T.C. Memo. 2012-58
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DENNIS C. JACKSON, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 17268-08L. Filed March 5, 2012.
Dennis C. Jackson, pro se.
Kimberly L. Clark, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THORNTON, Judge: Pursuant to sections 6320(c) and 6330(d), petitioner
seeks review of respondent’s determinations sustaining the filing of a Federal tax
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lien with respect to petitioner’s Federal income tax liabilities for 1999, 2000, 2001,
and 2002 and sustaining a proposed levy to collect these taxes.1 The Court has
previously granted respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect
to petitioner’s taxable years 1999, 2000, and 2001. The issues remaining for
decision are: (1) whether to sustain respondent’s determinations with respect to
petitioner’s 2002 tax liabilities; and (2) whether to grant respondent’s motion to
impose a penalty against petitioner pursuant to section 6673(a).
Background
None of the facts have been stipulated because petitioner refused to stipulate
as required by Rule 91. Petitioner lived in Oregon when he filed his
petition.
Petitioner failed to file Federal income tax returns for 1999, 2000, 2001, and
2002. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) conducted an examination and
executed substitutes for returns pursuant to section 6020(b) on petitioner’s behalf.
On January 21, 2004, respondent mailed petitioner notices of deficiency for 1999,
2000, and 2001. On November 23, 2004, respondent mailed petitioner a notice of
deficiency for 2002. In the notice of deficiency for 2002 respondent determined that
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
All monetary amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
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petitioner had $24,604 of unreported income, giving rise to a $2,235 deficiency.2
Respondent also determined that for 2002 petitioner was liable for a $499 addition
to tax pursuant to section 6651(a)(1) for failure to file his tax return timely and a
$277 addition to tax pursuant to section 6651(a)(2) for failure to pay timely.
Petitioner filed no Tax Court petition in response to any of the notices of
deficiency for the years 1999 through 2002. Consequently, respondent assessed
petitioner’s unpaid tax liabilities for these years.
On December 13, 2005, respondent sent petitioner a Letter 3172, Notice of
Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing, with respect to these
assessments. On January 3, 2006, petitioner submitted a Form 12153, Request for
2
Respondent determined the tax using a single filing status for petitioner.
Although respondent’s counsel at trial elicited testimony from petitioner that he was
married during 2002, neither party has raised any issue as to petitioner’s proper
filing status, and we deem any such issue waived.
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a Collection Due Process Hearing, raising frivolous and groundless arguments.3 The
hearing request did not raise spousal defenses or collection alternatives.
On May 1, 2006, respondent sent petitioner a Letter 1058, Final Notice--
Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing. On May 12, 2006,
petitioner submitted another Form 12153, raising essentially the same arguments as
before, except asserting for the first time: “I have no record of receiving a Notice of
Deficiency for the year 2002.”
By letter dated September 11, 2006, respondent’s settlement officer advised
petitioner that a telephone conference had been scheduled for October 3, 2006, and
requested certain documents. The letter stated that petitioner would be allowed a
face-to-face hearing on any nonfrivolous issue, provided that he identified the
nonfrivolous issue within 14 days by writing or calling the settlement officer. By
letter dated September 25, 2006, petitioner demanded a face-to-face hearing,
3
In a letter attached to the Form 12153, petitioner stated: “The heart of this
matter is the lack of any statute which clearly and unequivocally makes me liable for
(or subject to) the tax imposed within Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code.”
Petitioner further stated: “Please be aware that I have made the determination that I
am not liable for (or subject to) the taxes the IRS alleges I owe, and therefore I am
not a ‘taxpayer’ ”. Also attached to the Form 12153 was a “Schedule of Disputed
Issues”, listing nine frivolous and groundless issues he intended to raise at the
hearing, including that the IRS had failed to identify any authority to make a
determination that he is a “taxpayer” and that only foreign-earned income counts as
“taxable income”.
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asserting that because he had received no notice of deficiency for 2002 he expected
to challenge his underlying liability at the hearing. The letter did not, however,
identify any nonfrivolous basis for any such challenge.
Petitioner failed to call the settlement officer as requested for the scheduled
October 3, 2006, telephone conference and did not provide her any of the requested
documents.
By letter dated August 27, 2007, the settlement officer offered petitioner
another telephone conference on September 11, 2007, and again requested certain
documents. As in her previous letter, the settlement officer advised petitioner that
he would be allowed a face-to-face hearing on any nonfrivolous issue, provided that
he identified the nonfrivolous issue within 14 days by writing or calling the
settlement officer. The record does not establish that petitioner ever responded to
this letter. In any event, petitioner again failed to call the settlement officer as
requested for the scheduled September 11, 2007, telephone conference and still did
not provide the requested documents.
In the notice of determination dated June 9, 2008, respondent sustained the
notice of filing of tax lien and the proposed levy with respect to petitioner’s income
tax liabilities for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. The notice of determination states
that on the basis of her review of the administrative files, transcripts, and
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information that petitioner had submitted, the settlement officer had verified that all
applicable laws, regulations, and administrative procedures had been followed in
connection with the assessments and proposed collection of the taxes at issue.4
Petitioner timely petitioned this Court. The petition states: “This petition is
filed under protest as there’s no evidence I’m a ‘taxpayer’ and remedy for
nontaxpayers does not lie with the tax court or any remedy set forth in the tax
code”. The petition contains two assignments of error: (1) that the IRS had put
forth arbitrary “legal opinions” that petitioner is a “taxpayer” without facts to
support such opinions; and (2) that petitioner did not receive a proper hearing
because: “A telephone call discussing how an ‘assessment’ will be paid is not a
hearing in the legal sense, but a ‘sham or a pretense’.”
On January 7, 2010, petitioner filed a motion to vacate the assessments at
issue in this case because respondent’s counsel had allegedly failed to respond to his
purported request for admissions. The Court filed this document as petitioner’s
motion to review the sufficiency of respondent’s answers or objections to
petitioner’s request for admissions. By order dated January 19, 2010, the Court
4
In particular, the settlement officer’s log indicates that she investigated
petitioner’s claim that he had not received a notice of deficiency for 2002 and
verified through internal transcripts that the notice had been forwarded to him,
although she was unable to secure a copy of it.
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denied petitioner’s motion because he had not properly filed with the Court any
request for admissions as required by Rule 90(b).
On February 2, 2010, the Court received from petitioner a letter dated
January 25, 2010, accompanied by a document described in the letter as a request
for admissions, requesting discovery of information primarily in furtherance of
frivolous and groundless contentions.5 The Court filed these documents as
petitioner’s second motion to review the sufficiency of respondent’s answer or
objection to petitioner’s request for admissions. By order dated February 16, 2010,
the Court denied this motion because: (1) the motion was not timely filed with
the Court as required by Rule 90; (2) the document captioned “informal request
5
The first sentence of the purported request for admissions states: “This is an
informal request for discovery; please provide me with the following”. The
document lists six numbered requests for information, including the names and
badge numbers of every “witness” “personally involved [in] making decisions
against” petitioner; the names of any “witnesses” who are “experts in the
interpretation and application of United States tax law”; any “admissible evidence”
that petitioner is “subject to the laws of the United States”; any “admissible
evidence” that petitioner is a “taxpayer”; any “admissible evidence” that petitioner
received “taxable income”; and any “admissible evidence” that “petitioner has any
obligation to file tax returns imposed by laws of the United States.” The document
also lists 15 numbered “admissions * * * to be given to the witnesses the
Commissioner relies on to support his assessments against Dennis Jackson”,
requesting that these witnesses admit or deny various frivolous and groundless
contentions, such as that there is no evidence to prove that petitioner is a “taxpayer”
subject to U.S. laws and that the witness does not know the difference between a
“taxpayer” and a “non-taxpayer”.
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for discovery” did not constitute a proper request for admissions within the meaning
of Rule 90(a); and (3) the discovery requests did not appear to advance the
development of the case.
On September 17, 2010, petitioner again filed the same “informal request for
discovery” but this time with a cover letter stating that it was a request for
admissions. On November 12, 2010, respondent filed a motion for a protective
order that the Court excuse him from answering petitioner’s so-called request for
admissions and prohibit petitioner from serving any further formal discovery
requests or requests for admissions without first obtaining leave of the Court. On
December 8, 2010, the Court granted respondent’s motion, finding that petitioner’s
September 17, 2010, request for admissions, like the substantially identical
document that was the subject of the Court’s February 16, 2010, order, did not
constitute a proper request for admissions within the meaning of Rule 90 and did not
appear to advance the development of the case. The Court further observed that the
purported requests for admissions appeared to have been propounded primarily in
furtherance of frivolous arguments and were not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. The Court’s order stated:
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Furthermore, we are not persuaded that petitioner has complied
with Rule 70(a) and made reasonable attempts to obtain informally
facts that might be germane to any nonfrivolous issues in this case.
Petitioner’s repeated attempts to use improper requests for admissions,
even after being advised by the Court that they are improper,
constitutes an abuse of this Court’s procedures and convinces us that
respondent’s motion for protective order should be granted. See
Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691, 692 (1974); see also
Roat v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 1379, 1382-1383 (9th Cir. 1988)
(upholding this Court’s granting of a protective order against discovery
where the taxpayers propounded interrogatories, dealing mainly with
the Government’s authority to tax, to which a response would have
been “onerous and pointless”, and made no effort to consult
informally).
In its order the Court encouraged the parties to consult informally to exchange
information and to stipulate facts pursuant to Rule 91(a). The Court warned
petitioner that the continued assertion of frivolous or groundless arguments may
result in the imposition of penalties pursuant to section 6673(a)(1).
By letter to petitioner dated December 2, 2010, respondent’s counsel
requested a conference so that the parties might consult informally and attempt to
prepare stipulations as required by this Court. The letter specified the types of
income, payors, and amounts of income that respondent alleged gave rise to
petitioner’s underlying liability for 2002. The letter requested that petitioner admit
or deny receiving the items of income listed in the letter and provide various other
information, including an income tax return for 2002 and documents to substantiate
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any expenses or deductions he intended to claim for 2002. On December 15, 2010,
respondent’s counsel had a telephone conference with petitioner and his
representative.
On December 17, 2010, respondent filed with the Court a request for
admissions, consisting of 11 numbered requests that petitioner admit or deny facts
identifying the sources and amounts of income that he received in 2002, as reported
to respondent by third parties. On January 24, 2011, petitioner filed an objection to
respondent’s request for admissions, asserting that each requested admission was
“irrelevant” and “not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” On
January 31, 2011, respondent filed a motion to review the sufficiency of petitioner’s
objection to respondent’s request for admissions. In this motion respondent stated
that in the December 15, 2010, conference, petitioner had refused to answer
respondent’s questions and refused to stipulate any documents, including the
administrative record. By order dated February 11, 2011, the Court granted
respondent’s motion and deemed petitioner to have admitted the matters contained
in respondent’s request for admissions.6
6
The deemed admissions establish that in 2002 petitioner received the
following items of income: (1) $1,135 in net gains from sale of stock; (2) $34 in
dividends from Key National Bank Association; (3) $208 in royalties from Bidwell
and Co.; (4) $65 of interest income from Bidwell and Co.; (5)
(continued...)
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On January 18, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for leave to engage in
discovery with respondent, seeking to discover the same information or type of
information as had been described in the “informal request for discovery” that had
been the subject of three previous Court orders denying the requested discovery.
By order dated January 25, 2011, the Court denied petitioner’s motion for
essentially the same reasons described in its December 8, 2010, order.
On December 20, 2011, respondent filed a motion for partial summary
judgment with respect to petitioner’s taxable years 1999, 2000, and 2001.7 On
February 11, 2011, the Court granted respondent’s motion for partial summary
judgment for 1999, 2000, and 2001, finding that there were no genuine issues of
material fact in dispute with respect to these years, that having received notices of
6
(...continued)
$2 of interest income from Delta Enterprises, L.P.; (6) $659 of partnership gain from
Delta Enterprises, L.P.; (7) $19,068 of retirement income from Pacific Coast
Pension Fund; and (8) $8 of interest income from Crown Pacific Partners, Limited
Partnership.
7
Previously, on February 17, 2010, respondent had filed a motion for
summary judgment, asserting that petitioner could not properly challenge the
existence or amount of his underlying liability for any of the four years at issue
because he received notices of deficiency for each of these years. Petitioner
opposed the motion for summary judgment on the grounds that discovery had not
been completed and there were factual disputes as to whether he is a “taxpayer”
with “taxable income”. By order dated August 5, 2010, the Court denied
respondent’s motion for summary judgment because of a factual issue as to whether
petitioner had received a notice of deficiency for 2002.
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deficiency for these years petitioner was not entitled to challenge his underlying
liabilities for these years in this collection proceeding, and that he had not otherwise
put forward any grounds on which we could find that respondent erred in his
determinations with respect to these years. On February 28, 2011, petitioner filed a
motion to vacate partial summary judgment on grounds that “basic discovery” had
been denied and the trial judge was biased and should recuse himself. On March 2,
2011, the Court denied petitioner’s motion.
On March 14, 2011, a trial was held. Petitioner appeared and made frivolous
and groundless arguments. He contended that respondent had “deliberately
concealed” the identity of the agent who had made the assessments and prepared the
substitutes for returns and therefore the agent “does not exist” and therefore, in his
view, there is no legal basis for the liens. Respondent filed a motion for penalties
under section 6673 on the grounds that petitioner has instituted these proceedings
primarily for delay and that petitioner’s positions are frivolous and groundless. The
Court invited petitioner to respond to this motion on brief. Petitioner has made no
response to the motion.
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Discussion
I. Determination To Proceed With Collection Actions for 2002 Liability
Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States on all property and
property rights of a person who is liable for and fails to pay tax after demand for
payment has been made. The lien arises when assessment is made and continues
until the liability is paid or becomes unenforceable by lapse of time. Sec. 6322. For
the lien to be valid against certain third parties, the Secretary must file a notice of
Federal tax lien; within five business days thereafter, the Secretary must provide
written notice to the taxpayer. Secs. 6320(a), 6323(a). The taxpayer then has 30
days to request an administrative hearing before an Appeals officer. Sec.
6320(a)(3)(B), (b)(1); sec. 301.6320-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. To the extent
practicable, a hearing requested under section 6320 is to be held in conjunction with
a related hearing requested under section 6330. Sec. 6320(b)(4).
Section 6330 requires the Secretary to furnish a person notice and opportunity
for a hearing before levying on the person’s property. At the hearing, the person
may raise any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or proposed levy, including
spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the collection action, and
offers of collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). The person may challenge the
underlying tax liability only if the person did not receive a notice of deficiency or did
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not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); Sego
v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000). After receiving a notice of
determination, the person may seek judicial review in this Court. Sec. 6330(d)(1);
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, sec. 855(a), 120 Stat. at 1019.
If the validity of the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, we review that issue
de novo. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 610. Other issues we review for abuse
of discretion. Id.
Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to challenge his underlying
liability for 2002. Petitioner bears the burden of proving that respondent’s
determination of his underlying liability is erroneous.8 See Rule 142(a).
Petitioner’s deemed admissions establish that in 2002 he received income of
$21,179. This amount is made up of net gains from the sale of stock, interest,
dividends, royalties, partnership gains, and retirement income from a pension fund,
8
Petitioner has not asserted that the burden of proof as to any factual issue
should shift to respondent pursuant to sec. 7491(a). In any event, sec. 7491(a) does
not apply to shift the burden of proof because petitioner has failed to substantiate
items, maintain records, and cooperate fully with respondent. See sec. 7491(a)(2).
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as reported to the IRS by third parties.9 Under the Code, these items are clearly
taxable. See sec. 61(a)(3), (4), (6), (7), (11), (13). Petitioner has not expressly
disputed receiving any of this income or presented any evidence or made any
judicially cognizable argument to properly challenge his 2002 underlying liability.
Instead, petitioner has espoused frivolous and groundless arguments, including,
notably, the argument that he made in objecting to respondent’s request for
admissions, that the amounts and sources of his 2002 income are “irrelevant”. This
argument appears to emanate from his nonsensical contention, as appears repeatedly
in his petition and in other materials filed with this Court, that he is not liable for
Federal income taxes because he is not a “taxpayer”.10
The petition contains no specific allegations or supporting facts regarding the
section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax for failure to file his 2002 tax return timely.
9
In the notice of deficiency for 2002 respondent determined that petitioner
had gross income of $24,604. Respondent concedes that this determination is
overstated insofar as it exceeds the income established by the deemed admissions.
10
In support of this frivolous argument, petitioner cites Econ. Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 31 (1972). Petitioner’s reliance on that
case is misplaced. The plaintiffs in Econ. Plumbing claimed that money owed to
them under a contract had been wrongfully applied to the payment of a third party’s
taxes. The court held that those plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain a tax refund
suit because they were not the taxpayers against whom the taxes had been assessed.
Econ. Plumbing is not germane to the case before us because, if for no other reason,
this is not a tax refund suit.
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Petitioner’s frivolous arguments at trial and the many documents he has filed with the
Court similarly do not specifically address any issue regarding the addition to tax.
We deem petitioner to have conceded this issue and hold that respondent has no
burden of production under section 7491(c) as to the section 6651(a)(1) addition to
tax.11 See Rule 34(b); see also Funk v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 213, 217-218
(2004); Swain v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358, 363-365 (2002). We conclude and
hold that petitioner is liable for the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax, subject to
computational adjustments resulting from respondent’s concession as to the amount
of his 2002 gross income.12
On brief the only issue that petitioner has raised is the Court’s denial of his
discovery requests. Initially we note, as explained in the Court’s various orders
denying petitioner’s recurring discovery request, that petitioner has failed to comply
with this Court’s Rules and procedures regarding discovery. In particular, he has
11
Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that petitioner had
properly stated a claim with respect to the sec. 6651(a)(1) addition to tax,
respondent has satisfied any burden of production that might arise in this regard
under sec. 7491(c). The record shows that petitioner failed to file his 2002 income
tax return and, as previously discussed, that there was tax required to be shown on
it. Petitioner has asserted no facts that would establish reasonable cause as a
defense to the sec. 6651(a)(1) addition to tax.
12
On brief respondent concedes that petitioner is not liable for the sec.
6651(a)(2) addition to tax.
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failed to seek in good faith to attain the objectives of discovery through informal
consultation or communication before using formal discovery procedures.13 See
Rules 70(a)(1), 90(a). As explained in the Court’s December 8, 2010, order,
petitioner’s repeated attempts to make his improper discovery request, even after
being advised by the Court that it was improper, and his ongoing failure to make
good-faith attempts to obtain informally facts that might be germane to any
nonfrivolous issues in this case constituted an abuse of this Court’s procedures.
These failings would be reason enough to deny petitioner’s discovery requests. See,
e.g., Odend’hal v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 400, 403-404 (1980), aff’d, 748 F.2d 908
(4th Cir. 1984); Int’l Air Conditioning Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 89, 93 (1976);
Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691 (1974).
Moreover, as explained in the Court’s various orders, we do not believe that
petitioner’s discovery requests were “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of
admissible evidence”, as required by Rule 70(b).14 As his arguments on brief
13
Although his request for discovery stated that “This is an informal request
for discovery”, petitioner treated it as a formal discovery request, seeking to invoke
the Court’s discovery procedures to compel respondent’s compliance without the
requisite informal consultation with respondent’s counsel.
14
The only potentially nonfrivolous item included in petitioner’s discovery
requests was a request for evidence of his “taxable income”. But we believe that
this request was intended to subserve the frivolous argument, which appears
(continued...)
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demonstrate, his requested discovery is essentially aimed at challenging the
procedures that respondent used in arriving at his determinations of petitioner’s
deficiencies. In particular, petitioner seeks to discover the identities of IRS agents
who were involved in his audit and deficiency determinations so that he might, as he
states on brief, “confront” them. The identities of these agents are immaterial to the
de novo record on which we review petitioner’s underlying liability. It is well
established that this Court generally will not explore, either in deficiency cases or in
collection cases in which the underlying liability is properly at issue, the
underpinnings of a notice of deficiency to examine the Commissioner’s administrative
policy, motives, procedures, or evidence used in determining a deficiency. See
Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 159, 164 (2001) (holding that this general rule
applies to determination notices in collection cases); Dellacroce v. Commissioner, 83
T.C. 269, 280 (1984); Riland v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 185, 201 (1982);
Greenberg’s Express, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324, 327 (1974); Kovacevich v.
14
(...continued)
repeatedly in his discovery request and in many other documents filed with the
Court, that he is not a “taxpayer” who is subject to U.S. laws and that
only foreign-earned income counts as “taxable income”. This belief is bolstered by
the fact that when respondent requested, months before trial, that he admit or deny
the specified amounts and sources of income that respondent had determined he had
received in 2002, petitioner refused to either admit or deny these items, objecting
that they were “irrelevant”.
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Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-160 n.6 (denying the taxpayer’s request to reopen
the trial record in a collection case to permit testimony of an IRS employee allegedly
responsible for the taxpayer’s tax audit because, in pertinent part, “what goes on
during audits is immaterial to the de novo record on which we decide deficiency
cases”).15
On brief petitioner asserts that because the Court denied his discovery request,
he has been improperly subjected to an “irrefutable presumption[]/opinion” that he is
a “taxpayer with taxable income”. Petitioner is mistaken. The simple fact of the
matter is that petitioner has presented no relevant evidence or cognizable argument to
overcome his deemed admissions or otherwise to properly challenge his 2002
underlying liability.
In his petition, petitioner alleges that respondent’s settlement officer erred by
denying him a face-to-face hearing. Hearings conducted under section 6330 are
informal proceedings and do not invariably require a face-to-face meeting. Sec.
301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A-D6, Proced. & Admin. Regs. In certain circumstances the
15
On brief petitioner complains that the Court “granted summary judgment
when there was no discovery permitted”. For the sake of completeness and clarity,
we note that the Court granted partial summary judgment with respect to petitioner’s
taxable years 1999, 2000, and 2001. As previously explained, petitioner’s
underlying liabilities for those years, for which he admits having received notices of
deficiency, are not properly at issue in this collection proceeding.
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hearing may be conducted by telephone or correspondence. Id.; see Katz v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 329, 337-338 (2000). Once a taxpayer has been given a
reasonable opportunity for a hearing but has failed to avail himself of the opportunity,
the Appeals officer may proceed in making a determination by reviewing the case file.
See, e.g., Oropeza v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-94, aff’d, 402 Fed. Appx. 221
(9th Cir. 2010); Taylor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-25, aff’d, 130 Fed. Appx.
934 (9th Cir. 2005); sec. 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A-D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.
Petitioner was offered two telephone hearings but failed to avail himself of
either one. Moreover, petitioner raised only frivolous issues with respect to his
underlying liabilities for the years 1999 through 2001. With respect to his 2002
taxable year he also asserted that he did not receive a notice of deficiency and that he
was therefore entitled to challenge his underlying liability for 2002. But he failed to
identify any nonfrivolous basis for any such challenge to his underlying liability--a
failure that persists in this proceeding. In any event, in the light of petitioner’s failure
to identify any legitimate issue regarding his 2002 underlying liability or any other
aspect of respondent’s determination, it is unnecessary and would be unproductive to
remand this case for further proceedings on account of the lack of a face-to-face
hearing. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. at 189; Oropeza v.
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Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-94; Leggett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-
277; Wright v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-291; Holliday v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2005-132, aff’d, 186 Fed. Appx. 779 (9th Cir. 2006).
Petitioner has offered no collection alternatives and asserted no spousal
defenses. From our review of the record we are satisfied that respondent has met the
requirements of sections 6320 and 6330. Consequently, we shall sustain respondent’s
determinations with respect to the collection of petitioner’s 2002 tax liabilities,
subject to the recalculation, pursuant to Rule 155, of petitioner’s underlying liability
for 2002 to effect respondent’s concessions in this regard.
II. Section 6673(a) Penalty
Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Tax Court to require a taxpayer to pay to the
United States a penalty of up to $25,000 whenever it appears that proceedings have
been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or that the taxpayer’s
position in the proceedings is frivolous or groundless.
Petitioner has based his entire case on frivolous and groundless positions,
notably that he is not a “taxpayer” with “taxable income” who is subject to the laws
of the United States or required to file income tax returns. He has espoused these
frivolous and groundless views in numerous documents filed with the Court. He has
raised no legitimate issue about his 2002 underlying liability, characterizing the
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amounts and sources of his income as “irrelevant”. He has abused the judicial
process in repeatedly making his improper discovery request, even after the Court had
advised him of its impropriety, and refusing to comply with this Court’s Rules and
procedures. He has been warned by respondent’s counsel and this Court that his
frivolous and groundless positions and actions in this proceeding could subject him to
penalties pursuant to section 6673. He has chosen to disregard these warnings. He
has wasted this Court’s and respondent’s time and resources. It appears to the Court
that petitioner’s positions in this proceeding are frivolous and groundless and that he
has instituted and maintained this proceeding primarily for delay. Consequently, we
shall grant respondent’s motion in that we shall require petitioner to pay to the United
States a penalty of $15,000 pursuant to section 6673(a)(1).
To reflect the foregoing and to give effect to respondent’s concessions as to
petitioner’s 2002 underlying liability,
An appropriate order will be
issued, and decision will be entered
under Rule 155.