IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KENNETH COBLE, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 357, 2018
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1004005380
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: December 7, 2018
Decided: December 13, 2018
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to
affirm, and the record on appeal, the Court concludes that:
(1) The appellant, Kenneth Coble, filed this appeal from a Superior Court
order denying his motion to proceed pro se for a certificate of eligibility to file an
application for sentence modification under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f). The Superior Court
held that Coble was ineligible for relief under § 4214(f) and denied his motion to
proceed pro se. We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(2) In January 2011, Coble pleaded guilty to Assault in the Second Degree.
The State moved to declare Coble a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).
The Superior Court granted that motion and, on July 6, 2011, exercised its discretion
to sentence Coble to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s
judgment on direct appeal.1 In 2015 and 2016, this Court affirmed the Superior
Court’s denials of Coble’s petitions for post-conviction relief.2
(3) In October 2017, Coble asked the Superior Court for permission to
proceed pro se to pursue a certificate of eligibility and to modify his habitual
offender sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f). Under Superior Court Special Rule of
Procedure 2017-1, which the Superior Court enacted as directed by the General
Assembly in § 4214(f), a request for a certificate of eligibility under § 4214(f) may
be filed only by the petitioner’s attorney of record or the Office of Defense Services.3
The Superior Court will not consider a pro se request under § 4214(f) unless the
petitioner is granted permission to proceed pro se.4
(4) On June 13, 2018, the Superior Court denied Coble’s request, holding
that Coble was not eligible for relief under § 4214(f) because he had been sentenced
to life imprisonment, which had been imposed solely within the sentencing judge’s
discretion. This ruling is correct, as we recently explained in Durham v. State.5
1
Coble v. State, 2012 WL 1952293 (Del. May 30, 2012).
2
Coble v. State, 2015 WL 2247639 (Del. May 13, 2015); Coble v. State, 2016 WL 2585796 (Del.
Apr. 28, 2016).
3
DEL. SUPER. CT. SPEC. R. 2017-1(c)(2).
4
Id.
5
2018 WL 2069057 (Del. May 2, 2018). See also Clark v. State, 2018 WL 1956298 (Del. Apr.
24, 2018).
2
(5) When Coble was sentenced for second degree assault as a habitual
offender, § 4214(f) provided that a habitual offender could receive a sentence of up
to life imprisonment and would “receive a minimum sentence which shall not be less
than the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this Title for the 4th or
subsequent felony which forms the basis of the State’s petition to have the person
declared to be an habitual criminal except that this minimum provision shall apply
only when the fourth or subsequent felony is a Title 11 violent felony, as defined in
§ 4201(c) of this title.”6 The statutory maximum penalty for second degree assault
was eight years at Level 5 incarceration.7 Coble therefore faced a sentence between
eight years at Level V and life imprisonment. Because the sentencing judge
exercised discretion under § 4214(f) to sentence Coble to life imprisonment instead
of eight years at Level V incarceration, Coble did not receive a “minimum sentence
of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent felony.”8
(6) As we stated in Clark v. State, Coble’s argument that the Superior
Court’s discretionary imposition of a life sentence constitutes a “minimum sentence
of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent felony” within the
6
11 Del. C. § 4214(a) (2011).
7
11 Del. C. § 612 (2010) (defining assault in the second degree as a Class D felony); 11 Del. C. §
4205(b)(4) (establishing eight years of Level V incarceration as the maximum punishment for a
Class D felony).
8
11 Del. C. § 4214(f).
3
meaning of § 4214(f) and Superior Court Special Rule of Procedure 2017-1 is
inconsistent with the legislative history of § 4214(f).9
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice
9
2018 WL 1956298, at *3.
4