MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Dec 11 2018, 9:27 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brian A. Karle Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela Sanchez
Lee M. Stoy, Jr.
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Willie Langford, December 11, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1711-CR-2653
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Anne Flannelly,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G04-1609-F5-35289
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 1 of 9
Statement of the Case
[1] Willie Langford (“Langford”) appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle
with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.08 grams of alcohol but
less than 0.15 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood,1 which was
enhanced to a Level 5 felony based upon his previous conviction for operating a
vehicle while intoxicated (“OVWI”) causing death (“OVWI death conviction”).
He contends that the trial court abused its discretion during the enhancement
phase of his bifurcated trial when it admitted into evidence a booking report
from Langford’s OVWI death conviction. Because the booking report was
admissible under the public records exception to hearsay, the trial court
properly admitted the evidence, and we affirm Langford’s conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a booking
report into evidence during the enhancement phase of Langford’s
bifurcated trial.
Facts
[3] On September 6, 2016, an officer from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department (“IMPD”) pulled over Langford’s vehicle based upon Langford’s
failure to use his turn signal when making a turn. When speaking with
1
IND. CODE §§ 9-30-5-1; 9-30-5-3.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 2 of 9
Langford at his car window, the officer smelled a “very strong” odor of alcohol
and noticed that Langford had “red glossy eyes” and “slowed slurred speech.”
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). IMPD officers administered various field sobriety tests,
which Langford failed, and ultimately obtained a warrant for a blood test,
which revealed that Langford had a blood alcohol concentration of .085 grams
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.
[4] The State ultimately charged Langford with Count 1, Class C misdemeanor
OVWI, which was enhanced to a Level 5 felony based on his OVWI death
conviction that had occurred in 1989; and Count 2, Class C misdemeanor
operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.08
grams of alcohol but less than 0.15 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood,
which was also enhanced to a Level 5 felony based on his OVWI death
conviction.
[5] The trial court held a bifurcated jury trial on September 28, 2017. Following
phase one of the trial, the jury found Langford guilty of Count 2 and not guilty
of Count 1. During phase two, the enhancement phase, the State presented
testimony from Andrew Calderon (“Calderon”), who testified as a fingerprint
analyst and keeper of the records for IMPD. Calderon testified that he had
compared Langford’s thumbprint on State’s Exhibit 3, which was a fingerprint
card upon which Calderon had personally obtained Langford’s thumbprint just
prior to the enhancement phase of the trial, to a thumbprint contained on
State’s Exhibit 4, which was a document titled “Officer’s Arrest Report/Book-
In Slip” (“booking report”) and was the booking report from Langford’s OVWI
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 3 of 9
death conviction. (State’s Ex. 4). Calderon testified that a booking report, such
as contained in State’s Exhibit 4, was a “report filled out by an arresting officer
subsequent to an initial arrest” and that, in addition to the fingerprint and
general arrest information, it contained “various demographics” of the arrested
individual. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 168). For example, State’s Exhibit 4 contained
Langford’s name, address, date of birth, gender, race, and Social Security
number. The exhibit also contained procedural and ministerial information
relating to Langford’s arrest and booking for the OVWI causing death offense,
including the date and location of his arrest, the arresting officer, the booking
officer, the case cause number, and the statute citation for the offense charged.
Calderon testified that the booking report was filled out by an officer who had a
duty to accurately complete it and that the report was kept in the ordinary and
routine course of business. When the State moved to admit State’s Exhibit 4,
Langford objected based on hearsay. The State argued that the exhibit was
admissible under the public records exception to hearsay, and the trial court
agreed and admitted the exhibit into evidence. Calderon then testified that the
thumbprint on State’s Exhibit 3 and the thumbprint on State’s Exhibit 4 were
made by “one in the same person[,]” specifically Langford. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 173).
Additionally, the State offered into evidence certified copies of the charging
information and abstract of judgment from Langford’s OVWI death conviction
case.
[6] The jury determined that the State had proven that Langford had a previous
conviction for purposes of enhancing Count 2, and the trial court entered
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 4 of 9
judgment of conviction for Count 2 as a Level 5 felony. The trial court imposed
a four (4) year sentence for Langford’s Level 5 felony conviction and ordered
that it be served in Community Corrections. Langford now appeals.
Decision
[7] Langford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting State’s
Exhibit 4 during the enhancement phase of his trial. Specifically, he argues that
the evidence was hearsay and should have been excluded. The State contends
that State’s Exhibit 4 was a booking report and was admissible under the public
records exception to hearsay contained in Evidence Rule 803(8). Langford
contends, however, that State’s Exhibit 4 should be considered as an
“investigative report[,]” which would make it inadmissible under Evidence
Rule 803(8)(i). (Langford’s Br. 9).
[8] The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and we review the admission of evidence only for an abuse of
discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864,
871 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied. Where a trial court’s evidentiary ruling rests upon
the interpretation of a rule of evidence, which is a question of law, we conduct a
de novo review. Fansler v. State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018).
[9] Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 5 of 9
asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Generally, “[h]earsay is not admissible
unless these rules [of evidence] or other law provides otherwise.” Evid. R. 802.
One exception to the hearsay rule is for “public records,” which provides as
follows:
(8) Public Records.
(A) A record or statement of a public office if:
(i) it sets out:
(a) the office’s regularly conducted and regularly
recorded activities;
(b) a matter observed while under a legal duty to
[observe and] report; or
(c) factual findings from a legally authorized
investigation; and
(ii) neither the source of information nor other
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the following are not
excepted from the hearsay rule:
(i) investigative reports by police and other law enforcement
personnel, except when offered by an accused in a criminal
case;
(ii) investigative reports prepared by or for a public office,
when offered by it in a case in which it is a party;
(iii) factual findings offered by the government in a
criminal case; and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 6 of 9
(iv) factual findings resulting from a special investigation
of a particular complaint, case, or incident, except when
offered by an accused in a criminal case.
Evid. R. 803(8) (emphasis added).
[10] We agree with the State that State’s Exhibit 4 was a booking report, not an
investigative report, and that it was admissible under the public records
exception to hearsay. The public records hearsay exception “is based on the
assumption that public officials perform their duties properly without motive or
interest other than to submit accurate and fair reports.” Allen v. State, 994
N.E.2d 316, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Fowler v. State, 929 N.E.2d 875,
878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). We have previously discussed the
admissibility of a booking report under the public records exception in Evidence
Rule 803(8) and held that “police records created in connection with routine
booking procedures” are admissible under the public records exception. Fowler,
929 N.E.2d at 879. We recognize that the public records exception in Rule
803(8)(i) “excludes investigative police reports when offered against the accused
in criminal trials.” Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879. Investigative police reports are
generally excluded because “the adversarial nature of the confrontation
between the police and the defendant in criminal cases” at the scene of the
crime can lead a police officer to have observations that “are not as reliable as
observations by public officials in other cases[.]” Id. “However, this exclusion
does not bar admission of police records pertaining to ‘routine, ministerial,
objective nonevaluative matters made in non-adversarial settings.’” Allen, 994
N.E.2d at 320 (quoting Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879). “‘The rote recitation of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 7 of 9
biographical information in a booking sheet ordinarily does not implicate
the same potential perception biases that a subjective narrative of an
investigation or an alleged offense might.’” Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at
879 (quoting United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 72 (1st Cir. 2010)). “Due to
the lack of any motivation on the part of the recording official to do other than
mechanically register an unambiguous factual matter . . . , such records are, like
other public documents, inherently reliable.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985), reh’g denied).
[11] Here, State’s Exhibit 4 contained biographical information about Langford and
procedural information about his OVWI death case. The exhibit contained
factual, objective information that was obtained and recorded as part of the
ministerial, nonevaluative booking process. Thus, the exhibit was a booking
report admissible under Evidence Rule 803(8). See, e.g., Allen, 994 N.E.2d at
320 (explaining that a State’s exhibit that contained “non-adversarial
information”—including the defendant’s age, address, height and weight, the
jail where he was held, and the charge upon which he was arrested—was “more
appropriately characterized as a booking report” and was not subject to the
investigative police report exclusion); Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879 (holding that a
booking card, which contained biographical information and “was obtained
and recorded in the course of a ministerial, nonevaluative booking process[,]”
was admissible under the public records exception of Evidence Rule 803(8)).
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting State’s
Exhibit 4 during the enhancement phase of Langford’s bifurcated trial.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 8 of 9
[12] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr.J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 9 of 9