In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.D., Minor Child, J.S., Mother v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 20 2018, 7:48 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
J. Clayton Miller Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Jordan Law, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Richmond, Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination December 20, 2018
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of R.D., Minor Child, 18A-JT-1645
J.S., Mother, Appeal from the Randolph Circuit
Court
Appellant-Respondent,
The Honorable Jay L. Toney,
v. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
The Indiana Department of 68C01-1705-JT-114
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1645 | December 20, 2018 Page 1 of 15
[1] J.S. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights with

respect to R.D.1 We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 10, 2017, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a

petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights as to R.D., who was born

on August 24, 2003. On January 31, 2018, and March 8, 2018, the court held

an evidentiary hearing.

[3] On June 18, 2018, the court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental

rights as to R.D. which provides in part:

5. Mother has a total of four (4) children, including [R.D.].

6. In March, 2014, Mother entered into a Program of Informal
Adjustment with the Department of Child Services in Randolph
County, hereinafter referred to as “RCDCS”.

7. Mother and her children had contact with RCDCS after
Mother’s child, C.S., tested positive for opiates at birth on
October 31, 2013.

8. During the Program of Informal Adjustment, [R.D.], C.S.,
and another sibling, B.D., were in Mother’s care, custody and
control.

9. During the Program of Informal Adjustment, Mother did not
successfully complete a substance abuse treatment program.

1
R.D.’s father signed a Consent to Adoption for R.D. and does not appeal the termination of his parental
rights as to R.D.

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 10. Mother was a patient at the methadone Treatment Center
during some, or all, of the period of the Program of Informal
Adjustment.

11. Mother tested positive for heroin and Methadone on May 7,
2014.

12. Mother tested positive for heroin, cocaine and Methadone
on May 21, 2014.

13. On May 28, 2014, RCDCS received a report that [R.D.] got
off of the school bus and there was no adult to pick her up and
take her home.

14. RCDCS Case Manager, Cassandra West (previously known
as Cassandra Liss), addressed the report from May 28, 2014, and
determined that Mother had not made arrangements for [R.D.]
on that day.

15. Based on Mother’s positive drug screens, the report
regarding [R.D.] from May 28, 2014, and Mother’s general non–
compliance with the requirements of the Program of Informal
Adjustment, RCDCS filed a Verified Petition Alleging Child in
Need of Services as to each of the children in Mother’s care.

16. [R.D.] is the subject of a Child in Need of Services,
hereinafter referred to as “CHINS”, case that was filed on June
3, 2014, under Cause No. 68C01-1405-JC-000083 [(“Cause No.
83”)], which cause remains an open case.

17. [R.D.] and her two (2) siblings were removed from Mother’s
care on or about June 2, 2014.

18. A Detention and Initial Hearing was held on June 5, 2014, in
[Cause No. 83], and it was ordered that Juvenile should continue
outside of Mother’s care.

19. [R.D.] has remained outside of Mother’s care since her initial
removal.

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 20. Mother’s two (2) other children that were removed at the
same time as [R.D.], were never returned to Mother’s care, as
they were reunified with their father and their CHINS cases were
subsequently closed.

21. Mother gave birth to a fourth child, S.S., on September 25,
2016, and S.S.’s cord blood tested positive for opiates and
Methadone at birth.

22. S.S. was admitted to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit after
birth, where the child received treatment for withdrawal
symptoms.

23. Mother tested positive for opiates and Methadone during her
pregnancy with S.S.

24. Delaware County Department of Child Services filed a
Verified Petition Alleging Child in Need of Services as to S.S., in
November, 2016, under Cause No. 18C02-1611-JC-000335,
which case remains an open case.

25. Under [Cause No. 83], [R.D.] was found to be a Child in
Need of Services on June 30, 2014, after Mother’s admission that
Mother tested positive for heroin on May 7, 2014, and May 21,
2014, during which times Mother had one or more children in
her care.

26. On August 4, 2014, an Order of Participation was filed in
[Cause No. 83], in which Mother was ordered, among other
things, to:

a. Contact the FCM on a weekly basis via phone call, text
message or letter.

b. Notify the FCM of any changes to household
composition within five (5) days of the change.

c. Notify the FCM of any arrests or criminal charges
within five (5) days.

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 d. Keep all appointments with service providers.

e. Sign any releases needed to monitor compliance with
Court orders.

f. Maintain suitable, safe and stable housing.

g. Not use, consume, manufacture, trade, distribute, or
sell any illegal controlled substances, and will [sic] only
take prescription medications for which a valid and current
prescription exists.

27. The permanency plan for [R.D.], in [Cause No. 83], began as
Reunification.

28. RCDCS Case Manager West was working with Mother
toward reunification and testified that Mother progressed ruing
[sic] the Fall of 2014 and continuing into the Summer of 2015.

29. During the period of Mother’s progress, restrictions upon
Mother’s visitation with [R.D.] were lifted and by June, 2015,
RCDCS was granted authority to allow unsupervised visitation
between Mother and [R.D.] to further the goal of reunification
with Mother.

30. On or about June 1, 2015, a Permanency Hearing was held,
in [Cause No. 83] and a permanency plan of Reunification was
ordered.

31. On October 2, 2015, an Order Modifying Dispositional
Decree and Modifying Visitation was filed in [Cause No. 83],
granting RCDCS’ request, after RCDCS requested that Mother’s
visitation return to being supervised as Mother had failed to
submit to several drug screens when requested by DCS, and was
consistently late in arriving for visits with [R.D.].

32. A Review Hearing was held on October 26, 2015, in [Cause
No. 83], and Mother’s visitations were ordered to remain
supervised.

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 33. A Review Hearing was held on February 1, 2016, in [Cause
No. 83], and [R.D.] was ordered to continue in out-of-home
placement, and Mother’s visitations were ordered to remain
supervised.

34. A Permanency Hearing was held on April 26, 2016, in
[Cause No. 83], and Mother failed to appear. The permanency
plan was changed from reunification to guardianship.

35. Between the Review Hearing held October 26, 2015, in
[Cause No. 83], and the Permanency Hearing held April 26,
2016, Mother’s level of participation in services and visitation
decreased.

36. In April, 2016, RCDCS reported that Mother had stopped
contacting RCDCS on a regular basis.

37. During 2016, there were several months in which RCDCS
Case Manager West was not aware of Mother’s whereabouts,
that Mother did not visit [R.D.], and did not submit to drug
screens for RCDCS Case Manager West.

38. When Mother re-connected with RCDCS Case Manager
West, Mother was pregnant with S.S.

39. A Review Hearing was held on August 25, 2016, in [Cause
No. 83]. Mother’s visitation was ordered to remain supervised
and Mother was again ordered to participate in drug treatment
services and to cooperate with any drug screen requests.

40. A Review Hearing was held on December 15, 2016, in
[Cause No. 83], and Mother failed to appear. The Court found
that Mother had chosen not to visit with [R.D.] for three (3)
weeks prior, and that Mother had minimal contact with RCDCS
since the prior hearing. The permanency plan was changed to
adoption.

41. A Review Hearing and a Permanency Hearing was held on
March 30, 2017, and Mother failed to appear.

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 42. Mother failed to provide updated contact information to
RCDCS for many months during 2017.

43. Efforts to effect service of the Petition in this cause was
delayed due to Mother’s failure to advise DCS of her
whereabouts.

44. Mother testified that during the early months of 2017, she
continued to use illegal substances and abuse prescription
substances.

45. Mother testified that she went to Florida to live with her
father in the late Spring or Summer of 2017, in order to detox.

46. Mother testified that she took morphine pills with her to
Florida when she went to detox.

47. Mother testified that during her detox in Florida, she smoked
marijuana and took Suboxone. Mother further testified that she
had a prescription for the Suboxone from a doctor in Indiana, but
also testified that she bought Suboxone “off the street”.

48. RCDCS Case Manager Dawn Kunkler began working with
[R.D.] in June, 2017, and at that time, RCDCS was not aware of
Mother’s whereabouts.

49. RCDCS Case Manager Kunkler made attempts to locate and
contact Mother, including leaving voice and text messages on
Mother’s cell phone.

50. On August 25, 2017, RCDCS Case Manager Kunkler spoke
with Mother and learned that Mother was in Florida.

51. During the time Mother was in Florida, Mother did not visit
[R.D.], and Mother’s services referred by RCDCS were all
suspended due to Mother’s lack of contact.

52. RCDCS Case Manager Kunkler first met Mother at a Court
hearing, in [Cause No. 83], in December, 2017.

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 53. At the conclusion of evidence in this matter, Mother had not
visited with [R.D.] for at least one (1) year.

54. Mother has never successfully completed a substance abuse
treatment program, but did participate in a Methadone treatment
program for a period [of] time during the pendency of [Cause
No. 83].

55. During the period of time from June, 2014, through
September, 2015, Mother submitted many drug screens which
were only positive for Methadone, for which Mother did have a
valid prescription.

56. During the period of time from October, 2016, through May,
2017, Mother submitted many drug screens which were positive
for substances including Morphine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and
Alprazolam (Xanax).

57. After May, 2017, Mother did not submit to any drug screens
until sometime in early[] 2018, after Mother returned from
Florida.

58. Since January, 2018, Mother has submitted two (2) positive
drug screens, including one which was positive for Cocaine.

59. Mother has made little to no progress during the pendency of
[Cause No. 83].

60. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in [R.D.’s] removal and/or continued placement outside
the home will not be remedied.

61. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent/child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of
[R.D.].

62. Termination of the parent/child relationship is in the best
interest of [R.D.].

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 63. The Department of Child Services has a satisfactory plan for
the care and treatment of [R.D.], which includes Adoption.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 40-45.

Discussion

[4] The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of

Mother’s parental rights. In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS

is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition

described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-

child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

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[5] The State’s burden of proof for establishing the allegations in termination cases

“is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-

1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2), reh’g denied. This is “a

‘heightened burden of proof’ reflecting termination’s ‘serious social

consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re G.Y.,

904 N.E.2d at 1260-1261, 1260 n.1). “But weighing the evidence under that

heightened standard is the trial court’s prerogative—in contrast to our well-

settled, highly deferential standard of review.” Id. We do not reweigh the

evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the

evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn

from the evidence. Id. We confine our review to two steps: whether the

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the

findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id.

[6] Reviewing whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings,

or the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, is not a license to

reweigh the evidence. Id. “[W]e do not independently determine whether that

heightened standard is met, as we would under the ‘constitutional harmless

error standard,’ which requires the reviewing court itself to ‘be sufficiently

confident to declare the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(quoting Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind. 1991) (citing Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967))). “Our review must ‘give “due

regard” to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses

firsthand,’ and ‘not set aside [its] findings or judgment unless clearly

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 erroneous.’” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office,

989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A))). “Because a

case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in

person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court

when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640.

[7] Mother phrases the issue as and focuses her argument on whether DCS proved,

by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the best interests of

R.D. Mother does not specifically argue that the evidence does not support the

trial court’s determinations that there is a reasonable probability that the

conditions that resulted in R.D.’s removal and/or continued placement outside

the home will not be remedied and that there is a reasonable probability that the

continuation of the parent/child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of

R.D. To the extent Mother does not challenge the court’s findings, these

unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-

Child Relationship of B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to

challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the

findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied; McMaster v. McMaster, 681

N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (when the father failed to challenge

specific findings, this Court accepted them as true).

[8] Mother argues that the evidence does not support the court’s best-interests

determination and contends that the court wholly ignored or disregarded

significant contact between Mother and R.D. Mother also asserts that her

efforts to maintain her relationship with R.D. demonstrate she is an interested

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 and willing parent and contends that, even if this Court were to find a basis for

the trial court’s findings, the findings “fall far short of the high clear and

convincing evidence burden” which DCS is required to meet. Appellant’s Brief

at 9. DCS maintains that the court’s conclusion that termination is in R.D.’s

best interests is not clearly erroneous.

[9] In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required

to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and to the totality of the evidence.

McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent

to those of the children. Id. Children have a paramount need for permanency

which the Indiana Supreme Court has called a central consideration in

determining the child’s best interests, and the Court has stated that children

cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or

reunification and courts need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such

that the child’s physical, mental, and social development is permanently

impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d

at 647-648. However, focusing on permanency, standing alone, would

impermissibly invert the best-interests inquiry. Id. at 648. The testimony of a

child’s guardian ad litem regarding the child’s need for permanency supports a

finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at

203. Recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate to

terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in

removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing

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 evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of

Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[10] The record reveals that home- and school-based therapist Karen Poling testified

that R.D. has been involved with DCS for nearly four years, that “with all of us

being in her life for a really long time . . . she’d like to be a typical teenager,”

and that she would “like to go to school, she’d like to do sports and be involved

in clubs, and . . . not have us in her life.” Transcript Volume II at 45. When

asked whether she had concerns if R.D. “stays in this system, or with DCS

involvement, for . . . an indefinite period of time,” Poling stated:

I do. I am concerned that – that this – this – that – that part of
progress – regardless of whether she’s gonna have feelings that
she needs to share later about this process and about what
happened, she needs to be finished, she needs to have a break,
and then if those feeling[s] occur naturally, then that’s great, if
they don’t, then she’s not that type of person that is gonna need
to talk about all the things that have happened. And – but that’s
not gonna happen now, in this setting.

Id. at 46. In response to being asked “[w]hy not,” Poling indicated “[b]ecause

she’s so guarded and so resistant, because she wants us to be out of her life, that

she won’t participate in most cases.” Id. Family Case Manager Kunkler

testified that DCS’s plan for R.D. was adoption and that it was in her best

interests “[i]n regards to stability and permanency for this child, . . . and well-

being. She presents as happy there, I’ve observed it. It’s where she – where I

believe that she wishes to – for home to be and it’s . . . the most stable

environment she’s had the last four years.” Id. at 125. Court Appointed

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Special Advocate Andrea James (“CASA James”) testified that her

recommendation for the best interests of R.D. was adoption by R.D.’s relative

caregivers, which would involve the termination of Mother’s parental rights,

and that R.D.

would like to be adopted by [relative caregivers]. Um, she would
like to be able to contact her mom, on her terms, and she asks
that she not have visits with Mom right now, um, but says at
some point, she would like it – to have visits with her, on her
terms. When we talk about this, she usually mentions how she’s
very busy, um, with sports and school and friends, um, and that
she doesn’t, um, want that to interfere.

Id. at 141. In response to the question of whether she had an opinion on behalf

of R.D. about “an impact on her if the case is . . . left to just linger indefinitely,”

CASA James stated:

I do. Um, [R.D.], in the beginning, um, wouldn’t say a whole
lot. She was kind of quiet and laid back. Over the last year, she
tends to voice, often now, that she’s just tired of this. She doesn’t
like being pulled out of class. She doesn’t like to feel different
than the other kids in her grade. She wants to live a normal
teenage life. Um, she tells us, often, that she wants us, me and
the providers, she wants us gone. Um, she wants to be adopted
and just wants this to be over with.

Id. at 141-142. When asked how R.D. was doing, she stated “Awesome. She’s

doing great. Um, she’s getting wonderful grades, um, which has been a huge

improvement for her.” Id. at 136. CASA James Further stated that R.D. was

involved in Student Council, sports, and 4-H. We observe further that the court

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 found, and Mother does not challenge, that Mother submitted many drug

screens from October 2016 through May 2017 which were positive for

substances including Morphine, Fentanyl, Heroin, and Alprazolam (Xanax)

and that Mother has submitted two positive drug screens, including one which

was positive for Cocaine, since January 2018.

[11] Based on the testimony, as well as the totality of the evidence in the record and

set forth in the court’s termination order, we conclude that the court’s

determination that termination is in the best interests of the Child is supported

by clear and convincing evidence. See In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2005) (concluding that testimony of child advocate and family case

manager, coupled with evidence that conditions resulting in continued

placement outside home will not be remedied, is sufficient to prove by clear and

convincing evidence termination is in child’s best interests), trans. denied.

[12] We conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of

Mother.

[13] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

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