In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 18‐1529
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
JUAN ZAMUDIO,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:16‐cr‐00251‐TWP — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED OCTOBER 23, 2018 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 20, 2018
____________________
Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury returned a third su‐
perseding indictment charging defendant Juan Zamudio
with participating in a drug‐trafficking conspiracy after law
enforcement executed a search warrant at his home seizing
approximately 11 kilograms of methamphetamine, a loaded
gun, and a cell phone used to make intercepted calls, among
other items. Prior to trial, the district court granted
Zamudio’s motion to suppress the seized items. The gov‐
2 No. 18‐1529
ernment brings this interlocutory appeal arguing that the
district court erred in granting Zamudio’s motion to sup‐
press the evidence seized at Zamudio’s home pursuant to a
search warrant. We agree and reverse.
I. Background
In February 2016, the FBI’s Safe Streets Gang Task Force
began investigating numerous individuals in Indianapolis,
Indiana for drug‐related activities. The investigation led to
judicial authorization to intercept calls from ten different cell
phones. During its authorized surveillance, the government
intercepted phone calls between the apparent head of the
drug‐trafficking conspiracy, Jose Zamudio, and his brother
Juan Zamudio. (For the sake of clarity, we will refer to de‐
fendant as “Zamudio” and to his brother as “Jose.”)
Approximately nine months later, the government ap‐
plied for a search warrant to search 34 separate locations,
including Zamudio’s residence at 64 N. Tremont Street in
Indianapolis. That same day, the magistrate judge approved
the application for the search warrant. FBI Special Agent
Tim Bates prepared the application and 84‐page affidavit, in
which he set forth three specific instances of Zamudio’s par‐
ticipation in the drug‐trafficking conspiracy.
First, in October 2016, Jose called Zamudio to discuss a
potential methamphetamine sale to co‐defendant Jeffrey
Rush. After the call, Zamudio texted Rush and identified
himself as a contact for future drug transactions. Rush texted
back stating he wanted to purchase two pounds of metham‐
phetamine. Zamudio and Rush then planned to meet at a
Kroger grocery store. When they met, surveillance officers
observed Rush exit a vehicle and enter Zamudio’s vehicle.
No. 18‐1529 3
Then, Rush exited Zamudio’s vehicle with a “basketball‐
sized red box.”
Next, a week after the Kroger transaction, surveillance of‐
ficers observed Rush and co‐defendant Jeremy Perdue enter
Jose’s residence and exit a few minutes later. Rush and Per‐
due then went to a Long John Silver’s restaurant across the
street from where Zamudio worked and met with co‐
defendant Joseph Coltharp. When Coltharp left the restau‐
rant, police pulled him over for a traffic violation, and, after
searching his vehicle, found a package of narcotics on the
vehicle’s floorboard. In the interim, Zamudio reported back
to his brother that the drug transaction had been completed
and that he had collected $15,000 from Rush and Perdue.
Last, in November 2016, co‐defendant Adrian Bennett
called Jose’s phone, but Zamudio answered. Bennett and
Zamudio discussed a shipment of marijuana. Bennett told
Zamudio that he had “some change” (drug proceeds) and
also needed “more of his usual” (marijuana). In addition,
Bennett stated that he needed “some ice cream” (metham‐
phetamine). Zamudio relayed this information to his brother
and then told Bennett to stop by. Bennett said he would do
so in an hour.
Agent Bates averred Zamudio’s other drug‐trafficking ac‐
tivities, including that he had his own customer base in ad‐
dition to working at the direction of his brother. Further,
Agent Bates’s affidavit identified Zamudio’s address as 64
N. Tremont Street, that he paid utilities at this address, and
that his vehicle was routinely parked there overnight. Miss‐
ing from the affidavit—and the reason for this appeal—was
information that drug‐trafficking activity actually took place
at Zamudio’s residence. Nevertheless, Agent Bates stated
4 No. 18‐1529
that based on his experience and training, drug traffickers
“generally store their drug‐related paraphernalia in the resi‐
dences or the curtilage of their residences,” and “drug traf‐
fickers generally maintain records relating to their drug traf‐
ficking activities in their residences or the curtilage of their
residences.” He further averred that “[t]ypically, drug traf‐
fickers possess firearms and other dangerous weapons at
their residence to protect their profits, supply of drugs, and
themselves from others who might attempt to forcibly take
the trafficker’s profits or supply of drugs.”
II. Discussion
The government argues that the district court erred in
granting Zamudio’s motion to suppress because the search
warrant established sufficient probable cause to search
Zamudio’s home. Although Zamudio conceded at oral ar‐
gument that Agent Bates’s affidavit was sufficient to indicate
probable cause that he was engaged in a drug‐trafficking op‐
eration, he argues—as the district court concluded—that
there was not a sufficient nexus between the criminal con‐
duct and his home.
We review de novo a district court’s determination of
probable cause and give great deference to the judgment of
the magistrate judge who issued the warrant. United States v.
Haynes, 882 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); United
States v. Fifer, 863 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983) (“the duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substan‐
tial basis for … conclud[ing] that probable cause existed”)
(internal quotations omitted). Probable cause for a search
warrant exists when the supporting affidavit presents a total
set of circumstances creating a “fair probability” that evi‐
No. 18‐1529 5
dence of a crime will be found. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; United
States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 2018).
This circuit has consistently held that, for a search war‐
rant, probable cause “does not require direct evidence link‐
ing a crime to a particular place.” United States v. Anderson,
450 F.3d 294, 303 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010) (“we have made
clear that direct evidence linking a crime to a particular
place, while certainly helpful, is not essential to establish
probable cause to search that place”); United States v. Lamon,
930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Warrants may be issued
even in the absence of ‘direct evidence linking criminal ob‐
jects to a particular site.’”) (citation omitted). Rather, issuing
judges may draw reasonable inferences about where evi‐
dence is likely to be found based on the nature of the evi‐
dence and the offense. United States v. Orozco, 576 F.3d 745,
749 (7th Cir. 2009); Lamon, 930 F.3d at 1188. Thus, an affida‐
vit submitted in support of a warrant application “need only
contain facts that, given the nature of the evidence sought
and the crime alleged, allow for a reasonable inference that
there is a fair probability that evidence will be found in a
particular place.” Aljabari, 626 F.3d at 944. “In the case of
drug dealers,” this circuit has recognized, “evidence is likely
to be found where the dealers live.” Lamon, 930 F.2d at 1188;
see also Haynes, 882 F.3d at 666 (“judges may permissibly in‐
fer that evidence of drug dealing is ‘likely to be found where
the dealer[ ] live[s]’”) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, our inquiry is whether Agent Bates’s affi‐
davit gave the magistrate judge sufficient information sug‐
gesting a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime would
be found at Zamudio’s home. It did. As Zamudio admitted
6 No. 18‐1529
at oral argument, the affidavit established a reasonable
probability that he had engaged in a drug‐trafficking opera‐
tion. Accord United States v. Correa, ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐‐, 2018 WL
5780728, at *8 (7th Cir. Nov. 5, 2018) (“[I]f officers have prob‐
able cause to arrest someone, there is a good chance they al‐
so have probable cause to search his home for evidence”).
Agent Bates had been an FBI Special Agent since January
2009, had participated in federal electronic wiretap investi‐
gations, had been involved in drug investigations and
searches, and was familiar with the ways narcotics traffickers
conducted their business. Based on Agent Bates’s experience
and training, he asserted that drug traffickers generally store
their drug‐related paraphernalia and maintain records relat‐
ing to their drug‐trafficking at their residences—a fact we
too have recognized. See Lamon, 930 F.2d at 1188. He further
swore that drug dealers commonly store large sums of drug
money and evidence of financial transactions from drug
sales in their residences. Drug traffickers, according to Agent
Bates, also typically possess firearms at their residences to
protect their profits and drug supplies.
Under the circumstances, the issuing judge reasonably
drew the inference that indicia of drug‐trafficking would be
found at Zamudio’s home. Orozco, 576 F.3d at 749 (“a magis‐
trate evaluating a warrant application is entitled to take an
officer’s experience into account in determining whether
probable cause exists”); see also United States v. Kelly, 772 F.3d
1072, 1080 (7th Cir. 2014) (law enforcement’s statement “that
drug dealers are likely to keep contraband in their residenc‐
es” and purchase of drugs at different location created a
“fair probability” that law enforcement would find drugs at
the residence). This conclusion is consistent with our opinion
No. 18‐1529 7
in Orozco where the only support for the link between a
high‐ranking gang member and the likelihood of locating
drug‐dealing evidence at his home was the FBI agent’s belief
informed by his ten years of experience investigating drug‐
trafficking crimes. Id. at 749. In Orozco, we concluded that the
issuing magistrate judge was entitled to credit the FBI
agent’s lengthy experience and high degree of confidence
that the sought‐after evidence was likely to be found at the
defendant’s home. Id. at 750. Similarly, at the time he execut‐
ed the affidavit, Agent Bates had years of experience in in‐
vestigating narcotics traffickers and how they conduct their
business. He stated that drug traffickers commonly conceal
large sums of money and possess firearms at their residenc‐
es, along with drug‐related paraphernalia.
Zamudio believes this ruling will endorse a categorical
approach that in every case where a drug trafficker is in‐
volved, we will uphold a finding of probable cause to search
the drug trafficker’s residence. We have repeatedly rejected
that approach, see, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 475 F.3d 908,
916 (7th Cir. 2007), and we do again now. In the end, proba‐
ble cause is a practical, common‐sense decision best left to
the magistrate judge issuing the search warrant. See Gates,
462 U.S. at 239.
On a final note, although the district court based its deci‐
sion, in part, on errors in the affidavit where Zamudio’s
name was transposed with his brother’s name, on appeal,
Zamudio does not base his arguments on any resultant con‐
fusion. Indeed, despite the occasional name switching, there
was no confusion as to materially outcome‐determinative
facts: Zamudio participated in the drug‐trafficking conspira‐
cy; he lived at 64 N. Tremont Street; and, based on Agent
8 No. 18‐1529
Bates’s training and experience, drug traffickers store drug‐
related items at their residences. This was enough to create a
fair probability that Zamudio’s home contained evidence of
a crime.
Because we conclude that there was probable cause to
search Zamudio’s residence, we need not address whether
the good‐faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.
III. Conclusion
We therefore REVERSE the district court’s decision and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.