘‘might have been offered’’, whether or not
that matter was actually litigated, collateral estoppel applies
only to issues that were actually litigated in the first suit.
The rule of collateral estoppel provides that ‘‘[w]hen an issue
of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
4 The potential unfairness of collaterally estopping relitigation of an issue may be aggravated
where collateral estoppel is used ‘‘offensively’’—i.e., where ‘‘a plaintiff is seeking to estop a de-
fendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against
another plaintiff ’’, Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329—and may be particularly acute where an
issue has a small-dollar consequence in the first case and has a large-dollar consequence in the
subsequent case. ‘‘If a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he
may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable’’.
Id. at 330; see also Yamaha Corp. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (‘‘An ex-
ample of such unfairness would be when the losing party clearly lacked any incentive to litigate
the point in the first trial, but the stakes of the second trial are of a vastly greater magnitude’’);
Otherson v. Dep’t of Justice, INS, 711 F.2d 267, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (issue ‘‘[p]reclusion is some-
times unfair if the party to be bound lacked an incentive to litigate in the first trial, especially
in comparison to the stakes of the second trial’’). These concerns are not implicated where the
same cause of action is at issue in both trials, and the ‘‘stakes’’ of the second trial are, by defini-
tion, not greater than but identical to the ‘‘stakes’’ of the first.
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62 138 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (54)
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties, whether on the same or a dif-
ferent claim.’’ 1 Restatement, Judgments 2d, sec. 27 (1982)
(emphasis added); see also Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 153–154 (1979). Some even hold that, for purposes
of collateral estoppel, ‘‘the availability of judicial review is a
crucial factor in determining preclusive effect.’’ Wehrli v.
Cnty. of Orange, 175 F.3d 692, 694 (9th Cir. 1999).
A small tax case under section 7463(b) involves a small
amount, is resolved under less formal procedures, and
receives no appellate review. For these reasons, the question
whether a decision in a small tax case gives rise to collateral
estoppel (or ‘‘issue preclusion’’) is controversial, cf. Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. 215, 221–239 (2008) (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (discussing the collateral estoppel effect of small
tax cases); but in this case we do not face the question
whether collateral estoppel arises from a decision in a small
tax case. We resolve only the application of res judicata.
II. Res judicata arising from docket No. 1185–09S
Mr. Koprowski’s income tax liability for 2006 (the year for
which he now seeks relief from joint liability) has already
been decided in the deficiency case, and the doctrine of res
judicata requires us to follow that prior decision. Under the
Supreme Court’s explication of res judicata in Commissioner
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 597–598, four conditions must be met
to preclude relitigation of a claim: (1) the parties in each
action must be identical (or at least be in privity); (2) a court
of competent jurisdiction must have rendered the first judg-
ment; (3) the prior action must have resulted in a final judg-
ment on the merits; and (4) the same cause of action or claim
must be involved in both suits. See United States v.
Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir. 1994). Once these
conditions are met, each party is prohibited from raising any
claim or defense that was or could have been raised as part
of the litigation over the cause of action in the prior case. Id.
Those four conditions are met here:
1. In the deficiency case Mr. Koprowski was a petitioner,
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was the
respondent. In this case, Mr. Koprowski is again the peti-
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(54) KOPROWSKI v. COMMISSIONER 63
tioner, and the Commissioner is again the respondent. Thus,
the parties are identical.
2. In the deficiency case the Koprowskis filed their defi-
ciency suit in the only court authorized under section 6213(a)
to hear such suits—i.e., this Court. Clearly we had jurisdic-
tion in that prior case.
3. The deficiency case concluded with the entry of a deci-
sion by the Court on November 9, 2009, pursuant to the
stipulation of the parties. Our decision was a final judgment
on the merits of the Koprowskis’ 2006 joint and several
liability.
4. Finally, in the present case Mr. Koprowski seeks
innocent spouse relief from the very liability—i.e., the 2006
joint income tax liability—as to which this Court in the defi-
ciency case determined that he was jointly and severally
liable. The claims are thus identical.
Since the four conditions for claim preclusion are present,
relitigation of Mr. Koprowski’s claim is barred by res judi-
cata, unless he can invoke some exception to its application.
III. Arguments against the application of res judicata
A. Res judicata arising from a small tax case
Mr. Koprowski asserts that the deficiency case was a
‘‘small case’’ that proceeded under section 7463; and it
appears he may be arguing that res judicata does not arise
from such a case. If this is his argument, then we must reject
it. To assert that res judicata does not attach to the decision
of a small tax case under section 7463 is to assert that Con-
gress created in that statute a regime exempt from res judi-
cata. This assertion, however, effectively overlooks section
7463(b), which explicitly provides:
SEC. 7463(b). FINALITY OF DECISIONS.—A decision entered in any case
in which the proceedings are conducted under this section shall not be
reviewed in any other court and shall not be treated as a precedent[5] for
any other case.
5 If Mr. Koprowski’s denial of res judicata is prompted by the provision of section 7463(b) that
a small tax case decision ‘‘shall not be treated as precedent’’, then that position is answered by
observing (i) that res judicata is a bar to litigation, not a ‘‘precedent’’ that dictates its outcome,
and (ii) that before denying ‘‘precedent’’ status to small tax case decisions, subsection (b) first
gives those decisions ‘‘Finality’’ by providing that no other court can review them. Thus, in
Ginalski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004–104, we rejected in dictum the argument that ‘‘the
limitation on citing Summary Opinions as precedence deprives them of the effect of res judi-
Continued
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64 138 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (54)
This subsection assures the ‘‘[f]inality’’ 6 of a small tax case
decision by exempting it from appellate review. It would
flatly contradict the evident congressional purpose to hold
that the denial of appellate review deprives the decision of
finality.
If res judicata did not apply to decisions in small tax cases
because of a principle that such cases, by their nature,
should not bar future litigation, then this principle would be
subject to anomalies: Section 6512(a) bars a taxpayer from
filing a refund suit for a tax year for which he has previously
filed a timely Tax Court petition. On the other hand, section
6215(a) bars the Government from filing suit to collect any
part of a deficiency determined by the IRS that the Tax Court
has ‘‘disallowed’’. These provisions, equivalent to res judicata,
grant preclusive effect to Tax Court litigation, without distin-
guishing between regular cases and small tax cases. In light
of these provisions, it would be incoherent to find that sec-
tion 7463(b) implicitly exempts small tax cases from the
effect of res judicata.
The Court of Claims explicitly held that attempted relitiga-
tion after a decision in a small tax case in the Tax Court
under section 7463 ‘‘is barred under the doctrine of res judi-
cata.’’ Vaitkus v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 815, 815 (1982).
The text of section 7463(b) permits no other result. We there-
fore hold that the doctrine of res judicata does bar relitiga-
tion after a decision in a small tax case under section 7463.
B. Section 6015(g)(2)
Mr. Koprowski further resists the application of res judi-
cata on the grounds that his entitlement to innocent spouse
relief ‘‘was not raised in previous litigation nor adjudicated
on its merits in the previous case.’’ Mr. Koprowski is wrong
in asserting that the defense ‘‘was not raised’’, since in the
deficiency case he did assert an innocent spouse defense in
cata’’.
6 The heading of section 7463(b)—‘‘Finality of Decisions’’—helps to illuminate its meaning and
purpose. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (‘‘ ‘the title of a stat-
ute and the heading of a section’ are ‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the
meaning of a statute’’ (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–529
(1947))); Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011) (‘‘ ‘while a stat-
ute’s title does not define its meaning, it is relevant’ ’’ (quoting United States v. Chemetco, 274
F.3d 1154, 1159 (7th Cir. 2001))); cf. sec. 7806(b) (‘‘descriptive matter relating to the contents
of ’’ the Internal Revenue Code shall not ‘‘be given any legal effect’’).
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(54) KOPROWSKI v. COMMISSIONER 65
his opposition to the IRS’s motion for summary judgment (as
we quote above). However, in a sense he is correct in
asserting that the issue ‘‘was not * * * adjudicated’’, since
the parties withdrew their cross-motions for summary judg-
ment and the Koprowskis conceded the case in full, so that
the Court entered decision without addressing section 6015
(or any other issue).
In circumstances outside section 6015 this would be beside
the point, since res judicata bars not just issues that were
actually raised but rather ‘‘issues that were or could have
been raised in that action’’. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94 (emphasis
added). Thus, in other circumstances we would not inquire to
learn the extent to which the particular issue had actually
been raised and adjudicated; res judicata would apply in any
event.
However, under section 6015(g)(2) an innocent spouse
claimant can sometimes overcome res judicata, if the claim-
ant can meet two conditions. Section 6015(g)(2) provides:
(2) RES JUDICATA.—In the case of any election under subsection (b) or
(c) or of any request for equitable relief under subsection (f), if a decision
of a court in any prior proceeding for the same taxable year has become
final, such decision shall be conclusive except with respect to the qualifica-
tion of the individual for relief which was not an issue in such proceeding.
The exception contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply if the
court determines that the individual participated meaningfully in such
prior proceeding. [Emphasis added.]
Under this statute, to escape the effect of res judicata from
prior litigation, the requesting spouse must show (1) that his
innocent spouse claim ‘‘was not an issue’’ in the prior pro-
ceeding and (2) that he did not ‘‘participate[ ] meaningfully’’
in the prior proceeding. Mr. Koprowski meets neither of
those conditions.
First, his innocent spouse claim was explicitly put at issue
in the prior proceeding by the Koprowskis’ objection and
cross-motion, quoted above. For this reason alone, section
6015(g)(2) does not apply to relieve Mr. Koprowski from the
‘‘conclusive’’ effect of the prior suit.
Second, even if Mr. Koprowski had not explicitly raised an
innocent spouse claim in the deficiency case, to overcome res
judicata in the present case he would also have to show that
he did not meaningfully participate in the deficiency case;
and to make such a showing, he would have to overcome the
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66 138 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (54)
contrary indications in our records: Mr. Koprowski signed the
petition in the deficiency case—and all other papers that the
petitioners filed with the Court. The innocent spouse claim,
which was to his benefit and was to the detriment of Mrs.
Koprowski, was asserted in their opposition to the IRS’s
motion for summary judgment. When they appeared in per-
son before the Court, Mrs. Koprowski was all but silent, and
it was Mr. Koprowski who spoke for the two of them. The
record thus indicates that he did meaningfully participate in
the deficiency case, and he does not allege that he did not.
He therefore fails, for this additional reason, to satisfy sec-
tion 6015(g)(2), and he is not relieved from the operation of
res judicata in this instance.
Because res judicata does bar Mr. Koprowski’s relitigation
of the 2006 income tax liability that he already litigated in
the deficiency case, we will grant the IRS’s motion for sum-
mary judgment and will affirm the IRS’s determination not to
grant Mr. Koprowski relief from that liability.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and decision will be
entered.
Reviewed by the Court.
COLVIN, COHEN, HALPERN, FOLEY, VASQUEZ, GALE,
THORNTON, GOEKE, WHERRY, KROUPA, HOLMES, and MORRI-
SON, JJ., agree with this opinion of the Court.
MARVEL and PARIS, JJ., concur in the result only.
HOLMES, J., concurring: I agree with the rest of the Court
that a final decision in an S case precludes any claim in a
later case that could have been raised, subject to the statu-
tory exception of section 6015(g)(2). I write separately only to
note that the same result will certainly follow when the
Court finally addresses the question of whether decisions in
S cases collaterally estop losing parties from relitigating the
same issues in later cases. See Mitchell v. Commissioner, 131
T.C. 215, 221–39 (2008) (Holmes, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court has reminded us that we should not
‘‘carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax
law only.’’ Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
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(54) KOPROWSKI v. COMMISSIONER 67
States, 562 U.S. ll, ll, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011). The
same goes for the federal common law of judgments: ‘‘The
preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by
federal common law.’’ Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891
(2008). It is not our job to try to figure out whether pre-
clusion is a good policy or a bad one and in what cir-
cumstances we think it best applies: ‘‘A fundamental precept
of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doc-
trines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a ‘right,
question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be
disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or
their privies.’ ’’ Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153
(1979) (quoting S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1,
48–49 (1897)).
f
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