IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
EYERCE POSTON a/k/a EYERCE §
ARMSTRONG and AVEE §
POSTON, JR., § No. 579, 2018
§
Defendants Below, § Court Below—Superior Court of
Appellants, § the State of Delaware
§
v. § C.A. No. N16L-07-149
§
DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST §
COMPANY AMERICAS as Trustee §
for Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., §
Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass §
Through Certificates Series, 2006- §
QS5, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: November 21, 2018
Decided: December 18, 2018
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
Having considered the notice of appeal from an interlocutory order under
Supreme Court Rule 42, it appears to the Court that:
(1) This interlocutory appeal arises from a Superior Court order, dated
October 22, 2018, granting a motion to strike a jury demand. On November 1, 2018,
the defendants below-appellants, Eyerce Poston and Avee Poston, Jr., filed an
application for certification to take an interlocutory appeal. They argued, among
other things, that the order determined a substantial issue—their right to a jury a jury
trial under the Delaware Constitution—and that there were conflicting Superior
Court decisions regarding whether a defendant in a scire facias sur mortgage action
has a right to a jury trial. The plaintiff below-appellee, Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas, opposed the application.
(2) The Superior Court denied the application, holding that the order was
consistent with other Superior Court decisions on the issue of whether there is a
constitutional right to a jury trial in foreclosure actions, that recent Superior Court
decisions were not conflicting, and that, with trial scheduled for January 2019, an
interlocutory appeal would further delay resolution of the matter.
(3) We agree that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.
Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court.1 In the exercise of our discretion, we have concluded that the application for
interlocutory review does not meet the strict standards for certification under Rule
42(b) and should be refused. This case is not exceptional,2 and the potential benefits
of interlocutory review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable
costs caused by an interlocutory appeal. 3
1
Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(v).
2
Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii).
3
Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii).
2
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the interlocutory
appeal is REFUSED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice
3