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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-12942
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-00403-AT-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLAYTON ARMSTRONG HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(November 19, 2018)
Before JILL PRYOR, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Clayton Hill appeals his 8-month custodial sentence imposed upon
revocation of his supervised release. Hill previously served a 61-month term of
imprisonment after pleading guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by
obtaining the payment of fraudulent tax refunds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286,
and identity fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(7), 2. At his revocation
hearing, Hill conceded that he violated the terms of his supervised release by
traveling outside the district without his probation officer’s permission. Hill
admits he did not tell his probation officer and did not report to him for three
months.
On appeal, Hill argues that the his 8-month sentence, at the low end of the
advisory guidelines range of 8 to 14 months, is substantively unreasonable given
that his reason for leaving the district was to regain custody of his nine-year-old
daughter. Hill contends the district court did not adequately take into account the
circumstances of his supervised release violation, the nature of his offense, and his
character.
In response, the government stresses, among other things, that this is Hill’s
second violation. The first time, Hill’s supervised release was revoked for
fraudulent conduct, and he received a 6-month sentence, below the advisory
guidelines range. After his release, Hill reported to his probation officer only one
time before traveling out of the district without permission and absconding for
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several months. Because Hill continued to fail to report, a warrant was issued for
his arrest. As to this second violation, the government asked for a 14-month
sentence.
We review sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v.
Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006).
“Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court may, upon finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has violated a condition of
supervised release, revoke the term of supervised release and impose a term of
imprisonment after considering certain factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
Id. at 1107. The relevant § 3553(a) factors that a district court must consider
before imposing a sentence upon revocation are: (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for
deterrence; (3) the need to protect the public from the defendant’s further crimes;
(4) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training or medical care; (5) the relevant guidelines range; (6) pertinent policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission; (7) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities; and (8) the need to provide restitution to victims. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7)). The
district court does not need to explicitly mention that it considered the § 3553(a)
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factors, as long as the record shows that it did consider the factors. See United
States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2007).
The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden to show that the
sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United
States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). The weight given to any
specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). A district court abuses
its discretion when it: (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant
weight; (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight; or
(3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors
unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
If a district court revokes a term of supervision, it may require the defendant
to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release that is statutorily
authorized for the offense that resulted in the supervised release term. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3). Here, where the underlying offense was a Class C felony, the district
court could have imposed a prison term of up to two years. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C.
§§ 286, 1028(b), 3559(a)(3). Further, the parties do not dispute that, with a Grade
C supervised release violation and criminal history of VI, Hill’s recommended
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imprisonment range under advisory Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines was 8
to 14 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).
Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the guidelines
range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United
States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, a sentence imposed
well below the statutory maximum is another indicator of a reasonable sentence.
See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
Hill’s 8-month sentence, imposed at the bottom of his advisory guideline
range, was not substantively unreasonable. Hill failed to demonstrate that the
district court either ignored the § 3553(a) factors or committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the relevant § 3553(a) factors. See Irey, 612 F.3d 1189.
The record establishes that the district court sufficiently addressed the § 3553(a)
factors and adequately explained that, in light of the seriousness of Hill’s
underlying offense, his prior revocation of supervised release, and his tendency to
make poor decisions while subject to conditions of supervision, Hill’s supervised
release violation warranted an 8-month custodial sentence. See Irey, 612 F.3d at
1189; Dorman, 488 F.3d at 944; Sweeting, 437 F.3d at 1107.
Moreover, it was entirely within the district court’s discretion to place
particular emphasis on Hill’s inability to comply with the conditions of his
supervised release and find that Hill’s mitigating evidence was insufficient to
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warrant reinstating his supervised release. See Clay, 483 F.3d at 743.
Additionally, Hill’s 8-month sentence represented the lowest end of the applicable
guideline range and also was well below the two-year statutory maximum penalty,
suggesting substantive reasonableness. See Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746; Gonzalez, 550
F.3d at 1324. Therefore, Hill’s argument that his 8-month sentence was
substantively unreasonable lacks merit.
Accordingly, we affirm Hill’s 8-month custodial sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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