IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1801
Filed December 19, 2018
IN THE INTEREST OF A.M.,
Minor Child,
L.F., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her one-year-old
daughter. AFFIRMED.
Meegan M. Keller, Altoona, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John McCormally, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Erin Mayfield of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
2
TABOR, Presiding Judge.
A mother, Lacey, challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental relationship with one-year-old A.M. Lacey contends she has progressed
with her mental-health treatment, housing stability, and domestic-violence
counseling since the termination of her parental rights to two older children. In her
words, she doesn’t have “the drama-filled life” now at age twenty-six that she had
at nineteen. Given that progress, she believes she can resume care of A.M. Lacey
also argues termination is not in A.M.’s best interests.
After independently reviewing A.M.’s case, we find clear and convincing
evidence to support the termination of Lacey’s rights. 1 Lacey’s history of not
complying with medication management—which is critical to maintaining her
mental health—presents an ongoing risk to A.M. if returned to Lacey’s custody.
Accordingly, the State satisfied the elements for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(h) (2018). As for A.M.’s best interests, we find termination of
parental rights and the possibility of adoption by her foster parents ensures her
safety and stability, as well as her prospect for healthy development, for the short-
term and into the future. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2) (2017).
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Lacey has been involved with the Iowa department of human services
(DHS) for seven years. In 2011, the juvenile court removed her oldest child, Z.F.,
1
We review child-welfare cases de novo. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016)
(citing In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014)). Clear and convincing evidence must
support the juvenile court’s conclusions. Id. (citing In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa
2010)). Clear and convincing evidence means we harbor no serious or substantial doubt
about the correctness of the conclusion drawn from the evidence. Id. (citing D.W., 791
N.W.2d at 706).
3
because of Lacey’s struggle with substance abuse and mental-health issues.2 The
record from that case revealed Lacey, who stopped taking her prescribed
medication, threatened to harm herself and Z.F., who was only three weeks old. 3
The court terminated Lacey’s parental relationship with Z.F. in 2012.
A similar pattern emerged with Lacey’s second child, B.C., who was born in
2014. The juvenile court adjudicated B.C. as a CINA in December 2016 because
the mother had been using illegal drugs while caring for the child. Lacey
acknowledged that she struggled to take her medications as prescribed during the
pendency of B.C.’s CINA case. Lacey also endured domestic violence from B.C.’s
father. Still, Lacey initially made strides toward reunifying with B.C. Lacey
completed two substance-abuse programs. In June 2017, the juvenile court
delayed permanency for an additional six months.
Only then did the DHS caseworker learn that Lacey was pregnant and
expecting A.M. in August. The caseworker expressed concern A.M.’s father,
Kevin, who was previously incarcerated for assault, was also violent toward Lacey.
B.C. reported Kevin hit her mother “in the tummy.” In January 2018, the juvenile
court terminated parental rights to B.C. based on persistent concerns about
Lacey’s mental health, her dishonesty with the service providers, and the potential
for domestic violence in her home.
2
Medical specialists have diagnosed Lacey with depression and anxiety, as well as bipolar
and intermittent explosive and mood disorders.
3
Because the State alleged termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) (which
requires proof the court has terminated parental rights with respect to another child who
is a member of the same family), the juvenile court took judicial notice of the earlier child-
in-need-of-assistance (CINA) and termination files involving Lacey’s two older children.
4
A.M. was born in August 2017. Within days of her birth, the juvenile court
approved A.M.’s removal from Lacey’s care. A.M.’s medical records showed that
she
tested positive for syphilis at birth due to [Lacey] not
taking her prescribed medication during her pregnancy
to prevent [the] disease from transferring to her baby.
[The child] was transferred to the [neonatal intensive
care unit] at Blank Children’s Hospital to receive IV
antibiotics to treat the syphilis. [She] spent
approximately five days in the hospital.
A.M. later tested negative for syphilis. Since the removal, Lacey has had only fully-
supervised visitation. By her own admission, Lacey did not start to take her
prescribed medication consistently until mid-February 2018. Lacey also delayed
seeking help from a domestic-violence advocate. And while Lacey was renting a
house in Lucas during the CINA case, she did not have a written lease, was
concerned the landlord might sell the house, and was exploring affordable housing
options. At a permanency hearing in April 2018, the mother asked for six more
months to reunify with A.M., but the DHS and the child’s guardian ad litem
recommended termination of parental rights.
The State petitioned to terminate parental rights in May 2018. After a July
trial, the juvenile court issued its termination order.4 Lacey now appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Statutory Ground
To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must first find clear and
convincing evidence supporting one of the grounds for termination listed under
4
The order also terminated the parental rights of A.M.’s father, Kevin. He is not a party to
this appeal.
5
Iowa Code section 232.116(1). See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 706. In A.M.’s case, the
court found the State met its burden under paragraphs (g) and (h). To affirm, we
need only find grounds to terminate under one of the paragraphs cited by the
juvenile court. See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
We focus on paragraph (h). Lacey challenges only the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the fourth element—that A.M. could not be returned to her
custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4);
D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting the term “at the present time” to mean “at
the time of the termination hearing”).
Lacey contends she took “excellent advantage of all possible services”
offered to her during this CINA case. For example, according to Lacey, “[s]he has
obtained her own housing, completed substance abuse treatment twice, engaged
in mental health evaluations and therapy, attended visits on a very regular and
consistent basis, and is able to provide a safe home for the child.”
But the juvenile court, which had the opportunity to see Lacey in person,
described Lacey’s angry and defiant demeanor during the court hearing. The
juvenile court also detailed Lacey’s “unresolved mental health issues and
continued association with unsafe persons.” We defer to the juvenile court’s
assessment of these matters. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 110 (noting we give weight
to the juvenile court’s fact findings, especially those concerning witness credibility).
We also note that Lacey’s history of noncompliance with treatment
recommendations has impacted her mental health and A.M.’s physical health since
her birth—yet Lacey continued to struggle to take her medications as prescribed
6
until February 2018. Clear and convincing evidence shows A.M. would be at risk
of harm if returned to Lacey’s care at the time of the termination hearing.
B. Best Interests
Having found clear and convincing evidence supports terminating Lacey’s
parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h), we turn to her claim that termination
is not in A.M.’s best interests.
In making the best-interests determination, we give primary consideration
to A.M.’s safety, the best placement for furthering her long-term nurturing and
growth, as well as her physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. See
In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)).
Safety and the need for a permanent home mark the “defining elements in a child’s
best interest.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring
specially).
Lacey contends termination is not in A.M.’s best interests because of the
mother-daughter bond, her parenting skills, her completion of substance abuse
treatment, and her “significant progress” in anger management. We applaud the
efforts Lacey has made during this third CINA case. She deserves recognition for
her recovery from substance abuse and commitment to visitation with A.M. But
we cannot find A.M.’s best interests would be served by waiting any longer for
permanency. For the past year, A.M. has been living with the same foster parents
who adopted her half-sibling Z.F. The record shows she is well-adjusted and
nurtured in that family. Like the juvenile court, we find termination of Lacey’s
parental rights and potential adoption are in A.M.’s best interests.
AFFIRMED.