J-S57035-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
NICHOLAS DEMATTEO, :
:
Appellant : No. 1741 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order May 5, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0907481-1990
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., PLATT, J.* and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 04, 2018
Nicholas Dematteo1 (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court provided the following procedural history.2
1 Appellant is also known as Hernan Cortez. PCRA Court Opinion, 8/8/2017,
at 1.
2 We rely on the PCRA court’s summation of the facts and procedural history
because Appellant failed to include in the certified record any trial or
sentencing transcripts, or any materials pertaining to his first PCRA, two
appeals to our Court, or his petitions for writs of habeas corpus. See
Commonwealth v. Bongiorno, 905 A.2d 998, 1000-01 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(“[T]he ultimate responsibility of ensuring that the transmitted record is
complete rests squarely upon the appellant and not upon the appellate
courts.”). See also Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 151 A.3d 1117, 1127 (Pa.
Super. 2016) (finding claim waived where review of issue raised was
dependent upon materials not included in the certified record). However, the
omission of these materials does not hinder our ultimate review.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Appellant] and Adam Colon were arrested on July 14, 1990,
for the murder of Martin Brill. The defendants opted for a bench
trial and on January 7, 1992, [] both were convicted of second-
degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possessing an
instrument of crime. [Appellant] was sentenced to life in prison
on November 16, 1992. Post-verdict motions were filed on
November 6, 1992, which were subsequently denied. [Appellant]
filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, who
affirmed the trial court on July 19, 1993. [Commonwealth v.
Cortez, 633 A.2d 1220 (Pa. Super. 1993) (unpublished
memorandum)]. On May 26, 1994, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied [Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal].
[Commonwealth v. Cortez, 644 A.2d 1196 (Pa. 1994).
Appellant pro se filed his first PCRA petition] on January 14, 1997.
New counsel was appointed and on December 20, 1997,
[Appellant] amended his petition. The PCRA court dismissed the
petition on July 27, 1998. An appeal was filed on October 27,
1998, and the Superior Court again affirmed the lower court on
July 27, 1999. [Appellant] filed a motion for permission to file a
nunc pro tunc [petition for allowance of appeal] to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on June 7, 2000.
[Appellant] filed a state habeas petition on December 18,
2000, which was dismissed on February 22, 2001. On May 21,
2001, [Appellant] filed a federal habeas petition, which was
amended on March 27, 2002, with the aid of counsel. The petition
was subsequently denied by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on
June 4, 2004. [Appellant] then filed a petition for writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied on
December 6, 2004.
PCRA Court Opinion, 8/8/2017, at 1-2.
On March 23, 2012, Appellant, represented by counsel, filed a second
PCRA petition, which is the petition at issue in this case. Therein, Appellant
asserted his petition was timely filed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii),
which provides that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
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of due diligence.” PCRA Petition, 3/23/2012, at 10. Appellant’s purported
newly-discovered fact was that Victor Ruffin, an eyewitness who identified
Appellant as Colon’s accomplice to police and at trial, had lied about
Appellant’s involvement.
As alleged in Appellant’s PCRA petition, on July 29, 2011, the
Pennsylvania Innocence Project (the Project) interviewed Colon. Colon stated
that Appellant was not present during the shooting, and that Colon committed
the shooting by himself. Colon also relayed that in 1998 or 1999 he spoke to
Ruffin on the telephone. During the phone call, Colon asked Ruffin why he
identified Appellant as being involved in the shooting, and Ruffin responded
that he did so because the police told him that Colon had named Appellant as
the shooter. According to Colon, his wife and an individual with the street
name of “Bronco” were present during this phone call. The Project determined
that “Bronco” was an individual named Ricardo Morales. On January 26, 2012,
the Project interviewed Morales, who stated that Ruffin told him in 1997 that
Appellant had nothing to do with the shooting, and the police and district
attorney made him testify. Shortly thereafter, Morales set up the
aforementioned phone call between Colon and Ruffin. See PCRA Petition,
3/23/2012, at 6-7, 11-13. In support of his petition for relief, Appellant
attached certifications from Colon and Morales. Id. at Exhibit F (Certification
of Ricardo Morales); Exhibit G (Certification of Adam Colon).
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On March 21, 2017,3 the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss
Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The
notice stated that the reasons for dismissal were because: (1) the “petition
was untimely filed and no exceptions to the timeliness requirements
appl[ied;]” (2) the issues raised were “without arguable merit[;]” and (3) the
issues raised “ha[d] been previously litigated.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice,
3/21/2017. On May 5, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
petition by amended order.4
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA
court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Appellant presents two issues
for our review.
3 The docket indicates that a judicial reassignment and several continuances
occurred in 2016, but otherwise the record provided offers no explanation for
the five-year delay in reviewing Appellant’s second PCRA petition. This
lengthy delay is unacceptable. Our Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he
PCRA court [has] the ability and responsibility to manage its docket and
caseload and thus has an essential role in ensuring the timely resolution of
PCRA matters.” Commonwealth v. Renchenski, 52 A.3d 251, 260 (Pa.
2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 24–25 (Pa. 2012)
(“[T]he court, not counsel, controls the scope, timing and pace of the
proceedings below.”)). Additionally, “post-conviction counsel must ‘act
expeditiously so as to reduce unnecessary delays and ensure the efficient
administration of justice.’” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d
1096, 1104 n.11 (Pa. 2012)).
4The initial dismissal order, dated May 2, 2017, erroneously referenced a “no-
merit” letter and petition to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Turner, 544 A.2d 297 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d
213 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en banc), though no such letter was filed by
Appellant’s counsel. The amended order omitted this reference.
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[1] Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred in dismissing [Appellant’s]
petition without holding an evidentiary hearing where he
presented issues of material fact as to his diligence in uncovering
new evidence of a material witness’s recantation?
[2] Whether [Appellant’s] argument that his credible claim of
actual innocence acts as a gateway to overcome procedural bars
allows the [PCRA c]ourt to decide his claims on the merits?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (introductory headings and trial court answers omitted).
We begin with our standard of review.
This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review is limited to
the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record and we
do not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence
of record and is free of legal error. Similarly, we grant great
deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not
disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record.
However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.
Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Finally, we
may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record
supports it.
Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Perry, 128 A.3d 1285, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2015)).
Any PCRA petition, including second and subsequent petitions, must
either (1) be filed within one year of the judgment of sentence becoming final,
or (2) plead and prove a timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). “For
purposes of [the PCRA], a judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). When
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pursuing an otherwise untimely PCRA petition based on an exception to the
time-bar, the petition “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could
have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Recognizing his petition was patently untimely, Appellant attempted to
invoke the newly-discovered facts exception pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1)(ii), as detailed above. See PCRA Petition, 3/23/2012, at 10. On
appeal, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in denying his petition
without a hearing because there was a question of material fact as to whether
Appellant acted with due diligence in presenting his newly-discovered facts
exception.5 Appellant’s Brief at 16, 19-25.
To qualify for the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time-
bar, “a petitioner need only establish that the facts upon which the claim is
based were unknown to him and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence.” Burton, 158 A.3d at 629 (some citations omitted).
“Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect
his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have obtained
5 In explaining its rationale for finding that Appellant failed to invoke the
newly-discovered facts exception, the PCRA court conflated the distinct
requirements of the newly-discovered facts exception to the time-bar and the
merits-based analysis for after-discovered evidence claims. PCRA Court
Opinion, 8/8/2017, at 6-7. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618,
629 (Pa. 2017) (detailing the distinctions between those provisions). Although
the PCRA court erred in this respect, we may affirm on any basis. See
Benner, supra.
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the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth
v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
Even assuming that Appellant satisfied the newly-discovered facts
exception, Appellant failed to file his PCRA petition within 60 days of when it
first could have been filed, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Appellant
asserts that his petition complied with subsection 9545(b)(2) because it was
filed within 60 days of Morales’s interview. PCRA Petition, 3/23/2012, at 10.
However, based upon our review, Morales’s interview is not the starting date
for when Appellant first could have filed the petition. As detailed supra, prior
to interviewing Morales, the Project interviewed Colon on July 26, 2011.
During that interview, Colon stated that Appellant was not involved in the
shooting and that Ruffin had implicated Appellant because he believed that
Colon had told police that Appellant was the shooter. Thus, on or around July
26, 2011, Appellant became aware that Ruffin had acknowledged that his
identification of Appellant was not truth-based. The subsequent interview of
Morales merely corroborated Colon’s phone call and added another source for
Ruffin’s acknowledgement that he had lied about Appellant’s involvement.
“The focus of the exception is on [the] newly discovered facts, not on a newly
discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.”
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 57 A.3d 645, 648–49 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation omitted; emphasis in original)
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Thus, for his petition to have been timely-filed, Appellant had to file his
PCRA petition within 60 days of July 26, 2011, when he first learned of Ruffin’s
potential perjury. He did not. Accordingly, we find that the PCRA court did
not err in dismissing his petition based on its untimeliness. See
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
omitted) (“[W]hen a PCRA petition is … entitled to one of the [timeliness]
exceptions, but not filed within 60 days of the date that the claim could have
been first brought, the [PCRA] court has no power to address the substantive
merits of a petitioner’s PCRA claims.”)
Appellant next claims that his assertion of actual innocence should serve
as a “‘gateway’ to present otherwise time-barred claims.” Appellant’s Brief at
25 (citing McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013)). Our Court has
previously rejected a claim that McQuiggin allows petitioners asserting actual
innocence to overcome the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. Specifically, we
held that “[w]hile McQuiggin represents a further development in
federal habeas corpus law, … this change in federal law is irrelevant to the
time restrictions of our PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418,
421 (Pa Super. 2016). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting
Appellant’s alternative approach to circumvent the PCRA’s timeliness
requirements.
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Thus, we conclude that the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA
petition was proper and, accordingly, affirm the PCRA court’s May 5, 2017
order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/4/18
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Com. v. Dematteo, N.
Combined Opinion