NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 7, 2018*
Decided December 13, 2018
Before
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 17‐2757
ARACELIA ORTIZ‐QUINONES, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
v.
No. 16 C 4812
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees. Robert W. Gettleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Aracelia Ortiz‐Quinones sued her former employer, Cook County, and three
former supervisors for firing her because of her race. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e‐2(a), 1981.
The parties orally agreed to settle and signed a term sheet at a conference before a
magistrate judge. When the defendants moved to enforce the agreement, however,
Ortiz‐Quinones balked, asserting that she did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to
the settlement because she signed the term sheet under duress. The district judge
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 17‐2757 Page 2
adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that Ortiz‐Quinones freely agreed to settle.
Because Ortiz‐Quinones does not rebut the presumption of enforceability that applies
when a represented plaintiff agrees to a settlement, we affirm.1
Ortiz‐Quinones worked as a medical assistant in the Cook County hospital
system for about six months before she was terminated for failing to communicate
effectively with patients. Ortiz‐Quinones, who is of Puerto Rican descent, filed this race‐
discrimination lawsuit. She was represented by counsel. After the defendants answered
the amended complaint, the district judge referred the case to the magistrate judge for a
settlement conference.
At the settlement conference on April 26, 2017, which Ortiz‐Quinones attended
with her lawyer, the parties orally agreed to dismiss the case and signed a term sheet.
But the next day, Ortiz‐Quinones filed a pro se motion “against the settlement.” She
maintained that she is hard of hearing, that her attorney did not explain the terms of the
agreement, that she had been on post‐surgical prescription narcotics that made her
confused, drowsy, and dizzy, and that the magistrate judge used a “loud voice” and
“put[] pressure” on her. The defendants, after preparing a written settlement agreement
and exchanging it with Ortiz‐Quinones’s lawyer, moved to enforce it; Ortiz‐Quinones
opposed the motion and filed other motions and objections, all pro se.
The district judge referred all the motions related to the settlement to the
magistrate judge, who recommended granting the defendants’ motion because Ortiz‐
Quinones had knowingly and voluntarily entered the contract. The magistrate judge
did not hold an evidentiary hearing or take evidence about Ortiz‐Quinones’s mental
state, but she reported her own observations that Ortiz‐Quinones “vigorously and
vociferously participated” in the negotiations, was “ably represented by counsel,” and
had the opportunity to review the terms of the agreement before signing. Moreover,
although Ortiz‐Quinones presented her post‐operation instructions—which advised
against returning to work for two weeks or making important decisions in the 24 hours
following her surgery—the conference took place more than two weeks after the
April 10, 2017 surgery. The district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
1 Although we impose no sanction, we note that Ortiz‐Quinones certified that
her brief was 21,254 words —well in excess of the 14,000‐word limit. See FED. R. APP. P.
32(a)(7); CIR. R. 32(c); Vermillion v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. 18‐1517 (7th Cir. Oct. 24,
2018).
No. 17‐2757 Page 3
recommendation without further comment and entered an order granting the
defendants’ motion and denying Ortiz‐Quinones’s motions in opposition.
The defendants again delivered the settlement agreement to Ortiz‐Quinones, but
instead of signing it, she filed this appeal. She renews her argument that the settlement
is unenforceable because she did not understand it and was coerced. She again
maintains that she is hard of hearing, her lawyer did not explain that she was settling or
on what terms, she was ill and impaired, and the magistrate judge pressured her.
In general, a settlement agreement is a contract that is enforceable under
ordinary state‐law contract principles. Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490
(7th Cir. 2002). We recognize that this court’s case law is inconsistent about which
standard of review applies to a district court’s decision that parties have formed a valid
settlement contract. Compare Dillard v. Starcon Intʹl, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2007)
(abuse‐of‐discretion) with Beverly v. Abbott Labs., 817 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2016)
(de novo). But because we understand Ortiz‐Quinone to assert a duress defense to the
enforceability of a voidable contract, not to argue that no contract was formed, see 28
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 71:8 (2018), we review for abuse of discretion, see Baptist
v. City of Kankakee, 481 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2007).
In employment‐discrimination cases, we require that an employee’s settlement
be “knowing and voluntary” as a matter of federal law. Baptist 481 F.3d at 490 (7th Cir.
2007); see also Alexander v. Gardner‐Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974); Dillard v.
Starcon Int’l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007). We reverse a judge’s factual finding
that an employee knowingly and voluntarily agreed to a Title VII settlement only if it is
clearly erroneous considering the totality of the circumstances. Baptist, 481 F.3d at 490. If
an employee who is represented by counsel of her choice settles a lawsuit, then the
settlement agreement is presumed to be knowing and voluntary. See id. That
presumption applies here. A showing of duress, among other narrow exceptions, will
rebut the presumption of voluntariness. Id.
Though we understand Ortiz‐Quinones to argue that she was under duress at
the settlement conference, her allegations fall short of this standard. Duress involves
exploitation or undue advantage, not just “vexation” or stress related to a “difficult
bargaining position.” Baptist, 481 F.3d at 491 n.2; Castellano v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc.,
373 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2004). Ortiz‐Quinones’s allegations that she is hard of hearing
and that she felt ill, impaired or pressured by “loud talk” do not rise to the level of
exploitation or undue advantage. Moreover, the magistrate judge’s recollection of her
demeanor and her participation belie a claim of duress. In any event, duress is a defense
No. 17‐2757 Page 4
only if caused by the other contracting party. Baptist, 481 F.3d at 491 n.2. But Ortiz‐
Quinones blames her attorney for keeping her in the dark and the magistrate judge for
pressuring her. She does not assert that the defendants took advantage of her.
Further, any failure by Ortiz‐Quinones’s counsel to explain the process or the
settlement terms is irrelevant to the settlement’s enforceability. See Baptist, 481 F.3d
at 490. A claim about counsel’s “conduct or competence” is collateral and does not rebut
the presumption of voluntariness or establish duress. Id. at 490‐91. Finally, Ortiz‐
Quinones’s argument that the absence of a translator caused duress also fails; she never
requested one, see 28 U.S.C. § 1827(g)(4), and the magistrate judge observed no
difficulties with her comprehension.
AFFIRMED