lIn tbt, @nfte! 5tuttg [.ourt of fe[ersl @lsrmg
No. l8-979C
(Filed: November 28, 201 8)
(NOT TO BE PUBLISHED)
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JEFFREY SANDERS
Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
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Jeffrey Sanders, pro se, Oak Park, ML
Trial Attomey, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Jana Moses,
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. With her on the briefs were Joseph H.
Hunt, Assistant Attomey General, Civil Division, and Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and L.
Misha Preheim, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
OPINION AND ORDER
LETTOW, Senior Judge.
Pending before the court is the United States' ("the govemment's") motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(bX6) of the Rules ofthe Court ofFederal Claims C'RCFC")'
see Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 8, and the plaintiff s amended cross-motion
for summary judgment, see Am. Mot. for Summ. Judgment ("Pl''s Cross-Mot."), ECF No. 11.
Because this court lacks subj ect-matter jurisdiction over the complaint and Mr. Sanders has
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, the govemment's motion to dismiss Mr.
Sanders' complaint is GRANTED. Mr. Sanders' cross-motion for summary judgment is
accordingly DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The basis for Mr. Sanders' complaint is not readily apparent. The complaint states that
Mr. Sanders' "position is simple [and] well[-]grounded in fact and law," Compl. at 2, but Mr.
Sanders does not provide any factual underpinnings for his claim, see Compl. The submissions
701,8 tl0'{0 0001, 1,313 0113
by Mr. Sanders appear to use a cryptic messaging system, making it difficult to decipher. Many
differently formatted words seem to have no apparent relation to one another besides a common
root letter. See, e.g., Compl. at 3 ("enunciated essential establishments ev(ident)oking,
e(xactly)ecutive, explicit extr(acts)ments") (formatting removed).r Mr. Sanders requests reliefin
the form of "a writ of mandamus," along with a "cumulative 'Declaratory Judgment Award and
Reward of $23,880,000.00(Dollars)."' Id. at 3 (formatting removed).
Despite these obstacles in understanding the gist of the present case, the genesis ofthe
litigation ostensibly stems from previous litigation involving Mr. Sanders. See Compl. Exs. 1-5.
In 2006, Mr. Sanders was married to his then-wife, Tiyani Kuanda-Sanders. The two resided in
an apartment in Michigan, along with their shared child. Compl. Ex. l.
On a moming in 2006,
Mr. Sanders got into an argument with Tiyani, eventually striking her in the face with a closed
fist and threatening her life while holding a knife. Compl. Ex. 1, at 1 (Detroit Police Department
report); Compl. Ex.2,at I (Detroit police investigator's report).2 A visibly injured Tiyani
managed to escape with her young daughter and called the Detroit police, who met her outside
the residence. See Compl. Ex. 1,at 1; see also Sanders v. Detroit Police Dep't,490 Fed. Appx.
771,772 (6th Cir.2012). After speaking with Tiyani outside the couple's residence, the Detroit
police officers knocked on the door ofthe shared apartment. See Sanders v. Detroit Police
Dep ?, No. 07 -14206,2017 WL 548949, at * I (8.D. Mich. Feb. 10,2017) (hndings of fact and
conclusions of law). Mr. Sanders answered, and when questioned by the police regarding the
alleged domestic violence incident, said he wanted to get dressed, and took a step backwards. Id
The two Detroit police officers then entered the home with his wife's permission and arrested
Mr. Sanders on suspicion of domestic violence. 1d Following this arrest, a jury convicted Mr.
Sanders of domestic violence and the court sentenced him to time served and one-year of
probation. Sanders,490 Fed. Appx. at 772; see a/so Compl. Ex. 5, at 1 (order of conviction and
sentence). The state court also issued a protective order that prevented Mr. Sanders from
retuming to the shared residence, from stalking or assaulting Tiyani, and imposed other
restrictions (such as not possessing a firearm). See Compl. Ex. 3, at 1 (protective order).
Unhappy with this development, Mr. Sanders sued the Detroit Police Department, the
two of{icers involved in his arrest, two state judges, and the City of Detroit under 42 U.S.C. $
lMr. Sanders uses parentheses to denote multiple words from the same root. For example
he refers to "criti(cism)que," [c]one(latives)sponding," "coll(aborator)usive," and
"con(niving)sumptive." Compl. at 2 (formatting removed). In addition, Mr. Sanders lists
numerous words in alphabetical order that have no direct relation to the present case. See,e.g.,
Pl.'s Cross-Mot. ("Emphatic, encompassing - enduring - entity - entreaty." (capitalization
removed)).
The appendix to his complain, however, is neatly organized and coherent.
2Mr. Sanders' words as reported by his wife were "I'll kill you bitch." Compl. Ex. 1, at I
(Detroit Police Department report).
1983.3 In a series of lawsuits, Mr. Sanders claimed the arresting officers and the Detroit Police
Department violated his Fourth Amendment rights, as he was anested "without a warrant, and
not afforded a preliminary examination until [12 days laterf." Sanders v. Detroit Police Dep't,
No. 07-14206, 2008 WL 11383387, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2008). The litigation then
bounced back and forth between the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit during the next eleven years. See, e.g., Sanders v. Griefin,
No. 07-cv-14206-DT, 2007 WL 4181657 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2007); Sanders v. Detroit Police
Dep't,653 F. Supp. 2d 715 (8.D. Mich. 2009); Sanders,49O Fed. Appx. 771 (6th Cir. 2012);
Sanders v. Detoit Police Dep't,No,07-14206,2014 WL 12756778 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2014);
Sqnders v. Detroit Police Dep't,No.07-14206,2016 WL 74851 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 7,2016);
Sanders,2017 WL 548949; Sanders v. Detroit Police Dep'r, Nos. 17 -1116/1202,2017 WL
7833754 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2017); Sanders v. Detroit Police Dep't,No.07-14206,2018 WL
3997866 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21,2018). During this decade-plus of litigation, Mr. Sanders often
filed "a number of premature and baseless motions and notices," including "multiple 'emergency
motions' and 'emergency notices."' Sanders,2017 WL7833754, at * 1.4 All of these motions
"were [] denied." /d
The District Court for the Eastem District of Michigan eventually found that Mr.
Sanders' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, as "Tiyani Sanders consented to law
enforcement's entry into her apartment," and Mr. Sanders "did not object to the officers' request
to enter his apartment." Sanders,2017 WL 548949, at *3.5 This, along with the "domestic
violence ald emergency nature ofthe situation," made the search appropriate and consistent with
constitutional requirements. Id. at*3-4. This decision was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.
Sanders,2017 WL 7833754, at *1-2. In 2018, Mr. Sanders made another unsuccessful aftempt
in the District Court for the Eastem District of Michigan, see Sanders,2018 WL 399'7866, at +1,
before seeking relief in this court, see generdily Compl.
STANDARDS FORDECISION
Rule 12(b)(l ) - Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The Tucker Act provides this court with jurisdiction over "any claim against the United
States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act ofCongress or any regulation ofan
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
342 U.S.C. 1983 authorizes civil suits against state officials who deprive a person of
$
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
aSeveral ofthe "unilateral 'notices' [were reportedly] to settlejudgment in [Mr. Sanders']
favor for millions of dollars." Sanders,2012WL 13029531, at *1. Each ofthe notices were
found to be filed "without legal basis." 1d
sThe court also noted that
Mr. Sanders "did not give consent for the officers to enter his
home." Sanders,2017 WL 548949, at *4.
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U. S.C. $ 1491(a)( 1). To
invoke this court's Tucker Act jurisdiction, "a plaintiff must identiff a separate source of
substantive law that creates the right to money damages." Fisher v. United States,402 F.3d
1167,1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevanr part) (citing United States v. Mitchell,463 U.S.
206,216(1983);UnitedStatesv.Testdn,424U.S.392,398(1976)). Ifaplaintifffailstoraisea
claim under a money-mandating provision, this court "should [dismiss] for lack ofsubject matter
jurisdiction." Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Federal Aviation Admin.,525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cty. v. United States,487 F.3d871,876 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
A claim in this court is "barred unless the petition thereon is frled within six years after
such claim first accrues." 28 U.S.C. $ 2501. This six-year statute of limitations is jurisdictional.
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,552 U.S. 130, 134 (2008).
Mr. Sanders, as plaintiff, must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance ofthe evidence.
Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United Stdtes,659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Reynolds
v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv.,846 F.2d,746,748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). When ruling on amotion
to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction, the court must "accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in
the plaintiff s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor ofthe plaintiff" Id. (citing
Henke v. United States,60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). "lf a court lacks jurisdiction to
decide the merits of a case, dismissal is required as a matter of law." Gray v. United States,69
Fed. Cl. 95, 98 (2005) (citing Ex parte McCardle, T4 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868); Thoen v.
UnitedStates,T65F.2d 1110, ll16(Fed.Cir. 1985)); seealsoRCFC 12(hX3)("Ifthecourt
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.").
Rule 12(b)(6) - Failure to State a Claimfor which Relief can be Granted
Under Rule 12(bX6), a complaint that "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted" shall be dismissed. To survive a motion invoking Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiffs complaint
must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to reliefthat is
plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (qtoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly,550 U.S. 544,570 (2007)). The court is bound "to take the well-pleaded factua-
allegations in the complaint as true." Papasan v. Allain,478 U.S. 265,283 (1986); see also
Cambridge v. United States,558 F.3d 133 1, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009). "However, regardless of
whether the plaintiff is proceedingpro se or is represented by counsel, 'conclusory allegations or
legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss."' McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,501 F.3d 1354, 1 3 56 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Taylor
v. Bool