IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1161
Filed November 21, 2018
IN THE INTEREST OF A.G.,
Minor Child,
D.S., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights in his child
pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 232 (2018). AFFIRMED.
Elena M. Greenberg of Glazebrook & Hurd, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant
father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Paul L. White, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
2
McDONALD, Judge.
Dylan appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights in his
daughter, A.G., pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (g), (h) and (k)
(2018). The mother of the child at issue does not appeal. Dylan contends the
State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds
authorizing termination of his parental rights. He also argues termination of his
parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. See In re
A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). We give due regard to the factual findings
of the juvenile court, but, ultimately, we adjudicate the rights of the parties anew.
See In re K.N., 625 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 2001); In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 465
(Iowa Ct. App. 2011).
The legal framework governing chapter 232 proceedings is well
established. The State must prove by clear and convincing evidence one or more
statutory grounds authorizing the termination of a parent’s rights and must prove
termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1), (2); In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). Even when the State
proves its case, however, the juvenile court has the discretion to preserve the
parent-child relationship when the parent proves by clear and convincing evidence
a statutory factor allowing preservation of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa
Code § 232.116(3) (setting forth permissive factors to avoid the termination of
parental rights); In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018) (stating it is the
parent’s burden to prove an exception to termination). Evidence is clear and
convincing when “there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness
3
of conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492
(Iowa 2000).
In this case, the juvenile court ordered Dylan’s parental rights be terminated
pursuant to section 232.116(1)(e), (g), (h) and (k). Where, as here, the juvenile
court terminated a parent’s rights on more than one statutory ground, we may
affirm the order if we find clear and convincing evidence to support any one of the
statutory grounds. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010).
We focus our attention on section 232.116(1)(g). This provision authorizes
the juvenile court to terminate a parent’s rights upon clear and convincing evidence
of the following:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to section
232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the same
family or a court of competent jurisdiction in another state has
entered an order involuntarily terminating parental rights with respect
to another child who is a member of the same family.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent continues
to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would
correct the situation.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional period
of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(g).
There is little dispute the State has proved by clear and convincing evidence
the first element of its case. The child at issue, A.G., came to the attention of the
Iowa Department of Human Services (“IDHS”) at the time of her birth due to an
ongoing assistance proceeding involving the same family. A.G. was removed from
the parents’ care two days after her birth and adjudicated in need of assistance.
4
The State also proved by clear and convincing evidence the second
element of its case. The prior assistance proceeding pending at the time of A.G.’s
birth involved the parents and their child A.S. Child A.S. was removed from the
family due to the parents’ ongoing substance abuse, domestic violence in the
home, and the father’s untreated mental-health conditions. Despite the offer of
numerous services, the parents refused to correct the behaviors giving rise to the
removal of A.S. The juvenile court terminated Dylan’s and the mother’s rights in
A.S. in January 2018, prior to the time of the termination hearing and order in this
case.
We conclude there is clear and convincing evidence establishing the third
and fourth elements of the State’s case—that Dylan lacks the ability or willingness
to respond to services that would correct the situation and that an additional period
of rehabilitation would not correct the situation. As noted above, A.G. was
removed from Dylan’s care immediately after her birth due to concerns regarding
Dylan’s substance abuse, domestic violence in the home, and Dylan’s untreated
mental health, all of which precipitated the prior assistance proceeding regarding
A.S. The parents were ordered to attend substance-abuse treatment, individual
therapy for mental-health treatment, and domestic violence awareness classes.
They were provided with numerous services, including: drug screens; relative
placement; assessment services; domestic-abuse-awareness classes; visitation;
family safety, risk, and permanency services; substance-abuse evaluations;
substance-abuse treatment; transportation assistance; family team meetings;
mental-health evaluations; individual therapy services; safety planning; safe care
5
parenting curriculum; hospitalizations for the father; housing assistance; and
additional services provided in the prior assistance proceeding.
As in the assistance proceeding involving A.S., Dylan failed to respond to
these services. At the time of the termination hearing, Dylan had still not
acknowledged, let alone resolved, the issues giving rise to removal. He denied
mental-health concerns. But the evidence showed he was civilly committed in the
preceding year. After being released from his commitment, Dylan continued to
suffer from delusions and paranoia. He denied any substance-abuse addiction.
But the evidence showed he had tested positive for methamphetamine and had
been hospitalized for methamphetamine psychosis. He denied any domestic
violence. But the evidence showed domestic violence had been a long-standing
problem.
The State has proved Dylan has been unresponsive to services and
additional time would not remedy the situation. The State proved this ground for
termination by clear and convincing evidence. See In re L.H., 480 N.W.2d 43, 46
(Iowa 1992) (“The significance of this language appears to be that such a prior
adjudication will ordinarily have provided a useful insight concerning the parents’
ability to function within the goals of an earlier permanency plan.”); see also In re
R.P., No. 16-1154, 2016 WL 4544426, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App Aug. 31, 2016)
(concluding that father’s refusal of services supported termination of rights and
additional time would not remedy the situation); In re C.M., No. 14-1140, 2015 WL
408187, at *4-5 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2015) (affirming termination of parental
rights where the parents sought more time but evidence established they were
unlikely to resolve their substance-abuse problems); In re H.L., No. 14-0708, 2014
6
WL 3513262, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 16, 2014) (affirming termination of parental
rights where the father had history of substance abuse); In re J.L., No. 02-1968,
2003 WL 21544226, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 2003) (concluding that relapse
of parent despite offer of services supported termination of parental rights).
Dylan contends that termination of his parental rights is not in the best
interest of the child. Our consideration of the best interest of the child focuses on
the “best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2). There is no evidence showing that continuation of the parent-
child relationship is in the best interest of the child. Dylan has refused to
acknowledge or address the concerns giving rise to removal of the child. At the
time of the termination hearing, it was unclear that Dylan would even be available
to take care of the child because he was in custody on charges of burglary and
theft. “[I]t is not in the best interest[] of the child[] to return to a parent who refuses
to address the [IDHS]’s primary concerns.” In re E.H., No. 17-0615, 2017 WL
2684420, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED.