State v. Laird

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 45837 STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) Filed: December 11, 2018 Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk v. ) ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED BRADLEY HAROLD LAIRD, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge. Order revoking probation and executing previously suspended sentence, affirmed. Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; HUSKEY, Judge; and LORELLO, Judge ________________________________________________ PER CURIAM Bradley Harold Laird pled guilty to felony driving under the influence. I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005. The district court sentenced Laird to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years, but suspended the sentence and placed Laird on probation. Subsequently, Laird admitted to violating the terms of his probation by committing another crime. In the other case, the district court sentenced Laird and placed him on probation. As a result of the unrelated conviction, the district court in this case revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentence. Laird appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation in light of the probation he received in the unrelated case. 1 It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601. A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id. Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871- 73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and ordering execution of Laird’s sentence. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Laird’s previously suspended sentence is affirmed. 2