United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1359
CARMEN D. BURGOS-YANTÍN,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF JUANA DÍAZ, et al.,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Silvia Carreño-Coll, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Emil Rodríguez-Escudero and
Martínez-Luciano & Rodríguez-Escudero Law Office were on brief,
for appellant.
José R. Olmo-Rodríguez for appellee.
Margarita L. Mercado Echegaray, Solicitor General, and Susana
I. Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, on brief for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, amicus
curiae.
November 19, 2018
Per curiam. This appeal arises from the district
court's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a
resolution, issued by the Puerto Rico Secretary of Justice,
directing the Municipality of Juana Díaz to indemnify two municipal
police officers found liable under Puerto Rico tort law after a
federal jury trial for using excessive force resulting in a death.
The Municipality argues that the district court's order stretched
federal ancillary enforcement jurisdiction beyond its proper
bounds.1 We disagree and therefore affirm.
I.
Appellee and other family members filed this action
after the shooting death of their relative, Miguel Ángel-Burgos,
at the hands of the police. They brought federal claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Puerto Rico's general
tort statute, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. The complaint
initially named the Municipality of Juana Díaz (the
"Municipality"), its mayor, and several municipal police officers
as defendants. In 2009, however, the district court granted
summary judgment on the issue of municipal liability and dismissed
the Municipality from the case. Almost a year later, the court
1 Consistent with our precedent, we use the terms "ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction" and "enforcement jurisdiction" to refer
to the inherent power of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction
by enforcing judgments "in certain situations where jurisdiction
would otherwise be lacking." Futura Dev. of P.R., Inc. v. Estado
Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 144 F.3d 7, 9 n.1 (1st Cir. 1998).
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held a jury trial for the remaining defendants. The jury rejected
plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, as well as most of their tort law
claims. It did, however, return a verdict for Carmen Burgos-
Yantín ("Burgos-Yantín"), the decedent's mother, with respect to
her negligence claims against two municipal police officers in
their personal capacities. The district court entered judgment
against the two officers for $25,000 and $5,000, respectively.
In December 2012, Burgos-Yantín filed a Motion for
Execution of Judgment 2 asserting that the Municipality was
"responsible for the payment of the Judgment" against its officers
by operation of a Puerto Rico statute commonly referred to as "Law
9." See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, §§ 3085-3092. Law 9 permits
Commonwealth and municipal officials sued in their personal
capacities for alleged civil rights violations to ask the
Commonwealth to "assume the payment of any judgment" so long as
they acted "in good faith." Id. § 3085. With respect to municipal
officials, judgments must be "defrayed from available funds in the
corresponding . . . municipality." Id. § 3092. The Puerto Rico
Secretary of Justice (the "Secretary") is charged with determining
whether payment is due under Law 9. Id. § 3087. Here, the parties
agree that the Secretary issued a resolution in April 2011
2Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69, "[a] money
judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the court
directs otherwise." Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1).
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requiring the Municipality to pay the judgments against the
individual defendants.3
The Municipality opposed the Motion for Execution of
Judgment, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enforce the Secretary's resolution. The district court rejected
this argument, holding that it had "ancillary enforcement
jurisdiction" and inviting Burgos-Yantín to move for a writ of
execution against the Municipality. Burgos-Yantin v. Municipality
of Juana Diaz, No. 07-1146(JA), 2013 WL 435203, at *2-4 (D.P.R.
Jan. 2, 2013). Burgos-Yantín subsequently filed a motion
requesting "the garnishment, attach[ment], or restraining of the
Municipality of Juana Diaz's assets and properties." The district
court granted that motion. Burgos-Yantin v. Municipality of Juana
Díaz, No. 07-1146(SCC), 2014 WL 1096016, at *3 (D.P.R. Mar. 19,
2014). The Municipality now appeals the district court's ruling.
II.
This case turns on the district court's jurisdiction (or
lack thereof) to enforce the Secretary's Law 9 resolution against
the Municipality. A district court may exercise ancillary
jurisdiction for two reasons: "(1) to permit disposition by a
single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees,
factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function
3 The resolution itself is not in the record.
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successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its
authority, and effectuate its decrees." Peacock v. Thomas, 516
U.S. 349, 354 (1996) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
511 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1994)). Here, the district court relied on
the second rationale, i.e., ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.
Enforcement jurisdiction is "a creature of necessity,"
which grants a federal court the "inherent power to enforce its
judgments." Id. at 356, 359; see also U.S.I. Props. Corp. v. M.D.
Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 489, 496 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The jurisdiction
of a Court is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but
continues until that judgment shall be satisfied." (quoting Wayman
v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 23 (1825) (alteration
omitted))). But the scope of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction
is limited by its purpose. Such jurisdiction does not exist "where
the relief [sought is] of a different kind or on a different
principle than that of the prior decree." Peacock, 516 U.S. at
358 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
Likewise, ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is inapt when a party
seeks "to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment
on a person not already liable for that judgment." Id. at 357.4
4These principles apply both when the plaintiff invokes
enforcement jurisdiction in a second lawsuit, as occurred in
Peacock, and in the context of supplemental proceedings brought in
the original lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69.
See U.S.I., 230 F.3d at 500 n.10.
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In this appeal, the Municipality argues that Burgos-
Yantín's Motion for Execution of Judgment does not fall within the
district court's ancillary enforcement jurisdiction because the
motion seeks to impose a new obligation on the Municipality to pay
the "existing federal judgment" against the two police officers.
The Municipality also rejects the validity of the Secretary's Law
9 resolution and, consequently, the indemnification obligation it
purports to impose on the Municipality. Burgos-Yantín counters
that the resolution is valid and enforceable. Accordingly, she
argues, her motion is an appropriate procedural mechanism for
enforcing the judgment because, pursuant to the Law 9 resolution,
the Secretary has determined the Municipality's obligation to
indemnify the judgment rendered against the municipal officers.
A. The Validity of the Law 9 Resolution
The Municipality argues that the Secretary's resolution
is invalid because the Municipality was given no opportunity to
participate in the administrative process that led to its issuance,
an omission that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico subsequently
ruled improper in a different case. See Municipio de Fajardo v.
Secretario de Justicia, 187 D.P.R. 245 (2012).5 In Fajardo, the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that in a Law 9 proceeding, the
5 A certified translation of the Fajardo decision, originally
submitted to the district court, is included in appellants'
appendix. See App'x at pp. 138-46.
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Secretary could not "unilaterally commit the funds of autonomous
municipalities without even giving them the opportunity to be
heard," and directed the Justice Department to "design a process
that grants participation to municipalities when deciding to grant
judgment payment benefits" that would have "the potential of
committing municipal funds." App'x at 144. The Law 9 resolution
at issue in Fajardo was voided, and "the matter was remanded to
the Secretary to reassess its determination after hearing from
Fajardo." Burgos-Yantin, 2014 WL 1096016, at *2.
As the district court's well-reasoned opinion explained,
see id. at **2-3, the decision in Fajardo does not help the
Municipality in this case. Under the administrative scheme in
place at the time the Secretary issued the Law 9 resolution
challenged here, the Municipality had fifteen days to seek judicial
review of the Secretary's decision. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32,
§ 3087. It did not do so.6 Hence, "by the time the Municipality
first objected to the resolution -- after the [Puerto Rico] Supreme
6 Puerto Rico's Uniform Administrative Procedure Law ("UAPL")
provides for a thirty-day period for seeking judicial review of
administrative decisions. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 2172. The
Secretary's Law 9 resolutions qualify as administrative decisions.
App'x at 143 (Fajardo, 187 D.P.R. at 258 n.6) (explaining that the
UAPL applies to the Puerto Rico Department of Justice and thus to
Law 9 adjudications). We, however, need not consider the
interplay between the two deadlines because the Municipality
failed to meet even the longer one. See Burgos-Yantin, 2014 WL
1096016, at *2 ("In the three years since the administrative
proceedings ended and the resolution issued, the Municipality has
never sought to challenge it in state court.").
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Court's decision in Fajardo -- the [Law 9] resolution was already
final." Burgos-Yantin, 2014 WL 1096016, at *2.
The Municipality argues that notwithstanding that
Fajardo was decided in 2012, it applies to this case retroactively.
We disagree. The Fajardo court had the discretion to give
retroactive effect to its decision, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,
§ 3 annot. 1 ("The courts are the ones called to determine if a
decision should be retroactively applied or not." (citing Pedro
Quiles Rodríguez v. Superintendente de la Policía, 139 D.P.R. 272
(1995))), but "[n]othing in [the opinion] purported to revoke
final, unchallenged resolutions previously issued." Burgos-
Yantin, 2014 WL 1096016, at *2; cf. Pueblo v. Báez Cintrón, 2 P.R.
Offic. Trans. 42, 50 (P.R. 1974) (stating that "[w]e do not find
a grounded reason for imparting a retroactive effect to this
rule"). Indeed, as the district court aptly observed, "it is
worth recalling that the remedy that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
required in Fajardo was forward-looking: the creation of a new
administrative scheme that would give municipalities a voice in
Law 9 decisions." Burgos-Yantin, 2014 WL 1096016, at *2 (emphasis
added).7 Thus, by the time the Municipality chose to contest the
Secretary's Law 9 resolution, it was final and unappealable.
7In an attempt to avoid the statutory time bar, the
Municipality emphasizes that it challenged the Secretary's
decision by filing an amicus brief with the Supreme Court in the
Fajardo case. This argument is meritless. The Municipality's
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Having concluded that the Law 9 resolution is valid, we
consider whether the district court had jurisdiction to order the
Municipality to make the required payment to Burgos-Yantín.
B. The Applicability of Ancillary Enforcement Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court in Peacock cautioned courts against
exercising ancillary enforcement jurisdiction "over proceedings
that are entirely new and original." 516 U.S. at 358 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff there, Thomas, had
obtained a judgment on an ERISA cause of action against his former
employer, Tru–Tech, Inc. After failing in his efforts to collect
from the company, Thomas filed a new action in federal court
seeking to impose liability on a Tru-Tech executive and
shareholder, Peacock, based, inter alia, on Peacock's alleged
siphoning of company funds to prevent payment to Thomas. The
district court granted judgment against Peacock in "the precise
amount of the [first] judgment against Tru-Tech." Id. at 352.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the district court had properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction
over Thomas's suit.
In reversing, the Supreme Court rejected Thomas's
contention that his second suit fell within the federal court's
expression of support for a legal argument asserted by a different
municipality in a different case does not excuse its failure to
preserve that argument in its own proceeding.
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ancillary enforcement jurisdiction. Id. at 356. The Court
acknowledged that it had previously "approved the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction over a broad range of supplementary
proceedings involving third parties to assist in the protection
and enforcement of federal judgments -- including attachment,
mandamus, garnishment, and the prejudgment avoidance of fraudulent
transfers." Id. In this instance, however, the Court concluded
that Thomas's second suit was not a means of executing the prior
judgment, but rather an impermissible attempt to shift the
liability imposed in the earlier litigation from Tru-Tech to
Peacock. Id. at 358. Indeed, Peacock had been named in the first
suit but found not liable. Id. at 351. The Court stated that it
had "never authorized the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a
subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing
federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment."
Id. at 357.
The Municipality maintains that the circumstances here
are equivalent to those in Peacock because it, like defendant
Peacock, was dismissed from the case earlier, and Burgos-Yantín is
thus seeking to shift liability to a party "not already liable for
that judgment." Id. The circumstances here, however, are
materially different from Peacock. Most significantly, the new
claims in Peacock were premised on defendant Peacock's actions
after the original judgment was entered, and the plaintiff relied
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on a new theory of liability -- piercing the corporate veil -- to
seek the recovery from Peacock that previously had been assessed
against Tru-Tech. Id. at 353. Here, by contrast, Burgos-Yantín
is not seeking to hold the Municipality itself liable for its own
or the officers' conduct. That is, there is no claim of wrongdoing
by the Municipality, nor is there any claim that the Municipality
is liable for the conduct of the officers on some theory of
vicarious liability. Rather, Burgos-Yantín is attempting to
collect funds that the Secretary has determined the Municipality
must pay to satisfy the original judgment rendered against the
officers. In other words, Burgos-Yantín is seeking to enforce the
original judgment by enforcing the Municipality's statutory
obligation, pursuant to the Secretary's Law 9 resolution, to
indemnify the officers.
We have previously distinguished between collecting on
an original judgment and obtaining a new judgment in a separate
proceeding against a new party. In U.S.I. Properties, we noted
that courts routinely have exercised jurisdiction over a
"postjudgment claim [that] is simply a mode of execution designed
to reach property of the judgment debtor in the hands of a third
party." 230 F.3d at 496. We observed that "federal enforcement
jurisdiction is clear" when state procedural mechanisms -- "such
as garnishment or attachment" -- "allow the court to reach assets
of the judgment debtor in the hands of third parties in a
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continuation of the same action." Id. The Supreme Court in
Peacock also distinguished the new action challenged in that case
from the "broad range of supplementary proceedings involving third
parties" that courts have allowed pursuant to their ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction "to assist in the protection and
enforcement of federal judgments." Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356. The
Court expressly identified garnishment and attachment as among the
procedures that had been deemed permissible. See id.
The Municipality argues that the rationale for allowing
enforcement jurisdiction over proceedings seeking garnishment or
attachment of a judgment debtor's funds held by a third party does
not extend to funds "owed" as a result of an indemnification
arrangement. Indeed, we reserved judgment in U.S.I. Properties
on essentially this scenario: whether the federal courts'
enforcement jurisdiction covers proceedings against municipalities
that have contractual obligations to pay judgments on behalf of
impecunious police officers. 230 F.3d at 497 n.6. Although the
indemnification obligation here arises by statute, rather than
contract, the question of whether indemnification may be
equivalent to the mechanisms previously determined to support
enforcement jurisdiction is the same in either situation.
Now directly faced with that question, we conclude that
Burgos-Yantín's motion to execute judgment against the
Municipality, based on the Municipality's statutory obligation to
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pay, falls within the district court's enforcement jurisdiction.8
In practical terms, the jurisdictional inquiry here is largely
indistinguishable from that applicable to garnishment or
attachment. The Municipality's obligation to pay the damages
award won by Burgos-Yantín has been determined with finality under
state law, and that debt is not based on the Municipality's own
liability for the plaintiff's injury.9 Moreover, this is also not
a situation -- like Peacock or U.S.I. Properties -- where the
plaintiff asserted a new theory of direct liability. See, e.g.,
id. at 500 (noting that the plaintiff's "claim is not simply one
to collect a judgment already rendered but rather one to newly
establish liability directly on the part of a third party").
We thus conclude that the execution of judgment sought
by Burgos-Yantín bears a much stronger resemblance to the
8As we elaborate infra, we are not concluding that post-
judgment proceedings based on indemnification will always fall
within the court's ancillary enforcement jurisdiction. As the
Seventh Circuit observed, such jurisdiction may be inappropriate
where "the additional proceeding . . . inject[s] so many new
issues that it is functionally a separate case." Yang v. City of
Chicago, 137 F.3d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. City
of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 1997)).
9To be sure, garnishment and attachment are not identical to
the indemnification procedure in this case. Unlike the
garnishment and attachment contexts, the funds at issue here were
never the municipal officers' property, and, indeed, the
Municipality must itself generate those proceeds. However, this
factor does not outweigh the similarities between the
indemnification here and the enforcement procedures listed in
Peacock that the Supreme Court viewed as within the federal courts'
enforcement jurisdiction.
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supplemental proceedings that the Court in Peacock identified as
enforcement mechanisms than to the new action it rejected as
impermissible. To reiterate our observation in U.S.I. Properties,
"[f]ederal courts have drawn a distinction between postjudgment
proceedings that simply present a mode of execution to collect an
existing judgment and proceedings that raise an independent
controversy with a new party, attempting to shift liability." 230
F.3d at 498.10 Simply put, Burgos-Yantín is seeking to collect on
a judgment from the party holding the proceeds she is owed. As
such, she is properly invoking the court's ancillary enforcement
jurisdiction. See Groden v. N&D Transp. Co. Inc., 866 F.3d 22,
29 (1st Cir. 2017) (explaining that in ancillary-enforcement
proceedings against third parties, a judgment creditor does not
seek to impose new liability for a money judgment, but attempts to
secure the judgment debtor's funds via a mechanism designed for
that purpose); IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int’l Partners,
LLC, 438 F.3d 298, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (contrasting Peacock, which
10Indeed, the Supreme Court in Peacock appeared to recognize
this distinction when it described two prior cases as consistent
with its holding because "[i]n those cases, we permitted a judgment
creditor to mandamus county officials to force them to levy a tax
for payment of an existing judgment." 516 U.S. at 358. The Court
went on to observe: "The order in each case merely required
compliance with the existing judgment by the persons with authority
to comply. We did not authorize the shifting of liability for
payment of the judgment from the judgment debtor to the county
officials, as Thomas attempts to do here." Id. We note that this
enforcement procedure is very similar to the one we upheld in
Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 368 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004).
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"addressed whether ancillary jurisdiction was available to find
primary liability," with a prior circuit decision that "dealt with
ancillary jurisdiction to seek satisfaction of a judgment from a
party that is alleged to be secondarily liable based on an
indemnification agreement").
The Municipality argues that, even if ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction is appropriate based on an
indemnification theory, it is not proper here because Law 9 makes
the indemnification obligation discretionary rather than
mandatory. We fail to see any significance in that distinction
on the facts of this case. Before Burgos-Yantín filed her motion
for execution, the Secretary had exercised his discretion under
Law 9 in concluding that the Municipality must indemnify the
defendant officers. As discussed above, the Municipality failed
to challenge the Secretary's resolution either administratively or
through appeal to the Commonwealth courts. Accordingly, at this
point, the resolution is final, and it imposes a mandatory
obligation on the Municipality to pay the judgment on behalf of
the officers.
To be sure, in some cases, factual disputes or unresolved
issues of state law may counsel against assuming ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction over post-judgment proceedings based on
indemnification. As noted above, see supra note 8, we acknowledge
that a proceeding that involves "so many new issues that it is
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functionally a separate case," may be outside the scope of a
court's enforcement jurisdiction. Yang v. City of Chicago, 137
F.3d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. City of Chicago,
120 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 1997)). Courts have expressed
different views as to when the need to address state law issues
forecloses such jurisdiction. In two cases cited by the
Municipality, for example, the courts disagreed about whether
unresolved scope-of-employment questions precluded ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction over indemnification-based claims. In
Yang, the Seventh Circuit held that the federal court could resolve
the scope-of-employment issue. See id. at 526. The Sixth Circuit
expressly disagreed with Yang, holding that a "legitimate,
unresolved dispute[] concerning whether conduct occurs within the
scope of employment or authority deprives a federal court of
ancillary jurisdiction in a garnishment action pursuant to
Peacock." Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 146 (6th Cir. 2003).
In the Sixth Circuit's view, jurisdiction was improper when "[t]he
City's liability under the indemnification agreement" had not yet
been established. Id. at 143; see also id. at 144 (noting that
"substantial questions" remained concerning indemnification).11
11
The court in Hudson also noted that the plaintiff's "newly
presented indemnity principle" was premised on "hold[ing] the City
individually liable under the indemnity clause for the full amount
of the Officers' settlement." 347 F.3d at 144-45. The court
concluded that this theory of direct liability did not fall within
the supplementary proceedings allowed under Peacock: "The type of
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Here, we have no unresolved questions of law or fact
concerning indemnification. We have a final determination by the
Secretary of Justice directing the Municipality to indemnify the
two officers. Burgos-Yantín's motion simply asks the federal
court to enforce her judgment by ordering the Municipality to
follow the Secretary's Law 9 determination, thus properly invoking
the court's ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.
C. Order for Execution of Judgment
Having determined that the district court properly
exercised jurisdiction over Burgos-Yantín's motion, we must
consider whether the district court's order to enforce the judgment
against the Municipality complies with Puerto Rico law. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69, state law governs "not only
the parties' substantive rights [concerning execution of a
judgment] but also the procedure to be followed." Whitfield v.
Municipality of Fajardo, 564 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2009). In
ordering that "the judgment of $30,000 in favor of Burgos[-Yantín]
be EXECUTED against the Municipality of Juana Díaz," the district
court directed the appointment of a receiver for "any property
garnished, attached, or restrained from the Municipality."
garnishment proceeding referred to in Peacock does not contemplate
making the garnishee personally liable on the judgment based on
some independent legal theory as [the plaintiff] seeks to do in
this case." Id. at 144.
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Burgos-Yantin, 2014 WL 1096016, at *3. 12 Because no party
addressed the issue, and we considered it important, we ordered
briefing on whether property belonging to a Puerto Rico
municipality may be attached.
We now conclude it is unnecessary to reach that question.
As we previously have noted, Puerto Rico law provides that the
funds needed by a municipality to pay a court judgment must be
allocated in the municipality's budget.13 See Acevedo-Garcia v.
Vera-Monroig, 368 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004); P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 21, § 4303(c). In Acevedo-Garcia, we went on to determine
that a court order directing that "future budgets take account of
a court judgment" does not create an attachment of public funds.
Id. at 56 (citing Librotex, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueducts & Sewer Auth.,
138 D.P.R. 938, 942-43 (1995), for the proposition that "direct
attachment of the funds of a public agency [is] impermissible, but
an equitable order requiring the judgment to be included in the
agency's next budget cycle [is] acceptable"). We have thus
recognized that Puerto Rico law authorizes a procedure for
executing a monetary judgment that does not implicate our concern
about the attachment of municipal property.
12 This order mirrored the plaintiff's request to the court.
13Law 9 also provides that if the municipality does not have
enough funds to pay the judgment, the balance is paid by the
Commonwealth. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, § 3092.
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Consistent with our precedent, and the law of Puerto
Rico, the district court should enter an order directing the
Municipality of Juana Díaz to allocate funds in its budget for the
next fiscal year providing for the payment of the judgment at issue
in this case. To the extent that there are any issues concerning
the timing of the preparation of the next municipal budget, or the
way in which that allocation of funds to pay the judgment should
be set forth in the budget, the district court should work out
those details with the parties.
So ordered. Costs to appellee.
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