Good v. Comm'r

T.C. Memo. 2012-323

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

SANDY GOOD, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 13413-10. Filed November 20, 2012.

Sandy Good, pro se.

Horace Crump, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

MARVEL, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner’s

Federal income tax and additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(2) and (f) and

6654(a)1 as follows:

1
Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue
(continued...)
 -2-

[*2] Additions to tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(2) Sec. 6651(f)1 Sec. 6654(a)

2002 $15,889 $3,972 $11,520 $531
2003 16,403 4,101 11,892 423
2004 64,969 16,242 47,103 1,862
2005 44,044 To be determined2 31,932 1,767
2006 12,705 To be determined2 9,211 601

1
Alternatively, respondent determined that petitioner is liable for additions to
tax under sec. 6651(a)(1) if we conclude that he is not liable for the additions to tax
under sec. 6651(f).
2
The sec. 6651(a)(2) addition to tax is 0.5% of the amount of tax shown on
the return, with an additional 0.5% per month during which the failure to pay
continues, up to a maximum of 25%. In the notice of deficiency respondent did not
calculate the amounts of the sec. 6651(a)(2) additions to tax for 2005-06 because
the period necessary to support the assertion of the maximum penalty amount under
sec. 6651(a)(2) had not yet been attained.

The issues for decision are: (1) whether and if so to what extent petitioner had

unreported income for the years in issue; (2) whether petitioner is liable for self-

employment tax under section 1401 for the years in issue; (3) whether petitioner

was required to file Federal income tax returns for the years in issue; (4) whether

petitioner is liable for additions to tax under section 6651(f) for fraudulent failure to

file Federal income tax returns for the years in issue; (5) whether petitioner is liable

for additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(2) and 6654(a) for the years in

1
(...continued)
Code (Code) in effect for the years in issue, and Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Some monetary amounts have been rounded
to the nearest dollar.
 -3-

[*3] issue; and (6) whether we should impose a penalty under section 6673(a)(1).

Because petitioner maintains that as a minister of God he had no income, we will

first address whether petitioner operated a church and whether he was a minister.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been deemed established for purposes of this case in

accordance with Rule 91(f).2 The deemed facts are incorporated herein by this

reference. Petitioner resided in Alabama when he filed his petition.

2
On March 4, 2011, respondent filed a motion to show cause why proposed
facts and evidence should not be accepted as established under Rule 91(f) and
attached a proposed stipulation of facts. By order dated March 8, 2011, this Court
ordered that petitioner file a response to respondent’s motion in accordance with
Rule 91(f)(2) on or before March 28, 2011. Petitioner failed to file a response to
respondent’s motion that complied with Rule 91(f)(2). By order dated April 7,
2011, this Court made the order to show cause under Rule 91(f) absolute and
deemed established the facts and evidence set forth in respondent’s proposed
stipulation of facts. On April 12, 2011, petitioner electronically submitted a
document titled “Response to Respondent’s Stipulation of Facts”. By order dated
April 13, 2011, this Court granted petitioner leave to file the response out of time
because petitioner had attempted to respond timely. By that same order, this Court
vacated its order of April 7, 2011 and ordered the Clerk of the Court to file
petitioner’s “Response to Respondent’s Stipulation of Facts” as petitioner’s
response to the Court’s March 8, 2011, order to show cause. By order dated April
26, 2011, this Court made the order to show cause under Rule 91(f) absolute and
deemed established the facts and evidence set forth in respondent’s proposed
stipulation of facts.
 -4-

[*4] I. Background

After serving in the U.S. Air Force in Germany and receiving an honorable

discharge in 1976, petitioner attended school and worked at various jobs until 1993,

when he and his wife, Kathi Good, moved to Florida.

Sometime after moving to Florida, petitioner and Mrs. Good built a house at

32210 Bartel Street for their family. Because of the influx of people moving into the

Pensacola area, petitioner and Mrs. Good decided to build a second house at 32188

Bartel Street. Petitioner and Mrs. Good subsequently moved into the house at

32188 Bartel Street. On a date not apparent from the record, petitioner and Mrs.

Good also acquired property at 13450 County Road 91. Petitioner initially titled all

three properties in his name.

II. Prepare the Way Ministries

A. Background

In 1999 petitioner founded Prepare the Way Ministries. He did not consult

with a certified public accountant about the tax aspects of operating through

Prepare the Way Ministries. Petitioner, however, performed some research
 -5-

[*5] regarding Federal taxation and also read a book by Joseph N. Sweet3 regarding

ministries and taxation.

In 1999 petitioner also established Treasures in a Field Investments,4 an

unincorporated business trust organization (UBTO). He used Treasures in a Field

Investments to conduct transactions and to make conveyances. Petitioner, acting

through Treasures in a Field Investments, received and deposited funds into various

trust accounts and used funds from trust accounts to pay his business and personal

living expenses.

3
Mr. Sweet has been permanently enjoined from “[o]rganizing, promoting,
marketing, or selling the tax shelter, plan, or arrangement entitled ‘GOOD NEWS
for FORM 1040 Filers” and from “[o]rganizing, promoting, marketing, or selling
‘Unincorporated Business Trust Organizations’ (a/k/a ‘UBTOs’) or any other
abusive tax shelter, plan, or arrangement that incites taxpayers to attempt to violate
the internal revenue laws”. United States v. Sweet, 89 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2002-
2189 (M.D. Fla. 2002). Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, we take judicial notice of
the District Court’s order with respect to Mr. Sweet.
4
David Marvin Swanson d.b.a. Dynamic Monetary Strategies, created the
Treasures in a Field Investments trust organization for petitioner. On November 15,
2006, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division,
permanently enjoined Mr. Swanson from, among other things, “[s]elling or
organizing any type of trust, limited liability company, or similar arrangement, as
part of which Swanson advocates for the noncompliance of the income tax laws or
tax evasion, misrepresents the tax savings realized by using the arrangement, or
conceals the receipt of income”.
 -6-

[*6] B. Property Transactions

In 1999 petitioner and Mrs. Good transferred the properties at 32210 Bartel

Street, 32188 Bartel Street, and 13450 County Road 91 to Treasures in a Field

Investments.5 In 2002 Treasures in a Field Investments granted to petitioner and his

family an unrecorded life estate with respect to the property at 13450 County Road

91. In 2003 Treasures in a Field Investments sold the property at 32210 Bartel

Street.6 In 2004 Treasures in a Field Investments sold the property at 32188 Bartel

Street to Samuel J. Fitts and Iris K. Fitts for $120,000.

On a date not apparent from the record, petitioner and Mrs. Good began

building a house at the 13450 County Road 91 property. After the sale of the

property at 32188 Bartel Street in 2004, they lived in the partially constructed

5
With respect to at least one of the properties, petitioner effectively
transferred the property on February 2, 1999. However, neither petitioner nor any
witness signed the instrument of transfer until September 13, 2000.
6
Mrs. Good testified that the children of Samuel J. Fitts and Iris K. Fitts
purchased the 32210 Bartel Street property. The record contains a certificate of
trust executed on June 9, 2003, by Shawn Dornstadter, petitioner’s son-in-law. The
accompanying papers show that Treasures in a Field Investments transferred real
property to Michael J. Fitts and Doxie H. Fitts. We infer from the record that
Michael J. Fitts and Doxie H. Fitts purchased the 32210 Bartel Street property. The
record does not disclose the amount of the selling price with respect to the sale.
 -7-

[*7] house at 13450 County Road 91 while they continued its construction.7

Petitioner and Mrs. Good used the proceeds from the sale of the property at 32188

Bartel Street to fund construction of the house at 13450 County Road 91.

C. Development of the Ministerial Trust

Until 2004 petitioner operated Prepare the Way Ministries through the

Treasures in a Field Investments UBTO. In 2004 using a plan promoted by Glen

Stoll, petitioner reorganized his alleged ministry into a ministerial trust.8 Mr. Stoll

has since been enjoined from engaging in such promotions.9 To accomplish the

reorganization, a resolution was prepared purportedly to show that the board of

7
In 2004 Hurricane Ivan struck the house at 13450 County Road 91.
Petitioner and Mrs. Good continued to live in a portion of the house while repairing
the remainder using the insurance proceeds they received. Although Mrs. Good
testified that she and petitioner deposited the insurance proceeds into one of the
ministry bank accounts, petitioner did not identify any deposits as deposits of
insurance proceeds and the Court could not identify any such deposits from
information in the record.
8
During the years in issue petitioner engaged in business transactions with
Mr. Stoll. In 2008 Mr. Stoll, acting as trustee of the Work of His Hands Industries,
an unincorporated ministerial trust, conveyed two parcels of land, previously owned
by petitioner and Mrs. Good and conveyed to Treasures in a Field Investments, to
Andy and Renee Knott.
9
The parties stipulated that Mr. Stoll had been enjoined from engaging in the
promotion of ministerial trusts as a tax planning strategy. Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.
201, we take judicial notice of the injunction proceeding. United States v. Stoll,
2005 WL 1763617 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
 -8-

[*8] trustees of Treasures in a Field Investments took action to terminate the

operation of Treasures in a Field Investments as a UBTO, reorganize the entity as a

“Church Ministry Trust”, and change the entity name to Treasures in a Field. The

resolution, which the board allegedly adopted, provided that the reorganized

Treasures in a Field would be consistent with section 508(c)(1)(A) and section

501(c)(3).

During the years in issue petitioner held out Prepare the Way Ministries as a

section 501(c)(3) organization. In 2004 Mrs. Good executed a document allegedly

certifying that Prepare the Way Ministries had a “non-taxable status”. However,

Treasures in a Field failed to submit a Form 1023, Application for Recognition of

Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Instead,

petitioner, on behalf of Prepare the Way Ministries, prepared a Form W-8BEN,

Certificate of Foreign Status of Beneficial Owner for United States Tax

Withholding.10 Petitioner materially altered the Form W-8BEN by adding an

additional box labeled “church” under the portion of the form requesting

identification of the type of beneficial owner. Petitioner used this Form W-8BEN

10
Jason Evans, acting as “steward” for Prepare the Way Ministries, executed
the Form W-8BEN.
 -9-

[*9] to hold Prepare the Way Ministries out as a tax-exempt entity for transactions

requiring third-party reporting.

D. Bank Accounts

From December 31, 2001, through December 29, 2006, petitioner maintained

an account ending in 9269 (account 9269) in the name of Prepare the Way

Ministries at Regions Bank. The signature card for account 9269 showed petitioner,

Mrs. Good, Shane M. Good, Julie A. Good, Mr. Dornstadter, and Summer C.

Dornstadter, petitioner’s daughter, as authorized signatories.11 The employer

identification number (EIN) petitioner gave to Regions Bank was 929099107 and

was false. Petitioner used this false EIN to satisfy Region’s Bank requirement for

establishing an account.

From April 29, 2003, through December 29, 2006, petitioner maintained an

account ending in 2952 (account 2952) in the name of Treasures in a Field

Investments at AmSouth Bank.12 Only petitioner and Mrs. Good were authorized

11
The record does not identify the relationships among petitioner, Shane M.
Good, and Julie A. Good, but we infer from the record as a whole that Shane M.
Good and Julia A. Good are members of petitioner’s family.
12
From April 29, 2003, through July 31, 2004, account 2952 was held under
the name Treasures in a Field Investments. Beginning in approximately August
2004 account 2952 was held under the name Prepare the Way Ministries d.b.a.
Treasures in a Field Investments.
 - 10 -

[*10] signatories for account 2952. No EIN was provided to AmSouth Bank. We

refer to account 9269 and account 2952 collectively as the ministry bank accounts.13

III. Petitioner’s Activities and Finances During the Years in Issue

During the years in issue petitioner went on numerous trips, including trips

to Europe, which he testified at trial were missionary trips.14 Petitioner admitted

during his testimony that he also performed carpentry and landscaping work and

trained horses and that he rented space in the 32210 and 32188 Bartel Street

properties to families involved in his purported ministry.

Petitioner did not maintain a personal bank account separate from the

ministry bank accounts, and he made no distinction between his personal finances

and the finances of his alleged ministry. Petitioner deposited funds from his

activities, including income he received for performing various services, into the

ministry bank accounts, over which he had total dominion and control. The

alleged ministry paid petitioner’s living expenses, including room and board, as

13
By collectively referring to the accounts as ministry bank accounts, we are
not concluding that petitioner operated an entity that qualified as a church under the
Code. We refer to the accounts as ministry bank accounts simply for convenience.
14
He also testified that he conducted church meetings and other events at his
home.
 - 11 -

[*11] well as petitioner’s tax bills on the property at 13450 County Road 91.

Petitioner and Mrs. Good used a check card tied to account 2952 at restaurants,

grocery stores, a veterinarian’s office, home improvement stores, gas stations,

clothing stores, Wal-Mart, and Amazon.com. During 2002-04 petitioner and Mrs.

Good used funds in account 9269 to pay their mortgage and their cellular telephone

bills. Petitioner and Mrs. Good also used funds in the ministry bank accounts to pay

their American Express credit card bills.

IV. Petitioner’s Tax Reporting and the Notices of Deficiency

Petitioner failed to file Federal income tax returns for 2002-06. Accordingly,

respondent prepared substitutes for returns (SFRs) for petitioner for 2002-06

pursuant to section 6020(b). Respondent subsequently mailed to petitioner Letters

950 (so-called 30-day letters) with attached documents, including the SFRs, relating

to 2002-06.

During respondent’s examination for petitioner, respondent’s revenue agent

reconstructed petitioner’s income by analyzing deposits into the ministry bank

accounts. The revenue agent determined that petitioner made total deposits as

follows:
 - 12 -

[*12] Year Account 9269 Account 2952 Total

2002 $37,939 -0- $37,939
2003 17,256 $37,913 55,169
2004 62,971 59,477 122,448
2005 61,631 87,356 148,987
2006 21,091 30,824 51,915

The revenue agent determined that petitioner made taxable deposits as follows:15

Year Account 9269 Account 2952 Total

2002 $37,643 -0- $37,643
2003 16,428 $36,113 52,541
2004 58,183 59,013 117,196
2005 61,631 65,058 126,689
2006 21,091 27,767 48,858

15
With respect to account 2952, the revenue agent tabulated the total deposits,
eliminated nontaxable deposits, allocated taxable deposits between gross receipts
from petitioner’s Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business, and rental income
from Schedules E, Supplemental Income or Loss, and tabulated the results for each
year. With respect to account 9269, the record contains a copy of the revenue
agent’s spreadsheet showing the individual line items for the account. Although the
revenue agent identified certain deposits as nontaxable deposits, Schedule C gross
receipts, and Schedule E rental income, respondent’s revenue agent failed to
tabulate the results. Accordingly, for 2002-04 we have calculated petitioner’s total
taxable deposits with respect to account 9269 by eliminating from petitioner’s total
deposits those deposits the revenue agent identified as nontaxable. For 2005-06,
however, respondent’s agent did not eliminate any deposits from account 2969 as
nontaxable deposits.
 - 13 -

[*13] The revenue agent treated the taxable deposits as income and allocated the

income between petitioner’s Schedules C and Schedules E as follows:16

Schedule C:
Year Account 9269 Account 2952 Total

2002 $24,659 -0- $24,659
2003 12,803 $34,898 47,701
2004 57,880 58,513 116,393
2005 61,631 65,058 126,689
2006 21,091 27,767 48,858

Schedule E:
Year Account 9269 Account 2952 Total

2002 $12,984 -0- $12,984
2003 3,625 $1,215 4,840
2004 303 500 803

On March 18, 2010, respondent mailed to petitioner notices of deficiency for

the years in issue. Respondent determined that petitioner had unreported income as

follows:17

16
Respondent’s revenue agent did not tabulate the total amount of Schedule C
gross receipts for 2002-06 with respect to account 9269. On the basis of the
spreadsheets, we find that the revenue agent determined that petitioner had
unreported Schedule C gross receipts equal to the total amount of taxable deposits
in account 9269 minus the Schedule E rental income with respect to that account for
each year.
17
The amounts of unreported income as finally determined in the notices of
deficiency do not match in all respects the reconstruction of income prepared by the
revenue agent.
 - 14 -

[*14] Year Schedule E Schedule C Total

2002 $12,984 $44,260 $57,244
2003 4,840 54,405 59,245
2004 803 83,440 84,243
2005 -0- 132,990 132,990
2006 -0- 48,859 48,859

Respondent also determined that petitioner had self-employment income of $44,260,

$54,405, $83,440, $132,990, and $48,859, for 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006,

respectively, and that petitioner had a short-term capital gain of $114,667 for

2004.18

V. Petitioner’s Tax Court Proceedings

After receiving the notices of deficiency, petitioner filed a petition with this

Court contesting respondent’s determinations. The Court set this case for trial at the

Mobile, Alabama, trial session.

Following trial we held the record open to allow petitioner the opportunity to

produce to respondent additional evidence, which, if appropriate, could then be

18
The short-term capital gain of $114,667 was attributable to the sale of the
32188 Bartel Street property to Samuel J. Fitts and Iris K. Fitts. On March 22,
2004, Prepare the Way Ministries agreed to sell the 32188 Bartel Street property to
Samuel J. Fitts and Iris K. Fitts for $120,000. Respondent determined that
petitioner incurred fees of $5,323 and had “cost[s]” of $10 with respect to the sale.
Respondent also determined that petitioner had a basis of zero in the property.
Accordingly, respondent determined that petitioner realized gain of $114,667 from
sale of the property.
 - 15 -

[*15] stipulated and submitted as part of the trial record. The parties did not submit

a supplemental stipulation.19 Consequently, we decide this case on the trial record.

OPINION

I. Presumption of Correctness and Burden of Proof
With Respect to Tax Deficiencies

A. Presumption of Correctness

The Commissioner’s deficiency determination ordinarily is entitled to a

presumption of correctness. See Bone v. Commissioner, 324 F.3d 1289, 1293

(11th Cir. 2003), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2001-43. However, when a case involves

unreported income, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, to which an

appeal in this case would lie absent a stipulation to the contrary, see sec.

7482(b)(1)(A), (2), has held that the Commissioner’s determination of unreported

income is entitled to a presumption of correctness only if the determination is

supported by an evidentiary foundation linking the taxpayer to an income-producing

activity, see Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1549 (11th Cir. 1993),

aff’g T.C. Memo. 1991-636. A determination that is unsupported by any

evidence is arbitrary and erroneous, see Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d

19
On July 21, 2011, petitioner filed a document, with attached exhibits, titled
“Petitioner’s Status Report”.
 - 16 -

[*16] 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1979), rev’g 67 T.C. 672 (1977), but the required showing

is minimal, see Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d at 1549 (citing Carson v. United

States, 560 F.2d 693, 697 (5th Cir. 1977)). Once the Commissioner produces

evidence linking the taxpayer to an income-producing activity, the presumption of

correctness applies and the burden of production shifts to the taxpayer to rebut that

presumption by establishing that the Commissioner’s determination is arbitrary or

erroneous. Id.

Respondent introduced evidence that petitioner directed the operations and

financial affairs of Prepare the Way Ministries, Treasures in a Field Investments,

and Treasures in a Field during the years in issue. Respondent also introduced

evidence that, in addition to his alleged ministry work, petitioner engaged in other

secular work in exchange for payment and deposited proceeds from all his activities

into ministry bank accounts. See Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986)

(holding that bank deposits evidence receipt of income). Respondent introduced

evidence that petitioner, acting through Prepare the Way Ministries and Treasures in

a Field Investments, sold the 32188 Bartel Street property. Accordingly, we

conclude that respondent laid the requisite minimal evidentiary foundation for the

contested unreported income adjustments and that respondent’s determinations are

entitled to a presumption of correctness.
 - 17 -

[*17] Although his argument is not entirely clear, petitioner appears to contend that

respondent’s determinations are not entitled to the presumption of correctness

because respondent acted arbitrarily in issuing the notices of deficiency. Petitioner

contends that respondent’s determinations constitute a “naked” assessment because

respondent has failed to link petitioner’s receipt of income to an income-generating

activity.

The presumption of correctness does not apply when the Commissioner fails

to make a determination and issues a “‘naked’ assessment without any foundation

whatsoever”. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 441 (1976). As we stated

above, however, respondent has introduced substantive evidence to establish that

petitioner, acting through Prepare the Way Ministries, Treasures in a Field

Investments, and Treasures in a Field, received payments, made deposits into

various ministry bank accounts, engaged in income-producing activities during the

years in issue, and sold real property in 2004. That evidence is more than sufficient

to support respondent’s determinations in the notices of deficiency. Accordingly,

we find that the notices of deficiency are not “naked assessments”.

B. Burden of Proof

Generally, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the Commissioner’s

determinations in a notice of deficiency are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v.
 - 18 -

[*18] Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). If, however, a taxpayer produces

credible evidence20 with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the

taxpayer’s tax liability and satisfies the requirements of section 7491(a)(2), the

burden of proof on any such issue shifts to the Commissioner. Sec. 7491(a)(1).

Section 7491(a)(2) requires a taxpayer to demonstrate that he or she complied with

the substantiation requirements, maintained all records required under the Code, and

cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary21 for witnesses, information,

documents, meetings, and interviews. See also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C.

438, 440-441 (2001). The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that all of the

section 7491(a) requirements have been satisfied. Rolfs v. Commissioner, 135 T.C.

471, 483 (2010), aff’d, 668 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012).

Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a)(1) applies, and the record

establishes that he did not satisfy the section 7491(a)(2) requirements.

20
Credible evidence is evidence the Court would find sufficient upon which to
base a decision on the issue in the taxpayer’s favor, absent any contrary evidence.
See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001).
21
The term “Secretary” means “the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate”,
sec. 7701(a)(11)(B), and the term “or his delegate” means “any officer, employee,
or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized by the Secretary of the
Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority, to perform
the function mentioned or described in the context”, sec. 7701(a)(12)(A)(i).
 - 19 -

[*19] Consequently, petitioner bears the burden of proof as to any disputed factual

issue. See Rule 142(a).

II. Parties’ Arguments

Respondent contends that petitioner, a “carpenter”, received taxable income

and deposited that income into the ministry bank accounts. Respondent contends

that petitioner is liable for all taxable income deposited into the ministry bank

accounts because petitioner exercised dominion and control over those accounts.

Respondent also contends that petitioner is liable for self-employment tax with

respect to his unreported income. Relying on the determination of unreported

income, respondent further contends that petitioner had sufficient gross income to

require him to file Federal tax returns for the years in issue and that he failed to file

such returns. Respondent also contends that petitioner is liable for a civil penalty

for fraudulently failing to file his tax returns and additions to tax for failing to pay

his Federal income tax and estimated tax for the years in issue.

Petitioner contends that he did not receive any taxable income during the

years in issue. Petitioner contends that he was a man of God engaged in the work

of God during the years in issue and that everything he received or acquired

belonged to God. He further contends that he is exempt from Federal taxation

because his activities during the years in issue were religious. He contends that
 - 20 -

[*20] any assets he acquired were for the purpose of his ministry and any

disposition of those assets should not be taxed to him. Petitioner also contends that

he had no obligation to file Federal tax returns because he did not have sufficient

income to require him to file such returns.

We construe petitioner’s argument, at least in part, to be that he was a

minister entitled to exclude all income and gain he received and that he was entitled

to all benefits under the Code that generally accrue to ministers and church

organizations. Accordingly, we will consider: (1) whether petitioner’s alleged

ministry constituted a church, as that term is defined for Federal tax purposes; and

(2) whether petitioner was a minister of the gospel, as that term is defined for

Federal tax purposes.22

A. Whether Petitioner’s Alleged Ministry Constituted a Church

Section 501(a) provides that certain organizations, including churches, shall

be exempt from Federal taxation. See also sec. 501(c)(3). A church that qualifies

as an exempt organization for purposes of section 501 is not required to file an

application for exemption from taxation. Sec. 508(c)(1)(A); see also sec. 1.508-

1(a)(3)(i)(a), Income Tax Regs. Neither the Code nor the regulations define the

term “church”. See Found. of Human Understanding v. Commissioner, 88 T.C.

22
Neither party specifically addressed these issues in their post-trial briefs.
 - 21 -

[*21] 1341, 1356 (1987). However, as we have stated: “Although every church

may be a religious organization, not every religious organization is a church.” Id. at

1357.

Whether an entity is a church is a fact-specific inquiry. See id. In deciding

whether an entity is a church, this Court primarily considers the entity’s religious

purposes and “the means by which its religious purposes are accomplished.” Id.

“‘At a minimum, a church includes a body of believers or communicants that

assembles regularly in order to worship.’” Id. (quoting Am. Guidance Found., Inc.

v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 304, 306 (D.D.C. 1980)).

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has articulated criteria that it uses to

identify organizations that qualify for church status. Id. at 1358. The criteria

include the following:

“(1) a distinct legal existence;

(2) a recognized creed and form of worship;

(3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government;

(4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline;

(5) a distinct religious history;

(6) a membership not associated with any other church or
denomination;
 - 22 -

[*22] (7) an organization of ordained ministers;

(8) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies;

(9) a literature of its own;

(10) established places of worship;

(11) regular congregations;

(12) regular religious services;

(13) Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young; and

(14) schools for the preparation of its ministers.”

Id. (quoting Internal Revenue Manual 7(10)69, Exempt Organizations Examination

Guidelines Handbook 321.3(3) (Apr. 5, 1982)); see also Chambers v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-114, slip op. at 14-15. While we have declined to

adopt these criteria as a test, we have found that the criteria are helpful in deciding

whether an entity is a church. See Found. of Human Understanding v.

Commissioner, 88 T.C. at 1358.

Although Mrs. Good testified that petitioner held ministry meetings at his

home, the record contains no evidence regarding the identities of those who

attended the meetings and their relationship to petitioner or whether petitioner

held these meetings regularly. Petitioner offered only minimal testimony

regarding his purported ministry activities. He did not call any of his alleged
 - 23 -

[*23] parishioners to testify. Furthermore, the record shows that petitioner’s

purported ministry did not have a distinct legal existence separate from petitioner.

See, e.g., Hughes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-139. Petitioner failed to

introduce any credible evidence to support a finding that his purported ministry

activity satisfied any of the other criteria outlined above.

Petitioner had the burden of proving that his purported ministry activity

qualified as a church, and he failed to do so.23 See, e.g., Spiritual Outreach Soc’y v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-41, aff’d, 927 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1991).

B. Whether Petitioner Was a Minister of the Gospel

Generally, compensation for services rendered is includable in gross income.

See sec. 61(a)(1). However, section 107 provides that a minister of the gospel may

exclude from gross income a rental value or rental allowance provided to him as part

of his compensation. See also sec. 1.107-1, Income Tax Regs. A minister is an

individual “authorized to administer the sacraments, preach, and conduct services of

worship.” Salkov v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 190, 194 (1966). An individual is a

23
Even if we held that petitioner’s alleged ministry constituted a church under
sec. 501, petitioner would still have to include in income funds deposited into the
ministry bank accounts because he exercised full control over those accounts and
used the funds to pay his personal expenses. See, e.g., Chambers v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2011-114, slip op. at 23-24.
 - 24 -

[*24] minister if, acting pursuant to his or her authority as a minister, he or she

performs sacerdotal functions, conducts religious worship, participates in the

maintenance of “religious organizations and their integral agencies”, and performs

“teaching and administrative duties at theological seminars.” Sec. 1.107-1(a),

Income Tax Regs.; see also Brannon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-370.

While petitioner testified as to his religious education and experience, his

testimony alone is insufficient to convince us that he was a minister within the

meaning of section 107. Petitioner failed to introduce any credible evidence to

show that he was a minister or that he performed sacerdotal functions, participated

in the conduct or control of religious boards, societies, or other agencies related to

his religious affiliation, or performed any teaching or administrative duties at

religiously affiliated institutions. Accordingly, we find that petitioner has not

established that he was a minister for Federal tax purposes. See, e.g., Weeks v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-198.

III. Petitioner’s Unreported Income for the Years in issue

A. Bank Deposits

1. In General

Gross income includes “all income from whatever source derived”. Sec.

61(a). A taxpayer must maintain books and records establishing the amount of his
 - 25 -

[*25] or her gross income. Sec. 6001. If a taxpayer fails to maintain and produce

the required books and records, the Commissioner may determine the taxpayer’s

income by any method that clearly reflects income. See sec. 446(b); Petzoldt v.

Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 693 (1989); sec. 1.446-1(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. The

Commissioner’s reconstruction of income “need only be reasonable in light of all

surrounding facts and circumstances.” Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. at 687.

The bank deposits method is a permissible method of reconstructing income.

See Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 645 (1994); see also Langille v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-49, aff’d, 447 Fed. Appx. 130 (11th Cir. 2011).

Bank deposits constitute prima facie evidence of income. See Tokarski v.

Commissioner, 87 T.C. at 77. The Commissioner need not show the likely source

of a deposit treated as income, but the Commissioner “must take into account any

nontaxable source or deductible expense of which * * * [he] has knowledge” in

reconstructing income using the bank deposits method. See Clayton v.

Commissioner, 102 T.C. at 645-646. However, the Commissioner need not follow

any “leads” suggesting that a taxpayer has deductible expenses. DiLeo v.

Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 872 (1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992).
 - 26 -

[*26] After the Commissioner reconstructs a taxpayer’s income and determines a

deficiency, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the Commissioner’s use of

the bank deposits method is unfair or inaccurate. See Clayton v. Commissioner,

102 T.C. at 645. The taxpayer must prove that the reconstruction is in error and

may do so, in whole or in part, by proving that a deposit is not taxable. See id.

Respondent introduced credible evidence that petitioner did not maintain

adequate books and records with respect to his income.24 Therefore, we find that it

was reasonable for respondent to use an indirect method, i.e., the bank deposits

method, to reconstruct petitioner’s income. Accordingly, petitioner bears the

burden of proving that respondent’s determinations are arbitrary or erroneous.

Petitioner’s sole argument is that the deposits into the ministry bank accounts do

24
Although not entirely clear, petitioner’s contention appears to be that the
IRS cannot require him to maintain or produce financial records because the IRS
may not regulate religious activities and because such records are privileged. Sec.
6001 requires that “[e]very person liable for any tax” maintain records. Petitioner
has offered no support for his contention that he personally is exempt from the
recordkeeping requirement of sec. 6001. While exempt organizations are relieved
of some recordkeeping requirements, the Commissioner never recognized Prepare
the Way Ministries as an exempt organization under sec. 501(c)(3). See Church of
Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 452 (1984), aff’d, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th
Cir. 1987). Additionally, while the IRS must comply with specific procedures set
forth in sec. 7611 before it can obtain church records, petitioner has not proven that
he operated a church or that the records sought by respondent qualified as church
records. See also Chambers v. Commissioner, slip op. at 20-21. Accordingly, we
reject petitioner’s argument.
 - 27 -

[*27] not constitute taxable income to him because the deposits are attributable to

his ministry and, as religious funds, are not subject to taxation.

2. Whether Petitioner’s Bank Deposits Constituted
Taxable Income

Section 61(a) defines gross income as “all income from whatever source

derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: (1) Compensation for

services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items; (2) Gross

income derived from business; (3) Gains derived from dealings in property; (4)

Interest; (5) Rents”. The definition is construed broadly and extends to all

accessions to wealth, clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has complete control.

See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). As the

Supreme Court explained, a gain “constitutes taxable income when its recipient has

such control over it that, as a practical matter, he derives readily realizable

economic value from it.” Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137 (1952).

When the Commissioner reconstructs a taxpayer’s income using the bank

deposits method, the Commissioner may include in gross income “deposits into all

accounts over which the taxpayer has dominion and control, not just deposits into

the taxpayer’s personal bank accounts.” Chambers v. Commissioner, slip op. at

17-18; see also United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30, 38 (3d Cir. 1964); Davis
 - 28 -

[*28] v. United States, 226 F.2d 331, 334-335 (6th Cir. 1955); Price v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-103, slip op. at 25; Cohen v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2003-42, slip op. at 9; Woods v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-611,

aff’d without published opinion, 929 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1991). A taxpayer has

dominion and control when the taxpayer is free to use the funds at will. Rutkin, 343

U.S. at 137. Use of funds for personal purposes indicates dominion and control.

Woods v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-611.

The Court has extended this general principle to situations where a taxpayer

has dominion and control over an account titled in the name of a church or other

religious organization. For example, in Woods, this Court held that “[a]mounts

deposited into bank accounts in the name of the church constituted income of

petitioners because they exercised total dominion and control over those funds and

expended them for their personal living expenses and other personal purposes”. See

also Whittington v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-296, slip op. at 8-9.

Similarly, in Chambers v. Commissioner, slip op. at 19-24, this Court held

that all deposits into church bank accounts properly were includable in the

taxpayers’ gross income because the taxpayers “fully controlled the church

accounts, used money in those accounts at will, including to pay personal

expenses, and were not accountable to anyone in their congregation for their use
 - 29 -

[*29] of the church funds.” While the taxpayers in Chambers v. Commissioner, slip

op. at 23, testified that they used the money for mission trips and ministry expenses,

this Court held that the church bank account funds were includable in the taxpayers’

gross income because they failed to supply any receipts, records, or other evidence

to substantiate the nature and use of the funds.

Petitioner testified that his primary occupation is minister of the gospel. He

further testified that he performed all of his secular work as a volunteer and that any

payment he received as a result of such work constituted a contribution to the

ministry. With respect to the purported rental income, petitioner testified that he

made living space in the Bartel Street properties available to families in his ministry,

that the families contributed to Prepare the Way Ministries in exchange for use of

the space, and that he suggested the amount of the monthly contribution.

Petitioner testified that he relied on direct donations from people and other

ministries as well as the funds in the ministry bank accounts to support himself

during the years in issue. He testified that he received no salary and instead

received only housing and food in exchange for his services. He further testified

that the money that came into the ministry was distributed to other people. He

also testified that he and Mrs. Good used the money in the ministry bank accounts
 - 30 -

[*30] to pay for ministry-related expenses. We do not find this testimony

convincing or credible.

Respondent introduced the signature cards for the ministry bank accounts

showing that only petitioner and his family members had signatory authority over

the accounts. Respondent also introduced bank statements for the ministry bank

accounts which show that petitioner and Mrs. Good regularly used the ministry bank

accounts to pay their personal expenses. Finally, petitioner testified that he

deposited payments he received for services rendered into the ministry bank

accounts and that he used the funds in the ministry bank accounts to pay his

personal expenses.

Petitioner had unfettered access to the funds in the ministry bank accounts.

He used the money in the ministry bank accounts at will, including to pay his

personal expenses and those of his family members. Petitioner did not maintain a

separate personal bank account or attempt to separate his personal income and

expenses from the income and expenses of his alleged ministry. Instead, petitioner

used the ministry bank accounts as his own bank accounts and used the funds

therein to pay his personal living expenses, mortgage, property taxes, and home

construction costs.
 - 31 -

[*31] Because petitioner exercised dominion and control over the ministry bank

accounts, all taxable deposits into those accounts are includable in petitioner’s gross

income. See Chambers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-114; see also Burke v.

Commissioner, 929 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that rental income the

taxpayer deposited into a church account constituted taxable income to the taxpayer

upon receipt), aff’g in part, vacating in part, and remanding T.C. Memo. 1989-671.

3. Reconstructing Petitioner’s Income Using the Bank
Deposits Method

Under the bank deposits method, the Commissioner may assume that all

money deposited into the taxpayer’s account is taxable income. DiLeo v.

Commissioner, 96 T.C. at 868. However, as noted supra, the Commissioner must

take into account any nontaxable source of income or deductible expense of which

he has knowledge. Id. The Commissioner’s use of the bank deposits method is not

invalidated simply because some of the calculations are in error. See id.

Having decided that respondent acted reasonably in using an indirect

method to reconstruct petitioner’s income and having rejected petitioner’s sole

argument regarding whether such income constituted taxable income, we now

review respondent’s calculations of petitioner’s taxable income for the years in
 - 32 -

[*32] issue. To show the calculation of petitioner’s taxable income, respondent

introduced only the revenue agent’s workpapers. However, with respect to 2002,

2003, and 2005, in the notice of deficiency respondent determined that petitioner

had taxable income in excess of taxable deposits for those years as determined by

the revenue agent. Respondent has introduced no evidence to show the calculation

of petitioner’s taxable income as set forth in the notice of deficiency. Accordingly,

we will evaluate respondent’s determination of petitioner’s taxable income using the

revenue agent’s workpapers for the years in issue.

With respect to 2002, respondent’s revenue agent determined that petitioner

made taxable deposits into the ministry bank account of $37,643. The revenue

agent determined that the taxable deposits for 2002 consisted of Schedule C gross

receipts of $24,659 and Schedule E rental income of $12,984. However, in the

notice of deficiency respondent determined that petitioner had Schedule C gross

receipts of $44,260 and Schedule E rental income of $12,984. Respondent has

not introduced any evidence to explain the difference between the revenue agent’s

calculation of Schedule C gross receipts totaling $24,659 and the $44,260 gross

receipts figure in the notice of deficiency. Furthermore, an analysis of the ministry

bank account statements for 2002 reveals that the revenue agent properly
 - 33 -

[*33] reconstructed petitioner’s Schedule C gross receipts for 2002. An analysis of

the revenue agent’s spreadsheet with respect to petitioner’s Schedule E rental

income shows that the revenue agent erroneously included in petitioner’s income a

number of checks that were drawn on, rather than deposited into, the ministry bank

accounts. The revenue agent erroneously included $4,844 in petitioner’s Schedule

E rental income. Accordingly, we find that petitioner had Schedule C gross receipts

of $24,659 and Schedule E rental income of $8,140 for 2002.

With respect to 2003, respondent’s revenue agent determined that petitioner

made taxable deposits into the ministry bank accounts of $52,541. The revenue

agent determined that the taxable deposits for 2003 consisted of Schedule C gross

receipts of $47,701 and Schedule E rental income of $4,840. However, in the

notice of deficiency respondent determined that petitioner had Schedule C gross

receipts of $54,405 and Schedule E rental income of $4,840. Respondent has not

introduced any evidence to explain the difference between the revenue agent’s

calculation of Schedule C gross receipts totaling $47,701 and the $54,405 gross

receipts figure in the notice of deficiency. Furthermore, an analysis of the ministry

bank account statements for 2003 reveals that the revenue agent generally

reconstructed petitioner’s Schedule C gross receipts for 2003 properly, with the
 - 34 -

[*34] following exception. We find that the revenue agent included the same check

for $10 in petitioner’s Schedule E rental income for 2002 and in his Schedule C

gross receipts for 2003. Because we consider the $10 check as Schedule E rental

income for 2002, we will eliminate $10 from the revenue agent’s calculation of

petitioner’s Schedule C gross receipts for 2003. We also find that the revenue agent

erroneously tabulated petitioner’s Schedule E rental income. The revenue agent

determined that petitioner deposited into the ministry bank accounts nine checks that

constituted Schedule E rental income. The spreadsheet shows that the revenue

agent included in his calculation of petitioner’s Schedule E rental income three

checks twice.25 We will eliminate the duplications from the calculation of

petitioner’s Schedule E rental income. Accordingly, we find that petitioner had

Schedule C gross receipts of $47,061 and Schedule E rental income of $3,140 for

2003.

25
The revenue agent’s spreadsheet shows the erroneous double inclusion of
the following checks: (1) check No. 1001 for $635; (2) check No. 274 for $215;
and (3) check No. 1016 for $850.
 - 35 -

[*35] With respect to 2004,26 respondent determined that petitioner had Schedule E

rental income of $803 for 2004. Respondent included in petitioner’s rental income a

check for $500 from Samuel J. Fitts and Iris K. Fitts. This check constituted earnest

money for the purchase of the real property at 32188 Bartel Street. Respondent

properly included the earnest money as part of the selling price of the property.

Therefore, the $500 check should be excluded from petitioner’s 2004 Schedule E

rental income. Accordingly, we find that petitioner had rental income of $303 for

2004.

With respect to 2005, respondent’s revenue agent determined that petitioner

made total taxable deposits into the ministry bank accounts of $126,689. The

26
With respect to 2004, respondent’s revenue agent determined that petitioner
had Schedule C gross receipts of $116,393. The revenue agent included in
petitioner’s income a check for $9,000 that was deposited into account 9269.
Although the bank statement for account 9269 shows that the check was returned
for insufficient funds, respondent’s revenue agent failed to exclude the $9,000 check
from petitioner’s taxable income.

Despite the revenue agent’s error, we will refrain from adjusting petitioner’s
2004 Schedule C gross receipts. Respondent determined in the notice of deficiency
that petitioner had Schedule C gross receipts of $83,440, an amount that is $32,953
lower than the figure calculated by the revenue agent. The record supports an
inference that respondent subtracted from petitioner’s totaled Schedule C deposits
amounts that constituted nontaxable income. Because the amount subtracted,
$32,953, exceeds the amount of the check at issue, we find that petitioner is not
entitled to an additional reduction in his Schedule C gross receipts for the value of
the check. Accordingly, we will sustain respondent’s determination with respect to
petitioner’s 2004 Schedule C gross receipts.
 - 36 -

[*36] revenue agent determined that the taxable deposits for 2005 consisted of

Schedule C gross receipts of $126,689. However, in the notice of deficiency

respondent determined that petitioner had Schedule C gross receipts of $132,990.

Respondent has not introduced any evidence to explain the difference between the

revenue agent’s calculation of Schedule C gross receipts totaling $126,689 and the

$132,990 gross receipts figure in the notice of deficiency. Furthermore, our analysis

of the ministry bank account statements for 2005 confirms that the revenue agent

properly reconstructed petitioner’s Schedule C gross receipts for 2005.

Accordingly, we find that petitioner had Schedule C gross receipts of $126,689 for

2005.

In summary, we find that petitioner had Schedule C gross receipts of $24,659,

$47,061, $83,440, and $126,689 for 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. We

sustain respondent’s determinations regarding petitioner’s gross receipts for 2006.

We also find that petitioner had Schedule E rental income of $8,140, $3,140, and

$303 for 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively.
 - 37 -

[*37] B. 2004 Capital Gain

A taxpayer must recognize gain from the sale or exchange of property,

unless the Code provides otherwise.27 Sec. 1001(c). Section 1001(a) defines gain

from the sale or other disposition of property as the excess of the amount realized on

the sale of property over the adjusted basis of the property sold or exchanged. See

also sec. 1.61-6(a), Income Tax Regs. Section 1011(a) generally provides that a

taxpayer’s adjusted basis for determining the gain from the sale or other disposition

of property shall be its cost, adjusted to the extent provided by section 1016. If the

taxpayer constructed his own house, the taxpayer’s basis is equal to the cost of

building the house, including the amount paid for the lot. Litterio v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1992-524, aff’d, 21 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1994); Granger v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1970-155. The taxpayer has the burden of proving

27
Sec. 121(a) allows a taxpayer to exclude from income gain on the sale or
exchange of property if the taxpayer has owned and used such property as his
principal residence for at least two of the five years immediately preceding the sale.
Petitioner sold the 32188 Bartel Street property in 2004. Mrs. Good testified that
she and petitioner lived at the 32188 Bartel Street property before the 2004 sale.
However, until 2003 petitioner owned another home, at 32210 Bartel Street. The
record does not show whether petitioner and Mrs. Good moved to the 32188 Bartel
Street property before petitioner sold the 32210 Bartel Street property (i.e., before
2003) or immediately after the sale of the property in 2003. Accordingly, we are
unable to determine whether petitioner used the 32188 Bartel Street property as his
principal residence for at least two of the five years preceding the sale of the
property in 2004. Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to exclude any
gain from the sale of the property pursuant to sec. 121(a).
 - 38 -

[*38] the basis of property for purposes of determining the amount of gain the

taxpayer must recognize. O’Neill v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 44, 50 (9th Cir.

1959), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1957-193; see also Kynell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1954-174.

The 2004 capital gain relates to the sale by Treasures in a Field Investments

of the real property at 32188 Bartel Street. Petitioner does not dispute that he

originally owned the 32188 Bartel Street property in his own name, that he

transferred the property to Treasures in a Field Investments, and that Treasures in a

Field Investments sold the property to Samuel J. Fitts and Iris K. Fitts in 2004 for

$120,000. Although not entirely clear, petitioner’s only dispute appears to be

whether the proceeds from the sale of the property constitute taxable income to him.

Petitioner testified that all of the buildings, including the house at 32188

Bartel Street, “were church buildings where church activities occurred.” Mrs. Good

testified that she and petitioner resided in the house at 32188 Bartel Street. She also

testified that the ministry sold the house. She further testified that she and petitioner

used the proceeds from the sale of the house at 32188 Bartel Street to fund

construction of their new house at 13450 County Road 91.
 - 39 -

[*39] Respondent introduced a copy of a resolution in which the Elder Board of

Prepare the Way Ministries agreed to sell the 32188 Bartel Street property to

Samuel J. Fitts and Iris K. Fitts. Respondent also introduced a copy of a purchase

agreement dated February 6, 2004, showing the seller of the property as Treasures

in a Field and the purchase price as $120,000, with a provision for $500 in earnest

money. The record shows that petitioner deposited into account 2952 a $500 check

from Samuel J. Fitts and Iris K. Fitts dated February 6, 2004.

The evidence shows that petitioner used Treasures in a Field Investments to

conduct his business and sales transactions. While petitioner testified that he

conducted some ministry activities from the house at 32188 Bartel Street, he also

used the property as his personal residence. We find that Treasures in a Field

Investments held title to and sold the 32188 Bartel Street property as petitioner’s

nominee.28 Accordingly, petitioner must include in gross income gain from the sale

of the 32188 Bartel Street property.

28
“A nominee is an entity or individual who holds bare legal title to assets
owned by another entity or individual.” Lain v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-
99, slip op. at 13; see also Oxford Capital Corp. v. United States, 211 F.3d 280, 284
(5th Cir. 2000).
 - 40 -

[*40] In calculating the gain on the sale of the 32188 Bartel Street property,

respondent used the stated sale price of $120,000 and an adjusted basis of zero.

Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence regarding his acquisition and construction

costs, if any, for the 32188 Bartel Street property. While it is likely that petitioner

incurred costs in acquiring the lot and building the house on the 32188 Bartel Street

property, petitioner did not introduce any credible evidence regarding his cost basis

or adjusted basis in the property. The record adequately supports respondent’s

determination that Treasures in a Field Investments, acting as nominee for

petitioner, sold the property to Samuel J. Fitts and Iris K. Fitts for $120,000.

Neither petitioner nor respondent addressed the issue of whether petitioner’s

gain should be characterized as long-term or short-term capital gain. In the notice of

deficiency respondent characterized petitioner’s capital gain as short term.

However, the record contains sufficient evidence for us to decide whether the gain

should be characterized as long-term or short-term gain; accordingly, we consider

this issue tried by consent of the parties. See Rule 41(b).

Section 1222(3) provides that long-term capital gain is “gain from the sale or

exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year, if and to the extent such
 - 41 -

[*41] gain is taken into account in computing gross income.” While the record does

not show when petitioner acquired the 32188 Bartel Street property, the record does

show that in 1999 petitioner transferred the 32188 Bartel Street property to

Treasures in a Field Investments. We infer that petitioner owned the 32188 Bartel

Street property at the time of the 1999 transfer. Accordingly, we find that

petitioner’s gain from the sale of the 32188 Bartel Street property should be

characterized as long-term capital gain.

We sustain respondent’s determination as to the amount of petitioner’s 2004

capital gain, but we do not sustain respondent’s determination that the capital gain

was short-term gain.

IV. Self-Employment Tax

A taxpayer’s self-employment income is subject to self-employment tax. Sec.

1401(a) and (b). Self-employment tax is assessed and collected as part of the

income tax, must be included in computing any income tax deficiency or

overpayment for the applicable tax period, and must be taken into account for

estimated tax purposes. Sec. 1401; see also sec. 1.1401-1(a), Income Tax Regs.

Self-employment income is generally defined as “the net earnings from self-

employment derived by an individual”. Sec. 1402(b). “The term ‘net earnings
 - 42 -

[*42] from self-employment’ means the gross income derived by an individual from

any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions * * *

attributable to such trade or business”. Sec. 1402(a). Section 1402(c)(4) provides

that the term “trade or business” does not include “the performance of service by a

duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his

ministry” if an exemption under section 1402(e) is effective for the minister. See

also Wingo v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 922, 929 (1987). If the minister does not file

the application for exemption within the prescribed time, the minister is subject to

self-employment tax. Sec. 1402(e); see also Wingo v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. at

929-930.

Petitioner contends that he is not liable for self-employment tax because he is

a minister. Petitioner, however, did not introduce any credible evidence to prove

that he was a minister of a church, see supra p. 24, or that the Schedule C gross

receipts determined by respondent were for the performance of services as a

minister. Moreover, the record contains no credible evidence that petitioner

submitted a Form 4361, Application for Exemption From Self-Employment Tax for

Use by Ministers, Members of Religious Orders and Christian Science

Practitioners, for the years in issue that was approved by the IRS. Accordingly,
 - 43 -

[*43] petitioner has failed to prove that he was exempt from self-employment tax

during the years in issue.

We find that petitioner had self-employment income equal to the amounts of

his Schedule C gross receipts for 2002-05 as found in this opinion, and we hold that

petitioner is liable for self-employment tax with respect to these amounts. We

sustain respondent’s determination of self-employment tax for 2006.

V. Obligation To File a Return

Petitioner contends that he was not obligated to file returns for the years in

issue because he did not have sufficient income. See sec. 6012(a)(1)(A)(iv). Under

section 6012(a)(1)(A)(iv), an individual who is entitled to make a joint return and

whose gross income, when combined with the gross income of his spouse, exceeds

the sum of twice the exemption amount and the standard deduction applicable to a

joint return, must file a Federal income tax return. As discussed in Part III, see

supra pp. 32-36, we find that petitioner had unreported income of $32,799, $50,201,

$83,743, $126,689, and $48,859, for 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006,

respectively. Petitioner’s income for the years in issue exceeded the described

threshold and, consequently, petitioner had an obligation to file Federal income tax

returns for those years.
 - 44 -

[*44] VI. Fraudulent Failure To File Returns

Section 6651(f) imposes an addition to tax of up to 75% of the amount of

tax required to be shown on the return in the case of a taxpayer’s fraudulent failure

to file a tax return. To prove that a taxpayer is liable for the penalty, the

Commissioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) an

underpayment of tax exists, and (2) some part of the underpayment is due to fraud.

Sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b); Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. at 646. If the

Commissioner proves that any part of an underpayment is attributable to fraud,

then the entire underpayment shall be treated as attributable to fraud unless the

taxpayer shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a part was not so

attributable. See, e.g., sec. 6663(b).

A. Underpayment of Tax

The Commissioner cannot rely upon the taxpayer’s failure to meet the

burden of proof on the issue of the existence of a deficiency to sustain the burden

of proving the existence of an underpayment by clear and convincing evidence.

See Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 660-661 (1990); Otsuki v.

Commissioner, 53 T.C. 96, 106 (1969). However, the Commissioner need only

show that there is some underpayment for each of the years in issue. See

Langworthy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-218. Furthermore, when
 - 45 -

[*45] allegations of fraud are intertwined with unreported and indirectly

reconstructed income, the Commissioner may prove the existence of an

underpayment by proving a likely source of income or disproving nontaxable

sources alleged by the taxpayer. See Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. at 661.

As noted supra pp. 36, 41 petitioner failed to report income of $32,799, $50,201,

$83,743, $126,689, and $48,859 for 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006,

respectively, and failed to report a capital gain of $114,667 for 2004. In proving the

existence of petitioner’s underpayments, respondent does not rely solely on

petitioner’s failure to meet his burden of proof. Respondent appropriately

reconstructed petitioner’s taxable income using the bank deposits method, and the

reconstruction demonstrates clearly and convincingly that petitioner had an

underpayment of tax for each of the years in issue. Furthermore, respondent has

proven a likely source of petitioner’s unreported income, namely, petitioner’s

construction, carpentry, and rental activities. Accordingly, respondent has proven

by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner underpaid his Federal income tax

for each of the years in issue.

B. Fraudulent Intent

1. Introduction

If fraud is determined for multiple taxable years, the Commissioner’s

burden “applies separately for each of the years.” Temple v. Commissioner, T.C.
 - 46 -

[*46] Memo. 2000-337, slip op. at 24-25, aff’d, 62 Fed. Appx. 605 (6th Cir. 2003).

The Commissioner satisfies this burden by showing that “the taxpayer intended to

evade taxes known to be owing by conduct intended to conceal, mislead or

otherwise prevent the collection of taxes.” DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. at 874.

Fraud “does not include negligence, carelessness, misunderstanding or unintentional

understatement of income.” United States v. Pechenik, 236 F.2d 844, 846 (3d Cir.

1956).

The existence of fraud is a question of fact to be resolved upon

consideration of the entire record. See DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. at 874.

Fraud is never presumed and must be established by independent evidence of

fraudulent intent. See Baumgardner v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 311, 322 (9th Cir.

1957), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1956-112. Fraud may be shown by circumstantial

evidence because direct evidence of the taxpayer’s fraudulent intent is seldom

available. See Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. at 699; Gajewski v.

Commissioner, 67 T.C. 181, 199-200 (1976), aff’d without published opinion, 578

F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1978). The taxpayer’s entire course of conduct may establish

the requisite fraudulent intent. See Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213, 223-224

(1971). Any conduct likely to mislead or conceal may constitute an affirmative act

of evasion, see Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943), and an intent to
 - 47 -

[*47] mislead may be inferred from a pattern of such conduct, see Webb v.

Commissioner, 394 F.2d 366, 379 (5th Cir. 1968), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1966-81.

However, fraud is not proven when a court is left with only a suspicion of fraud, and

even a strong suspicion is not sufficient to establish a taxpayer’s liability for the

fraud penalty. See Olinger v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 823, 824 (5th Cir. 1956),

aff’g in part, rev’g in part on another ground T.C. Memo. 1955-9; Davis v.

Commissioner, 184 F.2d 86, 87 (10th Cir. 1950); Green v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.

538, 550 (1976).

2. Badges of Fraud

Because it is difficult to prove fraudulent intent by direct evidence, the

Commissioner may establish fraud by circumstantial evidence, which includes

various “badges of fraud” (hereinafter, factors) on which the courts often rely. See

Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir. 1986), aff’g T.C. Memo.

1984-601; DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. at 875. These factors focus on

whether the taxpayer engaged in certain conduct that is indicative of fraudulent

intent, such as: (1) understating income; (2) failing to maintain adequate records;

(3) offering implausible or inconsistent explanations; (4) concealing income or

assets; (5) failing to cooperate with tax authorities; (6) engaging in illegal

activities; (7) providing incomplete or misleading information to the taxpayer’s tax
 - 48 -

[*48] return preparer; (8) offering false or incredible testimony; (9) filing false

documents, including filing false income tax returns; (10) failing to file tax returns;

and (11) engaging in extensive dealings in cash.29 See Bradford v.

Commissioner, 796 F.2d at 307-308; Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 664-665

(1990); Recklitis v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874, 910 (1988); Lipsitz v.

Commissioner, 21 T.C. 917 (1954), aff’d, 220 F.2d 871 (4th Cir. 1955); see also

Morse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-332, slip op. at 8-9, aff’d, 419 F.3d 829

(8th Cir. 2005). The existence of any one factor is not dispositive, but the existence

of several factors is persuasive circumstantial evidence of fraud. See Niedringhaus

v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 211 (1992); Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. at

700.

Respondent contends, and our review of the record shows, that the

following factors are present in this case: (1) petitioner underreported his income

for the years in issue; (2) petitioner concealed income and assets during the years

in issue; (3) petitioner failed to cooperate with tax authorities regarding the years

in issue; (4) petitioner filed false documents; and (5) petitioner failed to file tax

returns for the years in issue. Respondent also contends that petitioner’s reliance

29
These factors are nonexclusive. See Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99
T.C. 202, 211 (1992).
 - 49 -

[*49] on frivolous arguments during these proceedings demonstrates his fraudulent

intent. We analyze each factor below.

a. Understating Income

A pattern of substantially underreporting income for several years is strong

evidence of fraud, particularly if the reason for the understatements is not

satisfactorily explained or is not due to innocent mistake. See Holland v. United

States, 348 U.S. 121, 137-139 (1954); Spies, 317 U.S. at 499; Webb v.

Commissioner, 394 F.2d at 379; see also Green v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2010-109 (finding that a satisfactory explanation may weigh against a finding of

fraud). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has stated that “a

‘[c]onsistent and substantial understatement of income is by itself strong evidence of

fraud.’” Korecky v. Commissioner, 781 F.2d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting

Merritt v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1962), aff’g T.C. Memo.

1959-172), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1985-63.

Petitioner failed to file Federal income tax returns for the five years in issue.

He thus failed to report income of $32,799, $50,201, $83,743, $126,689, and

$48,859 for 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively, and a capital gain of

$114,667 for 2004.
 - 50 -

[*50] Although not entirely clear, petitioner’s contention appears to be that he

underreported his income because he believed all of his income was attributable

to his alleged ministry. In the light of the other evidence in the record, we are not

prepared to find that petitioner simply was mistaken regarding his personal

obligation to file income tax returns and report income. Furthermore, as this Court

has stated, a taxpayer’s “mistaken contention indicates little about whether

* * * [the taxpayer] had fraudulent intent.” Chambers v. Commissioner, slip op. at

35.

Petitioner did not report any income for the years in issue. Given the

substantial amounts of petitioner’s unreported income, his pattern of underreporting

his income, and his lack of a satisfactory explanation for the understatements, we

conclude that petitioner’s understatements are persuasive evidence of fraudulent

intent. See, e.g., Morse v. Commissioner, 419 F.3d at 832; see also Lain v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-99, slip op. at 12.

b. Concealing Assets or Income

An intent to evade tax may be inferred by “concealment of assets or

covering up sources of income”. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499; Ruark v. Commissioner,

449 F.2d 311, 312-313 (9th Cir. 1971), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1969-48. A taxpayer’s
 - 51 -

[*51] use of “a complex series of financial transactions and nominees is a badge of

fraud.” Plotkin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-260, slip op. at 43. This Court

has previously held that a taxpayer’s use of a UBTO to conceal income supports a

finding of fraud. Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-283, slip op. at 10-

11. The mere existence of a paper trail documenting a taxpayer’s income or

expenses does not negate a finding of fraudulent intent. See Evans v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-199, slip op. at 16-17.

Petitioner concealed his assets through a series of transactions designed to

transfer his assets to various organizations, including Treasures in a Field

Investments, a UBTO. Petitioner later transferred his assets from Treasures in a

Field Investments to a ministerial trust, Treasures in a Field. Despite these transfers,

petitioner continued to control the use and disposition of his assets. Furthermore,

petitioner deposited all of his income into accounts titled in the name of Prepare the

Way Ministries and Treasures in a Field Investments.

Petitioner appears to contend that he did not conceal assets because he

deposited all proceeds into ministry bank accounts and recorded all properties that

the ministry owned. First, this Court notes that the mere existence of a paper trail

documenting the transfer of assets does not negate a finding of fraud. Second,

petitioner’s contention is refuted by the evidence showing that petitioner engaged
 - 52 -

[*52] in a series of transactions the purpose of which was tax avoidance.

Accordingly, this factor supports a finding of fraud.

c. Failing To Cooperate With Tax Authorities

Failure to cooperate with revenue agents during an investigation is a badge of

fraud. See Korecky v. Commissioner, 781 F.2d at 1568; Lord v. Commissioner,

525 F.2d 741, 747-748 (9th Cir. 1975), aff’g in part, rev’g in part 60 T.C. 199

(1973); Grosshandler v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1, 20 (198). This failure is

persuasive evidence of a taxpayer’s guilty knowledge. See Prof’l Servs. v.

Commissioner, 79 T.C. 888, 932-933 (1982). A taxpayer’s failure to cooperate

with the Commissioner and the Court during the pretrial and trial proceedings also

supports a finding of fraud. See Smith v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1049, 1052, 1059-

1060 (1988), aff’d, 926 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1991); Rice v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2003-208, slip op. at 15.

Petitioner failed to cooperate with respondent’s revenue agent during

respondent’s investigation of petitioner. Accordingly, respondent was forced to

subpoena petitioner’s ministry bank account records to reconstruct petitioner’s

income. Petitioner also failed to respond to a summons issued by respondent.

In addition, petitioner failed to cooperate with respondent’s counsel and

with the Court in preparing this case for trial. Petitioner failed to cooperate with
 - 53 -

[*53] respondent’s counsel in preparing a stipulation of facts as required by our

standing pretrial order. He failed to respond properly to respondent’s requests for

admissions. At trial petitioner failed to respond to the questions posed by

respondent’s counsel, continuing to assert an unidentified privilege. Accordingly,

we find that petitioner failed to cooperate with tax authorities, and this finding

supports a finding of fraud.

d. Filing False Documents

Fraudulent intent may be inferred when a taxpayer files a document intending

to conceal, mislead, or prevent the collection of tax. See Spies, 317 U.S. at 499.

Filing false documents with the IRS constitutes “an ‘affirmative act’ of

misrepresentation sufficient to justify the fraud penalty.” Zell v. Commissioner, 763

F.2d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 1985), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1984-152; see also Ernle v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-237, slip op. at 9. A taxpayer’s creation of false

documents, see Fairey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-129, slip op. at 24-25,

and/or use of a false EIN, see Chambers v. Commissioner, slip op. at 39, supports a

finding of fraud, see also Vetrano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-128.

Petitioner used a false EIN when he opened account 2952 at Regions Bank.

He also prepared a materially altered and false Form W-8BEN. Petitioner
 - 54 -

[*54] stipulated that he used the materially altered and false Form W-8BEN to hold

out his purported ministry as a tax-exempt entity. We find that he engaged in this

practice of creating and using false documents to evade the payment of Federal tax.

Consequently, this factor supports a finding of fraud.

e. Failing To File Tax Returns

A taxpayer’s failure to file tax returns is a badge of fraud. See Petzoldt v.

Commissioner, 92 T.C. at 701. While a failure to file returns, even over an

extended period, does not establish fraud per se, see Grosshandler v. Commissioner,

75 T.C. at 19, an extended pattern of failing to file returns may be persuasive

circumstantial evidence of fraud, see Marsellus v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 883, 885

(5th Cir. 1977), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1975-368.

Petitioner failed to file returns for 2002-06. Petitioner’s extended pattern of

failing to file returns constitutes persuasive circumstantial evidence of fraud.

f. Asserting Frivolous Arguments

A taxpayer’s assertion of frivolous arguments may provide evidence

supporting a finding of fraud. See Kotmair v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1253, 1259-

1261 (1986); Worsham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-219, slip op. at 19;

Lain v. Commissioner, slip op. at 14; DeVries v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-

185, slip op. at 21-22.
 - 55 -

[*55] During the course of these proceedings, petitioner repeatedly raised frivolous

and groundless arguments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has

held similar arguments to be frivolous and without merit. See United States v.

Morgan, 419 Fed. Appx. 958, 959 (11th Cir. 2011) (taxpayers’ argument that they

were not involved in a “trade or business” was frivolous); United States v. Morse,

532 F.3d 1130, 1132-1133 (11th Cir. 2008) (taxpayer’s assertion that the IRS had

no power over the taxpayer was meritless). We repeatedly cautioned petitioner

against asserting frivolous and groundless arguments. Despite these

admonishments, petitioner continued to assert such arguments. Accordingly, this

factor supports a finding of fraud.

C. Conclusion

Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner

underpaid his tax liabilities for 2002-06 and that some part of petitioner’s

underpayment for each year was due to fraud. Petitioner has not argued or

introduced any credible evidence to prove that any portion of his underpayments

was not attributable to fraud. He has not introduced any credible evidence to show
 - 56 -

[*56] that he acted without fraudulent intent. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is

liable for the section 6651(f) fraudulent failure to file additions to tax.30

VII. Sections 6651(a)(2) and 6654(a) Additions to Tax

If the taxpayer assigns error to the Commissioner’s determination that a

taxpayer is liable for an addition to tax, the Commissioner has the burden, under

section 7491(c), of producing evidence with respect to the liability of the taxpayer

for the addition to tax. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 446-447. To meet

his burden of production, the Commissioner must come forward with sufficient

evidence that it is appropriate to impose the addition to tax. Id. Once the

Commissioner meets his burden, the taxpayer must come forward with evidence

sufficient to persuade this Court that the determination is incorrect. Id.

Respondent determined that petitioner is liable under section 6651(a)(2) for

additions to tax for failure to timely pay tax shown on a return. Section 6651(a)(2)

imposes an addition to tax for failure to pay the amount of tax shown on a

taxpayer’s Federal income tax return on or before the payment due date, unless

such failure is due to reasonable cause and is not due to willful neglect. The

section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax applies only when an amount of tax is shown on

30
The amounts of the sec. 6651(f) additions to tax for 2002-05 must be
adjusted to reflect the adjustments to gross receipts calculated in this opinion.
 - 57 -

[*57] a return filed by the taxpayer or prepared by the Secretary. Sec. 6651(a)(2),

(g)(2); Cabirac v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 163, 170 (2003). When a taxpayer has

not filed a return, the section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax may not be imposed unless

the Secretary has prepared an SFR that satisfies the requirements of section

6020(b). See Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 200, 210 (2006), aff’d, 521 F.3d

1289 (10th Cir. 2008).

Respondent satisfied his burden of production by introducing into evidence

SFRs for the years in issue that satisfy the requirements of section 6020(b).

Consequently, petitioner had the burden of introducing evidence to show that his

failure to pay was due to reasonable cause. He did not do so. Petitioner did not

advance any argument regarding the section 6651(a)(2) additions to tax and

introduced no credible evidence to show reasonable cause for his failure to pay tax

shown on the returns. Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination with

respect to petitioner’s liability for the additions to tax under section 6651(a)(2) for

the years in issue.31

Respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for additions to tax for

failure to pay estimated tax under section 6654. Section 6654 imposes an addition

31
The amounts of the sec. 6651(a)(2) additions to tax for 2002-05 must be
adjusted to reflect the adjustments to gross receipts calculated in this opinion.
 - 58 -

[*58] to tax on an individual who underpays his estimated tax.32 The addition to tax

is calculated with reference to four required installment payments of the taxpayer’s

estimated tax liability. Sec. 6654(c) and (d). Each required installment of estimated

tax is equal to 25% of the “required annual payment”. Sec. 6654(d). In general, the

“required annual payment” is equal to the lesser of (1) 90% of the tax shown on the

individual’s return for that year (or, if no return is filed, 90% of his tax for such

year), or (2) if the individual filed a return for the immediately preceding taxable

year, 100% of the tax shown on that return. Sec. 6654(d)(1)(A), (B), and (C). A

taxpayer has an obligation to pay estimated tax only if he has a “required annual

payment”. Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. at 212; see also Mendes v.

Commissioner, 121 T.C. 308, 324 (2003).

Petitioner did not make any estimated tax payments for the years in issue.

Respondent introduced deemed stipulations that petitioner failed to file returns for

2002-06. On the basis of this information and the evidence with respect to

petitioner’s income for the years in issue, we are able to conclude that petitioner

had required annual payments for 2003-06. However, we are unable to conclude

32
Unless a statutory exception applies, the sec. 6654(a) addition to tax is
mandatory. See sec. 6654(a), (e); Recklitis v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874, 913
(1988).
 - 59 -

[*59] that petitioner had a required annual payment for 2002 because respondent

failed to introduce any evidence as to whether petitioner filed a return for 2001. See

Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. at 211-212. Accordingly, we reject

respondent’s determination as to the section 6654(a) addition to tax for 2002 and

sustain respondent’s determinations as to petitioner’s liability for the section

6654(a) additions to tax for 2003-06.33

VIII. Section 6673 Penalty

Section 6673(a)(1) provides that this Court may require the taxpayer to pay a

penalty not in excess of $25,000 whenever it appears to this Court that: (1) the

proceedings were instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay, (2)

the taxpayer’s position is frivolous or groundless, or (3) the taxpayer unreasonably

failed to pursue available administrative remedies. A taxpayer’s position is

frivolous or groundless if it is “‘contrary to established law and unsupported by a

reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law.’” Williams v. Commissioner,

114 T.C. 136, 144 (2000) (quoting Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th

Cir. 1986)).

33
The amounts of the sec. 6654 additions to tax for 2003-05 must be adjusted
to reflect the adjustments to gross receipts calculated in this opinion.
 - 60 -

[*60] During the pretrial proceedings this Court warned petitioner that if he

continued to assert frivolous or groundless positions, this Court would consider

imposing a penalty under section 6673. This Court issued the warning to petitioner

in three different orders before trial. At trial this Court again warned petitioner that

if he continued to assert frivolous or groundless positions, this Court would consider

imposing a penalty under section 6673. Despite this warning, petitioner asserted the

same arguments in his posttrial brief.

Respondent did not request that we impose a penalty pursuant to section

6673, and in the exercise of our discretion we will not impose a section 6673

penalty on petitioner. However, we warn petitioner that if in the future he maintains

groundless positions in this Court, he runs the risk that he will be sanctioned in

accordance with section 6673(a)(1).

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, and to the extent not

discussed above, conclude those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under

Rule 155.