J-S58015-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: C.W., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.W. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 652 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order April 6, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): No. CP-02-AP-102-2017
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2018
Appellant, J.W. (Father), appeals from the order entered on April 6,
2018 involuntarily terminating his parental rights to C.W. (a female born IN
July, 2015) (Child) pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2),
(5), (8), and (b).1 Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this case
as follows:
Child was born to C.L.P. (“Mother”) and resided with Mother until
Mother’s death in a shooting incident on March 11, 2016. [Father]
is named as the [f]ather on [Child’s] birth certificate [and] Father
signed an [a]cknowledgment of [p]aternity on the date of [Child’s]
birth.
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1 The order additionally involuntarily terminated the parental rights of another
man, D.C., who previously asserted a paternity claim, as well as any putative
father to Child. Neither D.C. nor any putative father is a party to the current
appeal or filed a separate appeal.
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[Child] initially came to the attention of [the Allegheny County
Office of Children and Youth Services (CYF)] after Mother tested
positive for marijuana at the time of [Child’s] birth. CYF
conducted an investigation and opened a case in September,
2016. CYF has remained involved with [Child’s] family since that
time.
Following [Child’s] birth, while she resided with Mother, Father
initially remained involved in CYF meetings and home visits, and
was often at Mother’s residence, although he [did not] reside
there, but was in and out of the house. However, on October 13,
2015, Father received a sentence of 15 to 30 months of
imprisonment for [possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance.]
On March 11, 201[6], Mother was shot and killed. CYF initially
placed [Child] along with her older brother[,] J.W.[,] with their
maternal grandmother following Mother’s death. In April, 201[6],
CYF sought an emergency custody authorization (ECA) because of
Mother’s death and Father’s incarceration. CYF subsequently
removed [Child], along with her brother J.W. from maternal
grandmother’s care and placed them with a maternal aunt. CYF
thereafter filed a dependency petition on March 25, 2016 on the
grounds that Mother was deceased and Father was still
incarcerated at that time. [The trial court] adjudicated [Child]
dependent on June 22, 2016, and [Child] subsequently returned
to the care of maternal grandmother, where she has resided since.
In February, 2017, while still incarcerated, Father [] contacted CYF
by letter in which he stated that he wished to see his daughter
upon his release, and that he missed her. CYF’s efforts to further
communicate with Father while he was incarcerated were
unsuccessful. Father did not seek visitation with [Child] while
incarcerated. However, he informed CYF by letter that during his
imprisonment, he had maintained some phone contact with
[Child] while she was in the care of maternal grandmother, until
maternal grandmother’s phone number changed and he could no
longer contact her. Father did not otherwise request visits with
[Child] while he was incarcerated.
On July 20, 2017, Father was released from incarceration and
placed on probation/parole. Initially, following his release on
probation/parole, Father listed his sister’s home as his residence.
However, he was subsequently ordered to reside in a halfway
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house in January, 2018, after violating the conditions of his
probation/parole by failing to reside in his designated residence
with his sister, and residing instead with his girlfriend.
Father attended his first hearing in this matter on August 9, 2017,
following his release from incarceration. Thereafter, CYF began to
conduct supervised visits between Father and [Child] beginning
on August 10, 2017. CYF arranged a total of [36] visits between
Father and [Child]. Of the [36] visits scheduled by CYF, Father
attended [23], each of which were approximately two and-a half
to three hours long. In January, 2018, [the trial court] granted
Father some unsupervised visitation with [Child].
CYF filed a petition for termination of the parental rights of Father
on June 20, 2017. [The trial court] conducted a hearing on the
petition on April 6, 201[8] and on April 13, 201[8 the trial court]
entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights. Father filed
a [n]otice of [a]ppeal on May 9, 2018 and a [c]oncise [s]tatement
of [e]rrors [c]omplained of on [a]ppeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) on that same day. [The trial court issued an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on June 11, 2018.]
Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/2018, at 2-5 (record citations and footnote omitted).
On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and
(8)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Father’s Brief at 6.2
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2Before turning to the merits of this appeal, we first note the following. On
August 18, 2017, the trial court appointed KidsVoice as counsel to represent
Child as required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) and our Supreme Court’s decision
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In his first issue presented, Father contends that the trial court erred by
finding CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that he “failed to address
relevant goals or whether a continued incapacity exists” under the relevant
subsections of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), as alleged in the termination petition.
Father’s Brief at 16-20. More specifically, in sum, Father avers:
CYF based much of its argument [in favor of terminating Father’s
parental rights] on evidence that Father was still in a half-way
house and was not in recommended mental health treatment. But
there was no testimony that Father poses a physical or
physiological risk to [Child]. CYF even admitted that the goal of
mental health treatment was something Father needed to do to
become a better parent.
Father has remedied any parental incapacity related to his ability
to care for [Child] except for housing which may be resolved in
the near future. Once he was given a realistic opportunity, Father
visited [Child] regularly. Father has done all that he could since
his release from prison and it would be contrary to the purpose of
establishing and requiring a parent to pursue reunification goals if
after doing so the parent is told that his or her efforts are still not
good enough.
____________________________________________
in In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (plurality). Andrea
Spurr, Esquire, an attorney from KidsVoice, represented Child at the
termination hearing and agreed that CYF met its burden in providing clear and
convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights. N.T., 4/6/2018, at
133-134. Upon Father’s appeal, Attorney Spurr filed an appellate brief on
Child’s behalf maintaining that termination of Father’s parental rights was
proper. Moreover, we recognize that Child was two years and eight months
old at the time of the termination proceeding. Our Supreme Court has
determined that a three-year-old is too young to express a preference
regarding reunification or termination of parental rights and an appointed
attorney may simultaneously represent a child’s best and legal interests in a
contested termination proceeding. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1089-
1090 (Pa. 2018). As such, we presume KidsVoice did not have a conflict of
interest in advocating for Child’s best and legal interests. Id.
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If any compliance should be reviewed it should respectfully include
CYF and the trial court as to whether Father was given a due
chance to succeed when Father was never transported from prison
for a hearing, Father never had a colloquy with the trial court as
to the availability and importance of counsel, Father was not
assisted with prison procedures to facilitate visits with [Child], or
even provided with the foster mother’s new telephone number so
Father could maintain contact with [Child]. The failure to reunify
could be argued to be the result of these omissions or failures
more than any deficiencies alleged to remain with Father after all
of Father’s efforts.
Id. at 18-20.
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011)
(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel
Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011);
Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an
abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,
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as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual
findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa.
1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of
parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See In
re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
Section 2511(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent.
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* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a
period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of
time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under Section 2511(a)(2) as
follows:
[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for termination
of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.” ...
[Our Supreme] Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for
termination under § 2511(a)(2):
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be
made lightly or without a sense of compassion for the
parent, can seldom be more difficult than when
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termination is based upon parental incapacity. The
legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption
Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of
performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit
as one who refuses to perform the duties.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.
Moreover, while incarceration alone cannot be grounds for termination
of parental rights, our Supreme Court has held:
A parent's absence and/or failure to support due to incarceration
is not conclusive on the issue of abandonment. Nevertheless, we
are not willing to completely toll a parent's responsibilities during
his or her incarceration. Rather, we must inquire whether the
parent has utilized those resources at his or her command while
in prison in continuing a close relationship with the child. Where
the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in declining to
yield to obstacles, his other rights may be forfeited.
* * *
[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative
factor, in a court's conclusion that grounds for termination exist
under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity
of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes
of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.
Id. at 828 (internal citations omitted).
Additionally, this Court has long recognized that a parent is required to
make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full
parental responsibilities. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness
regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as
untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340. It is well-settled that “we will not toll
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the well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of
C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1007 (Pa. Super. 2008), citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d
726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on
hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.”).
In this case, the trial court determined:
At the April 6, 2018 hearing on CYF’s petition for involuntary
termination of parental rights, [] CYF supervisor David Sprague,
[] credibly and consistently testified that [Child] had no face-to-
face contact with Father from the time of his incarceration in or
around October 2015, at which time [Child] was approximately
three months of age, until after his release on July 20, 2017, at
which time [Child] was two years of age. In addition, Father had
limited, if any, telephone or other contact with [Child] during the
extended period of incarceration. This absence of interaction
impaired the development of a meaningful bond between Father
and [Child] who has never resided in Father’s care since the time
of her birth. CYF presented credible and consistent testimony that
Father has never engaged in long-term care of [Child], who has
resided with maternal grandmother since shortly after Mother’s
death and for the majority of [Child’s] life – during which time
Father did not maintain regular contact.
Father’s absence from [Child’s] life has been the result, in part, of
his failure to commit to parenting and make appropriate decisions
in [C]hild’s best interests. His repeated incarcerations and most
recent placement in a halfway house after he failed to remain at
his designated residence following his release from jail on
probation or parole, is further evidence of his ongoing failure to
prioritize parenting. Rather, it reflects a continuation of conduct
and decision making that prevents Father from providing [Child]
with stability and consistency – as evidenced, for example, by his
inability to progress to a position that would enable him to secure
appropriate housing in which to care for [Child]. Father’s failure
to give priority to parenting and to provide a stable, secure
environment for his child, has caused [her] to be without essential
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parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for her physical
or mental well-being.
[The trial court] acknowledge[d] that Father was granted
visitation with [Child] following his release from imprisonment,
and that he attended 23 visits with [C]hild. However, although he
attended scheduled visits, Father’s conduct indicates a lack of the
appropriate level of responsibility and consistency necessary for
him to provide parental care to [Child] in a home setting. In
reaching this determination, [the trial court] found credible and
persuasive the testimony of Dr. [Beth] Bliss, a licensed
psychologist who conducted an evaluation of Father on January
12, 2018. Dr. Bliss diagnosed Father as suffering from anti-social
personality disorder that interferes with his ability to behave in a
consistent, responsible manner, and appropriately control his
impulses in order to effectively parent [Child]. Dr. Bliss reported
that Father’s mental health condition interferes with his ability to
provide stable and consistent parenting. This testimony by Dr.
Bliss is substantiated by the fact that Father has a lengthy criminal
history[fn] resulting in his most recent [incarceration] during
[Child’s] infancy which led her being without his parental care.
Father continues to demonstrate an inability to regulate his own
conduct and maintain stability in an independent setting outside
of confinement or a halfway house. His poor decision making and
inability to progress [] have hampered his ability to provide [Child]
with secure and consistent parental care and support.
Based on the foregoing, [the trial court] concluded that CYF
presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate that grounds for
termination of parental rights exist as to Father. The evidence
and testimony presented [] indicate that the conditions and
causes of the incapacity or refusal of Father to provide [Child] with
parental care cannot and will not be remedied by Father, and
continue to occur.
[fn] At the [termination] hearing, CYF presented evidence of
Father’s criminal history, as follows: On August 17, 2009[,]
Father received a sentence of [two] years of probation plus fines,
after he entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession of a
controlled substance. On July 7, 2011, Father received a sentence
of 9 months of probation for one count of possession of a
controlled substance. On October 13, 2015, Father was found
guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, possession of a controlled substance, possession of
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marijuana, use/possession of drug paraphernalia, endangering
the welfare of children, tampering with evidence, and conspiracy.
Father was sentenced to 15 to 30 months of imprisonment,
reduced to 11 months and [seven] days followed by [four] years
of probation under the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive Act.
On January 28, 2016, Father was found guilty of defiant trespass
and disorderly conduct and subsequently sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of nine days.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/2018, at 7-9 (record citations omitted).
Upon careful review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that
the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of Father under
Section 2511(a)(2) is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, Child was born in July, 2015. She was two years and nine months
old at the time of the termination hearing on April 6, 2018. Of that time,
Father was incarcerated for one year and nine months. It was proper for the
trial court to consider Father’s incarceration in assessing whether he was
incapable of caring or refused to care for Child.
Additionally, we reject Father’s suggestion that he was not assisted with
prison procedures to facilitate visits with Child or provided with the foster
mother’s new telephone number. Father was incarcerated in October 2015,
but waited until February 2017 to contact CYF by letter, requesting visitation
after he was to be released. N.T., 4/6/2018, at 23-24. Father never
requested visitation with Child while he was imprisoned nor did he take steps
to remain in contact with Child. Id. at 24. He also admitted to Dr. Bliss that
he did not talk to prison officials about the procedure for visitation. Id. at 84.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly considered
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the fact that Father made minimal efforts from prison and did not utilize his
resources to continue a close relationship with Child. He simply did not
exercise reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles for reunification
with Child.
Moreover, in early January 2018, after he was released from prison,
Father violated the terms of his probation/parole and moved into a halfway
house. On January 28, 2016, Father was found guilty of defiant trespass and
disorderly conduct and sentenced to nine days of incarceration. CYF presented
evidence of Father’s extensive criminal record and Dr. Bliss testified that
Father engages in a “persuasive pattern of not following the laws or rules.”
Id. at 86. Thus, we reject Father’s contention that the trial court relied almost
exclusively on his potential mental health issues and his residence in a halfway
house. Instead, the trial court determined that the totality of circumstances,
including engaging in continued misconduct and violating the terms of his
probation/parole, demonstrated Father’s incapacity or refusal to properly
parent.
Finally, Father concedes that he has not obtained appropriate housing
for Child. His claim that he will be able do so in the near future, after failing
to do so for an extended period, rings hollow. We simply may not toll the
well-being and permanency of Child indefinitely, because Father does not put
Child’s needs before his own. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(2). Because we may affirm the trial court’s decision
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regarding the termination of Father’s parental rights with regard to any one
subsection of Section 2511(a), we need not address the other statutory
sections proffered by CYF.
In his second issue presented, Father argues that the trial court erred
in finding that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that termination
of his parental rights would best meet the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of Child, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
Father’s Brief at 20-22. Father maintains that “Dr. Beth Bliss, a clinical
psychologist called as an expert witness by CYF, noted that without performing
an interactional [observation] of Father and [Child] that she could not address
the [] issue[].” Id. at 21. Father contends that although expert testimony is
not necessary for a Section 2511(b) assessment, there was no “testimony as
to the emotional effect that termination will have upon [Child] which
compelled the trial court to either speculate or rely upon unclear testimony
which cannot support a determination of the needs and welfare [of Child] as
required under § 2511(b).” Id. at 22.
This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under
Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to Section
2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under
Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
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§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)],
this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and
welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between
the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to
discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the
parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and
make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances ... where
direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not
necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).
A parent’s neglect is likewise a relevant part of this analysis:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect[], is able to sift through the
emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent ... Nor are
we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the
parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
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development of the child and [her] mental and emotional health
than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
This Court may affirm the involuntary termination of parental rights
despite the existence of some bond, where placement would be contrary to
her safety or best interests. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super.
2008). “The trial court should also examine the intangibles such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.”
Id. “Another consideration is the importance of continuity of relationships to
the child and whether the parent-child bond, if it exists, can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.” Id. Accordingly, “a parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of ... [his] child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill ... [his] parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super.
2004) (internal citations omitted).
On this issue, the trial court opined:
In terminating Father’s parental rights, [the trial court] considered
the developmental, physical and emotional needs of [Child]
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). In so doing, [the trial court]
determined that termination was warranted in light of the impeded
development of any meaningful, consistent relationship and bond
between Father and [Child], from her infancy until August, 2017
when supervised visitation between Father and [Child] began. In
addition[,] evidence and testimony presented at the hearing
indicated that [Child] displayed an emotional bond to maternal
grandmother to whom she is attached. Moreover, maternal
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grandmother effectively provides for [Child’s] physical, emotional
and developmental needs and welfare. CYF presented credible
testimony that [Child] has bonded with maternal grandmother,
that [Child] is doing well in her placement, and that maternal
grandmother engages and interacts with [Child] in an appropriate
manner.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/2018, at 9-10 (record citations omitted).
Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s assessment. CYF presented
the testimony of a caseworker who stated that Child has an emotional bond
and attachment with her maternal grandmother. N.T., 4/6/2018, at 72. Child
also has a very close relationship with her older brother, who also resides with
maternal grandmother, and he is very protective of Child. Id. at 73. In their
home, maternal grandmother interacts with the children with developmentally
appropriate toys and books. Id. at 73, 76-77. Child does not speak about
Father. Id. at 77.
The record reveals that Dr. Bliss was not able to conduct an interactional
observation of Father with Child. Id. at 82. Dr. Bliss scheduled appointments
three times, but it was never completed. Id. Father was late the first time
and Child was sent home before it could be conducted. Id. Child was sick for
the second scheduled observation and maternal grandmother cancelled the
appointment. Id. Father did not show for the third scheduled interactional
observation. Id. However, as stated above, an evaluation was not legally
required. Moreover, based upon background information provided by CYF, a
direct interview with Father, and her expertise and experience, Dr. Bliss
opined that “the likelihood of [Child] having a bond or attachment from the
first three months of her life and maintaining that bond or attachment despite
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no contact at all with someone until she was two and a half is extremely
unlikely.” Id. at 102. Dr. Bliss further opined that it was also extremely
unlikely Child developed a bond with Father during their supervised visits after
Father’s incarceration or that severing their relationship would be detrimental
to Child. Id.
Here, there was clear and convincing evidence that the involuntary
termination of Father’s parental rights was proper under Section 2511(b). The
trial court gave primary consideration to Child’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare. Despite the existence of some relationship with
Father, Child’s placement with him would be contrary to her safety or best
interests. Moreover, the trial court appropriately considered Child’s current
placement and her bond and attachment to her maternal grandmother and
older brother. There was clear and convincing evidence that maternal
grandmother has met all of Child’s needs, including providing love, comfort,
security, and stability for her. Whereas, the record reveals that Father has
not met these needs. As such, we discern no abuse of discretion in
terminating Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) and Father’s
second issue fails. For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/7/2018
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