MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 30 2018, 9:57 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Melinda K. Jackman-Hanlin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Greencastle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Supervising Deputy
Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In Re the Termination of the November 30, 2018
Parent-Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
M.R. (Minor Child) 18A-JT-1437
and Appeal from the Putnam Circuit
Court
S.H. (Mother) and R.R. (Father),
The Honorable Matthew Headley,
Appellants-Respondents, Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
67C01-1801-JT-1
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1437 | November 30, 2018 Page 1 of 23
Case Summary and Issue
[1] S.H. (“Mother”) and R.R. (“Father”) appeal the juvenile court’s order
terminating their parental rights to M.R. (“Child”), raising one issue for our
review: whether the juvenile court’s judgment terminating Mother and Father’s
parental relationship with Child was clearly erroneous. Concluding it is not, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born to Mother and Father on May 5, 2003. Mother and Father
have a history with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) that
began in July 2007 when Child reported sexual abuse by Father—a report
which was later substantiated by DCS. On December 3, 2015, DCS received a
report alleging Child had been abducted and raped. Child alleged that an
unknown male picked her up at her bus stop and raped her in his vehicle while
they were parked along the highway. In an interview, Child admitted the story
was fabricated to get Father’s attention. Linda Connors, the family case
manager, notified Mother that an additional report had been made the previous
night alleging Child was raped by her step-father. Mother stated Child did not
have a step-father, but stated Father was home, and denied the allegations.
After Connors expressed a concern for Child’s mental health, Child began
meeting with a therapist at the Hamilton Center.
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[3] On January 13, 2016, Child’s therapist reported to Connors that Child had
stated the rape did occur and that Mother and Father drank frequently. Child’s
therapist also expressed a concern for the level of supervision Mother and
Father were providing Child and stated that Mother, who suffers from seizures,
“‘check[s] out’ due to her health issues.” Exhibits, Volume 3 at 20. DCS,
Mother, and Father entered into an informal adjustment to provide services to
address Child’s mental health needs, in which Mother was provided with a
home-based caseworker and required to submit to random drug screens. By
May 2016, DCS received a report from Child’s school that Child had seventeen
unexcused absences in the second semester of the school year, ten excused
absences, and three unexcused tardies. Child also had nineteen discipline
reports in the first semester due to “academic noncompliance, dress code
violations, misconduct, tardies, attendance violation, insubordination[,] and
lying to a teacher/staff[,]” and five reports in the second semester for
attendance violations. Corrected Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.
[4] In August, Child reported violence and a lack of supervision to Connors and
reported running away from home while Mother was “drunk and passed out[.]”
Corrected Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 2 at 36. In a meeting with Mother,
Connors observed cuts and bruises on Mother, who indicated she got the
injuries from falling. Mother disclosed that she is depressed as a result of living
in Father’s home and that she drinks to cope with her depression. Mother also
reported that Child told her “she doesn’t want to be alive.” Id. at 37. Child
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disclosed running away from home again and stated she would prefer living in
foster care than with Mother and Father.
[5] On another occasion, in September 2016, Child ran away instead of attending
school and was found in the woods by Father. Child’s attendance problems
persisted, and Child was failing a majority of her classes. On September 26,
DCS received a report that Child was late to school and “crying hysterically.”
Id. Child stated that Father had slapped Child across the face and reported
violence at home between Mother, Father, and one of Mother’s sisters. Despite
“[m]ultiple safety plans” and an informal adjustment, problems continued and
DCS removed Child from the home the same day. Ex., Vol. 3 at 14.
[6] On September 27, DCS filed its Verified Petition Alleging a Child to be a Child
in Need of Services (“CHINS”) alleging Child was a victim of Mother and
Father’s inability, refusal or neglect to meet their parental responsibilities based
on the facts outlined above:
The [C]hild’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
neglect of the [C]hild’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply
the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
education, or supervision; and the [C]hild needs care, treatment,
or rehabilitation that the [C]hild is not receiving; and is unlikely
to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of
the Court.
Corrected Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 29.
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[7] Child was placed with Child’s paternal grandmother until October 3 when
Child ran away and she was then placed with Youth Services. Mother and
Father admitted Child was a CHINS at the detention hearing and the juvenile
court held a dispositional hearing on October 18, at which Father failed to
appear. In its dispositional order, the juvenile court accepted DCS’ pre-
dispositional recommendations, awarded DCS wardship of Child, and found:
The needs of [C]hild for care, treatment, or rehabilitation are:
Residential Placement and psychiatric treatment, education and
supervised contact with the parents; Parents need to maintain
sobriety from drugs and/or alcohol, need to learn how to
communicate effectively with each other and [C]hild and
understand [C]hild’s needs and set clear boundaries on roles.
Participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian in the plan for
the child is necessary to: to assist parents in being sober and
appropriate caregivers for [C]hild to provide a safe and stable
environment for [C]hild free from physical altercations; to
provide [C]hild with level of supervision [Child] needs; to assist
parents in obtaining and providing mental health services for
[C]hild.
***
[Child] will receive the following services until further review and
order of the Court: Child to remain in placement in residential
placement in Resource, receive mental health services, education
and supervised visitation with parents.
Id. at 42-43. As a result, DCS referred Father and Mother to submit to random
drug screens, complete home-based casework, domestic violence classes,
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parenting classes, and psychological evaluations. Additionally, Father was
referred to fatherhood engagement and therapeutic supervised visits and DCS
referred Mother to substance abuse individual outpatient therapy and individual
therapy.
[8] The juvenile court held periodic review hearings throughout the CHINS matter.
Adoption and legal guardianship were added to the permanency plan. At a
review hearing on August 17, 2017, the juvenile court found Mother and Father
to be non-compliant with the case plan and sentenced them to serve ten days in
the Putnam County Jail for contempt. In October 2017, the juvenile court held
a permanency hearing and again found that Mother and Father were
“minimally participating” in services and non-compliant with the case plan. Id.
at 9. Despite significant efforts by DCS to engage Mother and Father in
services, neither had complied with the plan by the next review hearing.
[9] On January 23, 2018, DCS filed its Verified Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parent-Child Relationship and the juvenile court held a review
hearing. At that time, the juvenile court found Mother and Father had not
“enhanced their ability to fulfill their parental obligations . . . [and] only
minimally complied with recommendations in this matter.” Ex., Vol. 3 at 81.
Reunification was then removed from Child’s permanency plan. The juvenile
court held a fact-finding hearing on May 1 and issued its order terminating
Mother and Father’s parental rights as to Child on May 18. The juvenile court
found, in part:
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1. Evidence shows that Mother has another child who is not in
her care.
2. Father was substantiated against for sexual abuse of Child
when she was very young.
3. Evidence shows that Parents were given an opportunity to
participate in an informal adjustment prior to the CHINS
case, but that failed to result in meaningful change.
4. Parents each have a significant substance abuse problem that
impacts their ability to parent Child.
5. Father has a significant criminal history of drinking and
driving offenses that spans close to three decades.
6. Father’s arrests and related criminal charges have failed to
result in meaningful change.
7. Mother has a substance abuse problem and has continued to
abuse alcohol for the CHINS case and during pendency of the
termination.
8. Father has a substance abuse problem and has continued to
abuse methamphetamine for the CHINS case and during
pendency of the termination.
9. The [family case manager] and service providers made
reasonable efforts to involve Parents in services.
10. Father failed to comply with the Dispositional Order by
failing to maintain sobriety and availing himself of the
services offered to him.
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11. Mother failed to comply with the Dispositional Order by
failing to maintain sobriety and availing herself of the services
offered to her.
12. The Child was never returned to Mother or Father’s care or
custody following the removal.
***
15. Child signed a consent and voluntarily attended an adoption
event for children to meet potential adoptive families, and has
received interest from two families.
***
17. Parents showed a pattern of unwillingness or inability to
meaningfully engage in services.
18. Evidence shows that Parents[’] lack of effort has a causal
connection to emotional damage to Child.
19. Evidence indicates that Child has been a victim of neglect and
lack of supervision for a long time.
20. Father’s most recent positive methamphetamine screen was
during a visit less than a month ago.
21. Evidence shows that DCS and services providers altered and
adjusted services in attempts to find programs that would
engage Parents.
22. Parents have a history with DCS.
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23. Father has failed to maintain employment.
24. Father failed to participate in numerous drug screens.
25. Mother failed to even take a tour of an intensive program to
treat her addiction.
26. Evidence of Parents ongoing substance abuse issues pose a
threat to Child’s well-being.
27. Parents have demonstrated a pattern of failure to participate
in the services needed, and the neglect that results from their
substance abuse is likely to continue.
28. Parents have failed to demonstrate a willingness to put Child’s
needs above their own.
29. Parents ignored many attempts to engage and cajole them
into participating.
***
35. [T]here is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the Child’s removal from the home of Mother and
Father will not be remedied, or that continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of
each Child.
36. [T]ermination of the parent-child relationship is in the best
interests of the Child[.]
Corrected Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 10-14. Mother and Father now appeal.
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Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[10] The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a
parent’s right to raise his or her children. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and
control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests.’” Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147
(Ind. 2005) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). This right is not
absolute, however, and must be “subordinated to the child’s interests in
determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.”
In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 264-65. Therefore, “[p]arental rights may be
terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental
responsibilities.” Id. at 265.
[11] Involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship is the “most extreme
sanction” and thus, considered a “last resort, available only when all other
reasonable efforts have failed.” In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1161 (2002). In conducting our
analysis, we are mindful that the purpose of terminating the parent-child
relationship is to protect children, not to punish parents. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d
at 265.
[12] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1437 | November 30, 2018 Page 10 of 23
(Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most
favorable to the judgment and afford “due regard” to the juvenile court’s unique
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140,
1143 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). When a juvenile court issues
findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of
review. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009). We first determine
whether the evidence supports the findings, and then determine whether the
findings support the judgment. Id. This court will set aside the juvenile court’s
judgment only if it is clearly erroneous, i.e., when it is unsupported by the
findings and conclusion entered on those findings. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office
of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 198-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). This court
will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of clear error
which leaves us with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Id. at 199.
II. Remedy of Conditions
[13] Mother and Father first challenge the juvenile court’s finding that there was a
reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal will not
be remedied. They contend the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating
that Mother and Father’s domestic violence, substance abuse issues, and
physical violence would not be remedied.
[14] The juvenile court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order
terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8. To
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terminate the parent-child relationship, the State must prove by clear and
convincing evidence:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services.
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(emphasis added); see also Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2
(providing the burden of proof in termination proceedings).
[15] Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive,
the juvenile court was only required to find that one of the three elements of
subsection (b)(2)(B) was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re
I.A., 903 N.E.2d 146, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, the juvenile court found
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the evidence supported (b)(2)(B)(i) and (b)(2)(B)(ii). Concluding the first
element, (b)(2)(B)(i), is met, we need not address the second element. 1
[16] In determining whether the conditions that led to removal are likely to be
remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis: we first identify the conditions that
led to Child’s removal, and then determine whether there is a reasonable
probability that those conditions will not be remedied. K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 647 (Ind. 2015). The second step requires the juvenile
court to evaluate a parent’s fitness to care for a child at the time of the
termination hearing and consider a parent’s pattern of conduct to determine
whether there is a “substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation of the
children.” In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. In
doing so, the juvenile court may consider a parent’s criminal history, substance
abuse issues, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate
housing and employment, and services offered by DCS to a parent and the
parent’s response to those services. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987
N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
1
Mother and Father briefly challenge the juvenile court’s finding that termination of the parent-child
relationship is in Child’s best interest. In their brief, Mother and Father explicitly “dispute the [juvenile
c]ourt’s determination under I.C. 31-35-2-4(b)(2). . .(C)” and state that “[t]ermination of the parental rights
of Mother and Father are [sic] not in the best interest of [Child].” Corrected Appellant’s Br. at 25, 30.
However, any potential argument challenging Child’s best interest stops there and is therefore waived under
Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), which requires that the argument “contain the contentions of the
appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by
citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]”
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[17] Although concerns about Mother and Father’s ability to parent Child began in
2007, DCS most recently became involved in 2015 to investigate an alleged
kidnapping and rape of Child, as well as substantiated allegations of neglect due
to lack of supervision and Mother and Father’s inability to meet Child’s mental
health needs. Transcript, Volume 2 at 29-30. Child was ultimately removed
because “[t]hings were escalating in the home.” Id. at 30. Mother and Father
were not compliant with services, Child continued to be absent from school and
had run away four times, a domestic violence altercation occurred between
Mother and Mother’s sister, and substance abuse and lack of supervision
persisted.
[18] As to facts relating to Child’s continued removal from Mother and Father, the
juvenile court found that both parents have a “significant substance abuse
problem” and have failed to maintain sobriety or engage in services during the
pendency of the CHINS and termination matters, ultimately demonstrating a
“pattern of unwillingness or inability to meaningfully engage in services[,]”
which negatively affects Child’s mental health. Corrected Appellant’s App.,
Vol. 2 at 10-11. Mother and Father argue the “lack of any continued evidence
of domestic violence and/or physical altercations would support a finding that
[they] had remedied these two conditions[.]” Corrected Appellant’s Br. at 29.
We disagree.
[19] In its order, the juvenile court focused on Mother and Father’s lack of progress
and failure to meaningfully engage in services. The record reveals DCS offered
a variety of services to Mother, including substance abuse individual outpatient
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therapy, home-based casework, individual therapy, random drug screens, and
parenting and domestic violence classes. Linda Connors, DCS family case
manager, testified that Mother did not complete individual therapy because
Mother did not like the therapist, so Connors offered to obtain different
therapists or provide transportation to Terre Haute for other types of outpatient
individual therapy. Mother indicated she wanted to continue with her current
therapy but never returned.
[20] Katherine Richards, community specialist case manager assigned to Mother,
testified that Mother would not return phone calls and would often cancel the
day before or morning of a scheduled meeting. In a team meeting, Richards
and Mother discussed the possibility of inpatient treatment at Tara Treatment
Center. Mother stated she would be more comfortable if she and Richards
went to tour the facility. However, Mother cancelled each scheduled
appointment at Tara for various reasons, including the cold weather and having
“too many things to do that day[,]” and she never toured the facility. Tr., Vol.
2 at 71. Richards has continued to make efforts to engage Mother in services by
calling her once a week; however, Richards has only received one return call
from Father who “hung up abruptly.” Id. Ultimately, Mother did not avail
herself of the services DCS offered to a “substantial degree[.]” Id. at 38.
[21] Similarly, Connors stated that Father did not avail himself of the services
offered to him. DCS referred Father to fatherhood engagement, home-based
casework, domestic violence and parenting classes, drug screens, and
therapeutic supervised visits. Father contends he advised DCS he had
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previously participated in multiple “IOPs”2 but those programs did not work for
him; yet “DCS continued to offer the same type of services that Father advised
DCS had not been successful for him . . . and did not offer any alternative
services for his substance abuse issues.” Corrected Appellant’s Br. at 27-28.
Father’s argument here fails because the law concerning termination of parental
rights does not require DCS to offer services to a parent to remedy deficient
parenting. In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
[22] Despite the services offered to him, Father only “dabbled in a couple of the
services, . . . [and] was never successful in finishing one service.” Tr., Vol. 2 at
35. Although Father completed an intake for the fatherhood engagement
program, Whitney Mallow, case manager for the program, testified that it took
“six to seven attempts to get the intake scheduled” with Father and he
demonstrated “minimal interest[.]” Id. at 88. Mallow testified that Father’s
presence at scheduled meetings “wasn’t typical” because he would frequently
not show up. Id. at 89. She also stated there was “never growth from visit to
visit” and described going over the same information at the meetings. Id. at 92.
Ultimately, “[t]here was never progress that [she] ever witnessed during [their]
time together” and Father did not obtain employment. Id.
2
Although “IOP” is not defined in the record, we believe this refers to an intensive outpatient program to
address substance abuse.
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[23] At the fact-finding hearing, Connors explained that she managed the child
family team meetings (“CFTM”) and testified:
CFTM meetings were pretty rough. Either [Mother and Father]
no-showed or they couldn’t get to our office. There was always
some kind of an excuse why they couldn’t be there. [Father]
would always state that he was working when he could never
show proof of employment. Sometimes we’d have to – we’d
have all service providers at the DCS office. We would pick up
and go to their home just to meet with them on the CFTMs. . . .
Id. at 46.
[24] Additionally, Connors stated that Mother and Father’s behavior at some of the
meetings was inappropriate and concerning. Connors detailed the first CFTM,
which Mother, Father, Connors, a home-based caseworker, and Child’s
therapist attended:
[Father] actually just kind of sat there and stared at a paper for
about 45 minutes. About 45 minutes later, he just kind of
popped his head up and asked where [Child’s] therapist was, who
was actually sitting next to him and had been participating in the
meeting the entire time. Other times we would have CFTMs
where [Father] was extremely argumentative, constantly
blame[d] DCS for being in this position, would not take
accountability. We even had [Child] at some of the CFTMs,
which was very concerning because the one that we had [Child],
I think it was last fall, [Father] made it very clear to [Child] that –
he would whisper it to [Child], kind of stare right at [Child] and
say, you know, people are trying to keep us apart, almost making
it kind of like a conspiracy, that he’s doing everything that he
needed to, even though they weren’t. So it was very concerning.
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Id. at 47.
[25] Throughout these proceedings, Mother and Father have failed to engage in
services indicating little likelihood of changed conditions. At the review
hearing in January 2018, the juvenile court found Mother and Father have
“continue[d] to evade drug screens and services offered to them[,]” failed to
cooperate with DCS, and Mother admitted to drinking heavily. Ex., Vol. 3 at
82. Most recently, Mother refused a drug screen several weeks prior to the fact-
finding hearing. Ultimately, Mother and Father’s non-cooperation with DCS
and failure to engage in services “reflects an unwillingness to change existing
conditions.” A.F. v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244,
1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Moreover, Mother and Father fail to
appreciate how their lack of compliance emotionally harms Child. See Tr., Vol.
2 at 38. Tina Araujo, visitation supervisor, observed Child and testified that
Child expresses “[a] lot of frustration” and is “very, very upset” when Mother
and Father refuse or fail a drug screen. Tr., Vol. 2 at 78.
[26] In addition, the juvenile court found Mother and Father have substance abuse
problems that have continued throughout the CHINS case and termination
proceedings. Mother and Father challenge this finding, arguing the State failed
to prove this condition would not be remedied. In support of this argument,
Mother and Father highlight the fact that they both submitted to numerous
drug screens, stating Mother submitted to “at least 28 drug screens . . . 65% of
those screens were negative” and Father submitted to “at least 30 drug screens
. . . 60% of those of those screens were negative[.]” Corrected Appellant’s Br.
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at 27. Although Mother and Father submitted to some drug screens, the record
reveals multiple instances of their refusal to submit to drug screens. Given their
refusal, the statistical information Mother and Father rely on cannot be a
complete and accurate reflection of their sobriety.
[27] The evidence in the record demonstrates that Mother and Father have not
remedied their substance abuse issues. Connors testified that Father has not
maintained sobriety, based on his drug screens, and tested positive for
methamphetamine around August 2017. In fact, Mother and Father’s recent
conduct highlights that these issues have not been remedied or improved. In
January 2018, Mother admitted to drinking heavily and Richards testified that
Mother appeared intoxicated at a January meeting. On April 4, just weeks
before the fact-finding hearing, Father was charged with operating a vehicle
while intoxicated, reckless driving, and resisting law enforcement. Shortly
thereafter, Father tested positive for methamphetamine and refused a drug
screen one week prior to the fact-finding hearing. Father has an extensive
criminal history involving alcohol and driving indicating a concerning pattern
of substance abuse.3
[28] In their brief, Father and Mother contend they engaged with DCS and various
service providers “to help move their case forward” by attending parenting
time, the CFTM meetings, and participating in classes. Id. at 28. As previously
3
At the time of DCS’ assessment in 2007, Father already had roughly nine operating while intoxicated
offenses and has since accumulated additional OWI convictions.
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discussed, neither parent meaningfully engaged in the services. They argue
“DCS admitted that [Mother and Father] did show improvement while the
cases were pending.” Id. at 28. Mother and Father’s statement refers to
Connors’ testimony that “there was a little bit of improvement” during the time
when Mother tried “Cummins [for individual outpatient therapy] and then she
wasn’t able to maintain. [Father] . . . was kind of dabbling with the Hamilton
Center . . . [but] it was a hit or miss with him. [DCS was] still getting positive
screens, a lot of no-shows or refusals for the random drug screens.” Tr., Vol. 2
at 40. However, when a parent demonstrates only temporary improvement and
the “pattern of conduct shows no overall progress,” the juvenile court may
reasonably find the “problematic situation will not improve.” In re N.Q., 996
N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Such is the case here.
[29] Connors testified that neither parent made any progress and she determined it
was not likely that the conditions that led to Child’s removal would be
remedied. Mother and Father’s prior history with DCS also supports this
conclusion. Nonetheless, even if Mother and Father made some slight
improvement, that improvement was brief. Rather, Mother and Father “have
demonstrated a pattern of failure to participate in the services needed, and the
neglect that results from their substance abuse is likely to continue.” Corrected
Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 12. Because the record reveals a pattern of Mother
and Father’s inability to maintain sobriety, failure to engage in services,
resulting in neglect and lack of supervision of Child, we cannot conclude the
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juvenile court’s finding that the conditions will not be remedied was clearly
erroneous.
III. Satisfactory Plan
[30] Mother and Father also argue there is insufficient evidence to support DCS’
claim that it has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child as
required by Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D). Mother and Father
contend that because Child was not in a pre-adoptive home at the time of the
fact-finding hearing, only two families had expressed interest in adopting Child,
and Child demonstrated hesitation about the decision to be adopted prior to the
hearing, the State’s claim that a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
Child is in place is refuted. Mother and Father also argue that Child’s behavior
during recent visits demonstrates Child “does not want to be adopted.”
Corrected Appellant’s Br. at 29.
[31] A satisfactory plan need not be detailed so long as it provides a “general sense
of the direction” of where the child will go after parental rights are terminated.
Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007), trans. denied. A plan is satisfactory if DCS will “attempt to find suitable
parents to adopt the children.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014), trans. denied. “[T]here need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption
will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.”
Id.
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[32] At the time of the fact-finding hearing in May 2018, Child was in foster care,
not a pre-adoptive home. Connors testified that adoption was added to the
permanency plan in July 2017 and although DCS had not found anyone to
adopt Child in the ten months since, Connors stated that was due to DCS’ focus
on family members because legal guardianship had been added to the
permanency plan in October. DCS began the adoption process on April 21, just
weeks before the hearing. Connors stated, “There’s a process that they have to
review the entire file, do a child summary, those types of things.” Tr., Vol. 2 at
59. At a recent social, two families expressed interest in adopting Child.
[33] Mother and Father do not cite to any authority to support their arguments
regarding a satisfactory plan. Although DCS only recently began taking steps
toward Child’s adoption, it is clear DCS has attempted and will continue to
attempt to find suitable parents to adopt Child. Therefore, sufficient evidence
of a satisfactory plan was presented at the fact-finding hearing.
Conclusion
[34] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led
to Child’s removal will not be remedied and a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatment of Child exists. Therefore, the juvenile court’s decision to terminate
Mother and Father’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous.
[35] Affirmed.
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Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
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