T.C. Memo. 2015-214
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MARK R. SMITH AND YONG N. SMITH, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 22033-12, 29621-12. Filed November 3, 2015.
Mark R. Smith, pro se.
Bryant W. Smith, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
HAINES, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners’
Federal income tax and penalties as follows:
Penalty
Year Deficiency sec. 6662(a)
2009 $13,732 $2,746
2010 6,098 1,219
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[*2] After concessions, we must decide whether Mr. Smith (petitioner)1 is entitled
to amounts in excess of what respondent allowed for: (1) returns and allowances
reported on the Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, attached to the 2009
Federal income tax return (2009 return); (2) unreimbursed employee business
expenses reported on the Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, attached to the 2009
1
Mrs. Smith submitted Forms 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief,
dated September 10, 2013, for the 2009 tax year and November 26, 2013, for the
2010 tax year. Respondent reviewed Mrs. Smith’s Forms 8857 and determined
that she should be granted relief from joint and several liability for 2009 and 2010
(years at issue) except for the unreported taxable State income tax refunds from
the 2009 tax year. Petitioner refused to agree that Mrs. Smith should be granted
relief from joint and several liability for the years at issue.
On December 16, 2014, respondent filed motions for partial summary
judgment in docket Nos. 22033-12 and 29621-12. With the exception of the
unreported taxable State income tax refunds from the 2009 tax year, respondent
advanced the position that Mrs. Smith satisfied the requirements of sec.
6015(b)(1)(A)-(E) and was entitled to relief from joint and several liability.
Trials in docket Nos. 22033-12 and 29621-12 were held on November 18,
2014, in San Francisco, California. Mrs. Smith was financially unable to travel
from Virginia to California for trial and was not present. The Court separated the
issue of relief from joint and several liability to allow trial to be held on the other
issues.
On April 17, 2015, the Court granted respondent’s motions for partial
summary judgment in docket Nos. 22033-12 and 29621-12. The Court ordered
that Mrs. Smith was entitled to relief from joint and several liability from any
understatement related to her and petitioner’s 2009 and 2010 Federal income tax
returns with the exception of understatements stemming from petitioners’ failure
to report taxable State income tax refunds for 2009. Because petitioner and Mrs.
Smith conceded that they failed to report taxable State income tax refunds for
2009, that is not an issue before the Court. Consequently, the Court’s decision in
this case affects only petitioner.
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[*3] return; and (3) cost of goods sold, rent or lease expenses, and interest
expenses reported on the Schedule C attached to the 2010 Federal income tax
return (2010 return). We must also determine whether petitioner is liable for
section 6662(a)2 accuracy-related penalties for the years at issue.
FINDINGS OF FACT
These cases were consolidated for purposes of briefing and opinion. The
parties’ stipulations of facts, with attached exhibits, are incorporated herein by this
reference. Petitioner lived in California when the petitions were filed.
The following table summarizes the amounts petitioner reported on his
Federal income tax returns for the years at issue and the amounts respondent
allowed and disallowed in the notices of deficiency:3
2
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
3
Items not at issue are not shown.
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[*4] Amount Amount Amount
Year Item claimed allowed disallowed
2009 Schedule C returns and allowances $45,021 -0- $45,021
2009 Schedule A unreimbursed employee
business expenses--travel while
away from home overnight 16,050 -0- 16,050
2009 Schedule A unreimbursed employee
business expenses--parking 468 -0- 468
2009 Schedule A unreimbursed employee
business expenses--meals and
entertainment 113 -0- 113
2010 Schedule C interest--other 6,620 -0- 6,620
2010 Schedule C rent/lease--other business
property 23,723 $12,892 10,831
2010 Schedule C interest 8,425 -0- 8,425
1. Returns and Allowances
In 2008 petitioner manufactured 64 large area solar panels in Virginia while
living there. He sold 46 of these solar panels in late 2008 and early 2009. In
March 2009 petitioner sold eight of the panels to a customer, Michael Raines, in
Los Angeles, California. Shortly after the panels were installed at a home, they
caught fire, causing extensive damage. The fire prompted a government
investigation which required petitioner to remove from the market all of the solar
panels that he had sold.
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[*5] On the Schedule C attached to the 2009 return petitioner reported zero gross
receipts or sales and a total of $45,021 as returns and allowances. At trial
petitioner asked the Court to allow $24,325 for returns and allowances, $10,576
for the cost of the solar panels that were manufactured but never sold, $9,312.60
for solar panels that were purchased from petitioner using stolen credit cards, and
$600 for his payments to Heritage Web Solutions.4
On March 29, 2009, petitioner paid Mr. Raines $7,512 by check.
Respondent conceded on brief that this amount should be allowed as a return or
allowance. On September 21, 2009, petitioner made a $13,300 wire transfer from
his and Mrs. Smith’s bank account to Empire Clean Energy Supply with a notation
indicating it was for the “Reynolds Warranty Payment.” Petitioner claimed
another customer had asked for replacement solar panels in lieu of a refund.
Petitioner introduced at trial a pro forma invoice from SET Solar Corp. showing
that replacement panels would cost $3,513.
In 2009 after petitioner stopped selling the solar panels he had
manufactured, he purchased solar panels from wholesalers and resold them on the
Internet. Petitioner claims he was notified after four of the orders had shipped that
4
Petitioner did not explain the discrepancy between the amount of returns
and allowances requested at trial and the amount reported on the 2009 return.
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[*6] the purchases had been made with stolen credit cards. Though petitioner
sought $9,312.60 at trial for purchases made with stolen credit cards, he
introduced only the following withdrawals to support his claims:5
Date Amount Type of withdrawal
7/24 $2,486.20 Bank card
8/10 1,916.90 Bank card
10/2 2,220.20 Bank card
10/19 2,188.40 Bank card
At trial petitioner introduced no invoices or other proof of these alleged fraudulent
purchases.
Petitioner hired Heritage Web Solutions to run his business’ Web site. In
late 2008 petitioner was promised an additional year of Web services if he prepaid
$1,200. Petitioner did not produce any documentation of this agreement. The
$1,200 was prepaid in four installments of $300 in November and December 2008
and February and March 2009. Petitioner introduced at trial proof of the two
payments made in 2009. Heritage Web Solutions closed shortly after the last
payment was made, and petitioner was without Internet support for the business.
5
On October 1, 2009, $6,826.40 was withdrawn from the bank account via
“Bams”, but this amount was returned on November 2, 2009.
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[*7] 2. Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses
After he was required to remove from the market all of the solar panels he
had sold, petitioner sought other employment. He obtained a visiting scholar
position with Hewlett-Packard (HP) in California. As a visiting scholar, petitioner
was hired to work on a research project for the U.S. Army. HP reimbursed
petitioner $6,186 for the cost of his move from Virginia to California. When
petitioner moved, Mrs. Smith remained in Virginia.
Petitioner received an offer letter from HP, but it was not introduced at trial.
A copy of petitioner’s Intern/Research Relocation Program Acknowledgment
Letter, however, was introduced at trial. It states, in part: “[I]n the event you
leave Hewlett-Packard, for any reason, during the term of your 3-12 month
assignment * * * you will be required to repay Hewlett-Packard for the entire
cost of your relocation benefits”. As long as the research went well and the U.S.
Army provided funding for the project, there was some expectation that
petitioner’s employment would continue, but HP provided no assurances and
petitioner’s employment could have been terminated at any time.
According to a declaration from Ann Faustmann of HP, petitioner was
employed from March 23, 2009, to November 1, 2012. Petitioner, however,
testified that his employment was not continuous during that period and that he
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[*8] was “laid off” during the middle of December each year. Petitioner did not
submit proof of these periods of unemployment, and he never applied for
unemployment benefits.
Petitioner signed a lease for an apartment in California with Trinity Property
Consultants in March 2009 that would last until April 30, 2010. Petitioner
discovered that the complex had poor security when a shooting took place there in
August 2009. Because the management did not intend to remedy the security
issues, petitioner paid to terminate his lease and signed a new 12-month lease
beginning on August 8, 2009, with Cupertino City Center in California.
3. Cost of Goods Sold
Petitioner reported cost of goods sold of $8,425 on his 2010 return, all of
which respondent disallowed. Petitioner conceded at trial that the amount claimed
on the return was incorrect and requested $1,575 for cost of goods sold. He
produced a quote for 1,000 “Outback VFX3-24E, 3.0kW, 24V Inverter export[s]”
from Wholesale Solar dated May 4, 2009, to support this assertion, testifying that
it was his recollection that the date should have been May 4, 2010. The quote
states the price per unit was $1,575, the subtotal was $1,575,000, and the quote
total was “?”.
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[*9] 4. Rent/Lease Expenses
Petitioner reported $4,550 in gross receipts or sales on his 2010 return.
Petitioner claimed a deduction for $23,723 in rent or lease expenses on the
Schedule C attached to the 2010 return, $10,831 of which was related to his
apartment in California. Respondent disallowed the portion of the deduction
related to the apartment. Petitioner produced a copy of the apartment’s floor plan
and denoted the areas that he claimed to have used exclusively for business
purposes. It indicated that petitioner used 53% of his apartment--the entire entry
area, dining area, living area, and deck--exclusively for business purposes. The
apartment’s layout required petitioner to pass through these areas to enter the
apartment itself, the bedroom, the bathroom, and the kitchen.
5. Interest Expenses
The claimed interest expenses were interest charges on credit card
purchases and a personal loan. The credit card interest related to purchases made
in earlier years as no purchases were made on the credit cards during 2010. No
evidence other than petitioner’s testimony was introduced to support the claim that
the items purchased with the credit cards were used in petitioner’s business.
Petitioner did not testify or provide other evidence regarding the use of the
personal loan proceeds.
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[*10] OPINION
We must determine whether petitioner is entitled to amounts in excess of
what respondent allowed. We must also decide whether petitioner is liable for
section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties.
I. Items Disallowed by Respondent
The Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of deficiency are presumed
correct, and the taxpayer has the burden to show that his determinations are
incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).6
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the
burden of establishing entitlement to any claimed deduction. Rule 142(a);
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). Section 162(a) allows
a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. In general, deductions are not
allowed for personal, living, or family expenses. Sec. 262(a).
Taxpayers are required to maintain sufficient records that substantiate the
amount and purpose of each item for which they claim a deduction. Sec. 6001;
6
Petitioners have not claimed that the burden should shift to respondent, nor
does the record show that shifting the burden would be appropriate in these cases.
See sec. 7491(a).
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[*11] Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89 (1975), aff’d per curiam, 540
F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Generally, a
taxpayer’s self-serving declaration is not a sufficient substitute for records. Weiss
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-17. Section 274(d) imposes strict
substantiation requirements for certain deductible expenses, such as traveling
expenses (including meals and lodging away from home) and entertainment
expenses.
Returns and allowances and cost of goods sold are taken into consideration
when determining a Schedule C business gross income. Deductions are subtracted
from the Schedule C business gross income in order to determine its net profit or
net loss. Accordingly, returns and allowances and cost of goods sold are not
treated as deductions and are not subject to the limitations of section 162. Metra
Chem Corp. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 654, 661 (1987); Nunn v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2002-250. Nevertheless, taxpayers must retain sufficient records to
substantiate amounts claimed as returns and allowances or cost of goods sold.
Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs.
1. Returns and Allowances
On brief respondent conceded that petitioner is entitled to a $7,512
Schedule C adjustment to gross income for returns and allowances for the refund
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[*12] issued to Mr. Raines in connection with the solar panels that caused the fire
in Santa Monica, California.
Petitioner credibly testified that he was required to remove his business
solar panels from the market because they caused a fire that damaged a home.
Bank statements reflect that petitioner made a $13,300 wire transfer to Empire
Clean Energy Supply on September 21, 2009, with a notation indicating it was for
the “Reynolds Warranty Payment”. We find this substantiation sufficient to allow
petitioner to include this amount in returns and allowances on the 2009 Schedule
C.
Petitioner also presented a pro forma invoice from SET Solar Corp. showing
replacement solar panels would cost $3,513, but he did not provide any records to
show that this amount was ever paid. Petitioner has provided insufficient
substantiation to allow him to include this amount in returns and allowances on
the 2009 Schedule C.
The amounts reported for payments to Heritage Web Solutions and alleged
fraudulent purchases should not have been categorized as returns and allowances
but potentially could be considered ordinary and necessary business expenses.
See sec. 162(a). Petitioner did not introduce copy of the agreement with Heritage
Web Solutions, and we cannot determine whether he reported this amount
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[*13] elsewhere on the 2009 Schedule C. In an attempt to substantiate the alleged
fraudulent purchases petitioner provided only bank statements showing
withdrawals made via bank card. Petitioner has not produced sufficient
substantiation to allow a deduction for either of these items.
It is unnecessary for us to address whether and where any amounts for the
manufactured but unsold solar panels should have been reported on the 2009
return because petitioner failed to provide any substantiation to support his claims.
We find that petitioner is entitled to returns and allowances of $20,812 on
his 2009 Schedule C.
2. Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses
a. Travel While Away From Home Overnight
The expenses of maintaining a household, including rent and utilities, are
not deductible. Sec. 1.262-1(b)(3), Income Tax Regs. However, to alleviate the
burden on taxpayers whose business or employment requires them to incur
duplicate living expenses, taxpayers may deduct traveling expenses, such as meals
and lodging, if such expenses are: (1) ordinary and necessary; (2) incurred while
away from home; and (3) incurred in the pursuit of a trade or business. Sec.
162(a)(2); see Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946); Tucker v.
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[*14] Commissioner, 55 T.C. 783, 786 (1971); Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.
557, 562 (1968).
For purposes of section 162(a)(2) a taxpayer’s “home” is generally the
vicinity of the taxpayer’s principal place of employment. Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 578, 581 (1980); Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 195
(1979), aff’d, 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981). A taxpayer’s residence, when outside
the vicinity of the taxpayer’s principal place of employment, may be treated as the
taxpayer’s tax home if the taxpayer’s employment is “temporary” rather than
“indefinite.” Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958). However, “if the
employment while away from home, even if temporary in its inception, becomes
substantial, indefinite, or indeterminate in duration, the situs of such employment
for purposes of the statute becomes the taxpayer’s home.” Kroll v. Commissioner,
49 T.C. at 562.
This Court has found that employment is “temporary” if it is the type which
can be expected to last only for a short period. Albert v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.
129, 131 (1949). We have found employment is “indefinite” if “its termination
cannot be foreseen within a fixed or reasonably short period of time.” Stricker v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 355, 361 (1970), aff’d, 438 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1971). An
appeal in this case would lie in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
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[*15] disagreed with this test in Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491 (1959)
(9th Cir. 1960), rev’g and remanding 32 T.C. 1368 (1959). In Harvey, the Court
of Appeals, drawing from the legislative purpose of section 162(a)(2), focused its
determination on whether it was reasonable under the circumstances to expect a
taxpayer to move. See also Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221, 223-224 (9th Cir.
1962). The location of a taxpayer’s tax home and whether a taxpayer’s
employment was temporary rather than indefinite are questions of fact to be
decided on the entire record. See Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. at 60-61;
Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 470.
The record contains relatively little information regarding petitioner’s
employment with HP. His position had an initial term of 3 to 12 months, and he
ended up working for HP for more than three years. At the time petitioner was
hired there was an expectation that his employment would continue if the research
went well and the project continued to receive funding from the U.S. Army.
Petitioner’s actions evidence his expectation that the research project would
continue for an indefinite time. If petitioner had truly believed that his position in
California was temporary, it is doubtful that he would have immediately entered
into a yearlong lease in March 2009 or entered into a yearlong lease five months
later in August 2009. Further, in December 2009 when petitioner was temporarily
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[*16] laid off, he did not seek unemployment benefits. It is highly unlikely that
petitioner would fail to seek unemployment benefits if he did not believe he was
going to be reemployed in the near future.
On the basis of the facts, we find that petitioner’s employment in California
was indefinite, and it would have been reasonable under the circumstances to
expect him to move there. See Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d at 495-496;
Stricker v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. at 361. Accordingly, we hold petitioner is not
entitled to a deduction for expenses while traveling away from home because
California was his tax home.
b. Parking Fees, Tolls, and Transportation
Petitioner provided no records to substantiate the amounts claimed for
parking fees, tolls, and transportation on the 2009 return. Accordingly, he is not
entitled to a deduction. See sec. 6001.
c. Meals and Entertainment
Petitioner provided no records to substantiate the amounts claimed for meals
and entertainment on the 2009 return. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a
deduction. See id.
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[*17] 3. Cost of Goods Sold
At trial petitioner admitted that the amount reported on the return was
incorrect and requested $1,575 for the cost of goods sold. To support his request,
he produced a quote from Wholesale Solar dated May 4, 2009, and testified that he
believed the date was incorrect and should have been May 4, 2010. The quote was
for 1,000 “Outback VFX3-24E, 3.0kW, 24V Inverter export[s]” with a subtotal of
$1,575,000, and a quote total of “?”. The quote from Wholesale Solar coupled
with petitioner’s testimony is insufficient to substantiate cost of goods sold. See
sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner is not entitled to any
cost of goods sold on his 2010 Schedule C.
4. Rent/Lease Expenses
Section 280A(a) generally disallows a deduction for business use of a
taxpayer’s personal residence. A taxpayer, however, may deduct expenses
allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular
basis as the principal place of business for the taxpayer’s trade or business or a
place of business which is used by clients or customers in meeting or dealing with
the taxpayer in the normal course of the trade or business. Sec. 280A(c)(1)(A) and
(B). “Exclusive use” requires that a taxpayer use a “specific part of a dwelling
unit solely for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business. The use of a
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[*18] portion of a dwelling unit for both personal purposes and for the carrying on
of a trade or business does not meet the exclusive use test.” Goldberger, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1532, 1557 (1987) (quoting S. Rept. No. 94-938, at 148
(1976), 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 49, 186, and H.R. Rept. No. 94-658, at 161 (1975),
1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 695, 853).
Petitioner testified that he used his apartment’s entry, dining and living
areas, and deck exclusively for business purposes. The only other evidence
offered to support petitioner’s testimony was a floor plan of the apartment on
which he denoted the area used for business purposes. Though petitioner claims
he met clients in his apartment, no testimony or other evidence from clients was
presented at trial.
We are not required to find petitioner’s unsupported and self-serving
testimony sufficient to prove that he used his apartment’s entry, dining and living
areas, and deck exclusively as his principal place of business or as a place to meet
clients. See Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986). Petitioner has not
met his burden of proving that he used a portion of his home exclusively for his
business and is not entitled to a deduction for 2010 Schedule C rent or lease
expenses in excess of the amount respondent allowed.
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[*19] 5. Interest Expenses
Petitioner introduced monthly statements for credit cards and a personal
loan to substantiate the amounts of interest paid. Petitioner testified that the credit
cards were used to make business purchases in earlier tax years, but he did not
provide substantiation for these purchases. He did not testify or provide other
evidence with respect to the use of the personal loan proceeds. Without
substantiation to show that the interest expenses are ordinary and necessary
business expenses, we cannot allow a deduction. See secs. 162(a), 6001.
Petitioner is not entitled to a 2010 Schedule C deduction for interest expenses.
II. Section 6662 Penalties
An accuracy-related penalty of 20% is imposed on the portion of an
underpayment attributable to negligence or a substantial understatement of income
tax. Sec. 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2). Negligence includes any failure to keep
adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs. An understatement of income tax is substantial if it exceeds the
greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable year or
$5,000. Sec. 6662(d).
The Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to a
taxpayer’s liability for any accuracy-related penalty. Sec. 7491(c). The
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[*20] Commissioner “must come forward with sufficient evidence indicating that
it is appropriate to impose” the accuracy-related penalty in order to meet this
burden. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). Once the
Commissioner provides sufficient information to satisfy his burden of production,
the burden shifts to the taxpayer to show that the penalty should not be imposed.
Id. at 447; see Rule 142.
Respondent has met his burden of production by showing that petitioner
lacks adequate records to fully substantiate the amounts reported on the 2009 and
2010 returns. See sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. The precise amounts of
petitioner’s underpayments will depend upon the Rule 155 computations, in
accordance with our findings and conclusions set forth above. To the extent that
such computations establish, as seems likely, that petitioner’s understatements of
income tax were substantial, respondent has also met his burden of production in
this regard. See Diallo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-300.
Petitioner failed to argue or offer evidence that reduced penalties should be
imposed. See sec. 6664(c). Accordingly, we find petitioner is liable for section
6662(a) accuracy-related penalties for the years at issue.
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, and to the extent not
discussed above, conclude those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
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[*21] To reflect the foregoing,
Decisions will be entered
under Rule 155.