NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 14 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAHDI ISMAIL YOUSEF NAHHAS, No. 16-70364
Petitioner, Agency No. A071-592-676
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 11, 2018**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Mahdi Ismail Yousef Nahhas (“Nahhas”), a native and citizen of Jordan,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) decision
affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of withholding of removal on
adverse credibility grounds under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) and relief under the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). Substantial
evidence supports the Board’s decision, and we therefore deny the petition.
We review for substantial evidence decisions by the Board denying
eligibility for withholding of removal and adverse credibility determinations.
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). Where, as here, the
Board “expressly adopt[ed]” the relevant part of the IJ’s decision, “we review the
IJ’s findings as if they were the BIA’s.” Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th
Cir. 2011). We also review for substantial evidence Board determinations denying
eligibility for protection under CAT. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048. We defer to the
factual findings of the Board, and they “are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). We review Board interpretations of legal questions de novo. See
Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence supports the denial of Nahhas’s withholding of removal
on adverse credibility grounds. To make an adverse credibility determination, an
IJ must evaluate “the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,” and
may base its determination on inconsistencies in testimony. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). An IJ may “consider any inconsistency,” not only those that
“‘go to the heart’ of the petitioner’s claim,” when assessing credibility. Shrestha,
590 F.3d at 1043 (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).
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However, “utterly trivial inconsistenc[ies]” are insufficient to justify an adverse
credibility determination and IJs should account for “petitioner’s explanation for a
perceived inconsistency.” Id. at 1043-44.
The IJ found and the Board affirmed that Nahhas was not credible because
of material inconsistencies in his testimony regarding three aspects of his
involvement with Amnesty International, which were core to his petition for
withholding of removal. Specifically, he provided inconsistent dates for when he
began working with the organization; conflicting timelines regarding his detention;
and differing accounts of whom he worked with at the organization. These
inconsistencies undermine a central basis of Nahhas’s asylum claim: that he was
persecuted because of his work with the human rights organization and thus fears
future persecution. When, as here, “an inconsistency is at the heart of the claim it
doubtless is of great weight.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1047.
As required, the IJ accounted for the explanations put forth by Nahhas to
explain his testimonial inconsistencies, see id. at 1044, and found them
unpersuasive. For example, the IJ noted petitioner’s tendency “to combine [] his
inconsistent answers into a single answer that blurred the inconsistencies.”
Additionally, the IJ determined and the Board affirmed that Nahhas’s two
voluntary returns to Jordan undermine his claim of past persecution and therefore
his credibility. Voluntary return to a home country provides a sound basis for an
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adverse credibility determination. Loho v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (9th
Cir. 2008) (returning for work). Unlike the petitioner in Loho, Nahhas returned
home to visit grieving or ailing family members, which, as the IJ noted, “lessened”
the visits’ “negative implication.” Even setting aside evidence regarding the trips,
there would still be substantial evidence supporting denial.
In sum, Nahhas’s inconsistencies and his lack of persuasive explanations
constituted sufficient substantial evidence supporting the adverse credibility
determination. Without credible testimony, Nahhas has not met his burden of
proof to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(b).
Substantial evidence also supports denial of the claim for CAT protection.
When, as here, an adverse credibility determination has been made, “to reverse the
BIA’s decision [denying CAT protection,] we would have to find that the reports
alone compelled the conclusion that [the petitioner] is more likely than not to be
tortured.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49 (quoting Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457
F.3d 915, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2006)). The reports about conditions in Jordan are the
only remaining credible evidence, but they do not satisfy petitioner’s burden to
prove that he specifically is “more likely than not” to be tortured if returned to
Jordan because they focus on generalized violence in the country. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2). Thus, the Board’s denial of CAT protection to Nahhas is
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supported by substantial evidence.
The petition for review is DENIED.
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